contextos-agents 1.7.0 → 2.0.0-beta.2

package/.agents/filesystem/safe-path.js

@@ -0,0 +1,256 @@
+/**
+ * .agents/filesystem/safe-path.js
+ * ContextOS Authoritative Safe Path Primitive
+ *
+ * Implements strict containment and security validation:
+ * - Prevents directory traversal attacks (..)
+ * - Rejects absolute, drive-qualified (C:\), and UNC (\\server\share) paths
+ * - Rejects NUL bytes and Alternate Data Streams (ADS)
+ * - Blocks Windows reserved device names (CON, PRN, AUX, NUL, COM1-9, LPT1-9)
+ * - Enforces parent directory containment via realpath to stop symlink/junction escapes
+ */
+
+const fs = require('fs');
+const path = require('path');
+const { isNetworkOrUNCPath } = require('./platform-hardening.js');
+
+const ERROR_CODES = {
+  OUTSIDE_PROJECT: 'CTX_PATH_OUTSIDE_PROJECT',
+  INVALID: 'CTX_PATH_INVALID',
+  RESERVED_DEVICE: 'CTX_PATH_RESERVED_DEVICE',
+  SYMLINK_ESCAPE: 'CTX_PATH_SYMLINK_ESCAPE',
+  UNSUPPORTED: 'UNSUPPORTED',
+};
+
+const WINDOWS_RESERVED_NAMES = new Set([
+  'CON', 'PRN', 'AUX', 'NUL',
+  'COM1', 'COM2', 'COM3', 'COM4', 'COM5', 'COM6', 'COM7', 'COM8', 'COM9',
+  'LPT1', 'LPT2', 'LPT3', 'LPT4', 'LPT5', 'LPT6', 'LPT7', 'LPT8', 'LPT9',
+]);
+
+class SafePathError extends Error {
+  constructor(code, message, details = {}) {
+    super(message);
+    this.name = 'SafePathError';
+    this.code = code;
+    this.details = details;
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Normalizes any path to forward slashes.
+ */
+function toPosix(p) {
+  return p.replace(/\\/g, '/');
+}
+
+/**
+ * Checks if a string segment is a Windows reserved device name.
+ */
+function isReservedDeviceName(segment) {
+  if (!segment) return false;
+  // Match exact name or name with extension (e.g. CON, con.txt, aux.json)
+  const baseName = segment.split('.')[0].toUpperCase();
+  return WINDOWS_RESERVED_NAMES.has(baseName);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Resolves and strictly validates a relative path inside projectRoot.
+ *
+ * @param {string} projectRoot - Absolute or relative path to project root
+ * @param {string} relativePath - Target relative path within project
+ * @param {object} [options]
+ * @param {boolean} [options.allowEscape=false] - If true, permits target outside root (default false)
+ * @param {boolean} [options.checkRealpathAncestors=true] - Verify ancestors do not symlink out of root
+ * @returns {{ resolvedPath: string, relativePosixPath: string }}
+ */
+function resolveManagedPath(projectRoot, relativePath, options = {}) {
+  const { checkRealpathAncestors = true } = options;
+
+  if (typeof projectRoot !== 'string' || projectRoot.trim() === '') {
+    throw new SafePathError(
+      ERROR_CODES.INVALID,
+      'Invalid project root: must be a non-empty string',
+      { projectRoot }
+    );
+  }
+
+  if (typeof relativePath !== 'string' || relativePath.trim() === '') {
+    throw new SafePathError(
+      ERROR_CODES.INVALID,
+      'Invalid path: target relativePath must be a non-empty string',
+      { relativePath }
+    );
+  }
+
+  // Check UNC/network path on project root
+  if (isNetworkOrUNCPath(projectRoot)) {
+    throw new SafePathError(
+      ERROR_CODES.UNSUPPORTED,
+      `UNC/network filesystem mutation is unsupported for projectRoot: ${projectRoot}`,
+      { projectRoot, status: 'UNSUPPORTED' }
+    );
+  }
+
+  // 1. Check for NUL bytes
+  if (relativePath.includes('\0') || projectRoot.includes('\0')) {
+    throw new SafePathError(
+      ERROR_CODES.INVALID,
+      'Path contains forbidden NUL character',
+      { relativePath }
+    );
+  }
+
+  // 2. Absolute, drive-qualified or UNC path checks (OUTSIDE_PROJECT)
+  if (/^[a-zA-Z]:[\\/]/.test(relativePath) || /^[a-zA-Z]:/.test(relativePath)) {
+    throw new SafePathError(
+      ERROR_CODES.OUTSIDE_PROJECT,
+      `Drive-qualified paths are forbidden: ${relativePath}`,
+      { relativePath }
+    );
+  }
+
+  if (path.isAbsolute(relativePath)) {
+    throw new SafePathError(
+      ERROR_CODES.OUTSIDE_PROJECT,
+      `Path must be relative to project root, received absolute path: ${relativePath}`,
+      { relativePath }
+    );
+  }
+
+  if (relativePath.startsWith('\\\\') || relativePath.startsWith('//')) {
+    throw new SafePathError(
+      ERROR_CODES.OUTSIDE_PROJECT,
+      `UNC network paths are forbidden: ${relativePath}`,
+      { relativePath }
+    );
+  }
+
+  // 3. Alternate Data Streams (ADS) colon check
+  // On Windows, 'file.txt:stream' or 'file.txt::$DATA' accesses alternate streams
+  if (relativePath.includes(':')) {
+    throw new SafePathError(
+      ERROR_CODES.INVALID,
+      'Path contains forbidden Alternate Data Stream character (":")',
+      { relativePath }
+    );
+  }
+
+  // 5. Windows reserved device names check
+  const normalizedSegments = toPosix(relativePath).split('/').filter(Boolean);
+  for (const seg of normalizedSegments) {
+    if (isReservedDeviceName(seg)) {
+      throw new SafePathError(
+        ERROR_CODES.RESERVED_DEVICE,
+        `Path segment '${seg}' is a reserved Windows device name (${Array.from(WINDOWS_RESERVED_NAMES).slice(0, 4).join(', ')}...)`,
+        { segment: seg, relativePath }
+      );
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Resolve absolute project root
+  const absRoot = path.resolve(projectRoot);
+  const targetResolved = path.resolve(absRoot, relativePath);
+
+  // 6. Strict directory traversal & containment check
+  const relFromRoot = path.relative(absRoot, targetResolved);
+  if (relFromRoot.startsWith('..') || path.isAbsolute(relFromRoot) || relFromRoot === '') {
+    if (relFromRoot === '') {
+      throw new SafePathError(
+        ERROR_CODES.INVALID,
+        'Managed path cannot target the project root itself directly',
+        { relativePath }
+      );
+    }
+    throw new SafePathError(
+      ERROR_CODES.OUTSIDE_PROJECT,
+      `Path '${relativePath}' resolves outside of project root '${absRoot}'`,
+      { relativePath, targetResolved, absRoot }
+    );
+  }
+
+  // 7. Symlink / Junction escape check on existing ancestor directories
+  if (checkRealpathAncestors) {
+    let realRoot = absRoot;
+    try {
+      if (fs.existsSync(absRoot)) {
+        realRoot = fs.realpathSync(absRoot);
+      }
+    } catch {
+      // Best-effort if root realpath fails
+    }
+
+    // Traverse upwards from target to find the nearest existing directory
+    let currentDir = targetResolved;
+    while (currentDir && currentDir !== path.dirname(currentDir)) {
+      if (fs.existsSync(currentDir)) {
+        try {
+          const realAncestor = fs.realpathSync(currentDir);
+          const relFromRealRoot = path.relative(realRoot, realAncestor);
+          if (relFromRealRoot.startsWith('..') || path.isAbsolute(relFromRealRoot)) {
+            throw new SafePathError(
+              ERROR_CODES.SYMLINK_ESCAPE,
+              `Path ancestor '${currentDir}' resolves via symlink to '${realAncestor}' outside project realpath root '${realRoot}'`,
+              { currentDir, realAncestor, realRoot }
+            );
+          }
+        } catch (err) {
+          if (err instanceof SafePathError) throw err;
+          // Ignore transient read errors for non-existent virtual paths
+        }
+        break;
+      }
+      currentDir = path.dirname(currentDir);
+    }
+  }
+
+  const relativePosixPath = toPosix(relFromRoot);
+
+  return {
+    resolvedPath: targetResolved,
+    relativePosixPath,
+  };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Windows-aware atomic rename with bounded retry for transient locks (EPERM, EBUSY, EACCES).
+ */
+function safeRenameSync(sourcePath, targetPath, maxRetries = 4, delays = [10, 50, 150, 300]) {
+  const targetDir = path.dirname(targetPath);
+  if (!fs.existsSync(targetDir)) {
+    fs.mkdirSync(targetDir, { recursive: true });
+  }
+
+  let lastError = null;
+  for (let attempt = 0; attempt <= maxRetries; attempt++) {
+    try {
+      fs.renameSync(sourcePath, targetPath);
+      return;
+    } catch (err) {
+      lastError = err;
+      const isTransient = err.code === 'EPERM' || err.code === 'EBUSY' || err.code === 'EACCES';
+      if (isTransient && attempt < maxRetries) {
+        const waitMs = delays[attempt] || 50;
+        try {
+          Atomics.wait(new Int32Array(new SharedArrayBuffer(4)), 0, 0, waitMs);
+        } catch {
+          const start = Date.now();
+          while (Date.now() - start < waitMs) {}
+        }
+      } else {
+        break;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+  throw lastError;
+}
+
+module.exports = {
+  resolveManagedPath,
+  toPosix,
+  isReservedDeviceName,
+  safeRenameSync,
+  SafePathError,
+  ERROR_CODES,
+  WINDOWS_RESERVED_NAMES,
+};

package/.agents/generated/claude/skills/context-os/SKILL.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 ## Overview
 
-Operating system and context orchestration layer for AI coding assistants. Standardizes software engineering workflows across requirements, architecture, atomic task planning, implementation, verification, and release.
+Deterministic context compiler and policy engine for AI coding agents. Standardizes software engineering workflows across requirements, architecture, atomic task planning, implementation, verification, and release.
 
 ## When to Use
 

package/.agents/generated/gemini/skills/context-os/SKILL.md

@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
 ---
 name: context-os
 description: >
-  AI Project Operating System context compiler that transforms user intent into minimal, relevant context for any AI agent across the full development lifecycle.
+  Deterministic context compiler and policy engine for AI coding agents.
 ---
 # context-os
 
 ## Overview
 
-Operating system and context orchestration layer for AI coding assistants. Standardizes software engineering workflows across requirements, architecture, atomic task planning, implementation, verification, and release.
+Deterministic context compiler and policy engine for AI coding agents. Standardizes software engineering workflows across requirements, architecture, atomic task planning, implementation, verification, and release.
 
 ## When to Use
 

package/.agents/plugins/contextos/plugin.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "contextos",
-  "version": "1.7.0",
+  "version": "1.7.1",
   "description": "Deterministic AI Project Operating System context compiler, MCP runtime, and high-precision engineering skills for Antigravity.",
   "author": {
     "name": "ContextOS Team",