compact-agent 1.10.0 → 1.11.0

package/resources/ecc/skills/security-bounty-hunter/SKILL.md

@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+---
+name: security-bounty-hunter
+description: Hunt for exploitable, bounty-worthy security issues in repositories. Focuses on remotely reachable vulnerabilities that qualify for real reports instead of noisy local-only findings.
+origin: ECC direct-port adaptation
+version: "1.0.0"
+---
+
+# Security Bounty Hunter
+
+Use this when the goal is practical vulnerability discovery for responsible disclosure or bounty submission, not a broad best-practices review.
+
+## When to Use
+
+- Scanning a repository for exploitable vulnerabilities
+- Preparing a Huntr, HackerOne, or similar bounty submission
+- Triage where the question is "does this actually pay?" rather than "is this theoretically unsafe?"
+
+## How It Works
+
+Bias toward remotely reachable, user-controlled attack paths and throw away patterns that platforms routinely reject as informative or out of scope.
+
+## In-Scope Patterns
+
+These are the kinds of issues that consistently matter:
+
+| Pattern | CWE | Typical impact |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| SSRF through user-controlled URLs | CWE-918 | internal network access, cloud metadata theft |
+| Auth bypass in middleware or API guards | CWE-287 | unauthorized account or data access |
+| Remote deserialization or upload-to-RCE paths | CWE-502 | code execution |
+| SQL injection in reachable endpoints | CWE-89 | data exfiltration, auth bypass, data destruction |
+| Command injection in request handlers | CWE-78 | code execution |
+| Path traversal in file-serving paths | CWE-22 | arbitrary file read or write |
+| Auto-triggered XSS | CWE-79 | session theft, admin compromise |
+
+## Skip These
+
+These are usually low-signal or out of bounty scope unless the program says otherwise:
+
+- Local-only `pickle.loads`, `torch.load`, or equivalent with no remote path
+- `eval()` or `exec()` in CLI-only tooling
+- `shell=True` on fully hardcoded commands
+- Missing security headers by themselves
+- Generic rate-limiting complaints without exploit impact
+- Self-XSS requiring the victim to paste code manually
+- CI/CD injection that is not part of the target program scope
+- Demo, example, or test-only code
+
+## Workflow
+
+1. Check scope first: program rules, SECURITY.md, disclosure channel, and exclusions.
+2. Find real entrypoints: HTTP handlers, uploads, background jobs, webhooks, parsers, and integration endpoints.
+3. Run static tooling where it helps, but treat it as triage input only.
+4. Read the real code path end to end.
+5. Prove user control reaches a meaningful sink.
+6. Confirm exploitability and impact with the smallest safe PoC possible.
+7. Check for duplicates before drafting a report.
+
+## Example Triage Loop
+
+```bash
+semgrep --config=auto --severity=ERROR --severity=WARNING --json
+```
+
+Then manually filter:
+
+- drop tests, demos, fixtures, vendored code
+- drop local-only or non-reachable paths
+- keep only findings with a clear network or user-controlled route
+
+## Report Structure
+
+```markdown
+## Description
+[What the vulnerability is and why it matters]
+
+## Vulnerable Code
+[File path, line range, and a small snippet]
+
+## Proof of Concept
+[Minimal working request or script]
+
+## Impact
+[What the attacker can achieve]
+
+## Affected Version
+[Version, commit, or deployment target tested]
+```
+
+## Quality Gate
+
+Before submitting:
+
+- The code path is reachable from a real user or network boundary
+- The input is genuinely user-controlled
+- The sink is meaningful and exploitable
+- The PoC works
+- The issue is not already covered by an advisory, CVE, or open ticket
+- The target is actually in scope for the bounty program

package/resources/ecc/skills/security-review/SKILL.md

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 ---
 name: security-review
 description: Use this skill when adding authentication, handling user input, working with secrets, creating API endpoints, or implementing payment/sensitive features. Provides comprehensive security checklist and patterns.
+origin: ECC
 ---
 
 # Security Review Skill
@@ -207,6 +208,11 @@ function renderUserContent(html: string) {
 ```
 
 #### Content Security Policy
+
+Start strict and loosen only with a documented removal plan. Do not default to
+`'unsafe-inline'` or `'unsafe-eval'`; they neutralize much of CSP's protection
+and should be treated as temporary compatibility debt.
+
 ```typescript
 // next.config.js
 const securityHeaders = [
@@ -214,8 +220,11 @@ const securityHeaders = [
     key: 'Content-Security-Policy',
     value: `
       default-src 'self';
-      script-src 'self' 'unsafe-eval' 'unsafe-inline';
-      style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline';
+      base-uri 'self';
+      object-src 'none';
+      frame-ancestors 'none';
+      script-src 'self';
+      style-src 'self';
       img-src 'self' data: https:;
       font-src 'self';
       connect-src 'self' https://api.example.com;

package/resources/ecc/skills/security-review/cloud-infrastructure-security.md

@@ -0,0 +1,361 @@
+| name | description |
+|------|-------------|
+| cloud-infrastructure-security | Use this skill when deploying to cloud platforms, configuring infrastructure, managing IAM policies, setting up logging/monitoring, or implementing CI/CD pipelines. Provides cloud security checklist aligned with best practices. |
+
+# Cloud & Infrastructure Security Skill
+
+This skill ensures cloud infrastructure, CI/CD pipelines, and deployment configurations follow security best practices and comply with industry standards.
+
+## When to Activate
+
+- Deploying applications to cloud platforms (AWS, Vercel, Railway, Cloudflare)
+- Configuring IAM roles and permissions
+- Setting up CI/CD pipelines
+- Implementing infrastructure as code (Terraform, CloudFormation)
+- Configuring logging and monitoring
+- Managing secrets in cloud environments
+- Setting up CDN and edge security
+- Implementing disaster recovery and backup strategies
+
+## Cloud Security Checklist
+
+### 1. IAM & Access Control
+
+#### Principle of Least Privilege
+
+```yaml
+# PASS: CORRECT: Minimal permissions
+iam_role:
+  permissions:
+    - s3:GetObject  # Only read access
+    - s3:ListBucket
+  resources:
+    - arn:aws:s3:::my-bucket/*  # Specific bucket only
+
+# FAIL: WRONG: Overly broad permissions
+iam_role:
+  permissions:
+    - s3:*  # All S3 actions
+  resources:
+    - "*"  # All resources
+```
+
+#### Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA)
+
+```bash
+# ALWAYS enable MFA for root/admin accounts
+aws iam enable-mfa-device \
+  --user-name admin \
+  --serial-number arn:aws:iam::123456789:mfa/admin \
+  --authentication-code1 123456 \
+  --authentication-code2 789012
+```
+
+#### Verification Steps
+
+- [ ] No root account usage in production
+- [ ] MFA enabled for all privileged accounts
+- [ ] Service accounts use roles, not long-lived credentials
+- [ ] IAM policies follow least privilege
+- [ ] Regular access reviews conducted
+- [ ] Unused credentials rotated or removed
+
+### 2. Secrets Management
+
+#### Cloud Secrets Managers
+
+```typescript
+// PASS: CORRECT: Use cloud secrets manager
+import { SecretsManager } from '@aws-sdk/client-secrets-manager';
+
+const client = new SecretsManager({ region: 'us-east-1' });
+const secret = await client.getSecretValue({ SecretId: 'prod/api-key' });
+const apiKey = JSON.parse(secret.SecretString).key;
+
+// FAIL: WRONG: Hardcoded or in environment variables only
+const apiKey = process.env.API_KEY; // Not rotated, not audited
+```
+
+#### Secrets Rotation
+
+```bash
+# Set up automatic rotation for database credentials
+aws secretsmanager rotate-secret \
+  --secret-id prod/db-password \
+  --rotation-lambda-arn arn:aws:lambda:region:account:function:rotate \
+  --rotation-rules AutomaticallyAfterDays=30
+```
+
+#### Verification Steps
+
+- [ ] All secrets stored in cloud secrets manager (AWS Secrets Manager, Vercel Secrets)
+- [ ] Automatic rotation enabled for database credentials
+- [ ] API keys rotated at least quarterly
+- [ ] No secrets in code, logs, or error messages
+- [ ] Audit logging enabled for secret access
+
+### 3. Network Security
+
+#### VPC and Firewall Configuration
+
+```terraform
+# PASS: CORRECT: Restricted security group
+resource "aws_security_group" "app" {
+  name = "app-sg"
+
+  ingress {
+    from_port   = 443
+    to_port     = 443
+    protocol    = "tcp"
+    cidr_blocks = ["10.0.0.0/16"]  # Internal VPC only
+  }
+
+  egress {
+    from_port   = 443
+    to_port     = 443
+    protocol    = "tcp"
+    cidr_blocks = ["0.0.0.0/0"]  # Only HTTPS outbound
+  }
+}
+
+# FAIL: WRONG: Open to the internet
+resource "aws_security_group" "bad" {
+  ingress {
+    from_port   = 0
+    to_port     = 65535
+    protocol    = "tcp"
+    cidr_blocks = ["0.0.0.0/0"]  # All ports, all IPs!
+  }
+}
+```
+
+#### Verification Steps
+
+- [ ] Database not publicly accessible
+- [ ] SSH/RDP ports restricted to VPN/bastion only
+- [ ] Security groups follow least privilege
+- [ ] Network ACLs configured
+- [ ] VPC flow logs enabled
+
+### 4. Logging & Monitoring
+
+#### CloudWatch/Logging Configuration
+
+```typescript
+// PASS: CORRECT: Comprehensive logging
+import { CloudWatchLogsClient, CreateLogStreamCommand } from '@aws-sdk/client-cloudwatch-logs';
+
+const logSecurityEvent = async (event: SecurityEvent) => {
+  await cloudwatch.putLogEvents({
+    logGroupName: '/aws/security/events',
+    logStreamName: 'authentication',
+    logEvents: [{
+      timestamp: Date.now(),
+      message: JSON.stringify({
+        type: event.type,
+        userId: event.userId,
+        ip: event.ip,
+        result: event.result,
+        // Never log sensitive data
+      })
+    }]
+  });
+};
+```
+
+#### Verification Steps
+
+- [ ] CloudWatch/logging enabled for all services
+- [ ] Failed authentication attempts logged
+- [ ] Admin actions audited
+- [ ] Log retention configured (90+ days for compliance)
+- [ ] Alerts configured for suspicious activity
+- [ ] Logs centralized and tamper-proof
+
+### 5. CI/CD Pipeline Security
+
+#### Secure Pipeline Configuration
+
+```yaml
+# PASS: CORRECT: Secure GitHub Actions workflow
+name: Deploy
+
+on:
+  push:
+    branches: [main]
+
+jobs:
+  deploy:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    permissions:
+      contents: read  # Minimal permissions
+
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+
+      # Scan for secrets
+      - name: Secret scanning
+        uses: trufflesecurity/trufflehog@main
+
+      # Dependency audit
+      - name: Audit dependencies
+        run: npm audit --audit-level=high
+
+      # Use OIDC, not long-lived tokens
+      - name: Configure AWS credentials
+        uses: aws-actions/configure-aws-credentials@v4
+        with:
+          role-to-assume: arn:aws:iam::123456789:role/GitHubActionsRole
+          aws-region: us-east-1
+```
+
+#### Supply Chain Security
+
+```json
+// package.json - Use lock files and integrity checks
+{
+  "scripts": {
+    "install": "npm ci",  // Use ci for reproducible builds
+    "audit": "npm audit --audit-level=moderate",
+    "check": "npm outdated"
+  }
+}
+```
+
+#### Verification Steps
+
+- [ ] OIDC used instead of long-lived credentials
+- [ ] Secrets scanning in pipeline
+- [ ] Dependency vulnerability scanning
+- [ ] Container image scanning (if applicable)
+- [ ] Branch protection rules enforced
+- [ ] Code review required before merge
+- [ ] Signed commits enforced
+
+### 6. Cloudflare & CDN Security
+
+#### Cloudflare Security Configuration
+
+```typescript
+// PASS: CORRECT: Cloudflare Workers with security headers
+export default {
+  async fetch(request: Request): Promise<Response> {
+    const response = await fetch(request);
+
+    // Add security headers
+    const headers = new Headers(response.headers);
+    headers.set('X-Frame-Options', 'DENY');
+    headers.set('X-Content-Type-Options', 'nosniff');
+    headers.set('Referrer-Policy', 'strict-origin-when-cross-origin');
+    headers.set('Permissions-Policy', 'geolocation=(), microphone=()');
+
+    return new Response(response.body, {
+      status: response.status,
+      headers
+    });
+  }
+};
+```
+
+#### WAF Rules
+
+```bash
+# Enable Cloudflare WAF managed rules
+# - OWASP Core Ruleset
+# - Cloudflare Managed Ruleset
+# - Rate limiting rules
+# - Bot protection
+```
+
+#### Verification Steps
+
+- [ ] WAF enabled with OWASP rules
+- [ ] Rate limiting configured
+- [ ] Bot protection active
+- [ ] DDoS protection enabled
+- [ ] Security headers configured
+- [ ] SSL/TLS strict mode enabled
+
+### 7. Backup & Disaster Recovery
+
+#### Automated Backups
+
+```terraform
+# PASS: CORRECT: Automated RDS backups
+resource "aws_db_instance" "main" {
+  allocated_storage     = 20
+  engine               = "postgres"
+
+  backup_retention_period = 30  # 30 days retention
+  backup_window          = "03:00-04:00"
+  maintenance_window     = "mon:04:00-mon:05:00"
+
+  enabled_cloudwatch_logs_exports = ["postgresql"]
+
+  deletion_protection = true  # Prevent accidental deletion
+}
+```
+
+#### Verification Steps
+
+- [ ] Automated daily backups configured
+- [ ] Backup retention meets compliance requirements
+- [ ] Point-in-time recovery enabled
+- [ ] Backup testing performed quarterly
+- [ ] Disaster recovery plan documented
+- [ ] RPO and RTO defined and tested
+
+## Pre-Deployment Cloud Security Checklist
+
+Before ANY production cloud deployment:
+
+- [ ] **IAM**: Root account not used, MFA enabled, least privilege policies
+- [ ] **Secrets**: All secrets in cloud secrets manager with rotation
+- [ ] **Network**: Security groups restricted, no public databases
+- [ ] **Logging**: CloudWatch/logging enabled with retention
+- [ ] **Monitoring**: Alerts configured for anomalies
+- [ ] **CI/CD**: OIDC auth, secrets scanning, dependency audits
+- [ ] **CDN/WAF**: Cloudflare WAF enabled with OWASP rules
+- [ ] **Encryption**: Data encrypted at rest and in transit
+- [ ] **Backups**: Automated backups with tested recovery
+- [ ] **Compliance**: GDPR/HIPAA requirements met (if applicable)
+- [ ] **Documentation**: Infrastructure documented, runbooks created
+- [ ] **Incident Response**: Security incident plan in place
+
+## Common Cloud Security Misconfigurations
+
+### S3 Bucket Exposure
+
+```bash
+# FAIL: WRONG: Public bucket
+aws s3api put-bucket-acl --bucket my-bucket --acl public-read
+
+# PASS: CORRECT: Private bucket with specific access
+aws s3api put-bucket-acl --bucket my-bucket --acl private
+aws s3api put-bucket-policy --bucket my-bucket --policy file://policy.json
+```
+
+### RDS Public Access
+
+```terraform
+# FAIL: WRONG
+resource "aws_db_instance" "bad" {
+  publicly_accessible = true  # NEVER do this!
+}
+
+# PASS: CORRECT
+resource "aws_db_instance" "good" {
+  publicly_accessible = false
+  vpc_security_group_ids = [aws_security_group.db.id]
+}
+```
+
+## Resources
+
+- [AWS Security Best Practices](https://aws.amazon.com/security/best-practices/)
+- [CIS AWS Foundations Benchmark](https://www.cisecurity.org/benchmark/amazon_web_services)
+- [Cloudflare Security Documentation](https://developers.cloudflare.com/security/)
+- [OWASP Cloud Security](https://owasp.org/www-project-cloud-security/)
+- [Terraform Security Best Practices](https://www.terraform.io/docs/cloud/guides/recommended-practices/)
+
+**Remember**: Cloud misconfigurations are the leading cause of data breaches. A single exposed S3 bucket or overly permissive IAM policy can compromise your entire infrastructure. Always follow the principle of least privilege and defense in depth.

package/resources/ecc/skills/security-scan/SKILL.md

@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
+---
+name: security-scan
+description: Scan your Claude Code configuration (.claude/ directory) for security vulnerabilities, misconfigurations, and injection risks using AgentShield. Checks CLAUDE.md, settings.json, MCP servers, hooks, and agent definitions.
+origin: ECC
+---
+
+# Security Scan Skill
+
+Audit your Claude Code configuration for security issues using [AgentShield](https://github.com/affaan-m/agentshield).
+
+## When to Activate
+
+- Setting up a new Claude Code project
+- After modifying `.claude/settings.json`, `CLAUDE.md`, or MCP configs
+- Before committing configuration changes
+- When onboarding to a new repository with existing Claude Code configs
+- Periodic security hygiene checks
+
+## What It Scans
+
+| File | Checks |
+|------|--------|
+| `CLAUDE.md` | Hardcoded secrets, auto-run instructions, prompt injection patterns |
+| `settings.json` | Overly permissive allow lists, missing deny lists, dangerous bypass flags |
+| `mcp.json` | Risky MCP servers, hardcoded env secrets, npx supply chain risks |
+| `hooks/` | Command injection via interpolation, data exfiltration, silent error suppression |
+| `agents/*.md` | Unrestricted tool access, prompt injection surface, missing model specs |
+
+## Prerequisites
+
+AgentShield must be installed. Check and install if needed:
+
+```bash
+# Check if installed
+npx ecc-agentshield --version
+
+# Install globally (recommended)
+npm install -g ecc-agentshield
+
+# Or run directly via npx (no install needed)
+npx ecc-agentshield scan .
+```
+
+## Usage
+
+### Basic Scan
+
+Run against the current project's `.claude/` directory:
+
+```bash
+# Scan current project
+npx ecc-agentshield scan
+
+# Scan a specific path
+npx ecc-agentshield scan --path /path/to/.claude
+
+# Scan with minimum severity filter
+npx ecc-agentshield scan --min-severity medium
+```
+
+### Output Formats
+
+```bash
+# Terminal output (default) — colored report with grade
+npx ecc-agentshield scan
+
+# JSON — for CI/CD integration
+npx ecc-agentshield scan --format json
+
+# Markdown — for documentation
+npx ecc-agentshield scan --format markdown
+
+# HTML — self-contained dark-theme report
+npx ecc-agentshield scan --format html > security-report.html
+```
+
+### Auto-Fix
+
+Apply safe fixes automatically (only fixes marked as auto-fixable):
+
+```bash
+npx ecc-agentshield scan --fix
+```
+
+This will:
+- Replace hardcoded secrets with environment variable references
+- Tighten wildcard permissions to scoped alternatives
+- Never modify manual-only suggestions
+
+### Opus 4.6 Deep Analysis
+
+Run the adversarial three-agent pipeline for deeper analysis:
+
+```bash
+# Requires ANTHROPIC_API_KEY
+export ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=your-key
+npx ecc-agentshield scan --opus --stream
+```
+
+This runs:
+1. **Attacker (Red Team)** — finds attack vectors
+2. **Defender (Blue Team)** — recommends hardening
+3. **Auditor (Final Verdict)** — synthesizes both perspectives
+
+### Initialize Secure Config
+
+Scaffold a new secure `.claude/` configuration from scratch:
+
+```bash
+npx ecc-agentshield init
+```
+
+Creates:
+- `settings.json` with scoped permissions and deny list
+- `CLAUDE.md` with security best practices
+- `mcp.json` placeholder
+
+### GitHub Action
+
+Add to your CI pipeline:
+
+```yaml
+- uses: affaan-m/agentshield@v1
+  with:
+    path: '.'
+    min-severity: 'medium'
+    fail-on-findings: true
+```
+
+## Severity Levels
+
+| Grade | Score | Meaning |
+|-------|-------|---------|
+| A | 90-100 | Secure configuration |
+| B | 75-89 | Minor issues |
+| C | 60-74 | Needs attention |
+| D | 40-59 | Significant risks |
+| F | 0-39 | Critical vulnerabilities |
+
+## Interpreting Results
+
+### Critical Findings (fix immediately)
+- Hardcoded API keys or tokens in config files
+- `Bash(*)` in the allow list (unrestricted shell access)
+- Command injection in hooks via `${file}` interpolation
+- Shell-running MCP servers
+
+### High Findings (fix before production)
+- Auto-run instructions in CLAUDE.md (prompt injection vector)
+- Missing deny lists in permissions
+- Agents with unnecessary Bash access
+
+### Medium Findings (recommended)
+- Silent error suppression in hooks (`2>/dev/null`, `|| true`)
+- Missing PreToolUse security hooks
+- `npx -y` auto-install in MCP server configs
+
+### Info Findings (awareness)
+- Missing descriptions on MCP servers
+- Prohibitive instructions correctly flagged as good practice
+
+## Links
+
+- **GitHub**: [github.com/affaan-m/agentshield](https://github.com/affaan-m/agentshield)
+- **npm**: [npmjs.com/package/ecc-agentshield](https://www.npmjs.com/package/ecc-agentshield)