comisai 1.0.19 → 1.0.23

package/node_modules/@comis/core/dist/security/input-guard.d.ts

@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * InputGuard — Semantic jailbreak detection with weighted 0.0-1.0 threat scoring.
- *
- * Factory function that creates a guard object with a `scan()` method. Detects
- * jailbreak attempts using weighted compound phrase patterns imported from
- * `injection-patterns.ts`, typoglycemia detection for 8 key terms, and code
- * block exclusion to minimize false positives on technical content.
- *
- * Returns scored results that PiExecutor uses for policy decisions:
- * - low risk (< mediumThreshold) -> action "pass"
- * - medium risk (>= mediumThreshold, < highThreshold) -> action "reinforce"
- * - high risk (>= highThreshold) -> action "warn" (default) or "block" (config)
- *
- * @module input-guard
- * @since Phase 283 (INPUT-03 through INPUT-06)
- */
-export interface InputGuardConfig {
-    /** Threat score threshold for "medium" risk (triggers reinforcement). Default: 0.4. */
-    readonly mediumThreshold: number;
-    /** Threat score threshold for "high" risk (triggers warn/block). Default: 0.7. */
-    readonly highThreshold: number;
-    /** Action for high-risk detections. Default: "warn". "block" requires explicit config. */
-    readonly action: "warn" | "block";
-}
-export interface InputGuardResult {
-    /** Threat score clamped to 0.0-1.0. */
-    readonly score: number;
-    /** Risk level derived from score vs thresholds. */
-    readonly riskLevel: "low" | "medium" | "high";
-    /** Matched pattern category names. */
-    readonly patterns: string[];
-    /** Recommended policy action. */
-    readonly action: "pass" | "warn" | "reinforce" | "block";
-}
-export interface InputGuard {
-    scan(text: string): InputGuardResult;
-}
-/**
- * Create an InputGuard that scores user input text for jailbreak risk.
- *
- * Configuration is optional; all fields have sensible defaults:
- * - mediumThreshold: 0.4
- * - highThreshold: 0.7
- * - action: "warn" (operator must explicitly set "block" to enable blocking)
- */
-export declare function createInputGuard(config?: Partial<InputGuardConfig>): InputGuard;

package/node_modules/@comis/core/dist/security/input-guard.js

@@ -1,166 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * InputGuard — Semantic jailbreak detection with weighted 0.0-1.0 threat scoring.
- *
- * Factory function that creates a guard object with a `scan()` method. Detects
- * jailbreak attempts using weighted compound phrase patterns imported from
- * `injection-patterns.ts`, typoglycemia detection for 8 key terms, and code
- * block exclusion to minimize false positives on technical content.
- *
- * Returns scored results that PiExecutor uses for policy decisions:
- * - low risk (< mediumThreshold) -> action "pass"
- * - medium risk (>= mediumThreshold, < highThreshold) -> action "reinforce"
- * - high risk (>= highThreshold) -> action "warn" (default) or "block" (config)
- *
- * @module input-guard
- * @since Phase 283 (INPUT-03 through INPUT-06)
- */
-import { IGNORE_PREV_INSTRUCTIONS, IGNORE_INSTRUCTIONS_BROAD, DISREGARD_PREVIOUS, DISREGARD_INSTRUCTIONS, FORGET_EVERYTHING, FORGET_INSTRUCTIONS_BROAD, YOU_ARE_NOW, YOU_ARE_NOW_ARTICLE, NEW_INSTRUCTIONS, NEW_INSTRUCTIONS_COLON, IMPORTANT_OVERRIDE, OVERRIDE_SAFETY, ACT_AS_ROLE, CONTEXT_RESET, RULE_REPLACEMENT, SYSTEM_TAG, SYSTEM_BRACKET, SYSTEM_COMMAND, SPECIAL_TOKEN_DELIMITERS, ROLE_BOUNDARY, ASSISTANT_ROLE_MARKER, } from "./injection-patterns.js";
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-// Weighted pattern categories (Pattern 6 from research)
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-/**
- * Each category groups related regex patterns with a single weight.
- * If ANY pattern in a category matches, the weight is added once (boolean per category).
- * Multiple matches within the same category do NOT multiply the weight.
- */
-const PATTERN_WEIGHTS = [
-    { patterns: [IGNORE_PREV_INSTRUCTIONS, IGNORE_INSTRUCTIONS_BROAD], weight: 0.6, name: "ignore_instructions" },
-    { patterns: [DISREGARD_PREVIOUS, DISREGARD_INSTRUCTIONS], weight: 0.5, name: "disregard_previous" },
-    { patterns: [FORGET_EVERYTHING, FORGET_INSTRUCTIONS_BROAD], weight: 0.5, name: "forget_instructions" },
-    { patterns: [YOU_ARE_NOW, YOU_ARE_NOW_ARTICLE], weight: 0.4, name: "role_assumption" },
-    { patterns: [NEW_INSTRUCTIONS, NEW_INSTRUCTIONS_COLON], weight: 0.5, name: "new_instructions" },
-    { patterns: [IMPORTANT_OVERRIDE], weight: 0.5, name: "important_override" },
-    { patterns: [OVERRIDE_SAFETY], weight: 0.6, name: "override_safety" },
-    { patterns: [ACT_AS_ROLE], weight: 0.4, name: "act_as_role" },
-    { patterns: [CONTEXT_RESET], weight: 0.4, name: "context_reset" },
-    { patterns: [RULE_REPLACEMENT], weight: 0.4, name: "rule_replacement" },
-    { patterns: [SYSTEM_TAG, SYSTEM_BRACKET, SYSTEM_COMMAND], weight: 0.3, name: "system_markers" },
-    { patterns: [SPECIAL_TOKEN_DELIMITERS], weight: 0.3, name: "special_tokens" },
-    { patterns: [ROLE_BOUNDARY, ASSISTANT_ROLE_MARKER], weight: 0.2, name: "role_markers" },
-];
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-// Code block exclusion (INPUT-06)
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-/**
- * Regex to match fenced code blocks (triple backtick) and inline code (single backtick).
- * ReDoS-safe: [\s\S]*? is non-greedy character class without alternation.
- */
-const CODE_BLOCK_REGEX = /```[\s\S]*?```|`[^`\n]+`/g;
-function stripCodeBlocks(text) {
-    CODE_BLOCK_REGEX.lastIndex = 0;
-    return text.replace(CODE_BLOCK_REGEX, " ");
-}
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-// Typoglycemia detection (INPUT-05)
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-/**
- * The 8 key jailbreak terms to check for scrambled-middle variants.
- * All are 5+ characters long, ensuring sufficient middle-letter entropy
- * to avoid false positives on short words.
- */
-const TYPOGLYCEMIA_TERMS = [
-    "ignore",
-    "previous",
-    "instructions",
-    "system",
-    "bypass",
-    "override",
-    "forget",
-    "delete",
-];
-/**
- * Check whether a word is a typoglycemia variant of a target term.
- *
- * A word is a variant if:
- * 1. Same length as target
- * 2. Same first character (case-insensitive)
- * 3. Same last character (case-insensitive)
- * 4. NOT an exact match (exact matches are handled by regex patterns)
- * 5. Same sorted middle characters
- *
- * This implements the "Cambridge University effect" where human readers
- * can understand words with scrambled middle letters.
- */
-function isTypoglycemiaVariant(word, target) {
-    if (word.length !== target.length)
-        return false;
-    const w = word.toLowerCase();
-    const t = target.toLowerCase();
-    if (w[0] !== t[0] || w[w.length - 1] !== t[t.length - 1])
-        return false;
-    if (w === t)
-        return false; // Exact match is NOT a variant
-    const wMiddle = [...w.slice(1, -1)].sort().join("");
-    const tMiddle = [...t.slice(1, -1)].sort().join("");
-    return wMiddle === tMiddle;
-}
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-// Factory function
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-/**
- * Create an InputGuard that scores user input text for jailbreak risk.
- *
- * Configuration is optional; all fields have sensible defaults:
- * - mediumThreshold: 0.4
- * - highThreshold: 0.7
- * - action: "warn" (operator must explicitly set "block" to enable blocking)
- */
-export function createInputGuard(config) {
-    const mediumThreshold = config?.mediumThreshold ?? 0.4;
-    const highThreshold = config?.highThreshold ?? 0.7;
-    const action = config?.action ?? "warn";
-    return {
-        scan(text) {
-            const stripped = stripCodeBlocks(text);
-            const matched = [];
-            let score = 0;
-            // 1. Weighted pattern category matching
-            for (const category of PATTERN_WEIGHTS) {
-                let categoryMatched = false;
-                for (const pattern of category.patterns) {
-                    // Reset lastIndex before each test() call (patterns have /g or /gi flags)
-                    pattern.lastIndex = 0;
-                    if (pattern.test(stripped)) {
-                        categoryMatched = true;
-                        break; // Category is boolean -- one match suffices
-                    }
-                }
-                if (categoryMatched) {
-                    score += category.weight;
-                    matched.push(category.name);
-                }
-            }
-            // 2. Typoglycemia detection
-            const words = stripped.split(/\s+/);
-            for (const word of words) {
-                if (word.length === 0)
-                    continue;
-                for (const term of TYPOGLYCEMIA_TERMS) {
-                    if (isTypoglycemiaVariant(word, term)) {
-                        matched.push(`typoglycemia:${term}`);
-                        score += 0.3;
-                        break; // One word matches at most one term
-                    }
-                }
-            }
-            // 3. Clamp score to [0.0, 1.0]
-            score = Math.min(score, 1.0);
-            // 4. Determine risk level
-            const riskLevel = score >= highThreshold ? "high"
-                : score >= mediumThreshold ? "medium"
-                    : "low";
-            // 5. Determine action
-            let resultAction;
-            if (riskLevel === "high") {
-                resultAction = action === "block" ? "block" : "warn";
-            }
-            else if (riskLevel === "medium") {
-                resultAction = "reinforce";
-            }
-            else {
-                resultAction = "pass";
-            }
-            return { score, riskLevel, patterns: matched, action: resultAction };
-        },
-    };
-}

package/node_modules/@comis/core/dist/security/scoped-secret-manager.d.ts

@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * ScopedSecretManager — per-agent SecretManager decorator with glob filtering.
- *
- * Wraps a base SecretManager and restricts access to secrets matching
- * the agent's allow patterns. Every access attempt (get, has, require)
- * emits a `secret:accessed` audit event through the optional TypedEventBus.
- *
- * Design decisions:
- * - Decorator pattern: callers cannot distinguish from a plain SecretManager
- * - Empty allowPatterns = unrestricted access (backward compat for existing agents)
- * - eventBus is optional: if omitted, no audit events are emitted (unit-test friendly)
- * - keys() filters but does not emit (listing operation, not access)
- */
-import type { SecretManager } from "./secret-manager.js";
-import type { TypedEventBus } from "../event-bus/index.js";
-/**
- * Options for creating a scoped (per-agent) SecretManager.
- */
-export interface ScopedSecretManagerOptions {
-    /** The agent this scoped manager belongs to. Included in all audit events. */
-    agentId: string;
-    /** Glob patterns that grant access. Empty array = unrestricted (backward compat). */
-    allowPatterns: string[];
-    /** Optional event bus for audit event emission. No-op if omitted. */
-    eventBus?: TypedEventBus;
-}
-/**
- * Create a SecretManager that filters access by glob patterns and emits audit events.
- *
- * The returned object implements the SecretManager interface exactly — same 4 methods
- * (get, has, require, keys), same return types. This is the decorator pattern:
- * callers cannot distinguish a ScopedSecretManager from a plain SecretManager.
- *
- * @param base - The underlying SecretManager to delegate allowed accesses to
- * @param options - Agent ID, allow patterns, and optional event bus
- * @returns A SecretManager that enforces per-agent access control
- */
-export declare function createScopedSecretManager(base: SecretManager, options: ScopedSecretManagerOptions): SecretManager;

package/node_modules/@comis/core/dist/security/scoped-secret-manager.js

@@ -1,94 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * ScopedSecretManager — per-agent SecretManager decorator with glob filtering.
- *
- * Wraps a base SecretManager and restricts access to secrets matching
- * the agent's allow patterns. Every access attempt (get, has, require)
- * emits a `secret:accessed` audit event through the optional TypedEventBus.
- *
- * Design decisions:
- * - Decorator pattern: callers cannot distinguish from a plain SecretManager
- * - Empty allowPatterns = unrestricted access (backward compat for existing agents)
- * - eventBus is optional: if omitted, no audit events are emitted (unit-test friendly)
- * - keys() filters but does not emit (listing operation, not access)
- */
-import { isSecretAccessible } from "./secret-access.js";
-/**
- * Create a SecretManager that filters access by glob patterns and emits audit events.
- *
- * The returned object implements the SecretManager interface exactly — same 4 methods
- * (get, has, require, keys), same return types. This is the decorator pattern:
- * callers cannot distinguish a ScopedSecretManager from a plain SecretManager.
- *
- * @param base - The underlying SecretManager to delegate allowed accesses to
- * @param options - Agent ID, allow patterns, and optional event bus
- * @returns A SecretManager that enforces per-agent access control
- */
-export function createScopedSecretManager(base, options) {
-    const { agentId, allowPatterns, eventBus } = options;
-    let warnedNoAllow = false;
-    /**
-     * Emit a one-time security:warn event when an agent accesses secrets
-     * without explicit secrets.allow configuration (CORE-02).
-     */
-    function warnUnrestrictedAccess(secretName) {
-        if (warnedNoAllow || allowPatterns.length > 0 || !eventBus)
-            return;
-        warnedNoAllow = true;
-        eventBus.emit("security:warn", {
-            category: "secret_access",
-            agentId,
-            message: `Agent "${agentId}" accessed secret "${secretName}" without explicit secrets.allow configuration. ` +
-                `Configure secrets.allow patterns to restrict access.`,
-            timestamp: Date.now(),
-        });
-    }
-    function emitAccess(secretName, outcome) {
-        eventBus?.emit("secret:accessed", {
-            secretName,
-            agentId,
-            outcome,
-            timestamp: Date.now(),
-        });
-    }
-    return {
-        get(key) {
-            warnUnrestrictedAccess(key);
-            if (!isSecretAccessible(key, allowPatterns)) {
-                emitAccess(key, "denied");
-                return undefined;
-            }
-            const value = base.get(key);
-            emitAccess(key, value !== undefined ? "success" : "not_found");
-            return value;
-        },
-        has(key) {
-            warnUnrestrictedAccess(key);
-            if (!isSecretAccessible(key, allowPatterns)) {
-                emitAccess(key, "denied");
-                return false;
-            }
-            const exists = base.has(key);
-            emitAccess(key, exists ? "success" : "not_found");
-            return exists;
-        },
-        require(key) {
-            warnUnrestrictedAccess(key);
-            if (!isSecretAccessible(key, allowPatterns)) {
-                emitAccess(key, "denied");
-                throw new Error(`Agent "${agentId}" is not allowed to access secret "${key}". ` +
-                    `Check the agent's secrets.allow configuration.`);
-            }
-            const value = base.get(key);
-            if (value === undefined) {
-                emitAccess(key, "not_found");
-                throw new Error(`Required secret "${key}" is not set. ` +
-                    `Check that this key is defined in your .env file or encrypted store.`);
-            }
-            emitAccess(key, "success");
-            return value;
-        },
-        keys() {
-            return base.keys().filter((k) => isSecretAccessible(k, allowPatterns));
-        },
-    };
-}

package/node_modules/@comis/daemon/dist/observability/delivery-context.d.ts

@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * DeliveryContext: metadata captured per message delivery for tracing (OBS-04).
- *
- * Records source/target channel identifiers, delivery timing, success status,
- * and optional attribution (agent, session). Downstream consumers use this
- * for delivery tracing dashboards and latency analysis.
- */
-export interface DeliveryContext {
-    /** Source channel that originated the message */
-    sourceChannelId: string;
-    sourceChannelType: string;
-    /** Delivery target */
-    targetChannelId: string;
-    targetChannelType: string;
-    /** Timestamp when delivery was initiated */
-    deliveredAt: number;
-    /** Time from message receipt to delivery completion in ms */
-    latencyMs: number;
-    /** Whether delivery succeeded */
-    success: boolean;
-    /** Error message if delivery failed */
-    error?: string;
-    /** Agent that processed the message */
-    agentId?: string;
-    /** Session key string */
-    sessionKey?: string;
-    /** Execution timeline steps synthesized from timing data */
-    steps?: Array<{
-        name: string;
-        timestamp: number;
-        durationMs: number;
-        status: "ok" | "error";
-        error?: string;
-    }>;
-    /** Additional metadata (retry count, parse mode fallback, etc.) */
-    metadata?: Record<string, unknown>;
-}

package/node_modules/@comis/daemon/dist/observability/delivery-context.js

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-export {};

package/node_modules/@comis/daemon/dist/observability/log-level-manager.d.ts

@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
-import { type ComisLogger } from "@comis/infra";
-/**
- * Log level manager: per-module child loggers with runtime level control.
- *
- * Modules obtain their logger via getLogger(module), which returns a cached
- * Pino child logger. Levels can be changed at runtime per-module or globally
- * via the daemon.setLogLevel RPC (OBS-04).
- */
-export interface LogLevelManager {
-    /** Get or create a child logger for a named module. Cached on first call. */
-    getLogger(module: string): ComisLogger;
-    /** Change the log level for a specific module's logger. */
-    setLevel(module: string, level: string): void;
-    /** Change the root logger's level (affects all modules that haven't been individually overridden). */
-    setGlobalLevel(level: string): void;
-}
-/**
- * Create a log level manager that maintains a registry of per-module child loggers.
- *
- * @param rootLogger - The root Pino logger from which child loggers are derived
- * @returns A LogLevelManager instance
- */
-export declare function createLogLevelManager(rootLogger: ComisLogger): LogLevelManager;

package/node_modules/@comis/daemon/dist/observability/log-level-manager.js

@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-import { isValidLogLevel } from "@comis/infra";
-/**
- * Create a log level manager that maintains a registry of per-module child loggers.
- *
- * @param rootLogger - The root Pino logger from which child loggers are derived
- * @returns A LogLevelManager instance
- */
-export function createLogLevelManager(rootLogger) {
-    const loggers = new Map();
-    const manager = {
-        getLogger(module) {
-            let logger = loggers.get(module);
-            if (!logger) {
-                logger = rootLogger.child({ module });
-                loggers.set(module, logger);
-            }
-            return logger;
-        },
-        setLevel(module, level) {
-            if (!isValidLogLevel(level))
-                return; // CRED-05: silently reject invalid levels
-            const logger = loggers.get(module);
-            if (logger) {
-                logger.level = level;
-            }
-        },
-        setGlobalLevel(level) {
-            if (!isValidLogLevel(level))
-                return; // CRED-05: silently reject invalid levels
-            rootLogger.level = level;
-        },
-    };
-    return manager;
-}

package/node_modules/@comis/daemon/dist/observability/log-transport.d.ts

@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Log transport factory: constructs pino multi-target transport config
- * for simultaneous file rotation (pino-roll) and stdout output.
- *
- * INFRA-02: File rotation transport.
- * INFRA-03: Dual file + stdout output.
- * INFRA-04: removeOtherLogFiles cleanup.
- *
- * @module
- */
-import type { LoggingConfig } from "@comis/core";
-import type pino from "pino";
-/**
- * Expand leading tilde to os.homedir().
- * pino-roll does NOT expand tildes, so this must be called before
- * passing filePath to the transport.
- */
-export declare function expandTilde(filePath: string): string;
-/**
- * Detect whether the process is running under pm2.
- *
- * pm2 sets the `PM2_HOME` environment variable for all managed processes.
- * When running under pm2, stdout is already captured to pm2's own log files
- * (`~/.pm2/logs/`), so the pino-roll file transport would be a byte-for-byte
- * duplicate.
- */
-export declare function isPm2Managed(): boolean;
-/**
- * Create a pino multi-target transport config from LoggingConfig.
- *
- * LI-1: PM2-aware transport selection.
- * - File transport (pino-roll): always active -- canonical log location.
- * - Stdout: skipped under pm2 (PM2_HOME set) to avoid byte-for-byte
- *   duplication with pm2's own log capture in ~/.pm2/logs/.
- *
- * Note: node-llama-cpp native module warnings write directly to stderr and
- * cannot be captured by Pino transports. This is a known limitation.
- *
- * @param config - Logging config from DaemonConfigSchema.logging
- * @param level - Log level to apply to each target (Pino multi-transport
- *   targets default to "info" unless explicitly set)
- * @returns Transport config to pass as LoggerOptions.transport
- */
-export declare function createFileTransport(config: LoggingConfig, level?: string): pino.TransportMultiOptions;

package/node_modules/@comis/daemon/dist/observability/log-transport.js

@@ -1,74 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Log transport factory: constructs pino multi-target transport config
- * for simultaneous file rotation (pino-roll) and stdout output.
- *
- * INFRA-02: File rotation transport.
- * INFRA-03: Dual file + stdout output.
- * INFRA-04: removeOtherLogFiles cleanup.
- *
- * @module
- */
-import os from "node:os";
-/**
- * Expand leading tilde to os.homedir().
- * pino-roll does NOT expand tildes, so this must be called before
- * passing filePath to the transport.
- */
-export function expandTilde(filePath) {
-    return filePath.replace(/^~(?=\/|$)/, os.homedir());
-}
-/**
- * Detect whether the process is running under pm2.
- *
- * pm2 sets the `PM2_HOME` environment variable for all managed processes.
- * When running under pm2, stdout is already captured to pm2's own log files
- * (`~/.pm2/logs/`), so the pino-roll file transport would be a byte-for-byte
- * duplicate.
- */
-export function isPm2Managed() {
-    return typeof process.env.PM2_HOME === "string" && process.env.PM2_HOME.length > 0;
-}
-/**
- * Create a pino multi-target transport config from LoggingConfig.
- *
- * LI-1: PM2-aware transport selection.
- * - File transport (pino-roll): always active -- canonical log location.
- * - Stdout: skipped under pm2 (PM2_HOME set) to avoid byte-for-byte
- *   duplication with pm2's own log capture in ~/.pm2/logs/.
- *
- * Note: node-llama-cpp native module warnings write directly to stderr and
- * cannot be captured by Pino transports. This is a known limitation.
- *
- * @param config - Logging config from DaemonConfigSchema.logging
- * @param level - Log level to apply to each target (Pino multi-transport
- *   targets default to "info" unless explicitly set)
- * @returns Transport config to pass as LoggerOptions.transport
- */
-export function createFileTransport(config, level) {
-    const expandedPath = expandTilde(config.filePath);
-    const pm2Detected = isPm2Managed();
-    const targets = [];
-    // File transport: always active -- ~/.comis/logs/ is the canonical log location
-    targets.push({
-        target: "pino-roll",
-        options: {
-            file: expandedPath,
-            size: config.maxSize,
-            mkdir: true,
-            limit: {
-                count: config.maxFiles,
-                removeOtherLogFiles: true,
-            },
-        },
-        ...(level ? { level } : {}),
-    });
-    // Stdout: skip under pm2 (pm2 captures stdout to ~/.pm2/logs/, so it would be a duplicate)
-    if (!pm2Detected) {
-        targets.push({
-            target: "pino/file",
-            options: { destination: 1 }, // stdout
-            ...(level ? { level } : {}),
-        });
-    }
-    return { targets };
-}

package/node_modules/@comis/daemon/dist/observability/obs-write-buffer.d.ts

@@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Generic batched write buffer for observability persistence.
- *
- * Sits between event bus listeners and ObservabilityStore: listeners push items
- * into the buffer; the buffer flushes batches to SQLite periodically or when
- * the buffer reaches its size threshold.
- *
- * Design:
- *  - Plain array (not ring buffer) per research recommendation
- *  - Dual trigger: size threshold (default 50) OR timer interval (default 500ms)
- *  - Timer uses unref() so it does not prevent Node.js process exit
- *  - drain() provides synchronous final flush for clean shutdown
- *  - flushFn is synchronous (better-sqlite3 db.transaction() is sync)
- *
- * @module obs-write-buffer
- */
-/** Public interface for the write buffer. */
-export interface ObsWriteBuffer<T> {
-    /** Add an item to the buffer. Triggers flush if buffer hits maxSize. */
-    push(item: T): void;
-    /** Flush current buffer contents to the flush callback. No-op if empty. */
-    flush(): void;
-    /** Synchronous final flush for shutdown: flushes remaining items and clears the interval timer. */
-    drain(): void;
-    /** Number of items currently buffered. */
-    readonly pending: number;
-}
-/** Options for creating a write buffer. */
-export interface ObsWriteBufferOptions<T> {
-    /** Callback invoked with a batch of items when flushing. Must be synchronous (better-sqlite3 is sync). */
-    flushFn: (items: T[]) => void;
-    /** Maximum buffer size before triggering a flush. Default: 50. */
-    maxSize?: number;
-    /** Interval in ms between automatic flushes. Default: 500. */
-    intervalMs?: number;
-}
-/**
- * Create a generic batched write buffer.
- *
- * Usage:
- * ```ts
- * const buf = createObsWriteBuffer<TokenUsageRow>({
- *   flushFn: (items) => store.insertTokenUsageBatch(items),
- *   maxSize: 50,
- *   intervalMs: 500,
- * });
- *
- * eventBus.on("token:usage", (entry) => buf.push(toRow(entry)));
- * // On shutdown:
- * buf.drain();
- * ```
- */
-export declare function createObsWriteBuffer<T>(opts: ObsWriteBufferOptions<T>): ObsWriteBuffer<T>;