cognium-dev 3.134.0 → 3.136.0

package/dist/cli.js

@@ -22643,6 +22643,12 @@ class LanguageSourcesPass {
       for (const finding of findPythonMongoengineWhereNosqlInjectionFindings(code, graph.ir.meta.file)) {
         ctx.addFinding(finding);
       }
+      for (const finding of findPythonTaintedFormatStringFindings(code, graph.ir.meta.file)) {
+        ctx.addFinding(finding);
+      }
+      for (const finding of findPythonHeaderCrlfInjectionFindings(code, graph.ir.meta.file)) {
+        ctx.addFinding(finding);
+      }
     }
     if (language === "rust") {
       additionalSanitizers.push(...findRustSetAllowlistGuardSanitizers(code));
@@ -22694,6 +22700,9 @@ class LanguageSourcesPass {
       for (const finding of findJsIndirectEvalCodeInjectionFindings(code, graph.ir.meta.file)) {
         ctx.addFinding(finding);
       }
+      for (const finding of findJsUtilFormatFormatStringFindings(code, graph.ir.meta.file)) {
+        ctx.addFinding(finding);
+      }
     }
     if (language === "java") {
       additionalSanitizers.push(...findJavaSafeJsonParseSanitizers(code));
@@ -22709,6 +22718,9 @@ class LanguageSourcesPass {
       for (const finding of findJavaMongoNosqlInjectionFindings(code, graph.ir.meta.file)) {
         ctx.addFinding(finding);
       }
+      for (const finding of findJavaUrlOpenStreamSsrfFindings(code, graph.ir.meta.file)) {
+        ctx.addFinding(finding);
+      }
     }
     if (language === "python" || language === "javascript" || language === "typescript" || language === "go") {
       const exfilFindings = findExternalSecretExfiltrationFindings(code, graph.ir.meta.file, language);
@@ -26949,6 +26961,336 @@ function findPythonMongoengineWhereNosqlInjectionFindings(code, file) {
   }
   return findings;
 }
+function findJavaUrlOpenStreamSsrfFindings(code, file) {
+  const findings = [];
+  if (typeof code !== "string" || code.length === 0)
+    return findings;
+  if (!/\bnew\s+URL\s*\(/.test(code) && !/\bURI\s*\.\s*create\s*\(/.test(code)) {
+    return findings;
+  }
+  if (!/\.\s*(?:openStream|openConnection|getContent)\s*\(/.test(code)) {
+    return findings;
+  }
+  const lines = code.split(`
+`);
+  const reqExtractRe = /\b\w+\s*\.\s*(?:getParameter|getParameterValues|getHeader|getHeaders|getCookies|getReader|getQueryString|getRequestURI|getInputStream|getPart|getParts)\s*\(/;
+  const taintedVars = new Set;
+  for (let pass = 0;pass < 3; pass++) {
+    const before = taintedVars.size;
+    for (let i2 = 0;i2 < lines.length; i2++) {
+      const t = lines[i2].trim();
+      const a = t.match(/^(?:final\s+)?(?:[\w<>?,\[\]]+\s+)?(\w+)\s*=\s*(.+?);?$/);
+      if (!a)
+        continue;
+      const lhs = a[1];
+      const rhs = a[2];
+      if (taintedVars.has(lhs))
+        continue;
+      if (reqExtractRe.test(rhs)) {
+        taintedVars.add(lhs);
+        continue;
+      }
+      for (const v of taintedVars) {
+        if (new RegExp(`\\b${v}\\b`).test(rhs)) {
+          taintedVars.add(lhs);
+          break;
+        }
+      }
+    }
+    if (taintedVars.size === before)
+      break;
+  }
+  if (taintedVars.size === 0)
+    return findings;
+  const sinkRe = /\.\s*(openStream|openConnection|getContent)\s*\(/;
+  const seen = new Set;
+  for (let i2 = 0;i2 < lines.length; i2++) {
+    const line = lines[i2];
+    const m = line.match(sinkRe);
+    if (!m)
+      continue;
+    const op = m[1];
+    const sinkIdx = line.indexOf(`.${op}`);
+    if (sinkIdx < 0)
+      continue;
+    const head = line.substring(0, sinkIdx + 1);
+    let tainted = reqExtractRe.test(head);
+    if (!tainted) {
+      for (const v of taintedVars) {
+        if (new RegExp(`\\b${v}\\b`).test(head)) {
+          tainted = true;
+          break;
+        }
+      }
+    }
+    if (!tainted)
+      continue;
+    const key = `${i2 + 1}:${op}`;
+    if (seen.has(key))
+      continue;
+    seen.add(key);
+    findings.push({
+      id: `ssrf-${file}-${i2 + 1}-java-url-${op.toLowerCase()}`,
+      pass: "language-sources",
+      category: "security",
+      rule_id: "ssrf",
+      cwe: "CWE-918",
+      severity: "critical",
+      level: "error",
+      message: `SSRF: Java \`URL.${op}()\` invoked on a URL derived from servlet ` + 'request input. Even when an `if (url.startsWith("https://"))` ' + "guard is present, the host portion remains attacker-controlled — " + "use a strict host allowlist (parse the URL, check `getHost()`) " + "before issuing the request.",
+      file,
+      line: i2 + 1,
+      snippet: line.trim()
+    });
+  }
+  return findings;
+}
+function findPythonTaintedFormatStringFindings(code, file) {
+  const findings = [];
+  if (typeof code !== "string" || code.length === 0)
+    return findings;
+  if (!/\b(?:request\.(?:args|form|values|json|files|cookies|headers|data)|flask\.request)\b/.test(code)) {
+    return findings;
+  }
+  const lines = code.split(`
+`);
+  const reqExtractRe = /\b(?:request\.(?:args|form|values|json|files|cookies|headers|data)\b|flask\.request\b)/;
+  const taintedVars = new Set;
+  for (let pass = 0;pass < 3; pass++) {
+    const before = taintedVars.size;
+    for (let i2 = 0;i2 < lines.length; i2++) {
+      const t = lines[i2].trim();
+      if (t.startsWith("#"))
+        continue;
+      const a = t.match(/^(\w+)\s*=\s*(.+?)$/);
+      if (!a)
+        continue;
+      const lhs = a[1];
+      const rhs = a[2];
+      if (taintedVars.has(lhs))
+        continue;
+      if (reqExtractRe.test(rhs)) {
+        taintedVars.add(lhs);
+        continue;
+      }
+      for (const v of taintedVars) {
+        if (new RegExp(`\\b${v}\\b`).test(rhs)) {
+          taintedVars.add(lhs);
+          break;
+        }
+      }
+    }
+    if (taintedVars.size === before)
+      break;
+  }
+  if (taintedVars.size === 0)
+    return findings;
+  const percentRe = /\b(\w+)\s*%\s*[\(\[\{"'\w]/;
+  const dotFormatRe = /\b(\w+)\s*\.\s*format\s*\(/;
+  const seen = new Set;
+  for (let i2 = 0;i2 < lines.length; i2++) {
+    const line = lines[i2];
+    const t = line.trim();
+    if (t.startsWith("#"))
+      continue;
+    const pm = line.match(percentRe);
+    if (pm && taintedVars.has(pm[1])) {
+      const key = `${i2 + 1}:percent`;
+      if (!seen.has(key)) {
+        seen.add(key);
+        findings.push({
+          id: `format_string-${file}-${i2 + 1}-py-percent`,
+          pass: "language-sources",
+          category: "security",
+          rule_id: "format_string",
+          cwe: "CWE-134",
+          severity: "high",
+          level: "error",
+          message: "Format-string injection: Python `<tainted> % args` uses an " + "HTTP-request-controlled format string. Malformed specifiers can " + "crash the handler (TypeError) and `%(name)s` access can reveal " + "arbitrary mapping keys. Use a literal format string and pass " + "untrusted values as arguments only.",
+          file,
+          line: i2 + 1,
+          snippet: line.trim()
+        });
+      }
+    }
+    const dm = line.match(dotFormatRe);
+    if (dm && taintedVars.has(dm[1])) {
+      const key = `${i2 + 1}:dotformat`;
+      if (!seen.has(key)) {
+        seen.add(key);
+        findings.push({
+          id: `format_string-${file}-${i2 + 1}-py-strformat`,
+          pass: "language-sources",
+          category: "security",
+          rule_id: "format_string",
+          cwe: "CWE-134",
+          severity: "high",
+          level: "error",
+          message: "Format-string injection: Python `<tainted>.format(...)` lets " + "the attacker control the format template. Field-access shapes " + "such as `{0.__class__.__init__.__globals__}` can leak module " + "globals (e.g. secret keys). Use a literal template and pass " + "untrusted values as positional/keyword arguments only.",
+          file,
+          line: i2 + 1,
+          snippet: line.trim()
+        });
+      }
+    }
+  }
+  return findings;
+}
+function findJsUtilFormatFormatStringFindings(code, file) {
+  const findings = [];
+  if (typeof code !== "string" || code.length === 0)
+    return findings;
+  if (!/\butil\s*\.\s*format\s*\(/.test(code))
+    return findings;
+  if (!/\breq\s*\.\s*(?:query|body|params|headers|cookies)\b/.test(code)) {
+    return findings;
+  }
+  const lines = code.split(`
+`);
+  const reqExtractRe = /\breq\s*\.\s*(?:query|body|params|headers|cookies)\b/;
+  const taintedVars = new Set;
+  for (let pass = 0;pass < 3; pass++) {
+    const before = taintedVars.size;
+    for (let i2 = 0;i2 < lines.length; i2++) {
+      const t = lines[i2].trim();
+      if (t.startsWith("//"))
+        continue;
+      const a = t.match(/^(?:const|let|var)\s+(\w+)\s*=\s*(.+?);?$/);
+      if (!a)
+        continue;
+      const lhs = a[1];
+      const rhs = a[2];
+      if (taintedVars.has(lhs))
+        continue;
+      if (reqExtractRe.test(rhs)) {
+        taintedVars.add(lhs);
+        continue;
+      }
+      for (const v of taintedVars) {
+        if (new RegExp(`\\b${v}\\b`).test(rhs)) {
+          taintedVars.add(lhs);
+          break;
+        }
+      }
+    }
+    if (taintedVars.size === before)
+      break;
+  }
+  if (taintedVars.size === 0)
+    return findings;
+  const callRe = /\butil\s*\.\s*format\s*\(\s*([\w.]+)\s*[,)]/;
+  for (let i2 = 0;i2 < lines.length; i2++) {
+    const line = lines[i2];
+    const m = line.match(callRe);
+    if (!m)
+      continue;
+    const arg = m[1];
+    const root = arg.split(".")[0];
+    if (!taintedVars.has(root) && !reqExtractRe.test(arg))
+      continue;
+    findings.push({
+      id: `format_string-${file}-${i2 + 1}-js-util-format`,
+      pass: "language-sources",
+      category: "security",
+      rule_id: "format_string",
+      cwe: "CWE-134",
+      severity: "medium",
+      level: "error",
+      message: "Format-string injection: Node `util.format(<tainted>, ...)` uses " + "an HTTP-request-controlled format string. The attacker can " + "manipulate `%s`/`%j`/`%O` specifiers to alter the rendered " + "output. Pass user input as a subsequent argument with a literal " + "format string.",
+      file,
+      line: i2 + 1,
+      snippet: line.trim()
+    });
+  }
+  return findings;
+}
+function findPythonHeaderCrlfInjectionFindings(code, file) {
+  const findings = [];
+  if (typeof code !== "string" || code.length === 0)
+    return findings;
+  if (!/\b\w+\s*\.\s*headers\b/.test(code))
+    return findings;
+  if (!/\b(?:request\.(?:args|form|values|json|files|cookies|headers|data)|flask\.request)\b/.test(code)) {
+    return findings;
+  }
+  const lines = code.split(`
+`);
+  const reqExtractRe = /\b(?:request\.(?:args|form|values|json|files|cookies|headers|data)\b|flask\.request\b)/;
+  const taintedVars = new Set;
+  for (let pass = 0;pass < 3; pass++) {
+    const before = taintedVars.size;
+    for (let i2 = 0;i2 < lines.length; i2++) {
+      const t = lines[i2].trim();
+      if (t.startsWith("#"))
+        continue;
+      const a = t.match(/^(\w+)\s*=\s*(.+?)$/);
+      if (!a)
+        continue;
+      const lhs = a[1];
+      const rhs = a[2];
+      if (taintedVars.has(lhs))
+        continue;
+      if (reqExtractRe.test(rhs)) {
+        taintedVars.add(lhs);
+        continue;
+      }
+      for (const v of taintedVars) {
+        if (new RegExp(`\\b${v}\\b`).test(rhs)) {
+          taintedVars.add(lhs);
+          break;
+        }
+      }
+    }
+    if (taintedVars.size === before)
+      break;
+  }
+  if (taintedVars.size === 0)
+    return findings;
+  const subscriptRe = /\b\w+\s*\.\s*headers\s*\[\s*['"][^'"]+['"]\s*\]\s*=\s*(.+)$/;
+  const methodRe = /\b\w+\s*\.\s*headers\s*\.\s*(?:add|set|setdefault|append)\s*\(\s*['"][^'"]+['"]\s*,\s*(.+?)\)/;
+  for (let i2 = 0;i2 < lines.length; i2++) {
+    const line = lines[i2];
+    const t = line.trim();
+    if (t.startsWith("#"))
+      continue;
+    let expr = null;
+    const sm = line.match(subscriptRe);
+    if (sm)
+      expr = sm[1];
+    else {
+      const mm = line.match(methodRe);
+      if (mm)
+        expr = mm[1];
+    }
+    if (!expr)
+      continue;
+    let tainted = reqExtractRe.test(expr);
+    if (!tainted) {
+      for (const v of taintedVars) {
+        if (new RegExp(`\\b${v}\\b`).test(expr)) {
+          tainted = true;
+          break;
+        }
+      }
+    }
+    if (!tainted)
+      continue;
+    findings.push({
+      id: `crlf-${file}-${i2 + 1}-py-headers`,
+      pass: "language-sources",
+      category: "security",
+      rule_id: "crlf",
+      cwe: "CWE-113",
+      severity: "medium",
+      level: "error",
+      message: "CRLF / header injection: Python Flask/Werkzeug " + "`response.headers[...] = <tainted>` lets an attacker inject a " + "`\\r\\n` sequence and forge additional headers or split the " + "response body. Validate the value (reject control characters) or " + "use a fixed allowlist.",
+      file,
+      line: i2 + 1,
+      snippet: line.trim()
+    });
+  }
+  return findings;
+}
 
 // ../circle-ir/dist/analysis/passes/sink-filter-pass.js
 var JS_XSS_SANITIZERS = [
@@ -40076,7 +40418,7 @@ var colors = {
 };
 
 // src/version.ts
-var version = "3.134.0";
+var version = "3.136.0";
 
 // src/formatters.ts
 var LIBRARY_API_SURFACE_TAG2 = "library-api-surface:caller-responsibility";

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "cognium-dev",
-  "version": "3.134.0",
+  "version": "3.136.0",
   "description": "Static Application Security Testing CLI for detecting security vulnerabilities via taint tracking",
   "main": "dist/index.js",
   "types": "dist/index.d.ts",
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@
   },
   "dependencies": {
     "@cognium/project-profile-detect": "^1.1.0",
-    "circle-ir": "^3.134.0"
+    "circle-ir": "^3.136.0"
   },
   "devDependencies": {
     "@types/node": "^25.5.0",