codiedev 0.10.0-beta.1 → 0.10.0-beta.10

package/dist/commands/security.js

@@ -1,156 +0,0 @@
-"use strict";
-Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
-exports.runSecurityCommand = runSecurityCommand;
-const securityInstall_1 = require("../securityInstall");
-const securityPilot_1 = require("../securityPilot");
-const securityPolicy_1 = require("../securityPolicy");
-const securityInventory_1 = require("../securityInventory");
-const securityDeepScan_1 = require("../securityDeepScan");
-const utils_1 = require("../utils");
-const securityDoctor_1 = require("../securityDoctor");
-const securityFeature_1 = require("../securityFeature");
-const SECURITY_USAGE = "Usage: codiedev security <doctor|pilot|inventory|scan|sync|rollback> [--json] [--deep] [--connect-mcp] [--supply-chain] [--no-upload] [--yes]";
-function printPilot(json) {
-    const report = (0, securityPilot_1.runSyntheticSecurityPilot)();
-    if (json) {
-        console.log(JSON.stringify(report, null, 2));
-        return report.ok;
-    }
-    console.log("\nCodiedev security pilot — synthetic, side-effect-free validation\n");
-    for (const item of report.cases) {
-        console.log(`${item.passed ? "✓" : "✗"} ${item.surface}: ${item.name} (${item.actual})`);
-    }
-    console.log(`\n${report.ok ? "PASS" : "FAIL"}: ${report.cases.filter((item) => item.passed).length}/${report.cases.length} policy checks matched.`);
-    console.log("No commands were executed and no real credentials were used.\n");
-    return report.ok;
-}
-function printDoctor(json, companyId) {
-    const result = (0, securityDoctor_1.collectSecurityDoctorReport)(companyId);
-    if (json) {
-        console.log(JSON.stringify(result, null, 2));
-        return result.ok;
-    }
-    console.log("\nCodiedev doctor — Agent Security details\n");
-    for (const check of (0, securityDoctor_1.securityDoctorChecks)(result)) {
-        const mark = check.status === "pass" ? "✓" : check.status === "warn" ? "!" : "✗";
-        console.log(`${mark} ${check.name}: ${check.detail}`);
-    }
-    console.log(`\n${result.ok ? "PASS" : "FAIL"}: ${result.ok ? "endpoint security is healthy" : "run `codiedev connect`, then repeat this check"}.\n`);
-    return result.ok;
-}
-async function runSecurityCommand(args) {
-    const subcommand = args.find((arg) => !arg.startsWith("-")) ?? "doctor";
-    const json = args.includes("--json");
-    if (args.includes("--help") || args.includes("-h") || subcommand === "help") {
-        console.log(SECURITY_USAGE);
-        return;
-    }
-    const connectedConfig = (0, utils_1.readConfig)();
-    const requiresEntitlement = !["pilot", "self-test"].includes(subcommand);
-    if (requiresEntitlement && (!connectedConfig || !(0, securityFeature_1.isAgentSecurityEnabled)(connectedConfig))) {
-        const detail = connectedConfig
-            ? `Agent Security is not enabled for ${connectedConfig.companyName}.`
-            : "Not connected. Run `codiedev connect` first.";
-        if (json)
-            console.log(JSON.stringify({ schemaVersion: 1, enabled: false, detail }, null, 2));
-        else
-            console.log(`\n${detail}\n`);
-        return;
-    }
-    if (subcommand === "inventory" || subcommand === "scan") {
-        const workspaceFlag = args.indexOf("--workspace");
-        const workspace = workspaceFlag >= 0 && args[workspaceFlag + 1]
-            ? args[workspaceFlag + 1]
-            : process.cwd();
-        const inventory = (0, securityInventory_1.buildSecurityInventory)({ workspace });
-        const deep = subcommand === "scan" && args.includes("--deep")
-            ? (0, securityDeepScan_1.runDeepSecurityScan)(inventory, {
-                workspace,
-                connectMcp: args.includes("--connect-mcp"),
-                supplyChain: args.includes("--supply-chain"),
-            })
-            : undefined;
-        const uploadableInventory = deep ? (0, securityDeepScan_1.mergeDeepScanFindings)(inventory, deep) : inventory;
-        let upload;
-        const config = (0, utils_1.readConfig)();
-        if (config && !args.includes("--no-upload")) {
-            try {
-                upload = await (0, securityInventory_1.uploadSecurityInventory)(uploadableInventory, config);
-            }
-            catch (error) {
-                if (!json)
-                    console.warn(`Inventory upload failed; local scan is still valid: ${error.message}`);
-            }
-        }
-        const output = { inventory: uploadableInventory, scanners: (0, securityInventory_1.scannerAvailability)(), ...(deep ? { deep } : {}), ...(upload ? { upload } : {}) };
-        if (json)
-            console.log(JSON.stringify(output, null, 2));
-        else {
-            const risky = inventory.components.filter((component) => component.findings.length > 0).length;
-            console.log(`\nCodiedev security inventory — ${inventory.components.length} components, ${risky} with local findings, ${inventory.drift.length} changed\n`);
-            const counts = new Map();
-            for (const component of inventory.components)
-                counts.set(component.kind, (counts.get(component.kind) ?? 0) + 1);
-            for (const [kind, count] of [...counts].sort())
-                console.log(`  ${kind}: ${count}`);
-            if (deep)
-                for (const run of deep.runs)
-                    console.log(`  ${run.scanner}: ${run.status} — ${run.detail}`);
-            if (upload)
-                console.log(`\nUploaded ${upload.accepted} component records to the security workspace.`);
-            console.log("\nUse --json for machine-readable hashes and findings. Use scan --deep for installed OSS scanners; --connect-mcp and --supply-chain are explicit because they start or download third-party code.\n");
-        }
-        return;
-    }
-    if (subcommand === "sync") {
-        const config = (0, utils_1.readConfig)();
-        if (!config) {
-            console.error("Not connected. Run `codiedev connect` first.");
-            process.exitCode = 1;
-            return;
-        }
-        try {
-            const policy = await (0, securityPolicy_1.syncEndpointSecurityPolicy)(config);
-            if (json)
-                console.log(JSON.stringify({ ok: true, policy }, null, 2));
-            else {
-                const verification = (0, securityPolicy_1.verifyEndpointSecurityPolicySignature)(policy);
-                console.log(`Security policy v${policy.policyVersion} synced (${policy.enforcementMode} mode; ${verification.detail}).`);
-            }
-        }
-        catch (error) {
-            console.error(`Security policy sync failed: ${error.message}`);
-            process.exitCode = 1;
-        }
-        return;
-    }
-    if (subcommand === "rollback") {
-        if (!args.includes("--yes")) {
-            console.error("Rollback overwrites the installed agent hook configurations. Re-run with `codiedev security rollback --yes` after confirming the snapshot shown by `codiedev doctor`.");
-            process.exitCode = 1;
-            return;
-        }
-        try {
-            const result = (0, securityInstall_1.restoreSecurityInstallSnapshot)((0, securityInstall_1.readSecurityInstallManifest)());
-            if (json)
-                console.log(JSON.stringify({ schemaVersion: 1, ok: true, ...result }, null, 2));
-            else
-                console.log(`Restored ${result.restored} hook configuration(s) from snapshot ${result.snapshotId}.`);
-        }
-        catch (error) {
-            console.error(`Rollback failed: ${error.message}`);
-            process.exitCode = 1;
-        }
-        return;
-    }
-    const ok = subcommand === "pilot" || subcommand === "self-test"
-        ? printPilot(json)
-        : subcommand === "doctor" || subcommand === "status"
-            ? printDoctor(json, connectedConfig.companyId)
-            : false;
-    if (!["pilot", "self-test", "doctor", "status"].includes(subcommand)) {
-        console.error(SECURITY_USAGE);
-    }
-    if (!ok)
-        process.exitCode = 1;
-}

package/dist/commands/send.d.ts

@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-import type { CodiedevConfig } from "../utils";
-export declare function runSend(args: string[], configOverride?: CodiedevConfig): Promise<void>;

package/dist/commands/share.d.ts

@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-import type { CodiedevConfig } from "../utils";
-export declare function runShare(args: string[], configOverride?: CodiedevConfig): Promise<void>;

package/dist/commands/shared.d.ts

@@ -1,64 +0,0 @@
-import { CodiedevConfig } from "../utils";
-/**
- * Layer per-command env overrides on top of the on-disk config. Useful for
- * ad-hoc testing — point a prod-connected CLI at a dev Convex deployment
- * without re-running `codiedev connect`. Both CODIEDEV_URL and CODIEDEV_TOKEN
- * must be set together (half-overrides would mismatch URL and auth realm).
- * Other fields (companyId, repos[]) come from the file unchanged.
- */
-export declare function applyConfigEnvOverrides(config: CodiedevConfig): CodiedevConfig;
-/**
- * Require a connected Codiedev config. Exits the process with a helpful
- * message if the user hasn't run `codiedev connect` yet.
- */
-export declare function requireConfig(): CodiedevConfig;
-/**
- * Perform an authenticated HTTP request against the Codiedev backend.
- * Returns the parsed JSON response body. Throws on non-2xx.
- */
-export declare function apiRequest<T = unknown>(method: "GET" | "POST", path: string, options: {
-    config: CodiedevConfig;
-    body?: Record<string, unknown>;
-    query?: Record<string, string | number | undefined>;
-}): Promise<T>;
-/**
- * Fire-and-forget per-invocation telemetry from CLI subcommands. Mirrors
- * the MCP server's emitTelemetry but stamps `source: "cli"` so adoption
- * dashboards can distinguish between the two surfaces. Never blocks the
- * user's command, never throws — telemetry must not change behavior.
- */
-export declare function recordAgentEvent(config: CodiedevConfig, event: {
-    tool: string;
-    ok: boolean;
-    latencyMs: number;
-    error?: string;
-}): void;
-/**
- * Per-step install telemetry for `npx codiedev connect`. One row per phase
- * (started, detect, install_target, validate_token, completed, failed) so
- * the admin company page can show a timeline when a customer says "it says
- * connected but it doesn't work." Fire-and-forget, never throws. Auto-stamps
- * platform + node + cli version so call sites only need step/target/ok/error.
- */
-export type InstallTelemetryStep = "started" | "detect" | "install_target" | "validate_token" | "completed" | "failed";
-export declare function recordInstallEvent(config: CodiedevConfig, event: {
-    step: InstallTelemetryStep;
-    target?: string;
-    ok: boolean;
-    error?: string;
-}): void;
-/**
- * Wraps a CLI subcommand body so success and failure both record telemetry
- * and the original error propagates after the event is queued. Use this in
- * each `runXxx` command instead of inline timing + try/catch boilerplate.
- */
-export declare function withTelemetry<T>(config: CodiedevConfig, tool: string, fn: () => Promise<T>): Promise<T>;
-/**
- * Relative-time formatter for inbox / listing output.
- */
-export declare function timeAgo(ts: number): string;
-/**
- * Strip surrounding quotes from a CLI argument if the user wrapped it.
- * `codiedev ping <name> "hey"` on some shells passes the quotes through.
- */
-export declare function stripQuotes(s: string): string;

package/dist/configDir.d.ts

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-export declare function codiedevStateDir(): string;

package/dist/connect.d.ts

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-export declare function runConnect(args?: string[]): Promise<void>;

package/dist/connectFlow.d.ts

@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
-import type { CodiedevConfig } from "./utils";
-export type ConnectTokenSource = "reused" | "prompt-required";
-export interface ConnectTokenInput {
-    savedConfig: CodiedevConfig | null;
-    force: boolean;
-}
-export type ConnectTokenResult = {
-    source: "reused";
-    token: string;
-} | {
-    source: "prompt-required";
-};
-export declare function resolveConnectToken(input: ConnectTokenInput): ConnectTokenResult;

package/dist/cursorHooks.d.ts

@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
-/** Cursor's native hook payload is close to Claude Code's, but its stable
- * conversation identifier and several tool fields use different names. Keep
- * the translation at the process boundary so the shared capture/security
- * pipeline never has to guess which surface produced an event. */
-export declare function normalizeCursorHookInput<T extends Record<string, unknown>>(input: T): T & Record<string, unknown>;
-/** Cursor stores JSONL message roles in `role`; the shared capture pipeline
- * uses Claude's top-level `type` discriminator. Preserve all original fields
- * and add only that discriminator so the existing parsers see real messages. */
-export declare function normalizeCursorTranscript(content: string): string;
-/** Cursor may change its private JSONL record shape independently of the hook
- * contract. Only a byte-empty snapshot is safe to discard; a non-empty file
- * that the current normalizer cannot parse must still be uploaded for backend
- * recovery and diagnosis. */
-export declare function isCursorTranscriptEmpty(content: string): boolean;
-export declare function cursorPreToolBlockResponse(reason: string): {
-    permission: "deny";
-    user_message: string;
-    agent_message: string;
-};
-export declare function cursorPromptBlockResponse(reason: string): {
-    continue: false;
-    user_message: string;
-};

package/dist/detection.d.ts

@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-export interface ClaudeCodeProbe {
-    dirExists: boolean;
-    binOnPath: boolean;
-}
-/**
- * Claude Code is "installed" if either ~/.claude exists (the user has
- * launched the app at least once) OR the `claude` binary is on PATH (the
- * user installed via npm/brew but hasn't launched yet). Either signal is
- * sufficient — we want to wire up the hook the moment the user has
- * obviously committed to the tool.
- */
-export declare function detectClaudeCode(probe: ClaudeCodeProbe): boolean;
-/**
- * True iff `cmd` looks like a hook command codiedev itself wrote. Used
- * both by the install filter (so `connect` replaces the existing entry
- * instead of stacking another one) and by `codiedev doctor` (so it can
- * grade whether the hook is wired up).
- *
- * Must match every form codiedev can write:
- *   - Legacy `npx codiedev-hook <subcommand>`
- *   - Absolute path from npm-registry install:
- *     `<node> /.../node_modules/codiedev/dist/hook.js <subcommand>`
- *   - Absolute path from `npm link` dev install (the monorepo folder
- *     is named `codiedev-cli`, not `codiedev`):
- *     `<node> /.../codiedev-cli/dist/hook.js <subcommand>`
- *
- * The `codiedev[^/\\]*` allows the trailing `-cli` (or any future suffix)
- * without matching unrelated paths like `notcodiedev/dist/hook.js`.
- */
-export declare function isCodiedevHookCommand(cmd: string | undefined): boolean;

package/dist/hook.d.ts

@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env node
-export declare function buildDiscoveryContext(skills: Array<{
-    key: string;
-    title: string;
-    score: number;
-}>): string | null;

package/dist/inboxFormat.d.ts

@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-export interface InboxPing {
-    pingId: string;
-    createdAt: number;
-    readAt?: number;
-    from: {
-        name: string;
-        email: string;
-    } | null;
-    subjectKey: string | null;
-    subject: {
-        title?: string;
-    } | null;
-    preview: string;
-}
-export interface InboxMention {
-    mentionId: string;
-    createdAt: number;
-    readAt?: number | null;
-    from: {
-        name: string;
-        email: string;
-    } | null;
-    postTitle: string | null;
-    preview: string | null;
-    url: string | null;
-}
-/**
- * Render the inbox for BOTH surfaces — `codiedev inbox` and the MCP
- * `codiedev_inbox` tool an agent calls for "any messages?". Shared so the
- * agent path can never drift back to pings-only while the human path shows
- * mentions.
- */
-export declare function formatInbox(opts: {
-    pings: InboxPing[];
-    mentions?: InboxMention[];
-    unreadOnly: boolean;
-    limit?: number;
-}): string[];

package/dist/limitEvent.d.ts

@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
-export type LimitKind = "session" | "user_spend" | "org_spend" | "other";
-export interface LimitEvent {
-    kind: LimitKind;
-    at: number;
-    resetText: string | null;
-    reason?: string;
-}
-export declare function classifyLimitKind(text: string): LimitKind;
-export declare function parseLimitEventFromTranscript(transcript: string): LimitEvent | null;
-/**
- * Codex writes a structured RateLimitSnapshot on token_count events. A normal
- * turn has `rate_limit_reached_type: null`; a blocked turn names the exact
- * boundary. Reading that field avoids locale-dependent terminal copy.
- */
-export declare function parseCodexLimitEventFromTranscript(transcript: string): LimitEvent | null;
-export declare function tailForLimitEvent(transcript: string, maxChars?: number): string;

package/dist/limitEventReporter.d.ts

@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-import { type LimitEvent } from "./limitEvent";
-export type LimitEventSource = "claude-code" | "codex";
-export type LimitEventPayload = LimitEvent & {
-    source: LimitEventSource;
-    sessionId?: string;
-    transcriptTail?: string;
-};
-export declare function postLimitEvent(config: {
-    backendUrl: string;
-    token: string;
-}, payload: LimitEventPayload, timeoutMs?: number): Promise<void>;
-export declare function reportTranscriptLimitEvent(args: {
-    config: {
-        backendUrl: string;
-        token: string;
-    };
-    source: LimitEventSource;
-    sessionId?: string;
-    transcript: string;
-    emitMinimalOnMiss?: boolean;
-}): Promise<boolean>;

package/dist/mcp.d.ts

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env node
-/**
- * Codiedev MCP server.
- *
- * Exposes the Codiedev artifact-collaboration surface as Model Context
- * Protocol tools so Claude Code / Codex / any MCP-capable agent can invoke
- * them natively from natural language (e.g. "push the spec we just worked on").
- *
- * Reads the same ~/.codiedev/config.json the CLI uses. Install + wire up by
- * running `npx codiedev connect`.
- */
-export {};

package/dist/prUrl.d.ts

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-export type GitProvider = "github" | "gitlab";
-export interface PrOrMrRef {
-    provider: GitProvider;
-    host: string;
-    owner: string;
-    repo: string;
-    number: number;
-}
-export declare function parsePrOrMrUrl(url: string): PrOrMrRef | null;

package/dist/prUrl.js

@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-"use strict";
-// PR/MR URL parser. GitHub uses `/pull/<n>`, GitLab uses `/-/merge_requests/<n>`.
-// Self-hosted GitLab keeps the same path shape on a different host (Sonifi
-// runs git.sonifi.com behind a Cloudflare tunnel, for example). Nested groups
-// land in `owner` as a slash-joined path so we can rebuild the full project
-// path when calling the GitLab API.
-Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
-exports.parsePrOrMrUrl = parsePrOrMrUrl;
-function parsePrOrMrUrl(url) {
-    if (!url)
-        return null;
-    const gh = url.match(/^https?:\/\/([^/]+)\/([^/]+)\/([^/]+)\/pull\/(\d+)(?:[/?#]|$)/);
-    if (gh && /github/i.test(gh[1])) {
-        return {
-            provider: "github",
-            host: gh[1],
-            owner: gh[2],
-            repo: gh[3],
-            number: Number(gh[4]),
-        };
-    }
-    const gl = url.match(/^https?:\/\/([^/]+)\/(.+)\/([^/]+)\/-\/merge_requests\/(\d+)(?:[/?#]|$)/);
-    if (gl) {
-        return {
-            provider: "gitlab",
-            host: gl[1],
-            owner: gl[2],
-            repo: gl[3],
-            number: Number(gl[4]),
-        };
-    }
-    return null;
-}

package/dist/repoResolver.d.ts

@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
-export type ResolveSource = "provided" | "resolved" | "unmatched";
-export interface RepoLite {
-    _id: string;
-    owner: string;
-    name: string;
-    gitProvider?: "github" | "gitlab";
-}
-export interface ResolveInput {
-    remoteUrl: string | null | undefined;
-    providedRepoId: string | null;
-    companyRepos: ReadonlyArray<RepoLite>;
-}
-export interface ResolveResult {
-    repoId: string | null;
-    source: ResolveSource;
-}
-export declare function resolveRepoForCapture(input: ResolveInput): ResolveResult;

package/dist/secret.d.ts

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-export declare function maskToken(token: string | null | undefined): string;

package/dist/security.d.ts

@@ -1,102 +0,0 @@
-export type SecurityHookPhase = "pre" | "post" | "failure";
-export type AgentSurface = "claude-code" | "codex" | "cursor" | "codie-harness";
-export declare const SECURITY_RUNTIME_VERSION = 1;
-export interface RawSecurityHookInput {
-    session_id?: string;
-    sessionId?: string;
-    cwd?: string;
-    hook_event_name?: string;
-    hookEventName?: string;
-    tool_name?: string;
-    toolName?: string;
-    tool_input?: unknown;
-    toolInput?: unknown;
-    tool_response?: unknown;
-    toolResponse?: unknown;
-    tool_use_id?: string;
-    toolUseId?: string;
-    duration_ms?: number;
-    durationMs?: number;
-    error?: unknown;
-    prompt?: string;
-}
-export interface SecurityWorkflowEvent {
-    schemaVersion: 1;
-    source: AgentSurface;
-    phase: SecurityHookPhase;
-    sessionId: string;
-    toolName: string;
-    toolUseId?: string;
-    cwd?: string;
-    observedAt: number;
-    toolDurationMs?: number;
-    payload: unknown;
-    redactionCount: number;
-    localDecision?: LocalSecurityAction;
-    localCategory?: LocalSecurityDecision["category"];
-    endpointId?: string;
-    endpointName?: string;
-    cliVersion?: string;
-    securityRuntimeVersion?: number;
-    securityPolicyVersion?: number;
-}
-export type LocalSecurityAction = "allow" | "alert" | "block";
-export type SecurityCategory = "secret_in_prompt" | "secret_exfiltration" | "destructive_outside_workspace" | "sensitive_file_read" | "sensitive_file_write" | "protected_agent_config_write" | "unapproved_network_egress" | "untrusted_mcp_tool" | "unapproved_command" | "obfuscated_shell_command" | "package_install" | "sensitive_read_then_egress";
-export interface EndpointSecurityPolicy {
-    schemaVersion: 1;
-    policyVersion: number;
-    enforcementMode: "alert" | "block";
-    rules: Partial<Record<SecurityCategory, LocalSecurityAction>>;
-    constraints?: {
-        allowedMcpServers?: string[];
-        allowedHosts?: string[];
-        allowedCommands?: string[];
-    };
-    exceptions: Array<{
-        scope: "company" | "user" | "source" | "repository" | "tool" | "category";
-        scopeValue: string;
-    }>;
-    fetchedAt: number;
-    signature?: {
-        algorithm: "Ed25519";
-        keyId: string;
-        signedAt: number;
-        value: string;
-    };
-}
-export interface LocalSecurityDecision {
-    action: LocalSecurityAction;
-    category?: SecurityCategory;
-    reason?: string;
-}
-export declare function withEndpointIdentity(event: SecurityWorkflowEvent, identity: {
-    endpointId?: string;
-    endpointName?: string;
-    cliVersion?: string;
-    securityRuntimeVersion?: number;
-    securityPolicyVersion?: number;
-}): SecurityWorkflowEvent;
-/**
- * Runs before a user prompt reaches the model. This is intentionally narrow:
- * block credential material, but allow safe references such as
- * `$OPENAI_API_KEY` so developers can ask agents to use environment variables
- * without pasting their values.
- */
-export declare function evaluatePromptSecurity(prompt: string | undefined, policy?: EndpointSecurityPolicy, source?: AgentSurface): LocalSecurityDecision;
-/** Runs synchronously before a tool executes. No network or model is involved. */
-export declare function evaluateToolSecurity(input: RawSecurityHookInput, phase: SecurityHookPhase, policy?: EndpointSecurityPolicy, source?: AgentSurface, sessionContext?: {
-    sensitiveReadAt?: number;
-    now?: number;
-}): LocalSecurityDecision;
-export declare function securityInputHasSensitivePath(input: RawSecurityHookInput): boolean;
-export declare function buildSecurityWorkflowEvent(input: RawSecurityHookInput, phase: SecurityHookPhase, source: AgentSurface, now?: () => number): SecurityWorkflowEvent | null;
-/**
- * Captures the intent side of the causal chain without weakening the local
- * privacy boundary. A prompt that the deterministic policy blocks never
- * becomes an uploadable event; allowed prompts are redacted and bounded using
- * the same sanitizer as tool payloads.
- */
-export declare function buildSecurityPromptEvent(input: Pick<RawSecurityHookInput, "session_id" | "sessionId" | "cwd" | "prompt">, source: AgentSurface, now?: () => number, policy?: EndpointSecurityPolicy): SecurityWorkflowEvent | null;
-/** Audit-safe evidence for a blocked prompt. The secret-bearing prompt is
- * intentionally omitted; administrators still see that prevention occurred. */
-export declare function buildBlockedSecurityPromptEvent(input: Pick<RawSecurityHookInput, "session_id" | "sessionId" | "cwd">, source: AgentSurface, category: NonNullable<LocalSecurityDecision["category"]>, now?: () => number): SecurityWorkflowEvent | null;