codebot-ai 1.6.0 → 1.8.0

package/dist/history.js

@@ -38,38 +38,50 @@ const fs = __importStar(require("fs"));
 const path = __importStar(require("path"));
 const os = __importStar(require("os"));
 const crypto = __importStar(require("crypto"));
+const integrity_1 = require("./integrity");
 const SESSIONS_DIR = path.join(os.homedir(), '.codebot', 'sessions');
 class SessionManager {
     sessionId;
     filePath;
     model;
+    integrityKey;
     constructor(model, sessionId) {
         this.model = model;
         this.sessionId = sessionId || crypto.randomUUID();
+        this.integrityKey = (0, integrity_1.deriveSessionKey)(this.sessionId);
         fs.mkdirSync(SESSIONS_DIR, { recursive: true });
         this.filePath = path.join(SESSIONS_DIR, `${this.sessionId}.jsonl`);
     }
     getId() {
         return this.sessionId;
     }
-    /** Append a message to the session file */
+    /** Append a message to the session file (HMAC signed) */
     save(message) {
         try {
-            const line = JSON.stringify({
+            const record = {
                 ...message,
                 _ts: new Date().toISOString(),
                 _model: this.model,
-            });
-            fs.appendFileSync(this.filePath, line + '\n');
+            };
+            record._sig = (0, integrity_1.signMessage)(record, this.integrityKey);
+            fs.appendFileSync(this.filePath, JSON.stringify(record) + '\n');
         }
         catch {
             // Don't crash on write failure — session persistence is best-effort
         }
     }
-    /** Save all messages (atomic overwrite via temp file + rename) */
+    /** Save all messages (atomic overwrite, HMAC signed) */
     saveAll(messages) {
         try {
-            const lines = messages.map(m => JSON.stringify({ ...m, _ts: new Date().toISOString(), _model: this.model }));
+            const lines = messages.map(m => {
+                const record = {
+                    ...m,
+                    _ts: new Date().toISOString(),
+                    _model: this.model,
+                };
+                record._sig = (0, integrity_1.signMessage)(record, this.integrityKey);
+                return JSON.stringify(record);
+            });
             const tmpPath = this.filePath + '.tmp';
             fs.writeFileSync(tmpPath, lines.join('\n') + '\n');
             fs.renameSync(tmpPath, this.filePath);
@@ -78,7 +90,7 @@ class SessionManager {
             // Don't crash — session persistence is best-effort
         }
     }
-    /** Load messages from a session file (skips malformed lines) */
+    /** Load messages from a session file (verifies HMAC, drops tampered) */
     load() {
         if (!fs.existsSync(this.filePath))
             return [];
@@ -92,20 +104,55 @@ class SessionManager {
         if (!content)
             return [];
         const messages = [];
+        let dropped = 0;
         for (const line of content.split('\n')) {
             try {
                 const obj = JSON.parse(line);
+                // Verify integrity if signature present (backward compat: unsigned messages pass)
+                if (obj._sig) {
+                    if (!(0, integrity_1.verifyMessage)(obj, this.integrityKey)) {
+                        dropped++;
+                        continue; // Drop tampered message
+                    }
+                }
                 delete obj._ts;
                 delete obj._model;
+                delete obj._sig;
                 messages.push(obj);
             }
             catch {
-                // Skip malformed line — don't crash the whole load
                 continue;
             }
         }
+        if (dropped > 0) {
+            console.warn(`Warning: Dropped ${dropped} tampered message(s) from session ${this.sessionId.substring(0, 8)}.`);
+        }
         return messages;
     }
+    /** Verify integrity of all messages in this session. */
+    verifyIntegrity() {
+        if (!fs.existsSync(this.filePath)) {
+            return { valid: 0, tampered: 0, unsigned: 0, tamperedIndices: [] };
+        }
+        try {
+            const content = fs.readFileSync(this.filePath, 'utf-8').trim();
+            if (!content)
+                return { valid: 0, tampered: 0, unsigned: 0, tamperedIndices: [] };
+            const records = [];
+            for (const line of content.split('\n')) {
+                try {
+                    records.push(JSON.parse(line));
+                }
+                catch {
+                    continue;
+                }
+            }
+            return (0, integrity_1.verifyMessages)(records, this.integrityKey);
+        }
+        catch {
+            return { valid: 0, tampered: 0, unsigned: 0, tamperedIndices: [] };
+        }
+    }
     /** List recent sessions */
     static list(limit = 10) {
         if (!fs.existsSync(SESSIONS_DIR))

package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -11,5 +11,11 @@ export { loadPlugins } from './plugins';
 export { loadMCPTools } from './mcp';
 export { MODEL_REGISTRY, PROVIDER_DEFAULTS, getModelInfo, detectProvider } from './providers/registry';
 export type { ModelInfo } from './providers/registry';
+export { CapabilityChecker } from './capabilities';
+export type { ToolCapabilities, CapabilityConfig } from './capabilities';
+export { deriveSessionKey, signMessage, verifyMessage, verifyMessages } from './integrity';
+export type { IntegrityResult } from './integrity';
+export { ReplayProvider, loadSessionForReplay, compareOutputs, listReplayableSessions } from './replay';
+export type { SessionReplayData, ReplayDivergence } from './replay';
 export * from './types';
 //# sourceMappingURL=index.d.ts.map

package/dist/index.js

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ var __exportStar = (this && this.__exportStar) || function(m, exports) {
     for (var p in m) if (p !== "default" && !Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(exports, p)) __createBinding(exports, m, p);
 };
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
-exports.detectProvider = exports.getModelInfo = exports.PROVIDER_DEFAULTS = exports.MODEL_REGISTRY = exports.loadMCPTools = exports.loadPlugins = exports.parseToolCalls = exports.MemoryManager = exports.SessionManager = exports.buildRepoMap = exports.ContextManager = exports.ToolRegistry = exports.AnthropicProvider = exports.OpenAIProvider = exports.Agent = void 0;
+exports.listReplayableSessions = exports.compareOutputs = exports.loadSessionForReplay = exports.ReplayProvider = exports.verifyMessages = exports.verifyMessage = exports.signMessage = exports.deriveSessionKey = exports.CapabilityChecker = exports.detectProvider = exports.getModelInfo = exports.PROVIDER_DEFAULTS = exports.MODEL_REGISTRY = exports.loadMCPTools = exports.loadPlugins = exports.parseToolCalls = exports.MemoryManager = exports.SessionManager = exports.buildRepoMap = exports.ContextManager = exports.ToolRegistry = exports.AnthropicProvider = exports.OpenAIProvider = exports.Agent = void 0;
 var agent_1 = require("./agent");
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "Agent", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return agent_1.Agent; } });
 var openai_1 = require("./providers/openai");
@@ -42,5 +42,17 @@ Object.defineProperty(exports, "MODEL_REGISTRY", { enumerable: true, get: functi
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "PROVIDER_DEFAULTS", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return registry_1.PROVIDER_DEFAULTS; } });
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "getModelInfo", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return registry_1.getModelInfo; } });
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "detectProvider", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return registry_1.detectProvider; } });
+var capabilities_1 = require("./capabilities");
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "CapabilityChecker", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return capabilities_1.CapabilityChecker; } });
+var integrity_1 = require("./integrity");
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "deriveSessionKey", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return integrity_1.deriveSessionKey; } });
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "signMessage", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return integrity_1.signMessage; } });
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "verifyMessage", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return integrity_1.verifyMessage; } });
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "verifyMessages", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return integrity_1.verifyMessages; } });
+var replay_1 = require("./replay");
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "ReplayProvider", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return replay_1.ReplayProvider; } });
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "loadSessionForReplay", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return replay_1.loadSessionForReplay; } });
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "compareOutputs", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return replay_1.compareOutputs; } });
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "listReplayableSessions", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return replay_1.listReplayableSessions; } });
 __exportStar(require("./types"), exports);
 //# sourceMappingURL=index.js.map

package/dist/integrity.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+/**
+ * Session History Integrity for CodeBot v1.8.0
+ *
+ * HMAC-SHA256 signing/verification for session messages.
+ * Key: SHA-256(sessionId + machineId) where machineId = hostname:username.
+ *
+ * This is tamper-DETECTION, not tamper-prevention. The key is deterministic
+ * per session+machine so verification works without storing keys separately.
+ *
+ * Uses Node's built-in crypto module — zero runtime dependencies.
+ */
+/** Derive a per-session HMAC key. Deterministic for same session+machine. */
+export declare function deriveSessionKey(sessionId: string): Buffer;
+/**
+ * Compute HMAC-SHA256 signature for a message object.
+ * Excludes the _sig field from the signing input.
+ */
+export declare function signMessage(message: Record<string, unknown>, key: Buffer): string;
+/**
+ * Verify a message's HMAC signature.
+ * Returns false if no signature present or if it doesn't match.
+ */
+export declare function verifyMessage(message: Record<string, unknown>, key: Buffer): boolean;
+export interface IntegrityResult {
+    valid: number;
+    tampered: number;
+    unsigned: number;
+    tamperedIndices: number[];
+}
+/**
+ * Verify an array of signed messages.
+ * Unsigned messages (pre-v1.8.0) are counted but not flagged as tampered.
+ */
+export declare function verifyMessages(messages: Array<Record<string, unknown>>, key: Buffer): IntegrityResult;
+//# sourceMappingURL=integrity.d.ts.map

package/dist/integrity.js

@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+"use strict";
+/**
+ * Session History Integrity for CodeBot v1.8.0
+ *
+ * HMAC-SHA256 signing/verification for session messages.
+ * Key: SHA-256(sessionId + machineId) where machineId = hostname:username.
+ *
+ * This is tamper-DETECTION, not tamper-prevention. The key is deterministic
+ * per session+machine so verification works without storing keys separately.
+ *
+ * Uses Node's built-in crypto module — zero runtime dependencies.
+ */
+var __createBinding = (this && this.__createBinding) || (Object.create ? (function(o, m, k, k2) {
+    if (k2 === undefined) k2 = k;
+    var desc = Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(m, k);
+    if (!desc || ("get" in desc ? !m.__esModule : desc.writable || desc.configurable)) {
+      desc = { enumerable: true, get: function() { return m[k]; } };
+    }
+    Object.defineProperty(o, k2, desc);
+}) : (function(o, m, k, k2) {
+    if (k2 === undefined) k2 = k;
+    o[k2] = m[k];
+}));
+var __setModuleDefault = (this && this.__setModuleDefault) || (Object.create ? (function(o, v) {
+    Object.defineProperty(o, "default", { enumerable: true, value: v });
+}) : function(o, v) {
+    o["default"] = v;
+});
+var __importStar = (this && this.__importStar) || (function () {
+    var ownKeys = function(o) {
+        ownKeys = Object.getOwnPropertyNames || function (o) {
+            var ar = [];
+            for (var k in o) if (Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(o, k)) ar[ar.length] = k;
+            return ar;
+        };
+        return ownKeys(o);
+    };
+    return function (mod) {
+        if (mod && mod.__esModule) return mod;
+        var result = {};
+        if (mod != null) for (var k = ownKeys(mod), i = 0; i < k.length; i++) if (k[i] !== "default") __createBinding(result, mod, k[i]);
+        __setModuleDefault(result, mod);
+        return result;
+    };
+})();
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.deriveSessionKey = deriveSessionKey;
+exports.signMessage = signMessage;
+exports.verifyMessage = verifyMessage;
+exports.verifyMessages = verifyMessages;
+const crypto = __importStar(require("crypto"));
+const os = __importStar(require("os"));
+// ── Key Derivation ──
+/** Derive a per-session HMAC key. Deterministic for same session+machine. */
+function deriveSessionKey(sessionId) {
+    const machineId = os.hostname() + ':' + getUserName();
+    return crypto.createHash('sha256')
+        .update(sessionId + machineId)
+        .digest();
+}
+/** Get username safely. */
+function getUserName() {
+    try {
+        return os.userInfo().username;
+    }
+    catch {
+        return 'unknown';
+    }
+}
+// ── Signing & Verification ──
+/**
+ * Compute HMAC-SHA256 signature for a message object.
+ * Excludes the _sig field from the signing input.
+ */
+function signMessage(message, key) {
+    const payload = canonicalize(message);
+    return crypto.createHmac('sha256', key)
+        .update(payload)
+        .digest('hex');
+}
+/**
+ * Verify a message's HMAC signature.
+ * Returns false if no signature present or if it doesn't match.
+ */
+function verifyMessage(message, key) {
+    const sig = message._sig;
+    if (!sig)
+        return false;
+    const expected = signMessage(message, key);
+    try {
+        return crypto.timingSafeEqual(Buffer.from(sig, 'hex'), Buffer.from(expected, 'hex'));
+    }
+    catch {
+        return false; // Different lengths or invalid hex
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * Canonical JSON representation for signing.
+ * Excludes _sig field. Keys are sorted for determinism.
+ */
+function canonicalize(obj) {
+    const sorted = {};
+    for (const key of Object.keys(obj).sort()) {
+        if (key === '_sig')
+            continue;
+        sorted[key] = obj[key];
+    }
+    return JSON.stringify(sorted);
+}
+/**
+ * Verify an array of signed messages.
+ * Unsigned messages (pre-v1.8.0) are counted but not flagged as tampered.
+ */
+function verifyMessages(messages, key) {
+    let valid = 0;
+    let tampered = 0;
+    let unsigned = 0;
+    const tamperedIndices = [];
+    for (let i = 0; i < messages.length; i++) {
+        const msg = messages[i];
+        if (!msg._sig) {
+            unsigned++;
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (verifyMessage(msg, key)) {
+            valid++;
+        }
+        else {
+            tampered++;
+            tamperedIndices.push(i);
+        }
+    }
+    return { valid, tampered, unsigned, tamperedIndices };
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=integrity.js.map

package/dist/policy.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+/**
+ * Policy Engine for CodeBot v1.7.0
+ *
+ * Loads, validates, and enforces declarative security policies.
+ * Policy files: .codebot/policy.json (project) + ~/.codebot/policy.json (global)
+ * Project policy overrides global policy where specified.
+ */
+import { ToolCapabilities } from './capabilities';
+export interface PolicyExecution {
+    sandbox?: 'docker' | 'host' | 'auto';
+    network?: boolean;
+    timeout_seconds?: number;
+    max_memory_mb?: number;
+}
+export interface PolicyFilesystem {
+    writable_paths?: string[];
+    read_only_paths?: string[];
+    denied_paths?: string[];
+    allow_outside_project?: boolean;
+}
+export interface PolicyToolPermission {
+    [toolName: string]: 'auto' | 'prompt' | 'always-ask';
+}
+export interface PolicyTools {
+    enabled?: string[];
+    disabled?: string[];
+    permissions?: PolicyToolPermission;
+    capabilities?: Record<string, ToolCapabilities>;
+}
+export interface PolicySecrets {
+    block_on_detect?: boolean;
+    scan_on_write?: boolean;
+    allowed_patterns?: string[];
+}
+export interface PolicyGit {
+    always_branch?: boolean;
+    branch_prefix?: string;
+    require_tests_before_commit?: boolean;
+    never_push_main?: boolean;
+}
+export interface PolicyMcp {
+    allowed_servers?: string[];
+    blocked_servers?: string[];
+}
+export interface PolicyLimits {
+    max_iterations?: number;
+    max_file_size_kb?: number;
+    max_files_per_operation?: number;
+    cost_limit_usd?: number;
+}
+export interface Policy {
+    version?: string;
+    execution?: PolicyExecution;
+    filesystem?: PolicyFilesystem;
+    tools?: PolicyTools;
+    secrets?: PolicySecrets;
+    git?: PolicyGit;
+    mcp?: PolicyMcp;
+    limits?: PolicyLimits;
+}
+export declare const DEFAULT_POLICY: Required<Policy>;
+/**
+ * Load and merge policies from project + global locations.
+ * Project policy overrides global where specified.
+ */
+export declare function loadPolicy(projectRoot?: string): Policy;
+export declare class PolicyEnforcer {
+    private policy;
+    private projectRoot;
+    constructor(policy?: Policy, projectRoot?: string);
+    getPolicy(): Policy;
+    /** Check if a tool is enabled by policy. Returns { allowed, reason }. */
+    isToolAllowed(toolName: string): {
+        allowed: boolean;
+        reason?: string;
+    };
+    /** Get the permission level for a tool (policy override or null for default). */
+    getToolPermission(toolName: string): 'auto' | 'prompt' | 'always-ask' | null;
+    /** Check if a path is writable according to policy. */
+    isPathWritable(filePath: string): {
+        allowed: boolean;
+        reason?: string;
+    };
+    /** Get sandbox mode. */
+    getSandboxMode(): 'docker' | 'host' | 'auto';
+    /** Check if network is allowed for executed commands. */
+    isNetworkAllowed(): boolean;
+    /** Get execution timeout in milliseconds. */
+    getTimeoutMs(): number;
+    /** Get max memory in MB for sandbox. */
+    getMaxMemoryMb(): number;
+    /** Check if agent should always work on a branch. */
+    shouldAlwaysBranch(): boolean;
+    /** Get branch prefix for auto-created branches. */
+    getBranchPrefix(): string;
+    /** Check if pushing to main/master is blocked. */
+    isMainPushBlocked(): boolean;
+    /** Should secrets block writes (vs just warn)? */
+    shouldBlockSecrets(): boolean;
+    /** Should scan for secrets on write? */
+    shouldScanSecrets(): boolean;
+    /** Check if an MCP server is allowed. */
+    isMcpServerAllowed(serverName: string): {
+        allowed: boolean;
+        reason?: string;
+    };
+    /** Get max iterations for the agent loop. */
+    getMaxIterations(): number;
+    /** Get max file size in bytes for write operations. */
+    getMaxFileSizeBytes(): number;
+    /** Get cost limit in USD (0 = no limit). */
+    getCostLimitUsd(): number;
+    /** Get capability restrictions for a tool. undefined = unrestricted. */
+    getToolCapabilities(toolName: string): ToolCapabilities | undefined;
+    /** Check a specific capability for a tool. Returns { allowed, reason }. */
+    checkCapability(toolName: string, capabilityType: keyof ToolCapabilities, value: string | number): {
+        allowed: boolean;
+        reason?: string;
+    };
+    /**
+     * Simple glob-like pattern matching:
+     * - `*` matches any single path component
+     * - `**` matches any number of path components
+     * - `.env` matches exact filename
+     */
+    private matchesPattern;
+}
+/**
+ * Generate a default policy file content for `codebot --init-policy`.
+ */
+export declare function generateDefaultPolicyFile(): string;
+//# sourceMappingURL=policy.d.ts.map