co-maintainer 0.6.7 → 0.6.9

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
package/dist/package.json CHANGED
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
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  {
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  "name": "co-maintainer",
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- "version": "0.6.7",
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+ "version": "0.6.9",
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  "description": "An imitator of yours, A PR review tool like co-maintainer.",
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  "keywords": [
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  "ai",
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ import { startRemakeScheduler, stopRemakeScheduler, } from "../../services/remak
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  import { registerRemoteReviewHandler } from "../../services/remote_review.js";
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  import { startRemoteWatchdog } from "../../remote/server/sessions.js";
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  import { passwordProblem } from "../../util/password.js";
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+ import { deleteAllSessions } from "../../store/sessions.js";
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  import { serveHttp } from "../../server/http.js";
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  import { currentPlatform, getEnv } from "../../util/runtime.js";
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  import { die } from "../error.js";
@@ -159,6 +160,11 @@ export async function runServe(args) {
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  console.log(`[serve] warning: ${warning}`);
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  await openAppDb();
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  console.log(`[serve] app.db ready at ${appDbPath()}`);
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+ if (args.some((arg) => arg.startsWith("--password="))) {
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+ // A password reset on the command line revokes every existing session, so a
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+ // leaked cookie cannot outlive it.
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+ deleteAllSessions();
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+ }
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  const fromCli = await discoverCliRepos();
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  if (fromCli.length > 0) {
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  console.log(`[serve] added ${fromCli.length} repositor${fromCli.length === 1 ? "y" : "ies"} built from the CLI: ${fromCli.join(", ")}`);
@@ -1,6 +1,9 @@
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  import { readConfig, configPath, savedKeyProvider, writeRepoConfig, writeUserConfig, } from "../../config.js";
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  import { checkReviewSystemPrompt, reviewSystemPromptLimit, } from "../../review/system_prompt.js";
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  import { hashPassword, passwordProblem } from "../../util/password.js";
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+ import { deleteAllSessions } from "../../store/sessions.js";
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+ import { appDbPath, closeAppDb, openAppDb } from "../../store/app_db.js";
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+ import { existsSync } from "node:fs";
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  import { readTextFile } from "../../util/runtime.js";
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  import { verifyAnthropic, verifyOpenAi, verifyOpenRouter, } from "../../ai/verify.js";
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  import { verifyOpenCode } from "../../ai/opencode.js";
@@ -351,6 +354,22 @@ export async function runSet(args) {
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  }
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  }
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  await writeUserConfig(patch);
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+ // A changed password, allowed user, or sign-in method must not leave old
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+ // dashboard sessions valid. Only touch the session store if it already
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+ // exists (a server has run); never create it just to clear it.
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+ const credentialChanged = patch.dashboardPasswordHash !== undefined ||
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+ patch.passwordAuthDisabled !== undefined ||
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+ patch.githubAuthEnabled !== undefined ||
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+ patch.githubOAuthAllowedUser !== undefined;
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+ if (credentialChanged && existsSync(appDbPath())) {
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+ await openAppDb();
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+ try {
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+ deleteAllSessions();
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+ }
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+ finally {
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+ await closeAppDb();
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+ }
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+ }
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  const summary = Object.entries(patch).map(([key, value]) => value === undefined
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  ? `${key} (unset)`
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  : `${key}=${secretFields.has(key) ? "•".repeat(8) : value}`);
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
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  * end the step's commands. Every finding is one escaped line, and nothing else
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  * from the review is printed to stdout in this mode. */
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  import { appendFileSync } from "node:fs";
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+ import { stripControlChars } from "../util/sanitize.js";
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  import { formatRunSummary } from "../util/run_summary.js";
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  import { humanShortTitle, sortHumanFindings, } from "./review_result.js";
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  /** GitHub shows at most this many error and this many warning annotations per
@@ -91,7 +92,7 @@ export function githubSummary(input) {
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  const text = [short, row.body.split("\n")[0] ?? ""]
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  .filter(Boolean)
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  .join(": ");
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- lines.push(`| ${cell(row.severity, 10)}${row.blocking ? " (blocking)" : ""} | ${row.state} | ${where(row)} | ${cell(text || row.title)} |`);
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+ lines.push(`| ${cell(row.severity, 10)}${row.blocking ? " (blocking)" : ""} | ${stripControlChars(row.state)} | ${where(row)} | ${cell(text || row.title)} |`);
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  }
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  }
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  lines.push("", `**Summary:** ${rows.filter((r) => r.state === "new").length} new · ${rows.filter((r) => r.state === "open").length} open · ${closed} closed · ${blocking} blocking`);
@@ -121,9 +122,12 @@ export function emitGithubOutput(input) {
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  * printed on stderr, and the runner reads workflow commands from stderr too.
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  * A line that would start one is given a prefix so it stays plain text. */
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  export function neutralizeCommands(text) {
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- // The runner also ends a line at a bare carriage return.
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+ // The runner also ends a line at a bare carriage return. Split first so a
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+ // `\r` still ends a line, then strip any other control characters (ESC/OSC)
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+ // from each line before neutralising a leading `::` workflow command.
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  return text
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  .split(/\r\n|\r|\n/)
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+ .map((line) => stripControlChars(line))
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  .map((line) => (line.trimStart().startsWith("::") ? `[log] ${line}` : line))
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  .join("\n");
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  }
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
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  import { parseFindings } from "../pr/findings.js";
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  import { readSuggestion, stripSuggestion } from "../pr/suggestion.js";
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+ import { stripControlChars } from "../util/sanitize.js";
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  import { anchorTextFromPatch, } from "../review/carry_over.js";
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  import { DEFAULT_REVIEW_BLOCKING, isBlocking, } from "../review/blocking.js";
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  import { humanCopy } from "../services/review.js";
@@ -219,23 +220,23 @@ export function formatHumanReview(input) {
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  any = true;
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  lines.push(`${group.label} (${rows.length})`);
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  for (const row of rows) {
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- const loc = humanLocation(row);
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+ const loc = stripControlChars(humanLocation(row));
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  const label = `[${row.severity} · ${row.blocking ? "blocking" : "non-blocking"}]`;
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- const short = humanShortTitle(row);
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+ const short = stripControlChars(humanShortTitle(row));
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  const head = `${group.bullet} ${loc} ${label}${short ? ` \`${short}\`` : ""}`;
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  lines.push(` ${head}`);
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  if (row.state === "closed")
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  continue;
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  if (row.body) {
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  for (const part of row.body.split("\n"))
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- lines.push(` ${part}`);
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+ lines.push(` ${stripControlChars(part)}`);
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  }
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  if (row.suggestion && row.path) {
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  const { lineFrom, lineTo, text } = row.suggestion;
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- lines.push(` Suggested replacement for ${row.path}:${lineFrom}${lineTo !== lineFrom ? `-${lineTo}` : ""}`);
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+ lines.push(` Suggested replacement for ${stripControlChars(row.path)}:${lineFrom}${lineTo !== lineFrom ? `-${lineTo}` : ""}`);
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  lines.push(" ```");
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  for (const part of text.split("\n"))
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- lines.push(` ${part}`);
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+ lines.push(` ${stripControlChars(part)}`);
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  lines.push(" ```");
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  }
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  }
@@ -1,15 +1,18 @@
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  import { cloneDir, worktreeDir } from "../config.js";
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  import { log } from "../util/log.js";
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  import { withKeyedLock } from "../util/keyed_lock.js";
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- import { commandOutput, isWindows, stat } from "../util/runtime.js";
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+ import { commandOutput, stat } from "../util/runtime.js";
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  export function withCloneLock(repo, fn) {
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  return withKeyedLock(`clone:${repo}`, fn);
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  }
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  export async function runCommand(command, args, cwd) {
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- // Windows resolves git and other shims through the shell, not as bare exes.
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- const windows = isWindows();
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- const output = await commandOutput(windows ? "cmd" : command, {
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- args: windows ? ["/c", command, ...args] : args,
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+ // Spawn the executable directly, never through `cmd /c`. git is a real .exe
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+ // on Windows, so cmd is unnecessary, and routing a pull request's file paths
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+ // through cmd let a path like `x&evil` run as a second command. `runtime.ts`
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+ // also sets NoDefaultCurrentDirectoryInExePath=1 so the working directory is
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+ // never searched for the executable.
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+ const output = await commandOutput(command, {
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+ args,
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  cwd,
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  stdout: "piped",
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  stderr: "piped",
@@ -38,6 +41,8 @@ async function cloneInto(repo, dir, run) {
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  const result = await run("git", [
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  "-c",
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  "core.longpaths=true",
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+ "-c",
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+ "core.symlinks=false",
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  "clone",
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  "--filter=blob:none",
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  `https://github.com/${repo}`,
@@ -54,6 +59,10 @@ async function cloneInto(repo, dir, run) {
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  `repository scope and falls back to the diff only` +
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  (firstLine ? `: ${firstLine}` : ""));
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  }
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+ // A pull request may ship symlinks; without this a codegraph tool could read
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+ // through one to a file outside the tree. Persist it in the clone so every
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+ // worktree checkout writes symlinks as plain files instead of following them.
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+ await run("git", ["config", "core.symlinks", "false"], dir);
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  log("checkout", `cloned in ${((performance.now() - started) / 1000).toFixed(1)}s`);
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  return dir;
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  }
@@ -185,9 +185,11 @@ export function codegraphTools(binary, worktree, runner = createCodegraphRunner(
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  return Promise.resolve("codegraph-node requires 'name' or 'file'.");
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  }
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  if (name) {
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- const flag = rejectFlagLike(name, "name");
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- if (flag)
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- return Promise.resolve(flag);
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+ // codegraph reads `name` as a file when it contains a slash, so hold
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+ // it to the same in-repo check as `file`.
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+ const nameErr = rejectEscapingPath(name);
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+ if (nameErr)
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+ return Promise.resolve(nameErr);
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  }
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  if (file) {
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  const pathErr = rejectEscapingPath(file);
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import { formatHumanReview, humanFindingsFromJson, reviewExitCodeFromJsonFinding
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  import { baseUrl, die, readApiError, remoteFetch, remoteFromEnv, } from "./http.js";
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  import { readConfig, writeUserConfig } from "../config.js";
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  import { getEnv } from "../util/runtime.js";
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+ import { stripControlChars } from "../util/sanitize.js";
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  import { prepareLocalCodegraph } from "../local/codegraph_prepare.js";
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  import { canPrompt } from "../tools/codegraph.js";
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  import { runRemoteToolCalls, toolHandlerMap, } from "./client_tools.js";
@@ -123,8 +124,9 @@ export async function runRemoteReview(cli) {
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  const hostKey = baseUrl(host);
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  const shown = config.remoteNoticeShownFor ?? [];
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  if (!shown.includes(hostKey) && !cli.json) {
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- console.error("Remote review sends your unpublished diff to the server you configured. " +
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- "Use a host you trust.");
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+ console.error("Remote review sends your unpublished diff to the server you configured, " +
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+ "and the server may ask it to read other files in this repository while " +
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+ "reviewing. Use a host you trust.");
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  await writeUserConfig({
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  remoteNoticeShownFor: [...shown, hostKey],
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  });
@@ -185,6 +187,10 @@ export async function runRemoteReview(cli) {
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  const { jobId } = (await submit.json());
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  let afterLogSeq = 0;
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  let toolResults = [];
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+ let toolCallsRun = 0;
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+ // A trustworthy server drives at most a few tool rounds; cap the total so a
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+ // malicious one cannot make the client read its tree without limit.
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+ const MAX_REMOTE_TOOL_CALLS = 200;
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  const intervalMs = hs.sync.intervalSeconds * 1000;
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  while (true) {
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  const sync = await remoteFetch(host, token, `/api/remote/reviews/${jobId}/sync`, {
@@ -205,10 +211,14 @@ export async function runRemoteReview(cli) {
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  if (!cli.json) {
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  console.error(cli.output === "github"
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  ? neutralizeCommands(line.message)
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- : line.message);
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+ : stripControlChars(line.message));
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  }
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  }
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  if (payload.toolCalls?.length) {
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+ toolCallsRun += payload.toolCalls.length;
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+ if (toolCallsRun > MAX_REMOTE_TOOL_CALLS) {
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+ die("remote_tool_calls_exceeded", `the server asked for more than ${MAX_REMOTE_TOOL_CALLS} tool calls`);
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+ }
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  toolResults = await runRemoteToolCalls(payload.toolCalls, localTools);
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  continue;
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  }
@@ -265,7 +275,7 @@ export async function runRemoteReview(cli) {
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  return;
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  }
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  if (payload.status === "failed" || payload.status === "canceled") {
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- die(payload.abort?.reason ?? "remote_failed", payload.abort?.message ?? "Remote review did not complete.");
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+ die(stripControlChars(payload.abort?.reason ?? "remote_failed"), stripControlChars(payload.abort?.message ?? "Remote review did not complete."));
269
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  }
270
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  await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, intervalMs));
271
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  }
@@ -1,4 +1,11 @@
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1
  /** Bounded request body read (bytes, streaming). */
2
+ export type BoundedBytesResult = {
3
+ ok: true;
4
+ bytes: Uint8Array;
5
+ } | {
6
+ ok: false;
7
+ reason: "too_large";
8
+ };
2
9
  export type BoundedBodyResult = {
3
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  ok: true;
4
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  text: string;
@@ -6,6 +13,10 @@ export type BoundedBodyResult = {
6
13
  ok: false;
7
14
  reason: "too_large" | "empty";
8
15
  };
16
+ /** Reads the raw body, streaming, and refuses once more than `maxBytes` have
17
+ * arrived — this holds with no Content-Length (chunked) too. The caller gets
18
+ * the exact bytes, which the webhook HMAC needs. */
19
+ export declare function readBoundedBytes(request: Request, maxBytes: number): Promise<BoundedBytesResult>;
9
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  export declare function readBoundedUtf8(request: Request, maxBytes: number): Promise<BoundedBodyResult>;
10
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  export declare function readBoundedJson(request: Request, maxBytes: number): Promise<{
11
22
  ok: true;
@@ -1,5 +1,8 @@
1
1
  /** Bounded request body read (bytes, streaming). */
2
- export async function readBoundedUtf8(request, maxBytes) {
2
+ /** Reads the raw body, streaming, and refuses once more than `maxBytes` have
3
+ * arrived — this holds with no Content-Length (chunked) too. The caller gets
4
+ * the exact bytes, which the webhook HMAC needs. */
5
+ export async function readBoundedBytes(request, maxBytes) {
3
6
  const lengthHeader = request.headers.get("content-length");
4
7
  if (lengthHeader !== null) {
5
8
  const declared = Number(lengthHeader);
@@ -9,7 +12,7 @@ export async function readBoundedUtf8(request, maxBytes) {
9
12
  }
10
13
  const stream = request.body;
11
14
  if (!stream)
12
- return { ok: true, text: "" };
15
+ return { ok: true, bytes: new Uint8Array(0) };
13
16
  const reader = stream.getReader();
14
17
  const chunks = [];
15
18
  let total = 0;
@@ -31,15 +34,21 @@ export async function readBoundedUtf8(request, maxBytes) {
31
34
  finally {
32
35
  reader.releaseLock();
33
36
  }
34
- if (total === 0)
35
- return { ok: true, text: "" };
36
37
  const merged = new Uint8Array(total);
37
38
  let offset = 0;
38
39
  for (const chunk of chunks) {
39
40
  merged.set(chunk, offset);
40
41
  offset += chunk.length;
41
42
  }
42
- return { ok: true, text: new TextDecoder().decode(merged) };
43
+ return { ok: true, bytes: merged };
44
+ }
45
+ export async function readBoundedUtf8(request, maxBytes) {
46
+ const body = await readBoundedBytes(request, maxBytes);
47
+ if (!body.ok)
48
+ return { ok: false, reason: "too_large" };
49
+ if (body.bytes.length === 0)
50
+ return { ok: true, text: "" };
51
+ return { ok: true, text: new TextDecoder().decode(body.bytes) };
43
52
  }
44
53
  export async function readBoundedJson(request, maxBytes) {
45
54
  const body = await readBoundedUtf8(request, maxBytes);
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
2
2
  * with a plain `Request`. */
3
3
  import { VERSION } from "../version.js";
4
4
  import { errorResponse } from "./errors.js";
5
+ import { readBoundedJson } from "../remote/server/body.js";
5
6
  import { hasCsrfHeader, login, logout, readSessionToken, sessionCookieHeader, verifySession, } from "./auth.js";
6
7
  import { memoryPasswordStore } from "./auth.js";
7
8
  import { clientAddress, forwardedHttps } from "./proxy_headers.js";
@@ -43,13 +44,11 @@ async function handleLogin(request, deps, passwords, ip) {
43
44
  if (deps.auth?.password === false) {
44
45
  return errorResponse(403, "password_disabled", "password sign-in is disabled");
45
46
  }
46
- let body;
47
- try {
48
- body = await request.json();
49
- }
50
- catch {
51
- return errorResponse(400, "bad_request", "expected a JSON body");
47
+ const parsed = await readBoundedJson(request, 64 * 1024);
48
+ if (!parsed.ok) {
49
+ return errorResponse(parsed.status, parsed.code, parsed.message);
52
50
  }
51
+ const body = parsed.value;
53
52
  const result = await login(String(body.password ?? ""), passwords, ip);
54
53
  if (!result)
55
54
  return errorResponse(401, "unauthorized", "wrong password");
@@ -103,6 +103,11 @@ export function serveHttp(app, port) {
103
103
  server.once("listening", () => resolve());
104
104
  server.once("error", reject);
105
105
  });
106
+ // Slow-loris defence: cap how long a client may take to send headers and
107
+ // the full request. Responses (SSE) are unaffected — those are measured on
108
+ // the response side, not here.
109
+ server.headersTimeout = 20_000;
110
+ server.requestTimeout = 120_000;
106
111
  server.listen(port);
107
112
  return {
108
113
  port,
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
1
1
  import { clearOauthStateCookieHeader, clearSessionCookieHeader, createSession, login, logout, oauthStateCookieHeader, randomToken, readOauthState, readSessionToken, sessionCookieHeader, verifySession, } from "../auth.js";
2
2
  import { githubAuthorizeUrl, githubLoginFromCode } from "../../github/oauth.js";
3
+ import { readBoundedUtf8 } from "../../remote/server/body.js";
3
4
  import { handleClient, handleLogo, handleStyles } from "../assets.js";
4
5
  import { activityFeed, listReposForHome, prDetail, repoKnowledge, RepoNotFound, repoOverview, repoPulls, repoRemoteReviews, runningJobs, skippedDeliveries, statsForRange, } from "../../services/dashboard.js";
5
6
  import { escapeHtml, html, notFound } from "./layout.js";
@@ -331,8 +332,16 @@ async function sessionOf(request) {
331
332
  return await verifySession(token);
332
333
  }
333
334
  function safeNext(value) {
335
+ // A path-only redirect. It must start with a single "/", and may not hold a
336
+ // backslash (browsers read "/\host" as "//host") or a control character (a
337
+ // tab or newline is stripped, turning "/\t/host" into "//host") — both would
338
+ // send the browser to another origin.
334
339
  if (!value || !value.startsWith("/") || value.startsWith("//"))
335
340
  return "/";
341
+ for (let i = 0; i < value.length; i++) {
342
+ if (value.charCodeAt(i) <= 0x1f || value[i] === "\\")
343
+ return "/";
344
+ }
336
345
  return value;
337
346
  }
338
347
  /** The externally visible origin. Behind a trusted proxy the browser reached
@@ -426,7 +435,8 @@ async function finishAppManifest(request, url) {
426
435
  return Response.redirect(installUrl, 303);
427
436
  }
428
437
  async function handleLoginForm(request, deps, ip, auth) {
429
- const form = await request.formData();
438
+ const bounded = await readBoundedUtf8(request, 64 * 1024);
439
+ const form = new URLSearchParams(bounded.ok ? bounded.text : "");
430
440
  const password = String(form.get("password") ?? "");
431
441
  const next = safeNext(String(form.get("next") ?? "/"));
432
442
  if (!auth.password) {
@@ -487,7 +497,7 @@ async function handleGithubCallback(request, url, githubOAuth, deps) {
487
497
  return new Response(null, {
488
498
  status: 303,
489
499
  headers: {
490
- location: saved.next,
500
+ location: safeNext(saved.next),
491
501
  "set-cookie": sessionCookieHeader(result.token, Boolean(deps.secureCookie)),
492
502
  },
493
503
  });
@@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ function remoteCard(config) {
225
225
  ${skSlot()}
226
226
  <div class="hd"><h2>Remote review tokens</h2></div>
227
227
  <div class="bd">
228
- <p class="muted" style="margin:0 0 16px">Bearer tokens for <code>co-maintainer review --remote</code>. The secret is shown once when created.</p>
228
+ <p class="muted" style="margin:0 0 16px">Bearer tokens for <code>co-maintainer review --remote</code>. The secret is shown once when created. Each token can review and read the guides of <strong>every active repository</strong> on this server, so treat a token as server-wide and revoke a leaked one.</p>
229
229
  <div id="remote-token-secret" class="secret" hidden></div>
230
230
  <div id="remote-token-list" class="muted">Loading…</div>
231
231
  <div class="two" style="max-width:none;margin-top:16px">
@@ -2,17 +2,27 @@ import { readConfig } from "../../config.js";
2
2
  import { errorResponse } from "../errors.js";
3
3
  import { hasDelivery, recordDelivery } from "../../store/deliveries.js";
4
4
  import { dispatchGithubEvent } from "../../services/webhook.js";
5
+ import { readBoundedBytes } from "../../remote/server/body.js";
5
6
  import { verifySignature } from "./signature.js";
7
+ /** GitHub caps a webhook payload at 25 MB; nothing larger is genuine. */
8
+ const WEBHOOK_MAX_BODY_BYTES = 25 * 1024 * 1024;
6
9
  function json(status, body) {
7
10
  return Response.json(body, { status });
8
11
  }
9
12
  export async function handleWebhookRequest(request, secret) {
10
- const raw = new Uint8Array(await request.arrayBuffer());
11
- if (secret) {
12
- const header = request.headers.get("x-hub-signature-256");
13
- if (!(await verifySignature(secret, raw, header))) {
14
- return errorResponse(401, "unauthorized", "bad webhook signature");
15
- }
13
+ const bounded = await readBoundedBytes(request, WEBHOOK_MAX_BODY_BYTES);
14
+ if (!bounded.ok) {
15
+ return errorResponse(413, "payload_too_large", "request body too large");
16
+ }
17
+ const raw = bounded.bytes;
18
+ // Fail closed: with no secret configured there is no way to tell a real
19
+ // delivery from a forged one, so reject rather than trust the payload.
20
+ if (!secret) {
21
+ return errorResponse(401, "unauthorized", "webhook secret is not configured, so deliveries cannot be verified");
22
+ }
23
+ const header = request.headers.get("x-hub-signature-256");
24
+ if (!(await verifySignature(secret, raw, header))) {
25
+ return errorResponse(401, "unauthorized", "bad webhook signature");
16
26
  }
17
27
  const deliveryId = request.headers.get("x-github-delivery");
18
28
  const event = request.headers.get("x-github-event");
@@ -6,6 +6,10 @@ import { abortQueuedRemoteReviewRow } from "./remote_review_abort.js";
6
6
  import { getReviewByJobId } from "../store/reviews.js";
7
7
  import { withRateLimitJob } from "./rate_limit.js";
8
8
  const handlers = new Map();
9
+ // Default caps so an unconfigured server is not a free-for-all. An operator can
10
+ // still set 0 in config to opt back into unlimited.
11
+ const DEFAULT_MAX_CONCURRENT_JOBS = 4;
12
+ const DEFAULT_MAX_REMOTE_REVIEWS_PER_TOKEN = 2;
9
13
  export function registerHandler(type, handler) {
10
14
  handlers.set(type, handler);
11
15
  }
@@ -112,7 +116,8 @@ function runningRemoteReviewsPerToken() {
112
116
  }
113
117
  function claimNextEligible() {
114
118
  const config = readConfig();
115
- const perTokenLimit = config.maxConcurrentRemoteReviewsPerToken;
119
+ const perTokenLimit = config.maxConcurrentRemoteReviewsPerToken ??
120
+ DEFAULT_MAX_REMOTE_REVIEWS_PER_TOKEN;
116
121
  const remoteRunning = perTokenLimit
117
122
  ? runningRemoteReviewsPerToken()
118
123
  : undefined;
@@ -145,7 +150,7 @@ function claimNextEligible() {
145
150
  return undefined;
146
151
  }
147
152
  export async function claimAndRun() {
148
- const limit = readConfig().maxConcurrentJobs;
153
+ const limit = readConfig().maxConcurrentJobs ?? DEFAULT_MAX_CONCURRENT_JOBS;
149
154
  if (limit && inFlight.size >= limit)
150
155
  return false;
151
156
  const job = claimNextEligible();
@@ -159,7 +164,7 @@ export async function claimAndRun() {
159
164
  const inFlight = new Set();
160
165
  let workerTimer;
161
166
  function tick() {
162
- const limit = readConfig().maxConcurrentJobs;
167
+ const limit = readConfig().maxConcurrentJobs ?? DEFAULT_MAX_CONCURRENT_JOBS;
163
168
  while (!limit || inFlight.size < limit) {
164
169
  const job = claimNextEligible();
165
170
  if (!job)
@@ -28,14 +28,19 @@ export declare function splitInline(findings: ParsedFinding[], files: Json[]): {
28
28
  export declare function reviewEvent(findingsCount: number): "REQUEST_CHANGES" | "COMMENT";
29
29
  /** The GitHub review event for a set of stored findings.
30
30
  *
31
- * `model` keeps the 0.4.13 behavior: any finding requests changes, because the
32
- * model's label already decided. `severity` ignores that label and requests
33
- * changes only for a P0 or P1, so the same finding set always yields the same
34
- * event. */
31
+ * Only open findings count. A re-review that closed the last finding used to
32
+ * request changes from the closed row while its body said "No actionable
33
+ * findings", so a review with no open finding approves.
34
+ *
35
+ * `model` keeps the 0.4.13 behavior: any open finding requests changes, because
36
+ * the model's label already decided. `severity` ignores that label and
37
+ * requests changes only for a P0 or P1, so the same finding set always yields
38
+ * the same event. */
35
39
  export declare function appReviewEvent(findings: {
36
40
  severity: string;
37
41
  title: string;
38
- }[], mode?: ReviewBlocking): "REQUEST_CHANGES" | "COMMENT";
42
+ state?: string;
43
+ }[], mode?: ReviewBlocking): "REQUEST_CHANGES" | "COMMENT" | "APPROVE";
39
44
  export interface ReviewMetadata {
40
45
  jobId: string;
41
46
  model: string;
@@ -141,16 +141,21 @@ export function reviewEvent(findingsCount) {
141
141
  }
142
142
  /** The GitHub review event for a set of stored findings.
143
143
  *
144
- * `model` keeps the 0.4.13 behavior: any finding requests changes, because the
145
- * model's label already decided. `severity` ignores that label and requests
146
- * changes only for a P0 or P1, so the same finding set always yields the same
147
- * event. */
144
+ * Only open findings count. A re-review that closed the last finding used to
145
+ * request changes from the closed row while its body said "No actionable
146
+ * findings", so a review with no open finding approves.
147
+ *
148
+ * `model` keeps the 0.4.13 behavior: any open finding requests changes, because
149
+ * the model's label already decided. `severity` ignores that label and
150
+ * requests changes only for a P0 or P1, so the same finding set always yields
151
+ * the same event. */
148
152
  export function appReviewEvent(findings, mode = DEFAULT_REVIEW_BLOCKING) {
149
- if (findings.length === 0)
150
- return "COMMENT";
153
+ const open = findings.filter((row) => row.state !== "closed");
154
+ if (open.length === 0)
155
+ return "APPROVE";
151
156
  if (mode === "model")
152
157
  return "REQUEST_CHANGES";
153
- const blocking = findings.some((row) => isBlocking(mode, { severity: row.severity, text: row.title }));
158
+ const blocking = open.some((row) => isBlocking(mode, { severity: row.severity, text: row.title }));
154
159
  return reviewEvent(blocking ? 1 : 0);
155
160
  }
156
161
  export function formatDuration(ms) {
@@ -367,16 +372,18 @@ async function updateCheck(client, job, checkRunId, body, log) {
367
372
  }
368
373
  }
369
374
  async function finishCheck(client, job, checkRunId, conclusion, title, findings, log) {
375
+ // A closed finding was fixed; counting it would report work that is done.
376
+ const open = findings.filter((finding) => finding.state !== "closed");
370
377
  await updateCheck(client, job, checkRunId, {
371
378
  status: "completed",
372
379
  conclusion,
373
380
  completed_at: new Date().toISOString(),
374
381
  output: {
375
382
  title: humanCopy(title),
376
- summary: humanCopy(findings.length === 0
383
+ summary: humanCopy(open.length === 0
377
384
  ? "No actionable findings."
378
- : `${findings.length} finding(s) reported.`),
379
- annotations: checkAnnotations(findings),
385
+ : `${open.length} finding(s) reported.`),
386
+ annotations: checkAnnotations(open),
380
387
  },
381
388
  }, log);
382
389
  }
@@ -814,7 +821,8 @@ async function runReviewJobCore(job, log, client, ai) {
814
821
  durationMs: Date.now() - startedAt,
815
822
  }, options.reviewBlocking);
816
823
  await resolveFailureNote(github, job, reviewId, log);
817
- await finishCheck(github, job, checkRunId, totalFindings === 0 ? "success" : "neutral", totalFindings === 0 ? "Review completed" : "Review findings", listFindingsForReview(reviewId), log);
824
+ const openFindings = totalFindings - closedCount;
825
+ await finishCheck(github, job, checkRunId, openFindings === 0 ? "success" : "neutral", openFindings === 0 ? "Review completed" : "Review findings", listFindingsForReview(reviewId), log);
818
826
  }
819
827
  export function registerReviewJobHandler() {
820
828
  registerHandler("review", {
@@ -7,3 +7,6 @@ export declare function getSession(tokenHash: string): SessionRow | undefined;
7
7
  export declare function deleteSession(tokenHash: string): void;
8
8
  export declare function deleteExpiredSessions(): void;
9
9
  export declare function deleteOtherSessions(keepTokenHash: string): void;
10
+ /** Drop every dashboard session. Used when a credential is reset from the CLI,
11
+ * so a leaked cookie cannot outlive the password it was issued under. */
12
+ export declare function deleteAllSessions(): void;
@@ -37,3 +37,8 @@ export function deleteOtherSessions(keepTokenHash) {
37
37
  .prepare(`DELETE FROM sessions WHERE token_hash != ?`)
38
38
  .run(keepTokenHash);
39
39
  }
40
+ /** Drop every dashboard session. Used when a credential is reset from the CLI,
41
+ * so a leaked cookie cannot outlive the password it was issued under. */
42
+ export function deleteAllSessions() {
43
+ getAppDb().prepare(`DELETE FROM sessions`).run();
44
+ }
@@ -14,6 +14,13 @@ import { join } from "node:path";
14
14
  export function isWindows() {
15
15
  return process.platform === "win32";
16
16
  }
17
+ // Windows only: keep the current working directory out of the executable search
18
+ // path, so a `git.cmd` / `gh.exe` committed in a reviewed repository cannot run
19
+ // in place of the real tool. Set once at module load — before any child spawn —
20
+ // and inherited by every child process we start.
21
+ if (isWindows() && !process.env.NoDefaultCurrentDirectoryInExePath) {
22
+ process.env.NoDefaultCurrentDirectoryInExePath = "1";
23
+ }
17
24
  /** The current OS in the vocabulary the config paths already used under Deno
18
25
  * (`"windows"`, not Node's `"win32"`). */
19
26
  export function currentPlatform() {
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
1
+ /** Strip C0/C1 control characters, keeping tab and newline. Run this over any
2
+ * string that came from the model or a remote server before it is printed to a
3
+ * terminal or a CI log, so it cannot inject ANSI/OSC escape sequences (cursor
4
+ * moves, screen clears, OSC 52 clipboard writes, OSC 8 disguised links) or a
5
+ * bare carriage return that overwrites the line. */
6
+ export declare function stripControlChars(value: string): string;
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
1
+ /** Strip C0/C1 control characters, keeping tab and newline. Run this over any
2
+ * string that came from the model or a remote server before it is printed to a
3
+ * terminal or a CI log, so it cannot inject ANSI/OSC escape sequences (cursor
4
+ * moves, screen clears, OSC 52 clipboard writes, OSC 8 disguised links) or a
5
+ * bare carriage return that overwrites the line. */
6
+ export function stripControlChars(value) {
7
+ // Dropped: 00-08, 0B-1F (so \r too), DEL 7F, and C1 80-9F. Kept: \t and \n.
8
+ // eslint-disable-next-line no-control-regex -- matching control chars is the point
9
+ return value.replace(/[\u0000-\u0008\u000b-\u001f\u007f-\u009f]/g, "");
10
+ }
package/package.json CHANGED
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  {
2
2
  "name": "co-maintainer",
3
- "version": "0.6.7",
3
+ "version": "0.6.9",
4
4
  "description": "An imitator of yours, A PR review tool like co-maintainer.",
5
5
  "keywords": [
6
6
  "ai",