cli-jaw 0.1.6 → 0.1.8

package/skills_ref/security-threat-model/LICENSE.txt

@@ -1,201 +0,0 @@
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package/skills_ref/security-threat-model/SKILL.md

@@ -1,81 +0,0 @@
----
-name: "security-threat-model"
-description: "Repository-grounded threat modeling that enumerates trust boundaries, assets, attacker capabilities, abuse paths, and mitigations, and writes a concise Markdown threat model. Trigger only when the user explicitly asks to threat model a codebase or path, enumerate threats/abuse paths, or perform AppSec threat modeling. Do not trigger for general architecture summaries, code review, or non-security design work."
----
-
-# Threat Model Source Code Repo
-
-Deliver an actionable AppSec-grade threat model that is specific to the repository or a project path, not a generic checklist. Anchor every architectural claim to evidence in the repo and keep assumptions explicit. Prioritizing realistic attacker goals and concrete impacts over generic checklists.
-
-## Quick start
-
-1) Collect (or infer) inputs:
-- Repo root path and any in-scope paths.
-- Intended usage, deployment model, internet exposure, and auth expectations (if known).
-- Any existing repository summary or architecture spec.
-- Use prompts in `references/prompt-template.md` to generate a repository summary.
-- Follow the required output contract in `references/prompt-template.md`. Use it verbatim when possible.
-
-## Workflow
-
-### 1) Scope and extract the system model
-- Identify primary components, data stores, and external integrations from the repo summary.
-- Identify how the system runs (server, CLI, library, worker) and its entrypoints.
-- Separate runtime behavior from CI/build/dev tooling and from tests/examples.
-- Map the in-scope locations to those components and exclude out-of-scope items explicitly.
-- Do not claim components, flows, or controls without evidence.
-
-### 2) Derive boundaries, assets, and entry points
-- Enumerate trust boundaries as concrete edges between components, noting protocol, auth, encryption, validation, and rate limiting.
-- List assets that drive risk (data, credentials, models, config, compute resources, audit logs).
-- Identify entry points (endpoints, upload surfaces, parsers/decoders, job triggers, admin tooling, logging/error sinks).
-
-### 3) Calibrate assets and attacker capabilities
-- List the assets that drive risk (credentials, PII, integrity-critical state, availability-critical components, build artifacts).
-- Describe realistic attacker capabilities based on exposure and intended usage.
-- Explicitly note non-capabilities to avoid inflated severity.
-
-
-### 4) Enumerate threats as abuse paths
-- Prefer attacker goals that map to assets and boundaries (exfiltration, privilege escalation, integrity compromise, denial of service).
-- Classify each threat and tie it to impacted assets.
-- Keep the number of threats small but high quality.
-
-### 5) Prioritize with explicit likelihood and impact reasoning
-- Use qualitative likelihood and impact (low/medium/high) with short justifications.
-- Set overall priority (critical/high/medium/low) using likelihood x impact, adjusted for existing controls.
-- State which assumptions most influence the ranking.
-
-### 6) Validate service context and assumptions with the user
-- Summarize key assumptions that materially affect threat ranking or scope, then ask the user to confirm or correct them.
-- Ask 1–3 targeted questions to resolve missing context (service owner and environment, scale/users, deployment model, authn/authz, internet exposure, data sensitivity, multi-tenancy).
-- Pause and wait for user feedback before producing the final report.
-- If the user declines or can’t answer, state which assumptions remain and how they influence priority.
-
-### 7) Recommend mitigations and focus paths
-- Distinguish existing mitigations (with evidence) from recommended mitigations.
-- Tie mitigations to concrete locations (component, boundary, or entry point) and control types (authZ checks, input validation, schema enforcement, sandboxing, rate limits, secrets isolation, audit logging).
-- Prefer specific implementation hints over generic advice (e.g., "enforce schema at gateway for upload payloads" vs "validate inputs").
-- Base recommendations on validated user context; if assumptions remain unresolved, mark recommendations as conditional.
-
-### 8) Run a quality check before finalizing
-- Confirm all discovered entrypoints are covered.
-- Confirm each trust boundary is represented in threats.
-- Confirm runtime vs CI/dev separation.
-- Confirm user clarifications (or explicit non-responses) are reflected.
-- Confirm assumptions and open questions are explicit.
-- Confirm that the format of the report matches closely the required output format defined in prompt template: `references/prompt-template.md`
-- Write the final Markdown to a file named `<repo-or-dir-name>-threat-model.md` (use the basename of the repo root, or the in-scope directory if you were asked to model a subpath).
-
-
-## Risk prioritization guidance (illustrative, not exhaustive)
-- High: pre-auth RCE, auth bypass, cross-tenant access, sensitive data exfiltration, key or token theft, model or config integrity compromise, sandbox escape.
-- Medium: targeted DoS of critical components, partial data exposure, rate-limit bypass with measurable impact, log/metrics poisoning that affects detection.
-- Low: low-sensitivity info leaks, noisy DoS with easy mitigation, issues requiring unlikely preconditions.
-
-## References
-
-- Output contract and full prompt template: `references/prompt-template.md`
-- Optional controls/asset list: `references/security-controls-and-assets.md`
-
-Only load the reference files you need. Keep the final result concise, grounded, and reviewable.

package/skills_ref/security-threat-model/agents/openai.yaml

@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-interface:
-  display_name: "Security Threat Model"
-  short_description: "Repo-grounded threat modeling and abuse-path analysis"
-  default_prompt: "Create a repository-grounded threat model for this codebase with prioritized abuse paths and mitigations."

package/skills_ref/security-threat-model/references/prompt-template.md

@@ -1,255 +0,0 @@
-# Threat Modeling Prompt Template for LLMs
-
-This reference provides a disciplined, repo-grounded prompt that produces AppSec-usable threat models. Use it when you need a reliable output contract and a consistent process to assemble the threat model output
-
-## System prompt
-
-Use this as a stable system prompt:
-
-````text
-You are a senior application security engineer producing a threat model that will be read by other AppSec engineers.
-
-Primary objective:
-- Generate a threat model that is specific to THIS repository and its real-world usage.
-- Prefer concrete, evidence-backed findings over generic vulnerability checklists.
-
-Evidence and grounding rules:
-- Do not invent components, data stores, endpoints, flows, or controls.
-- Every architectural claim must be backed by at least one "Evidence anchor" referencing a repo path
-  (and a symbol name, config key, or a short quoted snippet if available).
-- If information is missing, state assumptions explicitly and list the open questions needed to validate them.
-
-Security hygiene:
-- Never output secrets. If you encounter tokens/keys/passwords, redact them and only describe their presence and location.
-
-Threat modeling approach:
-- Model the system using data flows and trust boundaries.
-- Enumerate threats and produce attack goals and abuse paths
-- Prioritize threats using explicit likelihood and impact reasoning (qualitative is acceptable: low/medium/high).
-
-Scope discipline:
-- Clearly separate: production/runtime behavior vs CI/build/dev tooling vs tests/examples.
-- Clearly separate attacker-controlled inputs vs operator-controlled inputs vs developer-controlled inputs.
-- If a vulnerability class requires attacker control that likely does not exist for this repo's real usage, say so and downgrade severity.
-
-Communication quality:
-- Write for AppSec engineers: concise but specific.
-- Use precise terminology. Include mitigations and residual risks.
-- Avoid restating large blocks of README/spec; summarize and point to evidence.
-
-Diagram requirements:
-- Produce a single compact Mermaid flowchart showing primary components and trust boundaries.
-- Mermaid must render cleanly. Use a conservative subset:
-  - Use `flowchart TD` or `flowchart LR` and only `-->` arrows.
-  - Use simple node IDs (letters/numbers/underscores only) and quoted labels (e.g., `A["Label"]`); avoid `A(Label)` shape syntax.
-  - Do not use Mermaid `title` lines or `style` directives.
-  - Keep edge labels to plain words/spaces only via `-->|label|`; avoid `{}`, `[]`, `()`, or quotes in edge labels (if needed, drop the label).
-  - Keep node labels short and readable: do not include file paths, URLs, or socket paths (put those details in prose outside the diagram).
-- Wrap the diagram in a Markdown fenced block:
-  ```mermaid
-  <mermaid syntax here>
-  ```
-````
-
-## Repository summary prompt
-
-```
-We have a codebase located at {repo_directory/path}, currently on branch {branch_name}.
-
-Please produce a security-oriented summary of the repository (or the specified sub-path) with the goal of helping a follow-on security engineer quickly understand the system well enough to build an initial threat model and investigate potential security hypotheses.
-
-Objectives
-1.	Project overview
-	•	Identify the primary programming languages, frameworks, and build system.
-	•	Summarize the project’s core purpose and high-level architecture.
-	•	Describe major components, services, or modules and how they interact.
-2.	Security posture and entry points
-	•	Identify likely user entry points and trust boundaries.
-	•	Describe existing security layers (e.g., authentication, authorization, validation, sandboxing, isolation, privilege boundaries).
-	•	Call out security-critical components and assumptions that must hold for the system to remain secure.
-
-Guidance for Security Analysis
-
-Structure the summary so an application security engineer can quickly answer questions such as:
-	•	Where does user input originate?
-	•	How is untrusted data parsed, validated, and handled?
-	•	What security assumptions should not be violated?
-	•	Where are the most likely choke points for security bugs?
-
-Adapt the analysis to the project type. For example:
-	•	Web applications: where requests enter, how user data is parsed, routed, authenticated, and stored.
-	•	Command-line tools: supported inputs (arguments, files, environment variables, stdin) and how they are processed.
-	•	Network daemons: exposed ports, supported protocols, message formats, and request handling paths.
-	•	Operating system or low-level components: common vulnerability classes (e.g., memory corruption, logic flaws) that could lead to LPE or RCE.
-
-Be thorough but pragmatic: the goal is to help a security engineer quickly determine whether a discovered bug is security-relevant and where deeper investigation should focus.
-
-Tooling Notes
-
-If Ripgrep (rg) is available, use it to explore the codebase. When using grep or rg, always include the -I flag to avoid searching through binary files.
-```
-
-
-
-## User prompt template
-
-Use this as the task prompt, filling in what you know and marking the rest as assumptions:
-
-```text
-# Inputs
-Context (fill as available; otherwise infer and mark assumptions):
-- intended_usage: {intended_usage}
-- deployment_model: {deployment_model}
-- data_sensitivity: {data_sensitivity}
-- internet_exposure: {internet_exposure}
-- authn_authz_expectations: {authn_authz_expectations}
-- out_of_scope: {out_of_scope}
-
-Provided summaries (may be incomplete):
-- repository_summary: {repository_summary}
-
-
-In-scope code locations (if known):
-- in_scope_paths: {in_scope_paths}
-
-# Task
-Construct a repo-centric threat model that helps AppSec engineers understand the most important security risks and where to focus manual review.
-
-You MUST follow this process and reflect outputs in the final document:
-
-## Process
-1) Repo discovery (evidence collection)
-   a. Identify the repo shape:
-      - languages and frameworks
-      - how it runs (server/cli/library), entrypoints, build artifacts
-   b. Identify security-relevant surfaces and controls by searching for evidences, such as:
-      - network listeners/routes/endpoints; RPC handlers; message consumers
-      - authentication, session/token handling, authorization checks, RBAC/ACL logic
-      - parsing/serialization/deserialization (JSON/YAML/XML/protobuf), template rendering, eval/dynamic code
-      - file upload/read paths, archive extraction, image/document parsing
-      - database/queue/cache clients and query construction
-      - secrets/config loading, environment variables, key management
-      - SSRF-capable HTTP clients, webhooks, URL fetchers
-      - sandboxing/isolation, privilege boundaries, subprocess execution
-      - logging/auditing and error handling paths
-      - CI/build/release: pipelines, dependency management, artifact publishing
-   
-2) System model
-   a. Summarize the primary components (runtime plus critical build/CI components when relevant).
-   b. Enumerate data flows and trust boundaries.
-      - For each trust boundary, specify:
-        * source to destination
-        * data types crossing (e.g., credentials, PII, files, tokens, prompts)
-        * channel/protocol (HTTP/gRPC/IPC/file/db)
-        * security guarantees and validation (auth, mTLS, origin checks, schema validation, rate limits)
-   c. Provide a compact Mermaid diagram showing components and trust boundaries.
-
-3) Assets and security objectives
-   - List assets (data, credentials, integrity-critical state, availability-critical components, build artifacts).
-   - For each asset, state why it matters (confidentiality/integrity/availability, compliance, user harm).
-
-4) Attacker model
-   - Capabilities: realistic remote attacker assumptions based on intended usage and exposure.
-   - Non-capabilities: things attacker cannot plausibly do (unless explicitly in scope), to avoid inflated severity.
-
-5) Threat enumeration (concrete, system-specific)
-   - Generate threats as attacker stories tied to:
-     * entry points
-     * trust boundaries
-     * privileged components
-   - Prefer abuse paths (multi-step sequences) over single-line generic threats.
-
-6) Risk prioritization
-   - For each threat:
-     * Likelihood: low/medium/high with a 1 to 2 sentence justification
-     * Impact: low/medium/high with a 1 to 2 sentence justification
-     * Overall priority: critical/high/medium/low (based on likelihood x impact, adjusted for existing controls)
-   - Explicitly state which assumptions most affect risk.
-
-7) Validate assumptions and service context with the user (required before final report)
-   - Summarize key assumptions that materially affect scope or risk ranking.
-   - Ask 1 to 3 targeted questions to resolve missing service meta-context (service owner/environment, scale/users, deployment model, authn/authz, internet exposure, data sensitivity, multi-tenancy).
-   - Pause and wait for user feedback before producing the final report.
-   - If the user cannot answer, proceed with explicit assumptions and mark any conditional conclusions.
-
-8) Mitigations and recommendations
-   - For each high/critical threat:
-     * Existing mitigations (with evidence anchors)
-     * Gaps/weaknesses
-     * Recommended mitigations (code/config/process)
-     * Detection/monitoring ideas (logging, metrics, alerts)
-
-9) Focus paths for manual security review
-   - Output 2 to 30 repo-relative paths (files or directories) that merit deeper review.
-   - For each path, give a one-sentence reason tied to the threat model.
-
-10) Quality check
-   - Provide a short checklist confirming you covered:
-     * all entry points you discovered
-     * each trust boundary at least once in threats
-     * runtime vs CI/dev separation
-     * user clarifications (or explicit non-responses)
-     * assumptions and open questions
-
-## Required output format (exact)
-Before producing the final Markdown report, first provide an assumption-validation check-in:
-- List the key assumptions in 3 to 6 bullets.
-- Ask 1 to 3 targeted context questions.
-- Wait for the user response, then produce the final report below using the clarified context.
-
-Produce valid Markdown with these sections in this order:
-
-## Executive summary
-- 1 short paragraph on the top risk themes and highest-risk areas.
-
-## Scope and assumptions
-- In-scope paths, out-of-scope items, and explicit assumptions.
-- A short list of open questions that would materially change the risk ranking.
-
-
-## System model
-### Primary components
-### Data flows and trust boundaries
-Represent the system as a sequence of arrow-style bullets (e.g., Internet → API Server, User Input -> Application Logic, etc). For each boundary, document:
-	•	the primary data types crossing the boundary,
-	•	the communication channel or protocol,
-	•	the security guarantees (e.g., authentication, origin checks, encryption, rate limiting), and
-	•	any input validation, normalization, or schema enforcement performed.
-
-#### Diagram
-- Include a single, compact Mermaid diagram (`flowchart TD` or `flowchart LR`) showing primary components and trust boundaries (e.g., separate trust zones via subgraphs). Keep it compact, use only `-->`, avoid `title`/`style`, keep node labels short (no paths/URLs), and keep edge labels to plain words only (avoid `{}`, `[]`, `()`, or quotes).
-
-
-## Assets and security objectives
-- A table: Asset | Why it matters | Security objective (C/I/A)
-
-## Attacker model
-### Capabilities
-### Non-capabilities
-
-## Entry points and attack surfaces
-- A table: Surface | How reached | Trust boundary | Notes | Evidence (repo path / symbol)
-
-## Top abuse paths
-- 5 to 10 short abuse paths, each as a numbered sequence of steps (attacker goal -> steps -> impact).
-
-## Threat model table
-- A Markdown table with columns:
-  Threat ID | Threat source | Prerequisites | Threat action | Impact | Impacted assets | Existing controls (evidence) | Gaps | Recommended mitigations | Detection ideas | Likelihood | Impact severity | Priority
-
-Rules:
-- Threat IDs must be stable and formatted: TM-001, TM-002, ...
-- Priority must be one of: critical, high, medium, low.
-- Keep prerequisites to 1 to 2 sentences. Keep recommended mitigations concrete.
-
-## Criticality calibration
-- Define what counts as critical/high/medium/low for THIS repo and context.
-- Include 2 to 3 examples per level (tailored to the repo's assets and exposure).
-
-## Focus paths for security review
-- A table: Path | Why it matters | Related Threat IDs
-
-## Notes on use
-
-- Fill in known context, but allow the model to infer and mark assumptions.
-- Include 1–2 repo-path anchors per major claim; do not dump every match.

package/skills_ref/security-threat-model/references/security-controls-and-assets.md

@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-# Security Controls and Asset Categories
-
-Use this as a lightweight checklist to keep outputs consistent across teams. Prefer concrete, system-specific items over generic text.
-
-## Asset categories (pick only what applies)
-- User data (PII, content, uploads)
-- Authentication artifacts (passwords, tokens, sessions, cookies)
-- Authorization state (roles, policies, ACLs)
-- Secrets and keys (API keys, signing keys, encryption keys)
-- Configuration and feature flags
-- Models and weights (if ML systems)
-- Source code and build artifacts
-- Audit logs and telemetry
-- Availability-critical resources (queues, caches, rate limits, compute budgets)
-- Tenant isolation boundaries and metadata
-
-## Security control categories
-- Identity and access: authN, authZ, session handling, mTLS, key rotation
-- Input protection: schema validation, parsing hardening, upload scanning, sandboxing
-- Network safeguards: TLS, network policies, WAF, rate limiting, DoS controls
-- Data protection: encryption at rest/in transit, tokenization, redaction
-- Isolation: process sandboxing, container boundaries, tenant isolation, seccomp
-- Observability: audit logs, alerting, anomaly detection, tamper resistance
-- Supply chain: dependency pinning, SBOMs, provenance, signing
-- Change control: CI checks, deployment approvals, config guardrails
-
-## Mitigation phrasing patterns
-- "Enforce schema at <boundary> for <payload> before <component>."
-- "Require authZ check for <action> on <resource> in <service>."
-- "Isolate <parser/component> in a sandbox with <resource limits>."
-- "Rate limit <endpoint> by <key> and apply burst caps."
-- "Encrypt <data> at rest using <key management> and rotate <keys>."