clementine-agent 1.0.0

package/dist/security/integrity.d.ts

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+/**
+ * Clementine TypeScript — File integrity monitor (Layer 3).
+ *
+ * Computes SHA-256 checksums for critical vault system files and detects tampering.
+ * Zero external dependencies — uses node:crypto and node:fs only.
+ */
+export interface IntegrityResult {
+    file: string;
+    expected: string;
+    actual: string;
+    tampered: boolean;
+}
+export declare class IntegrityMonitor {
+    private checksums;
+    private lastRefreshTime;
+    constructor();
+    /** Re-baseline checksums for all critical files. */
+    refresh(): void;
+    /** Skip refresh if already refreshed within maxAgeMs. */
+    refreshIfStale(maxAgeMs?: number): void;
+    /** Check all critical files against stored checksums. */
+    check(): IntegrityResult[];
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=integrity.d.ts.map

package/dist/security/integrity.js

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+/**
+ * Clementine TypeScript — File integrity monitor (Layer 3).
+ *
+ * Computes SHA-256 checksums for critical vault system files and detects tampering.
+ * Zero external dependencies — uses node:crypto and node:fs only.
+ */
+import { createHash } from 'node:crypto';
+import { existsSync, readFileSync } from 'node:fs';
+import { SOUL_FILE, AGENTS_FILE, MEMORY_FILE, HEARTBEAT_FILE, CRON_FILE, } from '../config.js';
+const CRITICAL_FILES = [
+    SOUL_FILE,
+    AGENTS_FILE,
+    MEMORY_FILE,
+    HEARTBEAT_FILE,
+    CRON_FILE,
+];
+function hashFile(filePath) {
+    if (!existsSync(filePath))
+        return 'MISSING';
+    const content = readFileSync(filePath, 'utf-8');
+    return createHash('sha256').update(content).digest('hex');
+}
+export class IntegrityMonitor {
+    checksums = new Map();
+    lastRefreshTime = 0;
+    constructor() {
+        this.refresh();
+    }
+    /** Re-baseline checksums for all critical files. */
+    refresh() {
+        for (const file of CRITICAL_FILES) {
+            this.checksums.set(file, hashFile(file));
+        }
+        this.lastRefreshTime = Date.now();
+    }
+    /** Skip refresh if already refreshed within maxAgeMs. */
+    refreshIfStale(maxAgeMs = 5000) {
+        if (Date.now() - this.lastRefreshTime < maxAgeMs)
+            return;
+        this.refresh();
+    }
+    /** Check all critical files against stored checksums. */
+    check() {
+        const results = [];
+        for (const file of CRITICAL_FILES) {
+            const expected = this.checksums.get(file) ?? 'UNKNOWN';
+            const actual = hashFile(file);
+            results.push({
+                file,
+                expected,
+                actual,
+                tampered: expected !== actual,
+            });
+        }
+        return results;
+    }
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=integrity.js.map

package/dist/security/patterns.d.ts

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+/**
+ * Clementine TypeScript — Prompt injection detection patterns and thresholds.
+ *
+ * All constants used by the 5-layer injection scanner.
+ * Zero dependencies — pure data.
+ */
+export interface StructuralPattern {
+    readonly regex: RegExp;
+    readonly weight: number;
+    readonly label: string;
+}
+export declare const STRUCTURAL_PATTERNS: readonly StructuralPattern[];
+export interface SemanticAxis {
+    readonly name: string;
+    readonly weight: number;
+    readonly keywords: readonly string[];
+}
+export declare const SEMANTIC_AXES: readonly SemanticAxis[];
+export declare const SEMANTIC_WARN_THRESHOLD = 0.4;
+export declare const SEMANTIC_BLOCK_THRESHOLD = 0.7;
+export declare const BLACKLIST_PHRASES: readonly string[];
+/** Max Levenshtein distance for fuzzy blacklist matching. */
+export declare const BLACKLIST_FUZZY_DISTANCE = 2;
+export declare const LENGTH_WARN = 10000;
+export declare const LENGTH_BLOCK = 25000;
+export declare const ENTROPY_WARN = 5.5;
+export declare const ENTROPY_BLOCK = 6.5;
+/** Long messages with entropy below this are likely repetitive padding. */
+export declare const ENTROPY_MIN_FOR_LONG = 2;
+/** "Long" = messages over this char count are checked for min entropy. */
+export declare const ENTROPY_LONG_THRESHOLD = 2000;
+export declare const COMPOSITE_WARN = 0.3;
+export declare const COMPOSITE_BLOCK = 0.7;
+//# sourceMappingURL=patterns.d.ts.map

package/dist/security/patterns.js

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+/**
+ * Clementine TypeScript — Prompt injection detection patterns and thresholds.
+ *
+ * All constants used by the 5-layer injection scanner.
+ * Zero dependencies — pure data.
+ */
+export const STRUCTURAL_PATTERNS = [
+    // Role-play / instruction override
+    { regex: /ignore (?:all |previous |prior |above )?instructions/i, weight: 0.3, label: 'instruction override' },
+    { regex: /disregard (?:all |your |previous |prior )?(?:instructions|programming|rules)/i, weight: 0.3, label: 'instruction override' },
+    { regex: /you are now/i, weight: 0.25, label: 'identity override' },
+    { regex: /new instructions:?/i, weight: 0.25, label: 'instruction injection' },
+    { regex: /forget (?:your|everything|all)/i, weight: 0.25, label: 'memory wipe attempt' },
+    { regex: /(?:from now on|henceforth),? (?:you|your|act|behave|respond)/i, weight: 0.2, label: 'behavior override' },
+    { regex: /(?:pretend|act like|roleplay as|you're|you are) (?:a |an )?(?:different|new|evil|unrestricted|unfiltered)/i, weight: 0.25, label: 'role hijack' },
+    { regex: /enter (?:developer|debug|admin|sudo|god|jailbreak|DAN) mode/i, weight: 0.3, label: 'mode hijack' },
+    // System prompt leak probes
+    { regex: /repeat (?:your|the) (?:system|initial|original|first) (?:prompt|instructions|message)/i, weight: 0.2, label: 'prompt leak probe' },
+    { regex: /(?:show|display|print|output|reveal|tell me) (?:your |the )?(?:system|hidden|secret|internal) (?:prompt|instructions|rules)/i, weight: 0.2, label: 'prompt leak probe' },
+    { regex: /what (?:are|were) your (?:original|initial|system|hidden) (?:instructions|prompt|rules)/i, weight: 0.15, label: 'prompt leak probe' },
+    // Delimiter injection
+    { regex: /<\/?system>/i, weight: 0.3, label: 'delimiter injection' },
+    { regex: /<<SYS>>/i, weight: 0.3, label: 'delimiter injection' },
+    { regex: /### ?(?:System|Instruction)/i, weight: 0.2, label: 'delimiter injection' },
+    { regex: /^\[INST\]/im, weight: 0.25, label: 'delimiter injection' },
+    { regex: /<\|(?:im_start|im_end|system|endoftext)\|>/i, weight: 0.3, label: 'delimiter injection' },
+    // Tool hijack
+    { regex: /call (?:the )?(?:tool|function|mcp)/i, weight: 0.15, label: 'tool hijack attempt' },
+    { regex: /execute (?:command|bash|shell|code)/i, weight: 0.2, label: 'tool hijack attempt' },
+    { regex: /use (?:the )?(?:bash|terminal|shell) (?:tool )?to/i, weight: 0.15, label: 'tool hijack attempt' },
+    // Exfiltration
+    { regex: /send (?:this|the|all|my) (?:data|info|memory|conversation|history|context|prompt) to/i, weight: 0.25, label: 'data exfiltration' },
+    { regex: /(?:upload|post|transmit|exfiltrate) (?:the |this |all |my )?(?:data|memory|vault|notes|secrets)/i, weight: 0.25, label: 'data exfiltration' },
+];
+export const SEMANTIC_AXES = [
+    {
+        name: 'authority',
+        weight: 2.0,
+        keywords: [
+            'system', 'admin', 'root', 'override', 'bypass', 'superuser',
+            'elevated', 'privileged', 'master', 'sudo', 'administrator',
+        ],
+    },
+    {
+        name: 'urgency',
+        weight: 1.0,
+        keywords: [
+            'immediately', 'now', 'urgent', 'critical', 'emergency',
+            'right away', 'asap', 'hurry', 'quick', 'important',
+        ],
+    },
+    {
+        name: 'secrecy',
+        weight: 1.5,
+        keywords: [
+            "don't tell", 'hide this', 'secretly', 'between us', 'confidential',
+            'do not mention', 'keep quiet', 'off the record', 'no one else',
+            'do not log', 'do not save',
+        ],
+    },
+    {
+        name: 'identity',
+        weight: 2.0,
+        keywords: [
+            'you are now', 'new role', 'act as', 'pretend to be', 'new persona',
+            'new identity', 'become', 'transform into', 'switch to', 'roleplay',
+        ],
+    },
+];
+// ── Layer 2: Thresholds ────────────────────────────────────────────
+export const SEMANTIC_WARN_THRESHOLD = 0.4;
+export const SEMANTIC_BLOCK_THRESHOLD = 0.7;
+// ── Layer 4: Blacklist Phrases ─────────────────────────────────────
+export const BLACKLIST_PHRASES = [
+    'ignore previous instructions',
+    'ignore all instructions',
+    'disregard your programming',
+    'you are dan',
+    'jailbreak mode',
+    'developer mode enabled',
+    'do anything now',
+    'bypass content policy',
+    'bypass safety',
+    'bypass restrictions',
+    'ignore safety guidelines',
+    'pretend you have no restrictions',
+    'act as an unrestricted ai',
+    'enable unrestricted mode',
+    'ignore content filters',
+    'override your instructions',
+    'forget your rules',
+    'disable your safety',
+    'ignore your training',
+    'remove all limitations',
+];
+/** Max Levenshtein distance for fuzzy blacklist matching. */
+export const BLACKLIST_FUZZY_DISTANCE = 2;
+// ── Layer 5: Entropy & Length Thresholds ───────────────────────────
+export const LENGTH_WARN = 10_000;
+export const LENGTH_BLOCK = 25_000;
+export const ENTROPY_WARN = 5.5;
+export const ENTROPY_BLOCK = 6.5;
+/** Long messages with entropy below this are likely repetitive padding. */
+export const ENTROPY_MIN_FOR_LONG = 2.0;
+/** "Long" = messages over this char count are checked for min entropy. */
+export const ENTROPY_LONG_THRESHOLD = 2_000;
+// ── Composite Score Thresholds ─────────────────────────────────────
+export const COMPOSITE_WARN = 0.3;
+export const COMPOSITE_BLOCK = 0.7;
+//# sourceMappingURL=patterns.js.map

package/dist/security/scanner.d.ts

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+/**
+ * Clementine TypeScript — 5-layer prompt injection scanner.
+ *
+ * All layers are synchronous, zero-dependency, and CPU-only.
+ * Target overhead: <5ms per message.
+ */
+import { IntegrityMonitor } from './integrity.js';
+export interface LayerResult {
+    layer: number;
+    name: string;
+    triggered: boolean;
+    detail: string;
+}
+export interface ScanResult {
+    verdict: 'pass' | 'warn' | 'block';
+    reasons: string[];
+    score: number;
+    layers: LayerResult[];
+}
+export declare class InjectionScanner {
+    private integrity;
+    constructor(integrity: IntegrityMonitor);
+    /** Refresh integrity baselines (call after legitimate vault writes). */
+    refreshIntegrity(): void;
+    /** Refresh integrity baselines only if stale (skip if refreshed within maxAgeMs). */
+    refreshIfStale(maxAgeMs?: number): void;
+    /** Run all 5 layers and return a composite verdict. */
+    scan(text: string): ScanResult;
+}
+export declare function getScanner(): InjectionScanner;
+export declare const scanner: InjectionScanner;
+//# sourceMappingURL=scanner.d.ts.map

package/dist/security/scanner.js

@@ -0,0 +1,263 @@
+/**
+ * Clementine TypeScript — 5-layer prompt injection scanner.
+ *
+ * All layers are synchronous, zero-dependency, and CPU-only.
+ * Target overhead: <5ms per message.
+ */
+import { STRUCTURAL_PATTERNS, SEMANTIC_AXES, SEMANTIC_WARN_THRESHOLD, SEMANTIC_BLOCK_THRESHOLD, BLACKLIST_PHRASES, BLACKLIST_FUZZY_DISTANCE, LENGTH_WARN, LENGTH_BLOCK, ENTROPY_WARN, ENTROPY_BLOCK, ENTROPY_MIN_FOR_LONG, ENTROPY_LONG_THRESHOLD, COMPOSITE_WARN, COMPOSITE_BLOCK, } from './patterns.js';
+import { IntegrityMonitor } from './integrity.js';
+// ── Utilities ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+/** Compute Shannon entropy over character frequencies. */
+function shannonEntropy(text) {
+    if (text.length === 0)
+        return 0;
+    const freq = new Map();
+    for (const ch of text) {
+        freq.set(ch, (freq.get(ch) ?? 0) + 1);
+    }
+    let entropy = 0;
+    const len = text.length;
+    for (const count of freq.values()) {
+        const p = count / len;
+        if (p > 0)
+            entropy -= p * Math.log2(p);
+    }
+    return entropy;
+}
+/** Compute Levenshtein distance between two strings. */
+function levenshtein(a, b) {
+    const m = a.length;
+    const n = b.length;
+    if (m === 0)
+        return n;
+    if (n === 0)
+        return m;
+    // Use single-row optimization
+    let prev = new Uint16Array(n + 1);
+    let curr = new Uint16Array(n + 1);
+    for (let j = 0; j <= n; j++)
+        prev[j] = j;
+    for (let i = 1; i <= m; i++) {
+        curr[0] = i;
+        for (let j = 1; j <= n; j++) {
+            const cost = a[i - 1] === b[j - 1] ? 0 : 1;
+            curr[j] = Math.min(prev[j] + 1, // deletion
+            curr[j - 1] + 1, // insertion
+            prev[j - 1] + cost);
+        }
+        [prev, curr] = [curr, prev];
+    }
+    return prev[n];
+}
+// ── InjectionScanner ───────────────────────────────────────────────
+export class InjectionScanner {
+    integrity;
+    constructor(integrity) {
+        this.integrity = integrity;
+    }
+    /** Refresh integrity baselines (call after legitimate vault writes). */
+    refreshIntegrity() {
+        this.integrity.refresh();
+    }
+    /** Refresh integrity baselines only if stale (skip if refreshed within maxAgeMs). */
+    refreshIfStale(maxAgeMs = 5000) {
+        this.integrity.refreshIfStale(maxAgeMs);
+    }
+    /** Run all 5 layers and return a composite verdict. */
+    scan(text) {
+        const reasons = [];
+        const layers = [];
+        let score = 0;
+        let forceBlock = false;
+        // ── Layer 1: Structural Pattern Scan ────────────────────────
+        let l1Triggered = false;
+        const l1Details = [];
+        for (const pattern of STRUCTURAL_PATTERNS) {
+            if (pattern.regex.test(text)) {
+                l1Triggered = true;
+                score += pattern.weight;
+                const reason = `L1: structural match — ${pattern.label}`;
+                reasons.push(reason);
+                l1Details.push(pattern.label);
+            }
+        }
+        layers.push({
+            layer: 1,
+            name: 'Structural Pattern Scan',
+            triggered: l1Triggered,
+            detail: l1Triggered ? `Matched: ${l1Details.join(', ')}` : 'No matches',
+        });
+        // ── Layer 2: Semantic Anomaly Score ─────────────────────────
+        const lower = text.toLowerCase();
+        let semanticComposite = 0;
+        let totalWeight = 0;
+        const l2Details = [];
+        for (const axis of SEMANTIC_AXES) {
+            let matches = 0;
+            for (const keyword of axis.keywords) {
+                if (lower.includes(keyword))
+                    matches++;
+            }
+            const axisScore = axis.keywords.length > 0 ? matches / axis.keywords.length : 0;
+            semanticComposite += axisScore * axis.weight;
+            totalWeight += axis.weight;
+            if (matches > 0) {
+                l2Details.push(`${axis.name}: ${matches}/${axis.keywords.length}`);
+            }
+        }
+        const normalizedSemantic = totalWeight > 0 ? semanticComposite / totalWeight : 0;
+        const l2Triggered = normalizedSemantic >= SEMANTIC_WARN_THRESHOLD;
+        if (normalizedSemantic >= SEMANTIC_BLOCK_THRESHOLD) {
+            score += 0.4;
+            reasons.push(`L2: high semantic anomaly (${normalizedSemantic.toFixed(2)})`);
+        }
+        else if (l2Triggered) {
+            score += normalizedSemantic * 0.3;
+            reasons.push(`L2: elevated semantic anomaly (${normalizedSemantic.toFixed(2)})`);
+        }
+        layers.push({
+            layer: 2,
+            name: 'Semantic Anomaly Score',
+            triggered: l2Triggered,
+            detail: l2Details.length > 0
+                ? `Axes: ${l2Details.join('; ')} (composite: ${normalizedSemantic.toFixed(2)})`
+                : `No anomalies (composite: ${normalizedSemantic.toFixed(2)})`,
+        });
+        // ── Layer 3: Context Integrity Check ────────────────────────
+        const integrityResults = this.integrity.check();
+        const tampered = integrityResults.filter((r) => r.tampered);
+        const l3Triggered = tampered.length > 0;
+        if (l3Triggered) {
+            forceBlock = true;
+            for (const t of tampered) {
+                const shortFile = t.file.split('/').slice(-2).join('/');
+                reasons.push(`L3: integrity violation — ${shortFile} was modified`);
+            }
+        }
+        layers.push({
+            layer: 3,
+            name: 'Context Integrity Check',
+            triggered: l3Triggered,
+            detail: l3Triggered
+                ? `Tampered: ${tampered.map((t) => t.file.split('/').pop()).join(', ')}`
+                : 'All checksums valid',
+        });
+        // ── Layer 4: Blacklist Filter ───────────────────────────────
+        const normalized = lower.replace(/\s+/g, ' ').trim();
+        let l4Triggered = false;
+        const l4Details = [];
+        // Exact match
+        for (const phrase of BLACKLIST_PHRASES) {
+            if (normalized.includes(phrase)) {
+                l4Triggered = true;
+                score += 0.3;
+                l4Details.push(`exact: "${phrase}"`);
+                reasons.push(`L4: blacklist exact match — "${phrase}"`);
+            }
+        }
+        // Fuzzy match (only if no exact matches found)
+        if (!l4Triggered) {
+            for (const phrase of BLACKLIST_PHRASES) {
+                const phraseLen = phrase.length;
+                // Scale fuzzy tolerance by phrase length — short phrases get tighter matching
+                // to avoid false positives like "you are always" ≈ "you are dan"
+                const maxDist = phraseLen >= 20 ? BLACKLIST_FUZZY_DISTANCE : 1;
+                const windowMin = Math.max(0, phraseLen - maxDist);
+                const windowMax = phraseLen + maxDist;
+                // Slide a window across the normalized text
+                for (let start = 0; start <= normalized.length - windowMin; start++) {
+                    for (let end = start + windowMin; end <= Math.min(start + windowMax, normalized.length); end++) {
+                        const substring = normalized.slice(start, end);
+                        if (levenshtein(substring, phrase) <= maxDist) {
+                            l4Triggered = true;
+                            score += 0.2;
+                            l4Details.push(`fuzzy: "${phrase}"`);
+                            reasons.push(`L4: blacklist fuzzy match — "${phrase}"`);
+                            break;
+                        }
+                    }
+                    if (l4Triggered)
+                        break;
+                }
+                if (l4Triggered)
+                    break; // One fuzzy match is enough
+            }
+        }
+        layers.push({
+            layer: 4,
+            name: 'Blacklist Filter',
+            triggered: l4Triggered,
+            detail: l4Triggered ? `Matched: ${l4Details.join(', ')}` : 'No matches',
+        });
+        // ── Layer 5: Entropy & Length Heuristics ─────────────────────
+        let l5Triggered = false;
+        const l5Details = [];
+        const msgLen = text.length;
+        const entropy = shannonEntropy(text);
+        // Length checks
+        if (msgLen > LENGTH_BLOCK) {
+            l5Triggered = true;
+            score += 0.3;
+            l5Details.push(`length ${msgLen} > block threshold ${LENGTH_BLOCK}`);
+            reasons.push(`L5: message too long (${msgLen} chars)`);
+        }
+        else if (msgLen > LENGTH_WARN) {
+            l5Triggered = true;
+            score += 0.1;
+            l5Details.push(`length ${msgLen} > warn threshold ${LENGTH_WARN}`);
+            reasons.push(`L5: message unusually long (${msgLen} chars)`);
+        }
+        // High entropy (encoded payloads)
+        if (entropy > ENTROPY_BLOCK) {
+            l5Triggered = true;
+            score += 0.25;
+            l5Details.push(`entropy ${entropy.toFixed(2)} > block threshold ${ENTROPY_BLOCK}`);
+            reasons.push(`L5: very high entropy (${entropy.toFixed(2)}) — possible encoded payload`);
+        }
+        else if (entropy > ENTROPY_WARN) {
+            l5Triggered = true;
+            score += 0.1;
+            l5Details.push(`entropy ${entropy.toFixed(2)} > warn threshold ${ENTROPY_WARN}`);
+            reasons.push(`L5: high entropy (${entropy.toFixed(2)})`);
+        }
+        // Low entropy on long messages (repetitive padding)
+        if (msgLen > ENTROPY_LONG_THRESHOLD && entropy < ENTROPY_MIN_FOR_LONG) {
+            l5Triggered = true;
+            score += 0.15;
+            l5Details.push(`low entropy ${entropy.toFixed(2)} on long message — repetitive padding`);
+            reasons.push(`L5: suspiciously low entropy on long message (${entropy.toFixed(2)})`);
+        }
+        layers.push({
+            layer: 5,
+            name: 'Entropy & Length Heuristics',
+            triggered: l5Triggered,
+            detail: l5Details.length > 0
+                ? l5Details.join('; ')
+                : `OK (length: ${msgLen}, entropy: ${entropy.toFixed(2)})`,
+        });
+        // ── Verdict ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
+        // Clamp score to 0–1
+        score = Math.min(1.0, Math.max(0, score));
+        let verdict;
+        if (forceBlock || score >= COMPOSITE_BLOCK) {
+            verdict = 'block';
+        }
+        else if (score >= COMPOSITE_WARN || reasons.length > 0) {
+            verdict = 'warn';
+        }
+        else {
+            verdict = 'pass';
+        }
+        return { verdict, reasons, score, layers };
+    }
+}
+// ── Singleton ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+let _scanner = null;
+export function getScanner() {
+    if (!_scanner) {
+        _scanner = new InjectionScanner(new IntegrityMonitor());
+    }
+    return _scanner;
+}
+export const scanner = getScanner();
+//# sourceMappingURL=scanner.js.map

package/dist/tools/admin-tools.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+/**
+ * Clementine TypeScript — Admin/System MCP tools.
+ *
+ * set_timer, workspace_config/list/info, cron_run_history, cron_list,
+ * add_cron_job, trigger_cron_job, workflow_list/create/run,
+ * analyze_image, feedback_log/report, teach_skill, create_tool,
+ * self_restart, self_improve_status/run, source_self_edit,
+ * cron_progress_read/write
+ */
+import type { McpServer } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/mcp.js';
+export declare function registerAdminTools(server: McpServer): void;
+//# sourceMappingURL=admin-tools.d.ts.map