clawmoat 0.8.0 → 1.0.0

package/src/multimodal/index.js

@@ -0,0 +1,579 @@
+/**
+ * Multimodal Input Scanning
+ * Scan base64 image data URLs, PDF text content, and file metadata for threats
+ * 
+ * Focuses on detectable patterns without external dependencies:
+ * - Metadata analysis (MIME type validation, filename patterns)
+ * - Embedded strings in base64 content (between tags, steganographic patterns)
+ * - Size anomalies and suspicious payloads
+ * - Hidden text injection patterns
+ * 
+ * @module multimodal
+ * @example
+ * const { scanMultimodalInput } = require('./multimodal');
+ * 
+ * const result = scanMultimodalInput({
+ *   content: '...',
+ *   filename: 'innocent.png',
+ *   mimeType: 'image/png'
+ * });
+ * 
+ * if (!result.safe) {
+ *   console.log('Threats found:', result.findings);
+ * }
+ */
+
+const { Buffer } = require('buffer');
+const path = require('path');
+
+/**
+ * @typedef {Object} MultimodalScanResult
+ * @property {boolean} safe - true if no threats detected
+ * @property {Array} findings - Array of detected threat patterns
+ * @property {string|null} maxSeverity - Highest severity among findings
+ */
+
+/**
+ * @typedef {Object} MultimodalInput
+ * @property {string} content - Base64 data URL or text content
+ * @property {string} [filename] - Original filename if available
+ * @property {string} [mimeType] - MIME type if available
+ * @property {number} [size] - File size in bytes if available
+ */
+
+/**
+ * Suspicious file extensions that should trigger enhanced scanning
+ */
+const SUSPICIOUS_EXTENSIONS = [
+  '.exe', '.scr', '.bat', '.cmd', '.com', '.pif', '.vbs', '.js', '.jar',
+  '.ps1', '.sh', '.py', '.rb', '.php', '.asp', '.jsp', '.pl'
+];
+
+/**
+ * Expected MIME types for common file extensions
+ */
+const MIME_TYPE_MAP = {
+  '.png': ['image/png'],
+  '.jpg': ['image/jpeg'],
+  '.jpeg': ['image/jpeg'],
+  '.gif': ['image/gif'],
+  '.webp': ['image/webp'],
+  '.svg': ['image/svg+xml'],
+  '.pdf': ['application/pdf'],
+  '.txt': ['text/plain'],
+  '.json': ['application/json'],
+  '.xml': ['application/xml', 'text/xml'],
+  '.html': ['text/html'],
+  '.css': ['text/css'],
+  '.js': ['application/javascript', 'text/javascript']
+};
+
+/**
+ * Patterns that indicate potential prompt injection in embedded content
+ */
+const INJECTION_PATTERNS = [
+  // Direct injection attempts
+  /ignore\s+(?:previous|all)\s+instructions?/gi,
+  /system\s*:\s*you\s+are\s+now/gi,
+  /forget\s+(?:everything|all)\s+(?:above|before)/gi,
+  /act\s+as\s+(?:if\s+you\s+are|a)\s+(?:different|new)/gi,
+  
+  // Hidden instruction markers
+  /<!--\s*(?:system|instruction|prompt)/gi,
+  /\[(?:SYSTEM|INSTRUCTION|PROMPT)\]/gi,
+  /<(?:system|instruction|prompt)>/gi,
+  
+  // Steganographic patterns
+  /\u200b|\u200c|\u200d|\ufeff/g, // Zero-width characters
+  /\u00a0{2,}/g, // Multiple non-breaking spaces
+  
+  // Base64 encoded instructions (common patterns)
+  /aWdub3Jl|c3lzdGVt|Zm9yZ2V0|YWN0IGFz/g, // base64 for: ignore, system, forget, act as
+  
+  // URL-like patterns that could be callback URLs
+  /(?:https?:\/\/|data:)[^\s\'"]{20,}/gi
+];
+
+/**
+ * Patterns indicating potential steganographic content
+ */
+const STEGANOGRAPHIC_PATTERNS = [
+  // Repeated patterns that might hide data
+  /(.{1,4})\1{10,}/g, // Same 1-4 character sequence repeated 10+ times
+  
+  // Unusual entropy markers
+  /[A-Za-z0-9+/=]{100,}/g, // Long base64-like sequences
+  
+  // Hidden text markers
+  /\x00|\x01|\x02|\x03|\x04|\x05|\x06|\x07|\x08/g, // Control characters
+];
+
+/**
+ * PDF-specific threat patterns
+ */
+const PDF_THREAT_PATTERNS = [
+  // JavaScript in PDFs
+  /\/JavaScript/gi,
+  /\/JS/gi,
+  
+  // Launch actions
+  /\/Launch/gi,
+  /\/F\s*\(.*\.(?:exe|bat|cmd|scr)\)/gi,
+  
+  // Embedded files
+  /\/EmbeddedFile/gi,
+  /\/FileAttachment/gi,
+  
+  // Form actions
+  /\/URI\s*\(.*(?:javascript|data:)/gi
+];
+
+/**
+ * Analyze filename for suspicious patterns
+ * @param {string} filename 
+ * @returns {Array} Array of findings
+ */
+function analyzeFilename(filename) {
+  if (!filename) return [];
+  
+  const findings = [];
+  const ext = path.extname(filename).toLowerCase();
+  const basename = path.basename(filename, ext);
+  
+  // Check for suspicious extensions
+  if (SUSPICIOUS_EXTENSIONS.includes(ext)) {
+    findings.push({
+      type: 'suspicious_file_extension',
+      subtype: 'executable_extension',
+      severity: 'high',
+      matched: ext,
+      position: filename.lastIndexOf(ext),
+      message: `Potentially dangerous file extension: ${ext}`
+    });
+  }
+  
+  // Check for double extensions (e.g., file.txt.exe)
+  const doubleExtMatch = filename.match(/\.([^.]+)\.([^.]+)$/);
+  if (doubleExtMatch && SUSPICIOUS_EXTENSIONS.includes('.' + doubleExtMatch[2])) {
+    findings.push({
+      type: 'filename_obfuscation',
+      subtype: 'double_extension',
+      severity: 'high',
+      matched: doubleExtMatch[0],
+      position: doubleExtMatch.index,
+      message: 'Double file extension detected (possible obfuscation)'
+    });
+  }
+  
+  // Check for null bytes in filename
+  if (filename.includes('\x00')) {
+    findings.push({
+      type: 'filename_injection',
+      subtype: 'null_byte',
+      severity: 'critical',
+      matched: '\\x00',
+      position: filename.indexOf('\x00'),
+      message: 'Null byte in filename (path traversal attempt)'
+    });
+  }
+  
+  // Check for path traversal patterns
+  if (filename.includes('../') || filename.includes('..\\')) {
+    findings.push({
+      type: 'filename_injection',
+      subtype: 'path_traversal',
+      severity: 'high',
+      matched: filename.includes('../') ? '../' : '..\\',
+      position: Math.max(filename.indexOf('../'), filename.indexOf('..\\')),
+      message: 'Path traversal pattern in filename'
+    });
+  }
+  
+  // Check for drive-relative path traversal (Windows) — GHSA-qffp-2rhf-9h96
+  // Patterns like "C:target" (no backslash) resolve to current dir of that drive,
+  // bypassing ../  checks. Also catch absolute paths and UNC paths.
+  const driveRelativeMatch = filename.match(/^[A-Za-z]:[^\\\/]/);
+  const absolutePathMatch = filename.match(/^[A-Za-z]:[\\\/]/) || filename.startsWith('/') || filename.startsWith('\\\\');
+  if (driveRelativeMatch) {
+    findings.push({
+      type: 'filename_injection',
+      subtype: 'drive_relative_traversal',
+      severity: 'high',
+      matched: driveRelativeMatch[0],
+      position: 0,
+      message: 'Drive-relative path traversal (Windows) — can escape extraction directory'
+    });
+  }
+  if (absolutePathMatch) {
+    findings.push({
+      type: 'filename_injection',
+      subtype: 'absolute_path',
+      severity: 'high',
+      matched: filename.substring(0, 10),
+      position: 0,
+      message: 'Absolute path in filename — may write outside intended directory'
+    });
+  }
+  
+  // Check for extremely long filenames (possible buffer overflow attempt)
+  if (filename.length > 255) {
+    findings.push({
+      type: 'filename_anomaly',
+      subtype: 'excessive_length',
+      severity: 'medium',
+      matched: filename.substring(0, 50) + '...',
+      position: 255,
+      message: `Filename exceeds typical limits (${filename.length} characters)`
+    });
+  }
+  
+  return findings;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Validate MIME type against filename extension
+ * @param {string} filename 
+ * @param {string} mimeType 
+ * @returns {Array} Array of findings
+ */
+function validateMimeType(filename, mimeType) {
+  if (!filename || !mimeType) return [];
+  
+  const findings = [];
+  const ext = path.extname(filename).toLowerCase();
+  const expectedMimes = MIME_TYPE_MAP[ext];
+  
+  if (expectedMimes && !expectedMimes.includes(mimeType)) {
+    findings.push({
+      type: 'mime_mismatch',
+      subtype: 'extension_mismatch',
+      severity: 'medium',
+      matched: mimeType,
+      message: `MIME type '${mimeType}' doesn't match extension '${ext}' (expected: ${expectedMimes.join(' or ')})`
+    });
+  }
+  
+  // Check for dangerous MIME types
+  const dangerousMimes = [
+    'application/x-msdownload',
+    'application/x-executable',
+    'application/x-msdos-program',
+    'application/x-ms-shortcut'
+  ];
+  
+  if (dangerousMimes.includes(mimeType)) {
+    findings.push({
+      type: 'dangerous_mime_type',
+      subtype: 'executable_mime',
+      severity: 'critical',
+      matched: mimeType,
+      message: `Dangerous MIME type detected: ${mimeType}`
+    });
+  }
+  
+  return findings;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Analyze data URL for embedded threats
+ * @param {string} dataUrl 
+ * @returns {Array} Array of findings
+ */
+function analyzeDataUrl(dataUrl) {
+  if (!dataUrl.startsWith('data:')) return [];
+  
+  const findings = [];
+  
+  try {
+    // Parse data URL
+    const [header, data] = dataUrl.split(',');
+    const [mimeType, encoding] = header.replace('data:', '').split(';');
+    
+    // Check for suspicious MIME types in data URLs
+    if (mimeType === 'text/html' || mimeType === 'application/javascript') {
+      findings.push({
+        type: 'suspicious_data_url',
+        subtype: 'executable_content',
+        severity: 'high',
+        matched: mimeType,
+        message: `Potentially dangerous data URL MIME type: ${mimeType}`
+      });
+    }
+    
+    if (encoding === 'base64' && data) {
+      // Decode base64 and scan for patterns
+      try {
+        const decoded = Buffer.from(data, 'base64').toString('utf8');
+        const injectionFindings = scanForInjectionPatterns(decoded);
+        findings.push(...injectionFindings);
+        
+      } catch (err) {
+        // If base64 decode fails, still check the raw data for patterns
+        const rawFindings = scanRawBase64(data);
+        findings.push(...rawFindings);
+      }
+    }
+    
+    // Check for oversized data URLs (possible DoS)
+    if (data && data.length > 10 * 1024 * 1024) { // 10MB limit
+      findings.push({
+        type: 'size_anomaly',
+        subtype: 'oversized_data_url',
+        severity: 'medium',
+        matched: `${Math.round(data.length / 1024 / 1024)}MB`,
+        message: `Extremely large data URL (${Math.round(data.length / 1024 / 1024)}MB)`
+      });
+    }
+    
+  } catch (err) {
+    findings.push({
+      type: 'malformed_data_url',
+      subtype: 'parse_error',
+      severity: 'low',
+      matched: dataUrl.substring(0, 100),
+      message: 'Malformed data URL structure'
+    });
+  }
+  
+  return findings;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Scan text content for injection patterns
+ * @param {string} content 
+ * @returns {Array} Array of findings
+ */
+function scanForInjectionPatterns(content) {
+  const findings = [];
+  
+  for (const pattern of INJECTION_PATTERNS) {
+    const matches = [...content.matchAll(pattern)];
+    for (const match of matches) {
+      findings.push({
+        type: 'embedded_injection',
+        subtype: 'prompt_injection',
+        severity: 'high',
+        matched: match[0],
+        position: match.index,
+        message: 'Potential prompt injection pattern detected in embedded content'
+      });
+    }
+  }
+  
+  for (const pattern of STEGANOGRAPHIC_PATTERNS) {
+    const matches = [...content.matchAll(pattern)];
+    for (const match of matches) {
+      findings.push({
+        type: 'steganographic_pattern',
+        subtype: 'hidden_data',
+        severity: 'medium',
+        matched: match[0].substring(0, 50),
+        position: match.index,
+        message: 'Potential steganographic or hidden data pattern'
+      });
+    }
+  }
+  
+  return findings;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Scan raw base64 data for patterns without decoding
+ * @param {string} base64Data 
+ * @returns {Array} Array of findings
+ */
+function scanRawBase64(base64Data) {
+  const findings = [];
+  
+  // Check for known base64-encoded malicious patterns
+  const maliciousB64Patterns = [
+    /aWdub3JlXHMrKD86cHJldmlvdXN8YWxsKVxzK2luc3RydWN0aW9ucz8=/g, // "ignore previous instructions"
+    /c3lzdGVtXHMqOlxzKnlvdVxzK2FyZVxzK25vdw==/g, // "system: you are now"
+    /Zm9yZ2V0XHMrKD86ZXZlcnl0aGluZ3xhbGwpXHMrKD86YWJvdmV8YmVmb3JlKQ==/g, // "forget everything above"
+  ];
+  
+  for (const pattern of maliciousB64Patterns) {
+    const matches = [...base64Data.matchAll(pattern)];
+    for (const match of matches) {
+      findings.push({
+        type: 'encoded_injection',
+        subtype: 'base64_injection',
+        severity: 'high',
+        matched: match[0],
+        position: match.index,
+        message: 'Base64-encoded injection pattern detected'
+      });
+    }
+  }
+  
+  return findings;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Scan PDF text content for threats
+ * @param {string} pdfText 
+ * @returns {Array} Array of findings
+ */
+function scanPdfContent(pdfText) {
+  if (!pdfText) return [];
+  
+  const findings = [];
+  
+  for (const pattern of PDF_THREAT_PATTERNS) {
+    const matches = [...pdfText.matchAll(pattern)];
+    for (const match of matches) {
+      findings.push({
+        type: 'pdf_threat',
+        subtype: 'suspicious_pdf_feature',
+        severity: 'high',
+        matched: match[0],
+        position: match.index,
+        message: 'Suspicious PDF feature detected (JavaScript, launch action, or embedded file)'
+      });
+    }
+  }
+  
+  // Scan for general injection patterns in PDF text
+  const injectionFindings = scanForInjectionPatterns(pdfText);
+  findings.push(...injectionFindings);
+  
+  return findings;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Check for size anomalies that might indicate malicious content
+ * @param {MultimodalInput} input 
+ * @returns {Array} Array of findings
+ */
+function checkSizeAnomalies(input) {
+  const findings = [];
+  
+  if (input.size) {
+    // Check for suspiciously small files that claim to be images
+    if (input.mimeType && input.mimeType.startsWith('image/') && input.size < 100) {
+      findings.push({
+        type: 'size_anomaly',
+        subtype: 'suspiciously_small',
+        severity: 'low',
+        matched: `${input.size} bytes`,
+        message: `Suspiciously small image file (${input.size} bytes)`
+      });
+    }
+    
+    // Check for extremely large files (potential DoS)
+    if (input.size > 100 * 1024 * 1024) { // 100MB
+      findings.push({
+        type: 'size_anomaly',
+        subtype: 'extremely_large',
+        severity: 'medium',
+        matched: `${Math.round(input.size / 1024 / 1024)}MB`,
+        message: `Extremely large file (${Math.round(input.size / 1024 / 1024)}MB) - potential DoS`
+      });
+    }
+  }
+  
+  return findings;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Main multimodal input scanner
+ * @param {MultimodalInput} input 
+ * @returns {MultimodalScanResult}
+ */
+function scanMultimodalInput(input) {
+  if (!input) {
+    return { safe: true, findings: [], maxSeverity: null };
+  }
+  
+  const findings = [];
+  
+  // Analyze filename if provided
+  if (input.filename) {
+    findings.push(...analyzeFilename(input.filename));
+  }
+  
+  // Validate MIME type against filename
+  if (input.filename && input.mimeType) {
+    findings.push(...validateMimeType(input.filename, input.mimeType));
+  }
+  
+  // Check size anomalies
+  findings.push(...checkSizeAnomalies(input));
+  
+  // Analyze content based on type
+  if (input.content) {
+    if (input.content.startsWith('data:')) {
+      // Data URL analysis
+      findings.push(...analyzeDataUrl(input.content));
+    } else if (input.mimeType === 'application/pdf') {
+      // PDF content analysis
+      findings.push(...scanPdfContent(input.content));
+    } else if (typeof input.content === 'string') {
+      // Generic text content analysis
+      findings.push(...scanForInjectionPatterns(input.content));
+    }
+  }
+  
+  // Determine overall safety and max severity
+  const safe = findings.length === 0;
+  let maxSeverity = null;
+  
+  if (!safe) {
+    const severityRank = { low: 0, medium: 1, high: 2, critical: 3 };
+    maxSeverity = findings.reduce((max, finding) => {
+      return (severityRank[finding.severity] || 0) > (severityRank[max] || 0) 
+        ? finding.severity 
+        : max;
+    }, 'low');
+  }
+  
+  return {
+    safe,
+    findings,
+    maxSeverity
+  };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Convenience function to scan image data URLs
+ * @param {string} dataUrl 
+ * @param {string} [filename] 
+ * @returns {MultimodalScanResult}
+ */
+function scanImageDataUrl(dataUrl, filename = null) {
+  const mimeMatch = dataUrl.match(/data:([^;]+)/);
+  const mimeType = mimeMatch ? mimeMatch[1] : null;
+  
+  return scanMultimodalInput({
+    content: dataUrl,
+    filename,
+    mimeType
+  });
+}
+
+/**
+ * Convenience function to scan file metadata
+ * @param {string} filename 
+ * @param {string} mimeType 
+ * @param {number} [size] 
+ * @returns {MultimodalScanResult}
+ */
+function scanFileMetadata(filename, mimeType, size = null) {
+  return scanMultimodalInput({
+    content: '',
+    filename,
+    mimeType,
+    size
+  });
+}
+
+module.exports = {
+  scanMultimodalInput,
+  scanImageDataUrl,
+  scanFileMetadata,
+  analyzeFilename,
+  validateMimeType,
+  analyzeDataUrl,
+  scanForInjectionPatterns,
+  scanPdfContent
+};