claude-flow 3.54.0 → 3.55.0

package/v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/commands/mcp.js

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
 import { output } from '../output.js';
 import { confirm } from '../prompt.js';
 import { installParentDeathWatchdog } from '../runtime/parent-death-watchdog.js';
-import { getServerManager, getMCPServerStatus, filterAdvertisedMcpTools, parseMcpToolSelection, } from '../mcp-server.js';
+import { getServerManager, getMCPServerStatus, resolveMcpHttpAuthToken, isLoopbackHost, filterAdvertisedMcpTools, parseMcpToolSelection, } from '../mcp-server.js';
 import { listMCPTools, callMCPTool, hasTool } from '../mcp-client.js';
 // MCP tools categories
 const TOOL_CATEGORIES = [
@@ -71,6 +71,16 @@ const startCommand = {
             description: 'HTTP request timeout in milliseconds (default 30000; env RUFLO_MCP_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS)',
             type: 'number'
         },
+        {
+            name: 'auth-token-file',
+            description: 'Read the HTTP bearer token from this file (http transport). Preferred over --auth-token; env RUFLO_MCP_HTTP_TOKEN also works',
+            type: 'string'
+        },
+        {
+            name: 'auth-token',
+            description: 'HTTP bearer token (16+ printable ASCII chars). Visible in argv/ps - prefer RUFLO_MCP_HTTP_TOKEN or --auth-token-file',
+            type: 'string'
+        },
         {
             name: 'daemon',
             short: 'd',
@@ -90,6 +100,8 @@ const startCommand = {
         { command: 'claude-flow mcp start', description: 'Start with defaults (stdio)' },
         { command: 'claude-flow mcp start -p 8080 -t http', description: 'Start HTTP server' },
         { command: 'claude-flow mcp start -t http --request-timeout-ms 120000', description: 'Allow slower cold-start HTTP tools' },
+        { command: 'RUFLO_MCP_HTTP_TOKEN=<16+ chars> claude-flow mcp start -t http', description: 'HTTP server requiring "Authorization: Bearer <token>" on every request (except GET /health)' },
+        { command: 'RUFLO_MCP_HTTP_TOKEN=<16+ chars> claude-flow mcp start -t http --host 0.0.0.0', description: 'Non-loopback bind: allowed only with a token (or RUFLO_MCP_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_HTTP=1)' },
         { command: 'claude-flow mcp start -d', description: 'Start as daemon' },
         { command: 'claude-flow mcp start -f', description: 'Force restart (kill existing)' }
     ],
@@ -109,6 +121,17 @@ const startCommand = {
             output.printError('Request timeout must be an integer from 1 to 3600000 milliseconds');
             return { success: false, exitCode: 1 };
         }
+        let authToken;
+        try {
+            authToken = resolveMcpHttpAuthToken({
+                token: (ctx.flags.authToken ?? ctx.flags['auth-token']),
+                tokenFile: (ctx.flags.authTokenFile ?? ctx.flags['auth-token-file']),
+            });
+        }
+        catch (error) {
+            output.printError(error.message);
+            return { success: false, exitCode: 1 };
+        }
         const daemon = ctx.flags.daemon ?? false;
         const force = ctx.flags.force ?? false;
         output.writeln();
@@ -166,6 +189,7 @@ const startCommand = {
             port,
             tools: !tools || tools === 'all' ? 'all' : tools.split(','),
             ...(requestTimeoutMs === undefined ? {} : { requestTimeoutMs }),
+            ...(authToken ? { authToken } : {}),
             daemonize: daemon,
         };
         try {
@@ -218,6 +242,15 @@ const startCommand = {
             if (transport === 'http') {
                 output.writeln(output.dim(`  Health: http://${host}:${port}/health`));
                 output.writeln(output.dim(`  RPC: http://${host}:${port}/rpc`));
+                if (authToken) {
+                    output.writeln(output.dim('  Auth: bearer token required (Authorization: Bearer <token>); /health is public'));
+                }
+                else if (isLoopbackHost(host)) {
+                    output.printWarning('No auth token set: any local process (and DNS-rebinding web pages) can call tools. Set RUFLO_MCP_HTTP_TOKEN to require a bearer token.');
+                }
+                else {
+                    output.printWarning('Running UNAUTHENTICATED on a non-loopback host (RUFLO_MCP_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_HTTP is set).');
+                }
             }
             else if (transport === 'websocket') {
                 output.writeln(output.dim(`  WebSocket: ws://${host}:${port}/ws`));
@@ -596,6 +629,7 @@ const execCommand = {
             const startTime = performance.now();
             const result = await callMCPTool(tool, params, {
                 sessionId: `cli-${Date.now().toString(36)}`,
+                transport: 'cli',
                 requestId: `exec-${Date.now()}`,
             });
             const duration = performance.now() - startTime;

package/v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/commands/policy.js

@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+import { anchorPosture } from '../services/policy-ledger-anchor.js';
 import { output } from '../output.js';
 import { autoMigratePolicyStateIfNeeded, evaluatePolicyRequest, loadPolicyState, revokePolicyApproval, setPolicyBudget, setPolicyMode, upsertPolicyRule, verifyPolicyLedger, } from '../services/policy-runtime.js';
 function argJson(value, label) {
@@ -19,12 +20,16 @@ function requireInteractiveAdministrator() {
         throw new Error('policy administration requires an interactive local terminal');
     }
 }
+// #3602: say what verify can and cannot prove.
+const LEDGER_TRUST_SCOPE = 'detects edits confined to state.json or to the project directory; '
+    + 'does not defend against an attacker who can rewrite both the project directory and ~/.config/ruflo (ADR-475)';
 export const policyCommand = {
     name: 'policy',
     description: 'Agentic policy engine — evaluate actions, manage rules/approvals, and verify the decision ledger (ADR-324)',
     options: [
         { name: 'mode', type: 'string', description: 'Policy mode: legacy | observe | enforce' },
         { name: 'project-root', type: 'string', description: 'Project root containing .claude-flow/policy' },
+        { name: 'establish-anchor', type: 'boolean', description: 'verify: explicitly anchor a ledger that has receipts but no anchor (interactive, logged with user and time)' },
     ],
     async action(context) {
         const args = context.args ?? [];
@@ -87,8 +92,11 @@ export const policyCommand = {
                 return print({ receipts: state.receipts });
             }
             if (operation === 'verify') {
-                const ledger = await verifyPolicyLedger(root);
-                const result = print(ledger);
+                const establishAnchor = flags['establish-anchor'] === true || flags.establishAnchor === true;
+                if (establishAnchor)
+                    requireInteractiveAdministrator();
+                const ledger = await verifyPolicyLedger(root, { establishAnchor });
+                const result = print({ ...ledger, anchors: anchorPosture(root), scope: LEDGER_TRUST_SCOPE });
                 return ledger.valid ? result : { ...result, success: false, exitCode: 1 };
             }
             throw new Error(`unknown policy operation: ${operation}`);

package/v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/commands/session.js

@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@ import { confirm, input, select } from '../prompt.js';
 import { callMCPTool, MCPClientError } from '../mcp-client.js';
 import * as fs from 'fs';
 import * as path from 'path';
+import { stringify as stringifyYaml } from 'yaml';
+import { gzipSync, gunzipSync } from 'node:zlib';
 // Format date for display
 function formatDate(dateStr) {
     if (!dateStr)
@@ -561,7 +563,7 @@ const exportCommand = {
             // Format output
             let content;
             if (exportFormat === 'yaml') {
-                content = toSimpleYaml(result.data);
+                content = stringifyYaml(result.data);
             }
             else {
                 content = JSON.stringify(result.data, null, 2);
@@ -570,7 +572,8 @@ const exportCommand = {
             const absolutePath = path.isAbsolute(outputPath)
                 ? outputPath
                 : path.join(ctx.cwd, outputPath);
-            fs.writeFileSync(absolutePath, content, 'utf-8');
+            const bytes = compress ? gzipSync(content) : Buffer.from(content, 'utf-8');
+            fs.writeFileSync(absolutePath, bytes);
             spinner.succeed('Session exported');
             output.writeln();
             // session_export returns the whole record under `data`; its stats live there.
@@ -587,14 +590,14 @@ const exportCommand = {
                     { property: 'Agents', value: exportStats.agentCount ?? exportStats.agents ?? 0 },
                     { property: 'Tasks', value: exportStats.taskCount ?? exportStats.tasks ?? 0 },
                     { property: 'Memory Entries', value: exportStats.memoryEntries ?? 0 },
-                    { property: 'File Size', value: formatSize(content.length) }
+                    { property: 'File Size', value: formatSize(bytes.length) }
                 ]
             });
             output.writeln();
             output.printSuccess(`Session exported to ${outputPath}`);
             return {
                 success: true,
-                data: { sessionId, outputPath, format: exportFormat, size: content.length }
+                data: { sessionId, outputPath, format: exportFormat, size: bytes.length }
             };
         }
         catch (error) {
@@ -647,9 +650,11 @@ const importCommand = {
         try {
             // The YAML written by `session export --format yaml` is display-only;
             // there is no YAML parser here, so say so instead of failing obscurely.
-            if (absolutePath.endsWith('.yaml') || absolutePath.endsWith('.yml')) {
+            if (/\.ya?ml(?:\.gz)?$/i.test(absolutePath)) {
                 try {
-                    JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(absolutePath, 'utf-8'));
+                    const bytes = fs.readFileSync(absolutePath);
+                    const content = bytes[0] === 0x1f && bytes[1] === 0x8b ? gunzipSync(bytes) : bytes;
+                    JSON.parse(content.toString('utf-8'));
                 }
                 catch {
                     spinner.fail('Failed to import session');
@@ -783,37 +788,6 @@ function formatDuration(ms) {
     }
     return `${seconds}s`;
 }
-function toSimpleYaml(obj, indent = 0) {
-    // Simple YAML serializer (for basic types)
-    if (obj === null)
-        return 'null';
-    if (typeof obj === 'boolean')
-        return String(obj);
-    if (typeof obj === 'number')
-        return String(obj);
-    if (typeof obj === 'string')
-        return obj.includes(':') ? `"${obj}"` : obj;
-    const spaces = '  '.repeat(indent);
-    let result = '';
-    if (Array.isArray(obj)) {
-        for (const item of obj) {
-            result += `${spaces}- ${toSimpleYaml(item, indent + 1).trim()}\n`;
-        }
-        return result;
-    }
-    if (typeof obj === 'object') {
-        for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(obj)) {
-            if (typeof value === 'object' && value !== null) {
-                result += `${spaces}${key}:\n${toSimpleYaml(value, indent + 1)}`;
-            }
-            else {
-                result += `${spaces}${key}: ${toSimpleYaml(value, indent)}\n`;
-            }
-        }
-        return result;
-    }
-    return String(obj);
-}
 // Main session command
 export const sessionCommand = {
     name: 'session',

package/v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/index.js

@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ import { output } from './output.js';
 import { commands, getCommandsByCategory, getCommand, getCommandAsync, getCommandNames, getLazyCommandNames, hasCommand } from './commands/index.js';
 import { suggestCommand } from './suggest.js';
 import { runStartupUpdateCheck } from './update/index.js';
+import { ensureBlockingStdio } from './blocking-stdio.js';
 // Read version from package.json at runtime
 function getPackageVersion() {
     try {
@@ -66,6 +67,8 @@ export class CLI {
      * Run the CLI with given arguments
      */
     async run(args = process.argv.slice(2)) {
+        // #3851: keep piped output intact across the process.exit() calls below
+        ensureBlockingStdio();
         try {
             // #1791.2 — If the user invoked a lazy command (e.g. `hive-mind task`),
             // pre-load it BEFORE parsing so the parser can build scoped flag

package/v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/init/executor.js

@@ -1464,6 +1464,7 @@ data/
 logs/
 sessions/
 neural/
+console/
 *.log
 *.tmp
 `;

package/v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/init/helpers-generator.js

@@ -436,6 +436,7 @@ module.exports = commands;
 // Literal-word root guard mirrored in the mod and both shipped classic helpers.
 const ROOT_DELETE_CHECK_SOURCE = String.raw `function hasRootDelete(command, depth = 0) {
   let word = '', quote = '', started = false, redirect = false
+  let ansiNul = false // a NUL inside $'...' ends that string, as in bash
   let inRm = false, optionsEnded = false, recursive = false, force = false, root = false
   const isRoot = (operand) => {
     if (!operand.startsWith('/')) return false
@@ -447,22 +448,55 @@ const ROOT_DELETE_CHECK_SOURCE = String.raw `function hasRootDelete(command, dep
     }
     return parts.length === 0 || /[*?\[]/.test(parts[0])
   }
+  // One backslash escape inside $'...', from the character after the backslash.
+  // Returns the text it stands for and the index of its last character. An unknown escape keeps its backslash.
+  // The command arrives lowercased, so an uppercase-U escape reads as a lowercase one: eight digits starting 0000 are one code point.
+  const ansiEscape = (s, at) => {
+    const c = s[at]
+    const simple = { a: '\x07', b: '\b', e: '\x1b', f: '\f', n: '\n', r: '\r', t: '\t', v: '\v', '\\': '\\', "'": "'", '"': '"', '?': '?' }
+    if (simple[c] !== undefined) return [simple[c], at]
+    const digits = (from, max, pattern) => pattern.exec(s.slice(from, from + max))?.[0]
+    const octal = digits(at, 3, /^[0-7]+/)
+    if (octal) return [String.fromCharCode(parseInt(octal, 8) & 255), at + octal.length - 1]
+    const hex = c === 'x' ? digits(at + 1, 2, /^[0-9a-f]+/) : undefined
+    if (hex) return [String.fromCharCode(parseInt(hex, 16)), at + hex.length]
+    const wide = c === 'u' ? (digits(at + 1, 8, /^0000[0-9a-f]{4}$/) ?? digits(at + 1, 4, /^[0-9a-f]+/)) : undefined
+    if (wide) return [String.fromCodePoint(parseInt(wide, 16)), at + wide.length]
+    if (c === 'c' && at + 1 < s.length) return [String.fromCharCode(s.charCodeAt(at + 1) & 31), at + 1]
+    return ['\\' + c, at]
+  }
   const finishWord = () => {
     if (!started) return false
     // Literal shell strings (e.g. sh -c 'rm -rf /') also carried the old guard.
     // Bound rescanning to four levels; beyond that retain its conservative check.
-    if (word.includes('rm') && /[\s;&|()]/.test(word)) {
+    if (/[\s;&|()\x60]/.test(word)) {
       if (depth < 4 ? hasRootDelete(word, depth + 1) : word.includes('rm -rf /')) return true
     }
     if (!inRm) inRm = word === 'rm' || word.endsWith('/rm')
     else if (!optionsEnded && word === '--') optionsEnded = true
     else if (!optionsEnded && word.startsWith('-')) {
-      recursive = recursive || word === '--recursive' || /^-[a-z]*r[a-z]*$/.test(word)
-      force = force || word === '--force' || /^-[a-z]*f[a-z]*$/.test(word)
+      // GNU getopt accepts any unambiguous long-option prefix: --r, --recur, --forc.
+      recursive = recursive || (word.length > 2 && '--recursive'.startsWith(word)) || /^-[a-z]*r[a-z]*$/.test(word)
+      force = force || (word.length > 2 && '--force'.startsWith(word)) || /^-[a-z]*f[a-z]*$/.test(word)
     } else root = root || isRoot(word)
     word = ''; started = false
     return inRm && recursive && force && root
   }
+  // A command substitution's body, from just after its opening backtick. Bash removes a
+  // backslash only before $, a backtick or a backslash (and " inside double quotes) and
+  // drops backslash-newline; any other backslash stays for the nested scan.
+  const substitution = (from, inDouble) => {
+    let body = '', j = from
+    for (; j < command.length && command[j] !== '\x60'; j++) {
+      const next = command[j + 1]
+      if (command[j] === '\\' && j + 1 < command.length) {
+        if (next === '\n') { j++; continue }
+        if (next === '$' || next === '\x60' || next === '\\' || (inDouble && next === '"')) { body += next; j++; continue }
+      }
+      body += command[j]
+    }
+    return [j, depth < 4 ? hasRootDelete(body, depth + 1) : body.includes('rm -rf /')]
+  }
   const finishCommand = () => {
     const denied = inRm && recursive && force && root
     inRm = optionsEnded = recursive = force = root = false
@@ -473,7 +507,25 @@ const ROOT_DELETE_CHECK_SOURCE = String.raw `function hasRootDelete(command, dep
     const redirectionAmpersand = char === '&' && (redirect || command[i + 1] === '>')
     redirect = false
     if (quote) {
+      if (quote === "$'") {
+        if (char === "'") { quote = ''; ansiNul = false }
+        else if (char === '\\' && i + 1 < command.length) {
+          const [text, last] = ansiEscape(command, i + 1)
+          i = last
+          if (!ansiNul) { const nul = text.indexOf('\0'); if (nul < 0) word += text; else { word += text.slice(0, nul); ansiNul = true } }
+        } else if (!ansiNul) word += char
+        continue
+      }
       if (char === quote) quote = ''
+      else if (quote === '"' && char === '\x60' && command.indexOf('\x60', i + 1) > i) {
+        const [end, denied] = substitution(i + 1, true)
+        if (denied) return true
+        // The substitution is gone from the word, as bash's empty output is (a quoted empty substitution glued to -rf leaves -rf).
+        // A # right after it is still inside the word: a placeholder keeps a rescan (sh -c "...")
+        // from reading it as the start of a comment.
+        if (command[end + 1] === '#') word += '\u0001'
+        i = end
+      }
       else if (quote === '"' && char === '\\' && i + 1 < command.length &&
         (command[i + 1] === '"' || command[i + 1] === '\\' || command[i + 1] === '$' ||
           command.charCodeAt(i + 1) === 96 || command[i + 1] === '\n')) {
@@ -485,6 +537,16 @@ const ROOT_DELETE_CHECK_SOURCE = String.raw `function hasRootDelete(command, dep
     if (char === '\\' && i + 1 < command.length) {
       const next = command[++i]
       if (next !== '\n') { word += next; started = true }
+    } else if (char === '\x60' && command.indexOf('\x60', i + 1) > i) {
+      // Command substitution: scan the body as its own command; the substitution
+      // stays inside the enclosing word, so the rm being parsed keeps its state,
+      // and the word has started (a # right after it is not a comment).
+      const [end, denied] = substitution(i + 1, false)
+      if (denied) return true
+      i = end; started = true
+    } else if (char === '$' && (command[i + 1] === "'" || command[i + 1] === '"')) {
+      // ANSI-C ($'...': escapes decoded) and locale ($"...") quoting: the $ is not part of the word.
+      quote = command[i + 1] === "'" ? "$'" : '"'; started = true; i++
     } else if (char === '"' || char === "'") {
       quote = char; started = true
     } else if (char === '#' && !started) {

package/v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/mcp-server.d.ts

@@ -30,6 +30,12 @@ export interface MCPServerOptions {
     daemonize?: boolean;
     timeout?: number;
     requestTimeoutMs?: number;
+    /**
+     * Bearer token every HTTP request must present (`Authorization: Bearer <token>`).
+     * http transport only. Prefer RUFLO_MCP_HTTP_TOKEN / a token file over this
+     * field's CLI flag so the secret stays out of argv. Never logged or emitted.
+     */
+    authToken?: string;
 }
 /**
  * MCP Server status
@@ -49,6 +55,33 @@ export interface MCPServerStatus {
         metrics?: Record<string, number>;
     };
 }
+/** Exported for tests — see LOOPBACK_HOSTS. */
+export declare function isLoopbackHost(host: string): boolean;
+/**
+ * Explicit, documented opt-out of the non-loopback authorization gate in
+ * startHttpServer(). Exported for tests.
+ */
+export declare function isUnauthenticatedHttpAllowed(env?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv): boolean;
+/**
+ * The full startHttpServer() authorization gate, as a pure function:
+ * true means "refuse to start" (see the thrown error for why).
+ *
+ * A non-loopback bind is allowed when requests are authenticated (a bearer
+ * token is configured on the http transport) or the operator explicitly opts
+ * out with RUFLO_MCP_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_HTTP=1. Loopback binds are never
+ * refused, with or without a token. Exported for tests.
+ */
+export declare function shouldRefuseUnauthenticatedHttp(host: string, env?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv, authenticated?: boolean): boolean;
+/**
+ * Resolve the HTTP bearer token. Precedence: explicit value (CLI flag), token
+ * file, then RUFLO_MCP_HTTP_TOKEN. An unset/empty env var means "no token";
+ * a token that is set but malformed throws, so a typo can never silently
+ * start the server unauthenticated. Exported for tests.
+ */
+export declare function resolveMcpHttpAuthToken(input?: {
+    token?: string;
+    tokenFile?: string;
+}, env?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv, readFile?: (p: string) => string): string | undefined;
 export declare function parseMcpToolSelection(value: string | undefined): string[] | 'all';
 /**
  * Apply the existing `--tools` contract to advertised schemas. A selector can

package/v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/mcp-server.js

@@ -104,8 +104,72 @@ function processStartToken(pid) {
     }
 }
 /**
- * Default configuration
+ * Hosts treated as same-machine-only for MCP HTTP tool-call authorization
+ * purposes (see startHttpServer's non-loopback authorization gate below).
+ * Deliberately exact-string matching only (no DNS resolution) so anything
+ * not spelled exactly one of these three fails closed rather than open.
  */
+const LOOPBACK_HOSTS = new Set(['localhost', '127.0.0.1', '::1']);
+/** Exported for tests — see LOOPBACK_HOSTS. */
+export function isLoopbackHost(host) {
+    return LOOPBACK_HOSTS.has(host);
+}
+/**
+ * Explicit, documented opt-out of the non-loopback authorization gate in
+ * startHttpServer(). Exported for tests.
+ */
+export function isUnauthenticatedHttpAllowed(env = process.env) {
+    const v = env.RUFLO_MCP_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_HTTP;
+    return v === '1' || v === 'true';
+}
+/**
+ * The full startHttpServer() authorization gate, as a pure function:
+ * true means "refuse to start" (see the thrown error for why).
+ *
+ * A non-loopback bind is allowed when requests are authenticated (a bearer
+ * token is configured on the http transport) or the operator explicitly opts
+ * out with RUFLO_MCP_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_HTTP=1. Loopback binds are never
+ * refused, with or without a token. Exported for tests.
+ */
+export function shouldRefuseUnauthenticatedHttp(host, env = process.env, authenticated = false) {
+    return !isLoopbackHost(host) && !authenticated && !isUnauthenticatedHttpAllowed(env);
+}
+/** Printable ASCII without space (RFC 6750 token-ish), 16-512 chars. */
+const AUTH_TOKEN_PATTERN = /^[\x21-\x7e]{16,512}$/;
+/**
+ * Resolve the HTTP bearer token. Precedence: explicit value (CLI flag), token
+ * file, then RUFLO_MCP_HTTP_TOKEN. An unset/empty env var means "no token";
+ * a token that is set but malformed throws, so a typo can never silently
+ * start the server unauthenticated. Exported for tests.
+ */
+export function resolveMcpHttpAuthToken(input = {}, env = process.env, readFile = (p) => fs.readFileSync(p, 'utf8')) {
+    let raw;
+    let source = '';
+    if (input.token !== undefined) {
+        raw = input.token;
+        source = '--auth-token';
+    }
+    else if (input.tokenFile !== undefined) {
+        source = '--auth-token-file';
+        try {
+            raw = readFile(input.tokenFile).replace(/\r?\n$/, '');
+        }
+        catch {
+            throw new Error('Could not read the MCP HTTP auth token file given to --auth-token-file');
+        }
+    }
+    else if (env.RUFLO_MCP_HTTP_TOKEN !== undefined && env.RUFLO_MCP_HTTP_TOKEN !== '') {
+        raw = env.RUFLO_MCP_HTTP_TOKEN;
+        source = 'RUFLO_MCP_HTTP_TOKEN';
+    }
+    if (raw === undefined)
+        return undefined;
+    if (!AUTH_TOKEN_PATTERN.test(raw)) {
+        // The value is deliberately not echoed.
+        throw new Error(`Invalid MCP HTTP auth token from ${source}: it must be 16-512 printable ASCII characters with no spaces`);
+    }
+    return raw;
+}
 const DEFAULT_OPTIONS = {
     transport: 'stdio',
     host: 'localhost',
@@ -239,7 +303,7 @@ export class MCPServerManager extends EventEmitter {
         }
         const startTime = performance.now();
         this.startTime = new Date();
-        this.emit('starting', { options: this.options });
+        this.emit('starting', { options: { ...this.options, authToken: this.options.authToken ? '[redacted]' : undefined } });
         try {
             if (this.options.transport === 'stdio') {
                 // For stdio transport, spawn the server process
@@ -671,7 +735,7 @@ export class MCPServerManager extends EventEmitter {
                         }
                     }
                     try {
-                        const result = await callMCPTool(toolName, toolParams, { sessionId });
+                        const result = await callMCPTool(toolName, toolParams, { sessionId, transport: 'stdio' });
                         const isError = hasToolError(result);
                         trackRequest(toolName, !isError);
                         return {
@@ -725,6 +789,31 @@ export class MCPServerManager extends EventEmitter {
      * Start HTTP server in-process
      */
     async startHttpServer() {
+        // Authorization gate first, before any import or bind: a refused start must
+        // not depend on (or touch) anything else.
+        const authToken = this.options.authToken || undefined;
+        if (authToken && this.options.transport !== 'http') {
+            // The standalone websocket transport has no working token check, so a
+            // token there would be a false promise of protection.
+            throw new Error('An MCP HTTP auth token is only supported with --transport http');
+        }
+        if (shouldRefuseUnauthenticatedHttp(this.options.host, process.env, !!authToken)) {
+            // No ToolAuthorizer is wired below: @claude-flow/mcp's tool-call
+            // authorization is fully opt-in (requireToolAuthorization/toolAuthorizer),
+            // so without this check every registered tool (memory_*, hooks_*,
+            // agentdb_*, hive-mind_*, ...) would be callable by any client that can
+            // reach this host:port, unauthenticated — the same shape as
+            // CVE-2026-81735 (CVSS 10/10, UI-TARS-desktop mcp-http-server: optional
+            // auth middleware never wired by the integrating CLI + a non-loopback
+            // bind). Loopback stays unaffected; this only gates an explicit
+            // non-default `--host`. A configured bearer token (below) lifts the gate.
+            throw new Error(`Refusing to start the MCP HTTP server on non-loopback host "${this.options.host}": ` +
+                'this server is unauthenticated unless a token is set, so every registered MCP tool ' +
+                'would be reachable over the network. Set RUFLO_MCP_HTTP_TOKEN (or --auth-token-file) ' +
+                'to require a bearer token, bind to a loopback host (127.0.0.1, ::1, or localhost), or set ' +
+                'RUFLO_MCP_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_HTTP=1 to acknowledge the risk and proceed ' +
+                '(e.g. when a trusted reverse proxy or network boundary already enforces auth).');
+        }
         // Dynamically import the MCP server package
         // FIX for issue #942: Use proper package import instead of broken relative path
         const { createMCPServer } = await import('@claude-flow/mcp');
@@ -747,7 +836,7 @@ export class MCPServerManager extends EventEmitter {
             cacheTTL: tool.cacheTTL,
             handler: async (input, context) => {
                 try {
-                    const result = await callMCPTool(tool.name, input || {}, { sessionId: context?.sessionId || fallbackSessionId });
+                    const result = await callMCPTool(tool.name, input || {}, { sessionId: context?.sessionId || fallbackSessionId, transport: this.options.transport === 'websocket' ? 'websocket' : 'http' });
                     trackRequest(tool.name, !hasToolError(result));
                     return result;
                 }
@@ -770,6 +859,9 @@ export class MCPServerManager extends EventEmitter {
             enableMetrics: true,
             enableCaching: true,
             requestTimeout: this.options.requestTimeoutMs,
+            auth: authToken
+                ? { enabled: true, method: 'token', tokens: [authToken] }
+                : undefined,
         }, logger);
         const registration = mcpServer.registerTools(cliTools);
         if (registration.failed.length > 0) {

package/v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/mcp-tools/agentdb-tools.js

@@ -150,6 +150,10 @@ export const agentdbPatternStore = {
             const confidence = validateScore(params.confidence, 0.8);
             const bridge = await getBridge();
             const result = await bridge.bridgeStorePattern({ pattern, type, confidence });
+            if (result && result.success === false) {
+                // #3691: the write was refused/not persisted — never acknowledge it.
+                return { success: false, error: `Pattern store failed: ${result.error ?? 'write not persisted'}`, controller: result.controller };
+            }
             if (result) {
                 // #3288: `controller: 'reasoningBank'` is the ONLY label that means
                 // the healthy path ran. Every other label bridgeStorePattern can
@@ -176,12 +180,20 @@ export const agentdbPatternStore = {
                 const { storeEntry } = await import('../memory/memory-initializer.js');
                 const patternId = `pattern-${Date.now()}-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8)}`;
                 const value = JSON.stringify({ pattern, type, confidence, _fallback: 'reasoningBank-unavailable' });
-                await storeEntry({
+                const stored = await storeEntry({
                     key: patternId,
                     value,
                     namespace: 'pattern',
                     tags: [type, 'reasoning-pattern', 'fallback'],
                 });
+                // #3691: storeEntry reports failure as {success:false}, not a throw.
+                if (!stored || stored.success !== true) {
+                    return {
+                        success: false,
+                        error: `Pattern store failed: memory_store fallback did not persist (${stored?.error ?? 'no result'})`,
+                        recommendation: 'Run agentdb_health to inspect controller registration and check that .swarm/memory.db is writable.',
+                    };
+                }
                 return {
                     success: true,
                     // #3288: a caller must not have to already know to distrust a

package/v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/mcp-tools/hive-mind-tools.d.ts

@@ -6,10 +6,8 @@
 import { type MCPTool } from './types.js';
 /**
  * Read the current hiveToken directly off disk, for same-machine callers
- * that already have filesystem access to hive state (the CLI's own
- * `hive-mind join/leave/consensus` subcommands) -- NOT exposed over any MCP
- * tool response (in particular, not hive-mind_status), since that's a
- * remote-reachable surface a capability token must not leak through.
+ * (the CLI's own `hive-mind join/leave/consensus` subcommands) -- NOT exposed
+ * over any MCP tool response.
  */
 export declare function getHiveTokenForCli(): string | undefined;
 export declare const hiveMindTools: MCPTool[];