claude-dev-env 2.3.0 → 2.4.0

package/docs/wsl-docker-cowork-starter-matrix.md

@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+# WSL / Docker / Cowork starter matrix
+
+Attribution and policy surface for host memory consumers that sit under WSL2, Docker Desktop, and the Claude Cowork HCS VM. Source evidence: forensic capture summarized on [issue #256](https://github.com/jl-cmd/claude-dev-env/issues/256) (`results/05-wsl-who-started.md` in the local ram-process-sprawl evidence pack). This file records supported starters, whether each component is required for day-to-day agent work, and how to shut it down. It does **not** apply a `.wslconfig` memory cap.
+
+## Hard rules
+
+1. **No unmeasured `.wslconfig` memory cap.** Do not set `memory=` (or other hard caps) in `%UserProfile%\.wslconfig` until (a) the owner of the WSL VM commit is known for the workload under test and (b) a before/after private-working-set measurement is recorded on the same host boot window. A blind cap is out of scope for this matrix.
+2. **Proven starters only.** Rows below use only process-parent, service, HCS owner, registry, and product-log evidence from the capture. Proximity without a parent edge is labeled **unknown**, not a starter claim.
+3. **Two HCS VMs are not one.** Owner=`WSL` maps to `vmmemWSL`. Owner=`cowork-vm-*` maps to plain `vmmem`. Treat them as separate shutdown and policy targets.
+
+## Starter matrix
+
+| Component | Starter / owner (supported) | Required for daily agent work? | Shutdown / stop |
+|-----------|----------------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------|
+| **WSLService** (`wslservice.exe`) | Windows service **WSLService**, StartMode=Auto, parent `services.exe` since boot | **Platform yes** if any WSL2 distro is used; leave Auto unless WSL is retired on the host | `Stop-Service WSLService` only when deliberately disabling WSL; normal idle path is distro shutdown, not service kill |
+| **`vmmemWSL`** (WSL2 utility VM) | HCS VM Owner=`WSL`; worker chain `vmcompute` → `vmwp` → `vmmemWSL` | **Yes while any distro is Running** (`wsl -l -v`) | `wsl --shutdown` (stops all WSL2 distros and the WSL utility VM; disrupts Docker's WSL backend too) |
+| **First user wake of WSL VM** | **Unknown** in the capture (no Security 4688; no surviving user `wsl.exe` from the create second). Docker was **not** up yet at that create time | N/A — attribution gap | Same as `vmmemWSL` once running |
+| **Docker Desktop / `com.docker.backend`** | Docker Desktop launches backend (product log). **HKCU Run** key registers Docker Desktop for logon. Windows service `com.docker.service` was **Stopped** / Manual — engine path is Desktop/backend user-mode | **Only when containers or Docker tooling are in active use** | Quit Docker Desktop (tray → Quit); confirm `com.docker.backend` gone. Optional: remove or disable the HKCU Run value named `Docker Desktop` so logon does not relaunch it |
+| **Live `wsl.exe` for `docker-desktop` + Ubuntu integration** | Parent **`com.docker.backend.exe` (services)** | Same as Docker Desktop | Stop Docker Desktop; or `wsl --shutdown` (broader blast radius) |
+| **Live `wsl.exe` for `code-index-mcp`** | Parent **`codex.exe`** ← **ChatGPT.exe** ← explorer. Command shape: `wsl.exe …/code-index-mcp` | **Only while Codex/ChatGPT needs the Ubuntu MCP indexer** | Exit Codex / ChatGPT app-server session; confirm no `wsl.exe` whose command line is `code-index-mcp` |
+| **Plain `vmmem` (cowork HCS VM)** | HCS VM Owner=`cowork-vm-*` (name match). Chain `vmcompute` → `vmwp` → `vmmem`. **Exact user process that created the VM is unknown** (no live parent edge). Claude Desktop cmdlines carry `cowork-*` schemes; that is label association, not a proven create edge | **Only while Claude Cowork VM features are in use** | Quit Claude Desktop / Cowork UI that owns the session; if the HCS VM remains Running, treat full stop as an open procedure (see open questions). Do **not** assume `wsl --shutdown` stops this VM — it is not Owner=`WSL` |
+| **grok as WSL parent** | **None** in the capture (high-confidence negative) | N/A | N/A |
+| **claude as parent of live `wsl.exe`** | **None** in the capture (high-confidence negative) | N/A for WSL shells; see cowork row for the separate HCS VM | N/A for `wsl.exe` |
+
+### Capture facts that stay fixed for this matrix
+
+These are host-capture facts the matrix must not rewrite:
+
+- Docker autostart comes from the **HKCU `Run` key** entry for Docker Desktop (not the stopped `com.docker.service`).
+- **Codex `code-index-mcp`** is a live holder of `wsl.exe`; it is not the create-time owner of `vmmemWSL` when Codex starts hours later.
+- **cowork-vm** is a **separate** HCS VM and plain `vmmem` consumer; it is not `vmmemWSL`.
+- **grok** and **claude** were **not** parents of any live `wsl.exe` in the capture.
+
+## Open questions
+
+Named gaps only — do not fill these with guesses in policy or code:
+
+1. **Exact user-mode process that first woke the WSL VM** at the `vmmemWSL` create second (Security 4688 / Sysmon not available in the capture).
+2. **Exact process that created HCS `cowork-vm-*` / plain `vmmem`** (parent chain ends at `vmwp` / `vmcompute`).
+3. **Whether a given Docker start was pure logon Run vs interactive tray open** (Run key proves Docker can autostart; a dead parent PID on the backend does not by itself prove which path fired).
+4. **Identity of dead parents** of mid-session Ubuntu `wslhost` processes whose PPID is already recycled.
+5. **Documented, safe idle-stop for the cowork HCS VM** when Claude UI is gone but `hcsdiag` still lists Owner=`cowork-vm-*` Running.
+6. **Whether historical sessions of grok/claude started WSL earlier in a boot** — unprovable without process-creation audit history; live snapshot negatives do not extend backward.
+
+To close (1), (2), (4), or (6): enable process-creation audit (Security 4688) or Sysmon with filters on `wsl.exe`, `vmwp.exe`, and Docker/Claude/Codex image paths, then re-capture on a clean boot.
+
+## Policy options (with costs)
+
+Choose explicitly. None of these options includes an unmeasured `.wslconfig` `memory=` write.
+
+| Option | Action | RAM / sprawl effect (directional) | Cost / risk |
+|--------|--------|-----------------------------------|-------------|
+| **P0 — Observe only** | Keep matrix; no host change | None until a component is stopped | Continues dual-VM + Docker + Codex WSL hold when those apps run |
+| **P1 — Docker on demand** | Remove or disable HKCU Run `Docker Desktop`; start Desktop only when containers are needed | Avoids Docker backend + docker-desktop/Ubuntu integration `wsl.exe` on boots/sessions that never use Docker | Manual start latency; first container work pays cold start; any script that assumes Docker is already up fails until launch |
+| **P2 — Docker fully off when idle** | Quit Docker Desktop after use; optional P1 | Frees backend private set and Docker-held WSL distro activity | Must re-open Desktop before compose/build; `wsl -l -v` may still show Running until `wsl --shutdown` or Docker stops holding distros |
+| **P3 — Codex indexer off when idle** | Exit ChatGPT/Codex app-server when not reviewing; disable code-index MCP if product settings allow | Drops Codex-held `wsl.exe … code-index-mcp` edges | Codex features that need the Ubuntu indexer fail until restart; does **not** by itself tear down `vmmemWSL` if Docker or another client still holds a distro |
+| **P4 — WSL idle shutdown** | When no Docker/Codex/other WSL client is needed: `wsl --shutdown` | Tears down Ubuntu + docker-desktop distros and `vmmemWSL` | **Breaks** any live Docker WSL backend and any in-distro MCP until restart; never use mid-task if containers or WSL MCP are active |
+| **P5 — Cowork VM idle policy** | Quit Claude Cowork/Desktop when the VM is not needed; re-check `hcsdiag list` for Owner=`cowork-vm-*` | Targets plain `vmmem` (~multi-GB private in the capture) without touching Owner=`WSL` | Create/stop procedure for a leftover Running cowork VM is still an open question; wrong kill path can disrupt Cowork artifacts |
+| **P6 — Process-creation audit** | Turn on 4688 or Sysmon for wsl/vmwp/Docker/Claude/Codex | No direct RAM win; closes open questions (1)(2)(4)(6) | Audit volume, privacy review, and storage for event logs |
+| **P7 — `.wslconfig` memory cap** | Set `memory=` under `[wsl2]` | Caps WSL utility VM commit **only after** measured before/after on this host | **Blocked here until measured.** Risk: OOM inside distros, Docker backend instability, false “fix” that leaves cowork `vmmem` untouched |
+
+### Measurement gate for P7 (and any memory cap)
+
+Before any `.wslconfig` memory write:
+
+1. Record `wsl -l -v`, `hcsdiag list`, and private working set for `vmmemWSL` / plain `vmmem` / `com.docker.backend`.
+2. Name which component the cap is meant to bound (Owner=`WSL` only — cowork is outside `.wslconfig`).
+3. Apply cap; reboot or `wsl --shutdown` + re-start workload as required for the setting to apply.
+4. Re-record the same counters under the same workload.
+5. Commit the before/after note next to the policy decision (issue comment or evidence pack). Without that note, leave `.wslconfig` without a memory cap.
+
+## Quick identification commands
+
+Read-only checks agents and operators use on Windows:
+
+```text
+wsl -l -v
+hcsdiag list
+Get-CimInstance Win32_Service -Filter "Name='WSLService'"
+Get-ItemProperty HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
+Get-CimInstance Win32_Process -Filter "Name='wsl.exe'" | Select ProcessId, ParentProcessId, CommandLine
+```
+
+Resolve each `wsl.exe` ParentProcessId to an image name before blaming an agent binary. A missing parent is **unknown**, not proof of a named starter.
+
+## Related
+
+- Issue: [jl-cmd/claude-dev-env#256](https://github.com/jl-cmd/claude-dev-env/issues/256) (child of epic #252)
+- Local forensic write-up: `results/05-wsl-who-started.md` under the host evidence pack path named in the issue body

package/hooks/blocking/CLAUDE.md

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ PreToolUse hooks that deny (block) tool calls when a rule is violated. The main
 | `config/` | Shared constants for the verified-commit gate family (`verified_commit_constants.py`) |
 | `tdd_enforcer_parts/` | Concern modules the `tdd_enforcer.py` entry hook wires together: path classification, content analysis, candidate-path resolution, freshness, git-tracking restore detection, decisions, and constants |
 | `verified_commit_gate_parts/` | Concern modules the `verified_commit_gate.py` entry hook wires together: command tokenization, directory-change resolution, gated git-invocation resolution, deny-reason resolution, and deny-payload assembly |
+| `code_review_stamp_write_blocker_parts/` | Concern modules the `code_review_stamp_directory_write_blocker.py` entry hook wires together: the split directory-change-into-stamp matcher and the obfuscated-stamp-path-write matcher |
 | `claude_md_orphan_file_blocker_parts/` | Concern modules the `claude_md_orphan_file_blocker.py` entry hook wires together: reference extraction, subtree scan, scan plan, decision, and constants |
 | `package_inventory_stale_blocker_parts/` | Concern modules the `package_inventory_stale_blocker.py` entry hook wires together: inventory detection, decision, and constants |
 | `inventory_intent_records/` | The shared per-session pending-intent store both inventory blockers read to break the file/row add-order deadlock |
@@ -71,7 +72,10 @@ The check modules it calls are the `code_rules_<concern>.py` files below.
 | `block_main_commit.py` | PreToolUse (Bash) | `git commit`/`git push` directly to `main` |
 | `bot_mention_comment_blocker.py` | PreToolUse (Write/Edit) | PR review comments that @-mention a bot |
 | `claude_md_orphan_file_blocker.py` | PreToolUse (Write/Edit/MultiEdit) | Per-directory `CLAUDE.md` table cells naming a bare filename absent from the directory subtree |
-| `code_verifier_spawn_preflight_gate.py` | PreToolUse (Agent) | Spawning the `code-verifier` subagent when the branch has a merge conflict vs its base or a CODE_RULES violation on a working-tree-added line |
+| `code_review_pr_create_gate.py` | PreToolUse (Bash/MCP GitHub) | `gh pr create` or the MCP `create_pull_request` tool without a clean `xhigh` code-review stamp covering the branch surface |
+| `code_review_push_gate.py` | PreToolUse (Bash/PowerShell) | `git push` without a clean `low` code-review stamp covering the branch surface |
+| `code_review_stamp_directory_write_blocker.py` | PreToolUse (Bash/PowerShell/Write/Edit/MultiEdit) | Shell or file-tool writes into `~/.claude/code-review-stamps/`, and shell references to the stamp store module or its mint call, outside the sanctioned invoker |
+| `code_verifier_spawn_preflight_gate.py` | PreToolUse (Agent) | Spawning the `code-verifier` subagent when the branch has a merge conflict vs its base or a CODE_RULES violation on a working-tree-added line, or the CODE_RULES engine fails to load |
 | `convergence_gate_blocker.py` | PreToolUse (Bash) | Convergence workflow actions on a conflicting PR |
 | `conventional_pr_title_gate.py` | PreToolUse (Bash) | `gh pr create`/`gh pr edit` with a `--title` that is not a Conventional Commit, in a repo whose CI runs a semantic-pull-request title check |
 | `destructive_command_blocker.py` | PreToolUse (Bash/PowerShell) | Shell commands with destructive literals (`rm -rf`, `git reset --hard`, etc.) |
@@ -121,6 +125,9 @@ The check modules it calls are the `code_rules_<concern>.py` files below.
 | File | Role |
 |---|---|
 | `_gh_body_arg_utils.py` | Parsing helpers for `gh_body_arg_blocker.py` |
+| `code_review_enforcement_config_bootstrap.py` | Binds `config.code_review_enforcement_constants` to the sibling `config/` file by explicit location, so the code-review gate family resolves its constants regardless of a foreign `config` package's `sys.path` order |
+| `code_review_gate_deny.py` | Shared deny scaffold for the push and PR-create code-review gates: the `hookSpecificOutput` deny-payload builder and the log-and-emit helper, so both gates share one deny shape |
+| `code_review_stamp_store.py` | Reads and writes the per-work-tree code-review stamp files under `~/.claude/code-review-stamps/`, and decides whether a clean stamp at the needed effort covers the live branch surface |
 | `pr_description_body_audit.py` | Body audit logic for `pr_description_enforcer.py` |
 | `pr_description_command_parser.py` | `gh` command parsing for `pr_description_enforcer.py` |
 | `pr_description_pr_number.py` | PR number extraction logic |

package/hooks/blocking/code_review_enforcement_config_bootstrap.py

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+"""Deterministic loader for the code-review enforcement constants module.
+
+The stamp store and every code-review gate import their shared constants as
+``from config.code_review_enforcement_constants import ...``. In the installed
+hook tree a second, unrelated ``config`` package can sit ahead of this package
+on ``sys.path`` and win that dotted name by path order, so the import binds to
+the wrong file and raises ImportError on any constant the stale copy lacks.
+This module binds the dotted name to its sibling ``config/`` file by explicit
+location, so resolution never depends on ``sys.path`` order.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import importlib.util
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+
+
+def register_code_review_enforcement_constants() -> None:
+    """Bind the code-review enforcement constants dotted name to its config file.
+
+    ::
+
+        sys.path = ["<installed hooks>", "<blocking>"]  # foreign config first
+        register_code_review_enforcement_constants()
+        from config.code_review_enforcement_constants import STAMP_DIRECTORY_NAME
+        ok: bound to <blocking>/config/code_review_enforcement_constants.py
+
+    A ``from config.code_review_enforcement_constants import`` that follows this
+    call reads the entry straight from ``sys.modules``, so it resolves to this
+    file whatever else owns the ``config`` name. An entry already cached is left
+    in place, so the call is idempotent and never displaces a module a caller
+    loaded on purpose.
+
+    Returns:
+        None. The effect is the ``sys.modules`` registration.
+    """
+    _bind_config_module_by_location(
+        "config.code_review_enforcement_constants",
+        Path(__file__).resolve().parent / "config" / "code_review_enforcement_constants.py",
+    )
+
+
+def _bind_config_module_by_location(dotted_name: str, constants_file_path: Path) -> None:
+    """Register a dotted config name against an explicit file path in sys.modules."""
+    if dotted_name in sys.modules:
+        return
+    module_spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(dotted_name, constants_file_path)
+    if module_spec is None or module_spec.loader is None:
+        return
+    constants_module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(module_spec)
+    sys.modules[dotted_name] = constants_module
+    module_spec.loader.exec_module(constants_module)

package/hooks/blocking/code_review_gate_deny.py

@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+"""Shared deny scaffold for the code-review PreToolUse gates.
+
+The push gate and the PR-create gate deny a blocked tool call the same way: a
+``hookSpecificOutput`` payload carrying the deny decision and a corrective
+reason, logged through ``log_hook_block`` before it reaches stdout. This module
+holds that one payload builder and the log-and-emit helper, so the two gates
+share a single deny shape and stay in step.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+
+try:
+    _blocking_directory = str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent)
+    _hooks_directory = str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent)
+    for each_bootstrap_directory in (_blocking_directory, _hooks_directory):
+        if each_bootstrap_directory not in sys.path:
+            sys.path.insert(0, each_bootstrap_directory)
+
+    from code_review_enforcement_config_bootstrap import (
+        register_code_review_enforcement_constants,
+    )
+
+    register_code_review_enforcement_constants()
+
+    from config.code_review_enforcement_constants import (
+        DENY_PERMISSION_DECISION,
+        PRE_TOOL_USE_HOOK_EVENT_NAME,
+    )
+
+    from hooks_constants.hook_block_logger import log_hook_block
+except ImportError as import_error:
+    raise ImportError(
+        "the code_review_gate_deny dependencies did not import; "
+        "ensure the hooks directory is importable."
+    ) from import_error
+
+
+def build_code_review_deny_payload(deny_reason: str) -> dict[str, dict[str, str]]:
+    """Build the PreToolUse deny payload for a blocked code-review gate action.
+
+    Args:
+        deny_reason: The corrective message naming why the action is denied.
+
+    Returns:
+        The ``hookSpecificOutput`` deny payload.
+    """
+    return {
+        "hookSpecificOutput": {
+            "hookEventName": PRE_TOOL_USE_HOOK_EVENT_NAME,
+            "permissionDecision": DENY_PERMISSION_DECISION,
+            "permissionDecisionReason": deny_reason,
+        }
+    }
+
+
+def log_and_emit_code_review_deny(deny_reason: str, tool_name: str, hook_module_name: str) -> None:
+    """Log a code-review gate block and write its deny payload to stdout.
+
+    Args:
+        deny_reason: The corrective message naming why the action is denied.
+        tool_name: The name of the gated tool, recorded in the block log.
+        hook_module_name: The calling gate's module name, recorded in the log.
+    """
+    log_hook_block(
+        calling_hook_name=hook_module_name,
+        hook_event=PRE_TOOL_USE_HOOK_EVENT_NAME,
+        block_reason=deny_reason,
+        tool_name=tool_name if isinstance(tool_name, str) else None,
+    )
+    sys.stdout.write(json.dumps(build_code_review_deny_payload(deny_reason)) + "\n")

package/hooks/blocking/code_review_pr_create_gate.py

@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
+"""PreToolUse gate: PR create lands only behind a clean xhigh code-review stamp.
+
+Fires on Bash/PowerShell ``gh pr create`` and on the MCP
+``create_pull_request`` tool. Resolves the repository from the session
+working directory (or the payload cwd), computes the live change-surface
+hash, and allows the create only when a clean stamp at effort ``xhigh`` or
+higher covers that exact hash under ``~/.claude/code-review-stamps/``.
+
+Empty surfaces and repos with no resolvable upstream base are out of scope
+and allowed. Push lands behind ``code_review_push_gate`` and commit behind
+``verified_commit_gate``; this gate covers pull-request creation only.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import re
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+
+try:
+    _blocking_directory = str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent)
+    _hooks_directory = str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent)
+    for each_bootstrap_directory in (_blocking_directory, _hooks_directory):
+        if each_bootstrap_directory not in sys.path:
+            sys.path.insert(0, each_bootstrap_directory)
+
+    from code_review_enforcement_config_bootstrap import (
+        register_code_review_enforcement_constants,
+    )
+    from verified_commit_config_bootstrap import register_verified_commit_constants
+
+    register_code_review_enforcement_constants()
+    register_verified_commit_constants()
+
+    from code_review_gate_deny import (
+        build_code_review_deny_payload,
+        log_and_emit_code_review_deny,
+    )
+    from code_review_stamp_store import live_surface_hash, stamp_covers_surface
+    from config.code_review_enforcement_constants import (
+        ALL_GATED_SHELL_TOOL_NAMES,
+        GH_PR_CREATE_INVOCATION_PATTERN,
+        HASH_PREVIEW_LENGTH,
+        MCP_CREATE_PULL_REQUEST_TOOL_NAME,
+        PR_CREATE_GATE_CORRECTIVE_MESSAGE,
+        PR_CREATE_GATE_HOOK_MODULE_NAME,
+        PR_CREATE_REQUIRED_EFFORT,
+    )
+    from verification_verdict_store import resolve_repo_root
+except ImportError as import_error:
+    raise ImportError(
+        "the code_review_pr_create_gate dependencies did not import; "
+        "ensure the hooks directory is importable."
+    ) from import_error
+
+
+def _strip_quoted_regions(command_text: str) -> str:
+    """Blank out single- and double-quoted spans so prose is not gated."""
+    quote_pattern = re.compile(r"\"[^\"]*\"|'[^']*'")
+    return quote_pattern.sub(lambda each_match: " " * len(each_match.group(0)), command_text)
+
+
+def command_invokes_gh_pr_create(command_text: str) -> bool:
+    """Decide whether a shell command invokes ``gh pr create``.
+
+    ::
+
+        gh pr create --title T --body-file b.md  -> True
+        echo "gh pr create"                      -> False (quoted prose)
+        gh pr edit 1 --title T                   -> False
+
+    Args:
+        command_text: The raw command string from the tool payload.
+
+    Returns:
+        True when the command contains a real ``gh pr create`` invocation.
+    """
+    quote_stripped_command = _strip_quoted_regions(command_text)
+    invocation_pattern = re.compile(GH_PR_CREATE_INVOCATION_PATTERN, re.IGNORECASE)
+    return invocation_pattern.search(quote_stripped_command) is not None
+
+
+def is_mcp_create_pull_request_tool(tool_name: str) -> bool:
+    """Decide whether a tool name is the MCP create-pull-request tool.
+
+    Args:
+        tool_name: The PreToolUse ``tool_name`` field.
+
+    Returns:
+        True when the name is the configured MCP create-PR tool.
+    """
+    return tool_name == MCP_CREATE_PULL_REQUEST_TOOL_NAME
+
+
+def deny_reason_for_directory(target_directory: str) -> str | None:
+    """Decide whether a PR create from a directory must be blocked.
+
+    ::
+
+        no repo / empty surface / covering xhigh stamp   -> None (allow)
+        production surface without xhigh-or-higher stamp -> corrective (deny)
+
+    Args:
+        target_directory: The session or repo directory the create targets.
+
+    Returns:
+        The deny reason when the surface needs a clean xhigh stamp and none
+        covers it; None when the create may proceed.
+    """
+    repo_root = resolve_repo_root(target_directory)
+    if repo_root is None:
+        return None
+    surface_hash = live_surface_hash(repo_root)
+    if surface_hash is None:
+        return None
+    if stamp_covers_surface(repo_root, surface_hash, PR_CREATE_REQUIRED_EFFORT):
+        return None
+    hash_preview = surface_hash[:HASH_PREVIEW_LENGTH]
+    return (
+        f"{PR_CREATE_GATE_CORRECTIVE_MESSAGE} (repo: {repo_root}, surface sha256 {hash_preview}...)"
+    )
+
+
+def _deny_for_directory_or_none(
+    session_directory: str,
+) -> dict[str, dict[str, str]] | None:
+    """Return the deny payload for a directory that lacks a covering stamp."""
+    deny_reason = deny_reason_for_directory(session_directory)
+    if deny_reason is None:
+        return None
+    return build_code_review_deny_payload(deny_reason)
+
+
+def _shell_command_targets_pr_create(all_pretooluse_payload: dict[str, object]) -> bool:
+    """Decide whether a shell payload carries a real ``gh pr create``."""
+    tool_input = all_pretooluse_payload.get("tool_input", {})
+    if not isinstance(tool_input, dict):
+        return False
+    command_text = tool_input.get("command", "")
+    if not isinstance(command_text, str) or not command_text:
+        return False
+    return command_invokes_gh_pr_create(command_text)
+
+
+def decision_for_payload(
+    all_pretooluse_payload: dict[str, object],
+) -> dict[str, dict[str, str]] | None:
+    """Build the deny decision for a gated PR-create attempt.
+
+    Args:
+        all_pretooluse_payload: The PreToolUse hook payload.
+
+    Returns:
+        The deny decision mapping when the create lacks a covering xhigh
+        stamp; None when the create may proceed.
+    """
+    tool_name = all_pretooluse_payload.get("tool_name", "")
+    if not isinstance(tool_name, str):
+        return None
+    session_directory = all_pretooluse_payload.get("cwd", ".")
+    if not isinstance(session_directory, str):
+        session_directory = "."
+    if is_mcp_create_pull_request_tool(tool_name):
+        return _deny_for_directory_or_none(session_directory)
+    if tool_name not in ALL_GATED_SHELL_TOOL_NAMES:
+        return None
+    if not _shell_command_targets_pr_create(all_pretooluse_payload):
+        return None
+    return _deny_for_directory_or_none(session_directory)
+
+
+def main() -> None:
+    """Read the PreToolUse payload and decide whether to allow the PR create."""
+    try:
+        pretooluse_payload = json.load(sys.stdin)
+    except json.JSONDecodeError:
+        return
+    deny_decision = decision_for_payload(pretooluse_payload)
+    if deny_decision is None:
+        return
+    tool_name = pretooluse_payload.get("tool_name", "")
+    deny_reason = deny_decision["hookSpecificOutput"]["permissionDecisionReason"]
+    if not isinstance(deny_reason, str):
+        return
+    log_and_emit_code_review_deny(
+        deny_reason,
+        tool_name if isinstance(tool_name, str) else "",
+        PR_CREATE_GATE_HOOK_MODULE_NAME,
+    )
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()

package/hooks/blocking/code_review_push_gate.py

@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+"""PreToolUse gate: git push lands only behind a clean low code-review stamp.
+
+Fires on Bash/PowerShell tool calls. When the command carries a ``git push``,
+the gate resolves each repository the push targets, computes the live
+change-surface hash against the merge base, and allows the push only when a
+clean stamp at effort ``low`` or higher covers that exact hash under
+``~/.claude/code-review-stamps/``.
+
+Allowed without a stamp:
+
+- a command carrying the bypass marker (``# code-review-skip``) as a trailing
+  shell comment,
+- a repository with no resolvable upstream base,
+- a mechanically exempt surface (docs and image files, pytest test files, and
+  Python files whose docstring-stripped AST is unchanged), and
+- a surface a clean ``low``-or-higher stamp already covers.
+
+Commit lands behind ``verified_commit_gate``; only push is gated here.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+
+try:
+    _blocking_directory = str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent)
+    _hooks_directory = str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent)
+    for each_bootstrap_directory in (_blocking_directory, _hooks_directory):
+        if each_bootstrap_directory not in sys.path:
+            sys.path.insert(0, each_bootstrap_directory)
+
+    from code_review_enforcement_config_bootstrap import (
+        register_code_review_enforcement_constants,
+    )
+    from verified_commit_config_bootstrap import register_verified_commit_constants
+
+    register_code_review_enforcement_constants()
+    register_verified_commit_constants()
+
+    from code_review_gate_deny import log_and_emit_code_review_deny
+    from code_review_stamp_store import live_surface_hash, stamp_covers_surface
+    from config.code_review_enforcement_constants import (
+        ALL_GATED_SHELL_TOOL_NAMES,
+        CODE_REVIEW_BYPASS_MARKER,
+        GATED_PUSH_SUBCOMMANDS,
+        HASH_PREVIEW_LENGTH,
+        PUSH_GATE_CORRECTIVE_MESSAGE,
+        PUSH_GATE_HOOK_MODULE_NAME,
+        PUSH_REQUIRED_EFFORT,
+    )
+    from verification_verdict_store import (
+        is_verification_exempt_diff,
+        resolve_merge_base,
+        resolve_repo_root,
+    )
+    from verified_commit_gate_parts.command_tokenization import (
+        command_carries_trailing_marker,
+    )
+    from verified_commit_gate_parts.gated_invocations import gated_repo_directories
+except ImportError as import_error:
+    raise ImportError(
+        "the code_review_push_gate dependencies did not import; "
+        "ensure the hooks directory is importable."
+    ) from import_error
+
+
+def deny_reason_for_directory(target_directory: str) -> str | None:
+    """Decide whether a push from a directory must be blocked.
+
+    Allowed when the directory is no repo, has no upstream base, is a
+    mechanically exempt surface, or a clean low-or-higher stamp covers it.
+
+    Args:
+        target_directory: The directory the push targets.
+
+    Returns:
+        The deny reason when the surface lacks a covering low stamp, else None.
+    """
+    repo_root = resolve_repo_root(target_directory)
+    if repo_root is None:
+        return None
+    merge_base_sha = resolve_merge_base(repo_root)
+    if merge_base_sha is None:
+        return None
+    if is_verification_exempt_diff(repo_root, merge_base_sha):
+        return None
+    surface_hash = live_surface_hash(repo_root)
+    if surface_hash is None:
+        return None
+    if stamp_covers_surface(repo_root, surface_hash, PUSH_REQUIRED_EFFORT):
+        return None
+    hash_preview = surface_hash[:HASH_PREVIEW_LENGTH]
+    return f"{PUSH_GATE_CORRECTIVE_MESSAGE} (repo: {repo_root}, surface sha256 {hash_preview}...)"
+
+
+def _emit_first_denied_directory(command_text: str, session_directory: str, tool_name: str) -> None:
+    """Deny the push against the first target directory that lacks a stamp."""
+    all_target_directories = gated_repo_directories(
+        command_text, session_directory, all_gated_subcommands=GATED_PUSH_SUBCOMMANDS
+    )
+    for each_target_directory in all_target_directories:
+        deny_reason = deny_reason_for_directory(each_target_directory)
+        if deny_reason is None:
+            continue
+        log_and_emit_code_review_deny(deny_reason, tool_name, PUSH_GATE_HOOK_MODULE_NAME)
+        return
+
+
+def main() -> None:
+    """Read the PreToolUse payload and decide whether to allow the push.
+
+    Allows the command without a stamp when it carries the bypass marker
+    (``CODE_REVIEW_BYPASS_MARKER``) as a genuine trailing shell comment;
+    otherwise denies a push whose surface lacks a covering low stamp.
+    """
+    try:
+        pretooluse_payload = json.load(sys.stdin)
+    except json.JSONDecodeError:
+        return
+    tool_name = pretooluse_payload.get("tool_name", "")
+    if tool_name not in ALL_GATED_SHELL_TOOL_NAMES:
+        return
+    tool_input = pretooluse_payload.get("tool_input", {})
+    if not isinstance(tool_input, dict):
+        return
+    command_text = tool_input.get("command", "")
+    if not isinstance(command_text, str) or not command_text:
+        return
+    if command_carries_trailing_marker(command_text, CODE_REVIEW_BYPASS_MARKER):
+        return
+    session_directory = pretooluse_payload.get("cwd", ".")
+    if not isinstance(session_directory, str):
+        session_directory = "."
+    _emit_first_denied_directory(command_text, session_directory, tool_name)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()