claude-code-workflow 7.2.27 → 7.2.28

package/.codex/skills/security-audit/phases/02-owasp-review.md

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+# Phase 2: OWASP Review
+
+> **COMPACT PROTECTION**: This is a core execution phase. If context compression has occurred and this file is only a summary, **MUST `Read` this file again before executing any Step**. Do not execute from memory.
+
+Systematic code-level review against OWASP Top 10 2021 categories using inline subagent analysis and targeted pattern scanning.
+
+## Objective
+
+- Review codebase against all 10 OWASP Top 10 2021 categories
+- Use inline subagent multi-model analysis for comprehensive coverage
+- Produce structured findings with file:line references and remediation steps
+
+## Input
+
+| Source | Required | Description |
+|--------|----------|-------------|
+| `~/.codex/skills/security-audit/specs/owasp-checklist.md` | Yes | Detection patterns per OWASP category |
+| `.workflow/.security/supply-chain-report.json` | Yes | Phase 1 findings for dependency context |
+| Project source files | Yes | `.ts`, `.js`, `.py`, `.go`, `.java` excluding deps/build |
+
+## Execution Steps
+
+### Step 1: Identify Target Scope
+
+Discover source files, excluding generated and dependency directories.
+
+**Decision Table**:
+
+| Condition | Action |
+|-----------|--------|
+| Source files found | Proceed to Step 2 |
+| No source files found | Report as BLOCKED with path note; do not proceed |
+| Files > 500 | Prioritize routes/, auth/, api/, handlers/ first |
+
+**Execution**:
+
+```bash
+# Identify source directories (exclude deps, build, test fixtures)
+# Focus on: API routes, auth modules, data access, input handlers
+find . -type f \( -name '*.ts' -o -name '*.js' -o -name '*.py' -o -name '*.go' -o -name '*.java' \) \
+  ! -path '*/node_modules/*' ! -path '*/dist/*' ! -path '*/.git/*' \
+  ! -path '*/build/*' ! -path '*/__pycache__/*' ! -path '*/vendor/*' \
+  | head -200
+```
+
+---
+
+### Step 2: Inline Subagent OWASP Analysis
+
+Spawn inline subagent using `cli-explore-agent` role to perform systematic OWASP analysis.
+
+**Decision Table**:
+
+| Condition | Action |
+|-----------|--------|
+| Subagent completes successfully | Integrate findings into Step 4 consolidation |
+| Subagent times out | Continue with manual pattern scan (Step 3) only; log warning |
+| Subagent errors | Continue with manual pattern scan only; log warning |
+
+```
+spawn_agent({
+  task_name: "inline-owasp-analysis",
+  fork_context: false,
+  model: "haiku",
+  reasoning_effort: "medium",
+  message: `### MANDATORY FIRST STEPS
+1. Read: ~/.codex/agents/cli-explore-agent.md
+
+Goal: OWASP Top 10 2021 security audit of this codebase.
+Systematically check each OWASP category:
+A01 Broken Access Control | A02 Cryptographic Failures | A03 Injection |
+A04 Insecure Design | A05 Security Misconfiguration | A06 Vulnerable Components |
+A07 Identification/Auth Failures | A08 Software/Data Integrity Failures |
+A09 Security Logging/Monitoring Failures | A10 SSRF
+
+TASK: For each OWASP category, scan relevant code patterns, identify vulnerabilities with file:line references, classify severity, provide remediation.
+
+MODE: analysis
+
+CONTEXT: @src/**/* @**/*.config.* @**/*.env.example
+
+EXPECTED: JSON-structured findings per OWASP category with severity, file:line, evidence, remediation.
+
+CONSTRAINTS: Code-level analysis only | Every finding must have file:line reference | Focus on real vulnerabilities not theoretical risks`
+})
+const result = wait_agent({ targets: ["inline-owasp-analysis"], timeout_ms: 300000 })
+close_agent({ target: "inline-owasp-analysis" })
+```
+
+---
+
+### Step 3: Manual Pattern Scanning
+
+Supplement inline subagent analysis with targeted grep patterns per OWASP category. Reference `~/.codex/skills/security-audit/specs/owasp-checklist.md` for full pattern list.
+
+**A01 — Broken Access Control**:
+
+```bash
+# Missing auth middleware on routes
+grep -rn 'app\.\(get\|post\|put\|delete\|patch\)(' --include='*.ts' --include='*.js' . | grep -v 'auth\|middleware\|protect'
+# Direct object references without ownership check
+grep -rn 'params\.id\|req\.params\.' --include='*.ts' --include='*.js' . || true
+```
+
+**A03 — Injection**:
+
+```bash
+# SQL string concatenation
+grep -rniE '(query|execute|raw)\s*\(\s*[`"'\'']\s*SELECT.*\+\s*|f".*SELECT.*{' --include='*.ts' --include='*.js' --include='*.py' . || true
+# Command injection
+grep -rniE '(exec|spawn|system|popen|subprocess)\s*\(' --include='*.ts' --include='*.js' --include='*.py' . || true
+```
+
+**A05 — Security Misconfiguration**:
+
+```bash
+# Debug mode enabled
+grep -rniE '(DEBUG|debug)\s*[:=]\s*(true|True|1|"true")' --include='*.env' --include='*.py' --include='*.ts' --include='*.json' . || true
+# CORS wildcard
+grep -rniE "cors.*\*|Access-Control-Allow-Origin.*\*" --include='*.ts' --include='*.js' --include='*.py' . || true
+```
+
+**A07 — Identification and Authentication Failures**:
+
+```bash
+# Weak password patterns
+grep -rniE 'password.*length.*[0-5][^0-9]|minlength.*[0-5][^0-9]' --include='*.ts' --include='*.js' --include='*.py' . || true
+# Hardcoded credentials
+grep -rniE '(password|passwd|pwd)\s*[:=]\s*["\x27][^"\x27]{3,}' --include='*.ts' --include='*.js' --include='*.py' --include='*.env' . || true
+```
+
+---
+
+### Step 4: Consolidate Findings
+
+Merge inline subagent results and manual pattern scan results. Deduplicate and classify by OWASP category.
+
+**Decision Table**:
+
+| Condition | Action |
+|-----------|--------|
+| Same finding in both sources | Keep highest severity; merge evidence; note both sources |
+| Finding lacks file:line reference | Attempt to resolve via grep; if not resolvable, mark evidence as "pattern match — no line ref" |
+| Category has no findings | Set coverage to `checked` with 0 findings |
+| Category not applicable to project stack | Set coverage to `not_applicable` with reason |
+
+---
+
+## OWASP Top 10 2021 Coverage
+
+| ID | Category | Key Checks |
+|----|----------|------------|
+| A01 | Broken Access Control | Missing auth, IDOR, path traversal, CORS |
+| A02 | Cryptographic Failures | Weak algorithms, plaintext storage, missing TLS |
+| A03 | Injection | SQL, NoSQL, OS command, LDAP, XPath injection |
+| A04 | Insecure Design | Missing threat modeling, insecure business logic |
+| A05 | Security Misconfiguration | Debug enabled, default creds, verbose errors |
+| A06 | Vulnerable and Outdated Components | Known CVEs in dependencies (from Phase 1) |
+| A07 | Identification and Authentication Failures | Weak passwords, missing MFA, session issues |
+| A08 | Software and Data Integrity Failures | Unsigned updates, insecure deserialization, CI/CD |
+| A09 | Security Logging and Monitoring Failures | Missing audit logs, no alerting, insufficient logging |
+| A10 | Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) | Unvalidated URLs, internal resource access |
+
+---
+
+## Output
+
+| Artifact | Format | Description |
+|----------|--------|-------------|
+| `.workflow/.security/owasp-findings.json` | JSON | Findings per OWASP category with coverage map |
+
+```json
+{
+  "phase": "owasp-review",
+  "timestamp": "ISO-8601",
+  "owasp_version": "2021",
+  "findings": [
+    {
+      "owasp_id": "A01",
+      "owasp_category": "Broken Access Control",
+      "severity": "critical|high|medium|low",
+      "title": "Finding title",
+      "description": "Detailed description",
+      "file": "path/to/file",
+      "line": 42,
+      "evidence": "code snippet or pattern match",
+      "remediation": "Specific fix recommendation",
+      "cwe": "CWE-XXX"
+    }
+  ],
+  "coverage": {
+    "A01": "checked|not_applicable",
+    "A02": "checked|not_applicable",
+    "A03": "checked|not_applicable",
+    "A04": "checked|not_applicable",
+    "A05": "checked|not_applicable",
+    "A06": "checked|not_applicable",
+    "A07": "checked|not_applicable",
+    "A08": "checked|not_applicable",
+    "A09": "checked|not_applicable",
+    "A10": "checked|not_applicable"
+  },
+  "summary": {
+    "total": 0,
+    "by_severity": { "critical": 0, "high": 0, "medium": 0, "low": 0 },
+    "categories_checked": 10,
+    "categories_with_findings": 0
+  }
+}
+```
+
+## Success Criteria
+
+| Criterion | Validation Method |
+|-----------|-------------------|
+| All 10 OWASP categories have coverage entry | JSON coverage map has all A01–A10 keys |
+| All findings have owasp_id, severity, file, evidence, remediation | JSON schema check |
+| `owasp-findings.json` written to `.workflow/.security/` | File exists and is valid JSON |
+| Inline subagent result integrated (or skip logged) | Summary includes source note |
+
+## Error Handling
+
+| Scenario | Resolution |
+|----------|------------|
+| Inline subagent timeout | Continue with manual grep results; log "inline-owasp-analysis timed out" in summary |
+| OWASP checklist spec not found | Use built-in patterns from this file; note missing spec |
+| No source files in scope | Report BLOCKED with path; set all categories to not_applicable |
+| Grep produces no matches for a category | Set that category coverage to `checked` with 0 findings |
+
+## Next Phase
+
+-> [Phase 3: Threat Modeling](03-threat-modeling.md)

package/.codex/skills/security-audit/phases/03-threat-modeling.md

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+# Phase 3: Threat Modeling
+
+> **COMPACT PROTECTION**: This is a core execution phase. If context compression has occurred and this file is only a summary, **MUST `Read` this file again before executing any Step**. Do not execute from memory.
+
+Map STRIDE threat categories to architecture components, identify trust boundaries, and assess attack surface.
+
+## Objective
+
+- Apply the STRIDE threat model to the project architecture
+- Identify trust boundaries between system components
+- Assess attack surface area per component
+- Cross-reference with Phase 1 and Phase 2 findings
+
+## Input
+
+| Source | Required | Description |
+|--------|----------|-------------|
+| `.workflow/.security/supply-chain-report.json` | Yes | Phase 1 findings for dependency/CI context |
+| `.workflow/.security/owasp-findings.json` | Yes | Phase 2 findings to cross-reference in STRIDE gaps |
+| Project source files | Yes | Route handlers, data stores, external service clients, auth modules |
+
+## Execution Steps
+
+### Step 1: Architecture Component Discovery
+
+Identify major system components by scanning project structure.
+
+**Decision Table**:
+
+| Component Pattern Found | component.type |
+|------------------------|----------------|
+| `app.get/post/put/delete/patch`, `router.`, `@app.route`, `@router.` | api_endpoint |
+| `createConnection`, `mongoose.connect`, `sqlite`, `redis`, `S3`, `createClient` | data_store |
+| `fetch`, `axios`, `http.request`, `requests.get/post`, `urllib` | external_service |
+| `jwt`, `passport`, `session`, `oauth`, `bcrypt`, `argon2`, `crypto` | auth_module |
+| `worker`, `subprocess`, `child_process`, `celery`, `queue` | worker |
+
+**Execution**:
+
+```bash
+# Identify entry points (API routes, CLI commands, event handlers)
+grep -rlE '(app\.(get|post|put|delete|patch|use)|router\.|@app\.route|@router\.)' \
+  --include='*.ts' --include='*.js' --include='*.py' . || true
+
+# Identify data stores (database connections, file storage)
+grep -rlE '(createConnection|mongoose\.connect|sqlite|redis|S3|createClient)' \
+  --include='*.ts' --include='*.js' --include='*.py' . || true
+
+# Identify external service integrations
+grep -rlE '(fetch|axios|http\.request|requests\.(get|post)|urllib)' \
+  --include='*.ts' --include='*.js' --include='*.py' . || true
+
+# Identify auth/session components
+grep -rlE '(jwt|passport|session|oauth|bcrypt|argon2|crypto)' \
+  --include='*.ts' --include='*.js' --include='*.py' . || true
+```
+
+---
+
+### Step 2: Trust Boundary Identification
+
+Map the 5 standard trust boundary types. For each boundary: document what data crosses it, how it is enforced, and what happens when enforcement fails.
+
+**Trust Boundary Types**:
+
+| Boundary | From | To | Key Data Crossing |
+|----------|------|----|------------------|
+| External boundary | User/browser | Application server | User input, credentials, session tokens |
+| Service boundary | Application | External APIs/services | API keys, request bodies, response data |
+| Data boundary | Application | Database/storage | Query parameters, credentials, PII |
+| Internal boundary | Public routes | Authenticated/admin routes | Auth tokens, role claims |
+| Process boundary | Main process | Worker/subprocess | Job parameters, environment variables |
+
+For each boundary, document:
+- What crosses the boundary (data types, credentials)
+- How the boundary is enforced (middleware, TLS, auth)
+- What happens when enforcement fails
+
+---
+
+### Step 3: STRIDE per Component
+
+For each discovered component, evaluate all 6 STRIDE categories systematically.
+
+**STRIDE Category Definitions**:
+
+| Category | Threat | Key Question |
+|----------|--------|-------------|
+| S — Spoofing | Identity impersonation | Can an attacker pretend to be someone else? |
+| T — Tampering | Data modification | Can data be modified in transit or at rest? |
+| R — Repudiation | Deniable actions | Can a user deny performing an action? |
+| I — Information Disclosure | Data leakage | Can sensitive data be exposed? |
+| D — Denial of Service | Availability disruption | Can the system be made unavailable? |
+| E — Elevation of Privilege | Unauthorized access | Can a user gain higher privileges? |
+
+**Spoofing Analysis Checks**:
+- Are authentication mechanisms in place at all entry points?
+- Can API keys or tokens be forged or replayed?
+- Are session tokens properly validated and rotated?
+
+**Tampering Analysis Checks**:
+- Is input validation applied before processing?
+- Are database queries parameterized?
+- Can request bodies or headers be manipulated to alter behavior?
+- Are file uploads validated for type and content?
+
+**Repudiation Analysis Checks**:
+- Are user actions logged with sufficient detail (who, what, when)?
+- Are logs tamper-proof or centralized?
+- Can critical operations (payments, deletions) be traced to a user?
+
+**Information Disclosure Analysis Checks**:
+- Do error responses leak stack traces or internal paths?
+- Are sensitive fields (passwords, tokens) excluded from logs and API responses?
+- Is PII properly handled (encryption at rest, masking in logs)?
+- Do debug endpoints or verbose modes expose internals?
+
+**Denial of Service Analysis Checks**:
+- Are rate limits applied to public endpoints?
+- Can resource-intensive operations be triggered without limits?
+- Are file upload sizes bounded?
+- Are database queries bounded (pagination, timeouts)?
+
+**Elevation of Privilege Analysis Checks**:
+- Are role/permission checks applied consistently?
+- Can horizontal privilege escalation occur (accessing other users' data)?
+- Can vertical escalation occur (user -> admin)?
+- Are admin/debug routes properly protected?
+
+**Component Exposure Rating**:
+
+| Rating | Criteria |
+|--------|----------|
+| High | Public-facing, handles sensitive data, complex logic |
+| Medium | Authenticated access, moderate data sensitivity |
+| Low | Internal only, no sensitive data, simple operations |
+
+---
+
+### Step 4: Attack Surface Assessment
+
+Quantify the attack surface across the entire system.
+
+**Attack Surface Components**:
+
+```
+Attack Surface = Sum of:
+  - Number of public API endpoints
+  - Number of external service integrations
+  - Number of user-controllable input points
+  - Number of privileged operations
+  - Number of data stores with sensitive content
+```
+
+**Decision Table — Attack Surface Rating**:
+
+| Total Score | Interpretation |
+|-------------|---------------|
+| 0–5 | Low attack surface |
+| 6–15 | Moderate attack surface |
+| 16–30 | High attack surface |
+| > 30 | Very high attack surface — prioritize hardening |
+
+Cross-reference Phase 1 and Phase 2 findings when populating `gaps` arrays for each STRIDE category. A finding in Phase 2 (e.g., A03 injection) maps to STRIDE T (Tampering) for the relevant component.
+
+---
+
+## Output
+
+| Artifact | Format | Description |
+|----------|--------|-------------|
+| `.workflow/.security/threat-model.json` | JSON | STRIDE model with components, trust boundaries, attack surface |
+
+```json
+{
+  "phase": "threat-modeling",
+  "timestamp": "ISO-8601",
+  "framework": "STRIDE",
+  "components": [
+    {
+      "name": "Component name",
+      "type": "api_endpoint|data_store|external_service|auth_module|worker",
+      "files": ["path/to/file.ts"],
+      "exposure": "high|medium|low",
+      "trust_boundaries": ["external", "data"],
+      "threats": {
+        "spoofing": {
+          "applicable": true,
+          "findings": ["Description of threat"],
+          "mitigations": ["Existing mitigation"],
+          "gaps": ["Missing mitigation"]
+        },
+        "tampering": { "applicable": true, "findings": [], "mitigations": [], "gaps": [] },
+        "repudiation": { "applicable": true, "findings": [], "mitigations": [], "gaps": [] },
+        "information_disclosure": { "applicable": true, "findings": [], "mitigations": [], "gaps": [] },
+        "denial_of_service": { "applicable": true, "findings": [], "mitigations": [], "gaps": [] },
+        "elevation_of_privilege": { "applicable": true, "findings": [], "mitigations": [], "gaps": [] }
+      }
+    }
+  ],
+  "trust_boundaries": [
+    {
+      "name": "Boundary name",
+      "from": "Component A",
+      "to": "Component B",
+      "enforcement": "TLS|auth_middleware|API_key",
+      "data_crossing": ["request bodies", "credentials"],
+      "risk_level": "high|medium|low"
+    }
+  ],
+  "attack_surface": {
+    "public_endpoints": 0,
+    "external_integrations": 0,
+    "input_points": 0,
+    "privileged_operations": 0,
+    "sensitive_data_stores": 0,
+    "total_score": 0
+  },
+  "summary": {
+    "components_analyzed": 0,
+    "threats_identified": 0,
+    "by_stride": { "S": 0, "T": 0, "R": 0, "I": 0, "D": 0, "E": 0 },
+    "high_exposure_components": 0
+  }
+}
+```
+
+## Success Criteria
+
+| Criterion | Validation Method |
+|-----------|-------------------|
+| At least one component analyzed | `components` array has at least 1 entry |
+| All 6 STRIDE categories evaluated per component | Each component.threats has all 6 keys |
+| Trust boundaries mapped | `trust_boundaries` array populated |
+| Attack surface quantified | `attack_surface.total_score` calculated |
+| `threat-model.json` written to `.workflow/.security/` | File exists and is valid JSON |
+
+## Error Handling
+
+| Scenario | Resolution |
+|----------|------------|
+| No components discovered via grep | Analyze project structure manually (README, package.json); note uncertainty |
+| Phase 2 findings not available for cross-reference | Proceed with grep-only; note missing OWASP context |
+| Ambiguous architecture (monolith vs microservices) | Document assumption in summary; note for user review |
+| No `.github/workflows/` for CI boundary | Mark process boundary as not_applicable |
+
+## Next Phase
+
+-> [Phase 4: Report & Tracking](04-report-tracking.md)