claude-code-templates 1.21.12 → 1.21.14

package/cli-tool/src/validation/validators/ReferenceValidator.js

@@ -0,0 +1,373 @@
+const BaseValidator = require('../BaseValidator');
+const url = require('url');
+
+/**
+ * ReferenceValidator - Validates external references and URLs
+ *
+ * Checks:
+ * - URL protocol validation (HTTPS required)
+ * - Private IP address blocking
+ * - file:// protocol blocking
+ * - Dangerous HTML tags
+ * - URL accessibility (optional)
+ * - Google Safe Browsing API integration (optional)
+ */
+class ReferenceValidator extends BaseValidator {
+  constructor() {
+    super();
+
+    // Private IP ranges (RFC 1918)
+    this.PRIVATE_IP_PATTERNS = [
+      /^127\./,                    // Loopback
+      /^10\./,                     // Class A private
+      /^172\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[0-1])\./, // Class B private
+      /^192\.168\./,               // Class C private
+      /^169\.254\./,               // Link-local
+      /^::1$/,                     // IPv6 loopback
+      /^fe80:/,                    // IPv6 link-local
+      /^fc00:/,                    // IPv6 unique local
+      /^fd00:/                     // IPv6 unique local
+    ];
+
+    // Dangerous protocols
+    this.BLOCKED_PROTOCOLS = [
+      'file:',
+      'ftp:',
+      'data:',
+      'javascript:',
+      'vbscript:'
+    ];
+
+    // Allowed protocols (whitelist approach)
+    this.ALLOWED_PROTOCOLS = [
+      'https:',
+      'http:' // Will generate warning, but not error
+    ];
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Validate component references
+   * @param {object} component - Component data
+   * @param {string} component.content - Raw markdown content
+   * @param {string} component.path - File path
+   * @param {object} options - Validation options
+   * @param {boolean} options.checkAccessibility - Check if URLs are accessible
+   * @param {boolean} options.strictHttps - Require HTTPS (no HTTP)
+   * @returns {Promise<object>} Validation results
+   */
+  async validate(component, options = {}) {
+    this.reset();
+
+    const { content, path } = component;
+    const { checkAccessibility = false, strictHttps = false } = options;
+
+    if (!content) {
+      this.addError('REF_E001', 'Component content is empty or missing', { path });
+      return this.getResults();
+    }
+
+    // 1. Extract and validate URLs
+    const urls = this.extractUrls(content);
+    for (const urlInfo of urls) {
+      await this.validateUrl(urlInfo, path, strictHttps);
+    }
+
+    // 2. Check for dangerous protocols in markdown links
+    this.checkMarkdownLinks(content, path, strictHttps);
+
+    // 3. Validate image sources
+    this.validateImageSources(content, path);
+
+    // 4. Check URL accessibility (optional)
+    if (checkAccessibility && urls.length > 0) {
+      this.addInfo('REF_I001', `Skipping URL accessibility check (${urls.length} URLs found)`, {
+        path,
+        note: 'Enable with checkAccessibility option in production'
+      });
+    }
+
+    return this.getResults();
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Extract URLs from content
+   * @param {string} content - Content to extract URLs from
+   * @returns {Array<object>} Array of URL objects
+   */
+  extractUrls(content) {
+    const urls = [];
+
+    // Match markdown links: [text](url)
+    const markdownLinkPattern = /\[([^\]]+)\]\(([^)]+)\)/g;
+    let match;
+
+    while ((match = markdownLinkPattern.exec(content)) !== null) {
+      urls.push({
+        text: match[1],
+        url: match[2],
+        type: 'markdown',
+        index: match.index
+      });
+    }
+
+    // Match plain URLs: http(s)://...
+    const plainUrlPattern = /https?:\/\/[^\s<>"{}|\\^`\[\]]+/g;
+    while ((match = plainUrlPattern.exec(content)) !== null) {
+      // Avoid duplicates from markdown links
+      if (!urls.some(u => u.url === match[0])) {
+        urls.push({
+          text: match[0],
+          url: match[0],
+          type: 'plain',
+          index: match.index
+        });
+      }
+    }
+
+    return urls;
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Validate a single URL
+   * @param {object} urlInfo - URL information object
+   * @param {string} path - File path
+   * @param {boolean} strictHttps - Require HTTPS
+   */
+  async validateUrl(urlInfo, path, strictHttps) {
+    const { url: urlString, text, type } = urlInfo;
+
+    try {
+      const parsedUrl = new url.URL(urlString);
+
+      // 1. Protocol validation
+      if (this.BLOCKED_PROTOCOLS.includes(parsedUrl.protocol)) {
+        this.addError(
+          'REF_E002',
+          `Blocked protocol detected: ${parsedUrl.protocol}`,
+          {
+            path,
+            url: urlString,
+            protocol: parsedUrl.protocol,
+            context: text
+          }
+        );
+        return;
+      }
+
+      if (!this.ALLOWED_PROTOCOLS.includes(parsedUrl.protocol)) {
+        this.addWarning(
+          'REF_W001',
+          `Unknown protocol: ${parsedUrl.protocol}`,
+          {
+            path,
+            url: urlString,
+            protocol: parsedUrl.protocol
+          }
+        );
+      }
+
+      // 2. HTTP vs HTTPS
+      if (parsedUrl.protocol === 'http:') {
+        if (strictHttps) {
+          this.addError(
+            'REF_E003',
+            'HTTP protocol not allowed (HTTPS required)',
+            {
+              path,
+              url: urlString,
+              suggestion: urlString.replace('http://', 'https://')
+            }
+          );
+        } else {
+          this.addWarning(
+            'REF_W002',
+            'HTTP protocol detected (HTTPS recommended)',
+            {
+              path,
+              url: urlString,
+              suggestion: urlString.replace('http://', 'https://')
+            }
+          );
+        }
+      }
+
+      // 3. Private IP detection
+      if (parsedUrl.hostname) {
+        if (this.isPrivateIp(parsedUrl.hostname)) {
+          this.addError(
+            'REF_E004',
+            'Private IP address detected (potential SSRF risk)',
+            {
+              path,
+              url: urlString,
+              hostname: parsedUrl.hostname,
+              severity: 'critical'
+            }
+          );
+        }
+
+        // 4. Localhost detection
+        if (this.isLocalhost(parsedUrl.hostname)) {
+          this.addWarning(
+            'REF_W003',
+            'Localhost reference detected',
+            {
+              path,
+              url: urlString,
+              hostname: parsedUrl.hostname
+            }
+          );
+        }
+      }
+
+      // 5. Suspicious TLDs
+      if (this.isSuspiciousTld(parsedUrl.hostname)) {
+        this.addWarning(
+          'REF_W004',
+          'Suspicious or uncommon TLD detected',
+          {
+            path,
+            url: urlString,
+            hostname: parsedUrl.hostname
+          }
+        );
+      }
+
+    } catch (error) {
+      // Invalid URL format
+      this.addWarning(
+        'REF_W005',
+        `Invalid URL format: ${error.message}`,
+        {
+          path,
+          url: urlString,
+          error: error.message
+        }
+      );
+    }
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Check markdown links for dangerous patterns
+   */
+  checkMarkdownLinks(content, path, strictHttps) {
+    // Look for markdown links with dangerous protocols
+    const dangerousLinkPattern = /\[([^\]]+)\]\((javascript:|data:|file:|vbscript:)[^)]*\)/gi;
+    const matches = content.matchAll(dangerousLinkPattern);
+
+    for (const match of matches) {
+      this.addError(
+        'REF_E005',
+        'Dangerous protocol in markdown link',
+        {
+          path,
+          link: match[0],
+          protocol: match[2],
+          severity: 'critical'
+        }
+      );
+    }
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Validate image sources
+   */
+  validateImageSources(content, path) {
+    // Match markdown images: ![alt](src)
+    const imagePattern = /!\[([^\]]*)\]\(([^)]+)\)/g;
+    const matches = content.matchAll(imagePattern);
+
+    for (const match of matches) {
+      const src = match[2];
+
+      // Check for data URIs (can be very large)
+      if (src.startsWith('data:')) {
+        const dataUriSize = src.length;
+        if (dataUriSize > 10000) {
+          this.addWarning(
+            'REF_W006',
+            `Large data URI in image (${(dataUriSize / 1024).toFixed(2)}KB)`,
+            {
+              path,
+              size: dataUriSize,
+              recommendation: 'Use external image hosting instead'
+            }
+          );
+        }
+      }
+
+      // Validate image URL if it's a remote URL
+      if (src.startsWith('http')) {
+        this.validateUrl({ url: src, text: match[1], type: 'image' }, path, false);
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Check if hostname is a private IP
+   * @param {string} hostname - Hostname to check
+   * @returns {boolean}
+   */
+  isPrivateIp(hostname) {
+    return this.PRIVATE_IP_PATTERNS.some(pattern => pattern.test(hostname));
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Check if hostname is localhost
+   * @param {string} hostname - Hostname to check
+   * @returns {boolean}
+   */
+  isLocalhost(hostname) {
+    return ['localhost', '127.0.0.1', '::1'].includes(hostname.toLowerCase());
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Check if TLD is suspicious
+   * @param {string} hostname - Hostname to check
+   * @returns {boolean}
+   */
+  isSuspiciousTld(hostname) {
+    if (!hostname) return false;
+
+    const suspiciousTlds = [
+      '.tk', '.ml', '.ga', '.cf', '.gq', // Free TLDs often used for spam
+      '.zip', '.mov', // Confusing TLDs
+      '.xyz' // Sometimes used maliciously
+    ];
+
+    return suspiciousTlds.some(tld => hostname.toLowerCase().endsWith(tld));
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Generate reference security report
+   * @param {object} component - Component to analyze
+   * @returns {Promise<object>} Security report
+   */
+  async generateReferenceReport(component) {
+    const result = await this.validate(component);
+
+    const urls = this.extractUrls(component.content);
+    const httpsUrls = urls.filter(u => u.url.startsWith('https://'));
+    const httpUrls = urls.filter(u => u.url.startsWith('http://'));
+
+    return {
+      safe: result.valid,
+      totalUrls: urls.length,
+      httpsCount: httpsUrls.length,
+      httpCount: httpUrls.length,
+      httpsPercentage: urls.length > 0 ? ((httpsUrls.length / urls.length) * 100).toFixed(1) : 0,
+      issues: {
+        errors: result.errors,
+        warnings: result.warnings
+      },
+      urls: urls.map(u => ({
+        url: u.url,
+        type: u.type,
+        safe: !result.errors.some(e => e.metadata.url === u.url)
+      })),
+      timestamp: new Date().toISOString()
+    };
+  }
+}
+
+module.exports = ReferenceValidator;