claude-code-session-manager 0.61.0 → 0.62.1

package/src/main/index.cjs

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-const { app, BrowserWindow, ipcMain, dialog, Menu, session, systemPreferences, globalShortcut, shell, clipboard, nativeImage, powerSaveBlocker, protocol } = require('electron');
+const { app, BrowserWindow, ipcMain, dialog, Menu, session, systemPreferences, globalShortcut, shell, clipboard, powerSaveBlocker, protocol } = require('electron');
 const { spawn, execFile, execFileSync } = require('node:child_process');
 const path = require('node:path');
 const fs = require('node:fs');
@@ -9,8 +9,6 @@ const { cleanChildEnv } = require('./lib/cleanEnv.cjs');
 const { terminateLosingInstance } = require('./lib/singleInstanceGuard.cjs');
 const { acquireSchedulerOwnership, releaseSchedulerOwnership } = require('./lib/instanceLock.cjs');
 const { manager: ptyManager, registerPtyHandlers } = require('./pty.cjs');
-const browserView = require('./browserView.cjs');
-const browserCapture = require('./browserCapture.cjs');
 const configMgr = require('./config.cjs');
 const transcripts = require('./transcripts.cjs');
 const sessionsStore = require('./sessionsStore.cjs');
@@ -40,13 +38,6 @@ const adminHttp = createAdminHttp();
 scheduler.registerAdminRoutes(adminHttp);
 prdCreate.registerAdminRoute(adminHttp, scheduler.remote);
 chatRunner.registerAdminRoute(adminHttp);
-const { createBrowserAgentServer } = require('./browserAgentServer.cjs');
-const browserAgentServer = createBrowserAgentServer({
-  listTabs: () => browserView.listViews(),
-  screenshot: ({ viewId }) => browserView.captureShotForAgent({ viewId }),
-  action: (params) => browserView.dispatchViewAction(params),
-  dom: ({ viewId }) => browserView.captureAgentDom({ viewId }),
-});
 const supervisor = require('./supervisor.cjs');
 const watchers = require('./watchers.cjs');
 const teams = require('./teams.cjs');
@@ -69,7 +60,6 @@ const agentMemory = require('./agentMemory.cjs');
 const git = require('./git.cjs');
 const filesIpc = require('./files.cjs');
 const { registerDocEditHandlers, attachWindow: attachDocEditWindow } = require('./docEdit.cjs');
-const webRemote = require('./webRemote.cjs');
 const { listExchanges } = require('./exchanges.cjs');
 const { resolveClaudeBin } = require('./lib/claudeBin.cjs');
 const { checkInsideHome, assertInsideHome } = require('./lib/insideHome.cjs');
@@ -306,8 +296,6 @@ async function rebootApp() {
     ptyManager.attachWindow(mainWindow);
     configMgr.attachWindow(mainWindow);
     transcripts.attachWindow(mainWindow);
-    browserView.attachWindow(mainWindow);
-    browserCapture.attachWindow(mainWindow);
     voiceHotkey.init(mainWindow).catch((e) => {
       logs.writeLine({ scope: 'voice-hotkey', level: 'error', message: 'reinit failed', meta: { error: e?.message } });
     });
@@ -506,25 +494,6 @@ ipcMain.handle('app:pick-directory', async () => {
 
 ipcMain.on('app:reboot-app', () => rebootApp());
 
-// Recorder export "Save to file…" (PRD 412) — native Save As dialog, written
-// directly since the path is user-chosen, not renderer input.
-ipcMain.handle('browser:save-recording', validated(schemas.browserSaveRecording, async ({ defaultName, text }) => {
-  try {
-    const result = await dialog.showSaveDialog(mainWindow, {
-      defaultPath: defaultName,
-      filters: [
-        { name: 'Markdown', extensions: ['md'] },
-        { name: 'All Files', extensions: ['*'] },
-      ],
-    });
-    if (result.canceled || !result.filePath) return { ok: false, canceled: true };
-    await fsp.writeFile(result.filePath, text, 'utf8');
-    return { ok: true, path: result.filePath };
-  } catch (e) {
-    return { ok: false, error: e && e.message ? e.message : String(e) };
-  }
-}));
-
 // Image paste — Ctrl+V in the Terminal pane. Reads the OS clipboard via
 // Electron's native API (renderer's navigator.clipboard.read() doesn't expose
 // raw image MIME types under contextIsolation), saves the bitmap to a temp
@@ -570,19 +539,6 @@ ipcMain.handle('clipboard:write-text', validated(schemas.clipboardWriteText, ({
   }
 }));
 
-// PRD 407 Capture panel — write side of paste-image's read. Writes a
-// screenshot capture to the OS clipboard as an image.
-ipcMain.handle('browser:copy-image', validated(schemas.browserCopyImage, ({ dataUrl }) => {
-  try {
-    const img = nativeImage.createFromDataURL(dataUrl);
-    if (!img || img.isEmpty()) return { ok: false, error: 'empty image' };
-    clipboard.writeImage(img);
-    return { ok: true };
-  } catch (e) {
-    return { ok: false, error: e && e.message ? e.message : String(e) };
-  }
-}));
-
 // Hooks tab "Test fire": run a hook command with a fake event payload piped
 // to stdin. shell:true is intentional — Claude Code's hook field is a shell
 // string. Timeout is enforced via SIGKILL on a timer because spawn's built-in
@@ -841,7 +797,6 @@ agentMemory.registerAgentMemoryHandlers();
 git.register(ipcMain);
 filesIpc.registerFilesHandlers();
 registerDocEditHandlers();
-webRemote.registerRemoteHandlers();
 chatRunner.registerChatHandlers();
 
 // Direct in-process PRD authoring for a queued PromptTicket classified
@@ -943,11 +898,6 @@ app.on('web-contents-created', (_e, wc) => {
   });
 
   wc.on('will-navigate', (event, url) => {
-    // The embedded Browser tab's WebContentsView is a real browser — it must
-    // be able to navigate anywhere. Exempt ONLY webContents registered by
-    // browserView.cjs; the main window's lock below is unchanged.
-    if (browserView.isBrowserViewContents(wc.id)) return;
-
     const allowed = useDevServer
       ? ['http://localhost:5173', 'http://127.0.0.1:5173']
       : [];
@@ -1144,16 +1094,12 @@ app.whenReady().then(async () => {
   ptyManager.attachWindow(mainWindow);
   configMgr.attachWindow(mainWindow);
   transcripts.attachWindow(mainWindow);
-  browserView.registerBrowserView({ mainWindow, ipcMain });
-  browserCapture.attachWindow(mainWindow);
-  browserCapture.registerBrowserCapture({ ipcMain, getView: browserView.getView });
   voiceHotkey.init(mainWindow).catch((e) => {
     logs.writeLine({ scope: 'voice-hotkey', level: 'error', message: 'init failed', meta: { error: e?.message } });
   });
   scheduler.attachWindow(mainWindow);
   watchers.attachWindow(mainWindow);
   pluginInstall.attachWindow(mainWindow);
-  webRemote.attachWindow(mainWindow);
   chatRunner.attachWindow(mainWindow);
   promptSessionEvents.attachWindow(mainWindow);
   attachDocEditWindow(mainWindow);
@@ -1177,18 +1123,12 @@ app.whenReady().then(async () => {
     console.log(`[main] scheduler ownership held by pid ${ownership.holderPid} — running scheduler-passive (no reconciliation, no admin server)`);
     logs.writeLine({ scope: 'scheduler', level: 'info', message: 'scheduler-passive: ownership held by another instance', meta: { holderPid: ownership.holderPid } });
   }
-  browserAgentServer.start().catch((e) => {
-    logs.writeLine({ scope: 'browser-agent-server', level: 'error', message: 'init failed', meta: { error: e?.message } });
-  });
   // First-boot default: install the bundled session-manager-dev plugin (its 10
   // dev skills) from the app's own marketplace. One-shot + idempotent; never
   // throws. SM_SEED_DEV_PLUGIN_DISABLE=1 to opt out.
   seedDevPlugin({ logger: console }).catch((e) => {
     logs.writeLine({ scope: 'seed-dev-plugin', level: 'error', message: 'seed failed', meta: { error: e?.message } });
   });
-  webRemote.init().catch((e) => {
-    logs.writeLine({ scope: 'webRemote', level: 'error', message: 'init failed', meta: { error: e?.message } });
-  });
   // History rollup finalize pass: deferred 30s past boot so it never competes
   // with first-paint, fire-and-forget (cron/offline refresh is PRD 651 — this
   // is just the one-shot in-app pass).
@@ -1249,7 +1189,6 @@ let teardownDone = false;
 function runShutdownCleanup() {
   if (teardownDone) return;          // idempotent — will-quit may still fire after an app.exit path
   teardownDone = true;
-  webRemote.destroy();
   // Mark a clean exit so the next boot can distinguish a graceful quit from an
   // OOM-kill / native crash (which leaves the sentinel `open`).
   crashDiagnostics.markCleanShutdown();
@@ -1287,7 +1226,6 @@ app.on('before-quit', () => {
   transcripts.closeAll();
   watchers.manager.killAll();
   adminHttp.stop().catch(() => {});
-  browserAgentServer.stop().catch(() => {});
   // Best-effort flush of any pending OTEL spans. shutdown() has its own 2s
   // ceiling so a wedged exporter can't hold quit.
   otel.shutdown().catch(() => {});

package/src/main/ipcSchemas.cjs

@@ -25,17 +25,6 @@ const ptyTabId = z.object({ tabId: z.string().min(1).max(128) });
 // have a live PTY? Bounded so the renderer can't ask about unbounded lists.
 const ptyAlive = z.object({ tabIds: z.array(z.string().min(1).max(128)).max(500) });
 
-// v2 mobile: subscribe to a session's live state + summary. cwd is needed to
-// locate the transcript JSONL (transcriptPath); validated against home-dir boundary
-// in webRemote before any fs access.
-const sessionSubscribe = z.object({
-  // tabId becomes a transcript FILENAME (`<tabId>.jsonl`) — restrict to a
-  // session-id charset (no '/', no '.', so it can't traverse out of the project
-  // transcript dir). sessionId is a UUID, which satisfies this.
-  tabId: z.string().min(1).max(128).regex(/^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9_-]*$/),
-  cwd: z.string().min(1).max(4096),
-});
-
 // 64 KiB cap per pty:write — typewriter input is bounded; a renderer firing
 // megabytes per call is either a bug or an attack. Block it at the boundary.
 const PTY_WRITE_MAX_BYTES = 64 * 1024;
@@ -50,115 +39,12 @@ const ptyResize = z.object({
   rows: z.number().int().min(3).max(1000),
 });
 
-// ──────────────────────────────────────────── Browser (WebContentsView embed)
-// viewId is a renderer-generated identifier; restrict to a safe charset (no
-// '/', no '.') since it keys the in-process Map<viewId, WebContentsView> —
-// not used as a filesystem path, but kept consistent with tabId conventions.
-const BROWSER_VIEW_ID_RE = /^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9_-]*$/;
-const browserViewId = z.object({
-  viewId: z.string().min(1).max(128).regex(BROWSER_VIEW_ID_RE),
-});
-
-const browserCreate = z.object({
-  viewId: z.string().min(1).max(128).regex(BROWSER_VIEW_ID_RE),
-  // Non-persistent partition string (PRD 400 run-mode isolation). No leading
-  // 'persist:' enforced here — callers choose persistence explicitly.
-  partition: z.string().min(1).max(256),
-});
-
-const BOUNDS_INT = z.number().int().min(0).max(100000);
-const browserSetBounds = z.object({
-  viewId: z.string().min(1).max(128).regex(BROWSER_VIEW_ID_RE),
-  x: BOUNDS_INT,
-  y: BOUNDS_INT,
-  width: BOUNDS_INT,
-  height: BOUNDS_INT,
-});
-
-const browserNavigate = z.object({
-  viewId: z.string().min(1).max(128).regex(BROWSER_VIEW_ID_RE),
-  url: z.string().min(1).max(8192),
-});
-
-// PRD 407: DOM/text capture from the active browser sub-tab.
-const browserCaptureDom = z.object({
-  viewId: z.string().min(1).max(128).regex(BROWSER_VIEW_ID_RE),
-  kind: z.enum(['text', 'html']),
-});
-
-// PRD 404: filter -> prune -> summarize -> chunk capture of a picked
-// selection (browser:capture). selectors comes from the PRD 403 picker.
-const browserCaptureSelection = z.object({
-  viewId: z.string().min(1).max(128).regex(BROWSER_VIEW_ID_RE),
-  selectors: z.array(z.string().min(1).max(2048)).min(1).max(50),
-  mode: z.enum(['agent', 'html', 'a11y', 'selector']),
-});
-
-// PRD 407: clipboard image write (browser:copy-image). dataUrl is a PNG data
-// URL from webContents.capturePage() — capped well above any realistic
-// screenshot so a malformed/huge payload can't wedge the IPC channel.
-const browserCopyImage = z.object({
-  dataUrl: z.string().min(1).max(50_000_000),
-});
-
 // Recorder export (PRD 412): write arbitrary recorded-flow text to the OS
-// clipboard, separate from the image-only browserCopyImage above.
+// clipboard.
 const clipboardWriteText = z.object({
   text: z.string().max(1_000_000),
 });
 
-// Recorder export (PRD 412): native "Save As" dialog write, bypassing the
-// config.cjs write-boundary since the path is user-chosen via OS dialog.
-const browserSaveRecording = z.object({
-  defaultName: z.string().min(1).max(255),
-  text: z.string().max(1_000_000),
-});
-
-// PRD 407: binary-safe atomic write (browser:save-binary) for screenshot
-// captures — config:write-text is utf8-only.
-const browserSaveBinary = z.object({
-  path: z.string().min(1).max(4096),
-  base64: z.string().min(1).max(50_000_000),
-  // Single-writer law (lib/opsOwnership.cjs) — required for ops-root paths.
-  writer: z.string().min(1).max(64).optional(),
-});
-
-// PRD 410: replay a recorded step list against a live view. The renderer
-// owns the step list (main never persists recorded steps), so every call is
-// self-contained. `select` is accepted for forward-compat even though the
-// live recorder engine doesn't emit it yet.
-const browserReplayStep = z.object({
-  n: z.number().int().min(1),
-  verb: z.enum(['navigate', 'click', 'type', 'select', 'wait-for']),
-  target: z.string().max(2000),
-  value: z.string().max(2000).optional(),
-  variable: z.string().max(64).nullable().optional(),
-  kind: z.enum(['nav', 'assert']).optional(),
-  masked: z.boolean().optional(),
-  variableSuggestion: z.string().max(64).optional(),
-});
-
-const browserReplay = z.object({
-  viewId: z.string().min(1).max(128).regex(BROWSER_VIEW_ID_RE),
-  steps: z.array(browserReplayStep).max(500),
-  values: z.record(z.string().max(64), z.string().max(2000)).optional(),
-  continueOnError: z.boolean().optional(),
-});
-
-// PRD 402: address-bar zoom control. factor is clamped again in
-// browserView.cjs's setZoom — this just bounds the wire payload.
-const browserSetZoom = z.object({
-  viewId: z.string().min(1).max(128).regex(BROWSER_VIEW_ID_RE),
-  factor: z.number().min(0.1).max(10),
-});
-
-// PRD 402: Cmd/Ctrl+F find bar.
-const browserFind = z.object({
-  viewId: z.string().min(1).max(128).regex(BROWSER_VIEW_ID_RE),
-  text: z.string().max(2000),
-  forward: z.boolean().optional(),
-});
-
 // ──────────────────────────────────────────── Transcripts
 const SESSION_UUID_RE = /^[a-zA-Z0-9-]{1,64}$/;
 
@@ -680,6 +566,15 @@ const exchangesList = z.object({
 // this one lives here per PRD 638 so it's reusable without importing files.cjs.
 const filesDuplicate = z.object({ path: z.string().min(1).max(4096) });
 
+// files:save-binary — binary-safe atomic write (formerly browser:save-binary,
+// re-homed off the Browser tab). Mirrors the retired browserSaveBinary shape.
+const filesSaveBinary = z.object({
+  path: z.string().min(1).max(4096),
+  base64: z.string().min(1).max(50_000_000),
+  // Single-writer law (lib/opsOwnership.cjs) — required for ops-root paths.
+  writer: z.string().min(1).max(64).optional(),
+});
+
 // ──────────────────────────────────────────── Doc Edit (PRD 638 rewrite runner)
 // docedit:run — consumed by docEdit.cjs's registerDocEditHandlers.
 const docEditRun = z.object({
@@ -744,23 +639,6 @@ const chatExternalSend = z.object({
   ),
 });
 
-// ──────────────────────────────────────────── Web Remote
-// OTP is 8 uppercase alphanumeric chars (case-insensitive entry, normalised to upper in handler).
-const WEB_REMOTE_OTP_RE = /^[A-Z0-9]{8}$/i;
-const DEVICE_ID_RE = /^[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-4[0-9a-f]{3}-[89ab][0-9a-f]{3}-[0-9a-f]{12}$/i;
-
-const webRemotePair = z.object({
-  otp: z.string().regex(WEB_REMOTE_OTP_RE),
-}).strict();
-
-const webRemoteRevokeDevice = z.object({
-  deviceId: z.string().regex(DEVICE_ID_RE),
-}).strict();
-
-const webRemoteAuditTail = z.object({
-  lines: z.number().int().min(1).max(500).optional(),
-}).strict();
-
 // ──────────────────────────────────────────── History
 const DATE_YYYY_MM_DD = /^\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}$/;
 
@@ -892,96 +770,19 @@ function validated(schema, handler) {
   };
 }
 
-// ──────────────────────────────────────────── Web Remote command allowlist
-// Commands are split into three tiers:
-//   READ_COMMANDS      — return data; allowed when remoteEnabled=true.
-//   SAS_GATED_READS    — return sensitive user data (sessions, PRDs, logs,
-//                        transcript summaries); additionally require
-//                        _e2eAuthenticated=true (SAS confirmed by user).
-//                        A compromised relay cannot exfiltrate this data from
-//                        a session that has not been SAS-confirmed.
-//   MUTATE_COMMANDS    — write files, spawn processes, or mutate persisted
-//                        state; gated behind remoteControlEnabled=true AND
-//                        _e2eAuthenticated=true.
-// ALLOWED_COMMANDS is the union, kept for existing import compatibility.
-//
-// Ungated READ_COMMANDS (justify each):
-//   cmd:app:version      — exposes only the app semver string; no user data.
-//   cmd:session:unsubscribe — teardown lifecycle; returns nothing sensitive.
-const READ_COMMANDS = new Set([
-  'cmd:app:version',
-  // v2 mobile: unsubscribe is a teardown lifecycle call with no data payload.
-  'cmd:session:unsubscribe',
-]);
-
-// Sensitive reads — return user data; require SAS confirmation same as MUTATE.
-const SAS_GATED_READS = new Set([
-  'cmd:sessions:load',
-  'cmd:history:aggregate',
-  // subscribe initiates a live stream of session state/summary — sensitive.
-  'cmd:session:subscribe',
-  // NOTE: cmd:exchanges:list is intentionally NOT allowlisted — webRemote.cjs has
-  // no dispatch handler for it, so an allowlist entry would only fail closed with
-  // an opaque reject. Re-add here together with the handler when remote exchanges
-  // are wired, so the allowlist always mirrors an actual capability.
-  //
-  // Scheduler/Epics commands (cmd:schedule:*) were removed here deliberately
-  // (core scheduler/Epics redesign) — Remote no longer reaches into scheduler
-  // internals at all; a future Remote rebuild will talk to Scheduler/Epics
-  // through whatever higher-level surface that redesign lands on, not this
-  // per-command allowlist.
-]);
-
-const MUTATE_COMMANDS = new Set([
-  'cmd:sessions:save',
-  'cmd:pty:spawn',
-  'cmd:pty:write',
-  // pty:kill terminates a live session; pty:resize drives the geometry of the
-  // user's interactive PTY — both write live process state, so they are gated
-  // behind remoteControlEnabled + SAS like every other mutation. A read-only
-  // mobile mirror has no business killing or resizing the desktop's session.
-  'cmd:pty:kill',
-  'cmd:pty:resize',
-  // Pushes a prompt into an open tab's chat queue — a real mutation of that
-  // tab's session, same tier as pty:write.
-  'cmd:chat:send',
-]);
-
-const ALLOWED_COMMANDS = new Set([...READ_COMMANDS, ...SAS_GATED_READS, ...MUTATE_COMMANDS]);
-
 module.exports = {
   // Centralized slug regex — used by scheduler.cjs and queueOps.cjs for
   // direct test()/match() containment checks alongside the zod parses.
   SCHEDULE_SLUG_RE,
   SCHEDULE_RUN_ID_RE,
   PRD_CREATE_SLUG_RE,
-  READ_COMMANDS,
-  SAS_GATED_READS,
-  MUTATE_COMMANDS,
-  ALLOWED_COMMANDS,
   schemas: {
-    webRemotePair,
-    webRemoteRevokeDevice,
-    webRemoteAuditTail,
     ptySpawn,
     ptyTabId,
     ptyAlive,
     ptyWrite,
     ptyResize,
-    sessionSubscribe,
-    browserViewId,
-    browserCreate,
-    browserSetBounds,
-    browserNavigate,
-    browserCaptureDom,
-    browserCaptureSelection,
-    browserCopyImage,
-    browserSaveBinary,
     clipboardWriteText,
-    browserSaveRecording,
-    browserReplay,
-    browserSetZoom,
-    browserFind,
     transcriptSubscribe,
     transcriptTabId,
     transcriptPath,
@@ -1049,6 +850,7 @@ module.exports = {
     watchersRemove,
     watchersKillTab,
     filesDuplicate,
+    filesSaveBinary,
     docEditRun,
     docEditRunInSession,
     chatRun,

package/src/main/lib/__tests__/coldBootPromptSessionsWrite.test.cjs

@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+/**
+ * coldBootPromptSessionsWrite.test.cjs — regression coverage for the
+ * "Epics marked Completed come back Open" bug.
+ *
+ * config.cjs's allowedRoots starts as just {os.homedir()}, and
+ * validateWrite() explicitly skips the homedir root (a project cwd must be
+ * registered via addAllowedRoot() before writeJson()/writeTextAtomic() will
+ * accept a write under it). addAllowedRoot's only callers used to be pty.cjs
+ * (Terminal spawn) and lib/prdCreate.cjs — never the Epic persistence path —
+ * so on a cold boot, before any Terminal/PRD activity for a project, both
+ * mergeActiveIndex's own write and the renderer's Epic-archive write
+ * (config:write-json of promptSessionArchivePath) were silently rejected.
+ *
+ * Both cases below use a tmp dir INSIDE the homedir so validatePath (the
+ * READ boundary, satisfied by the homedir root alone) succeeds while
+ * validateWrite (which skips the homedir root, per config.cjs:113) still
+ * requires an explicit per-project root registration — reproducing the
+ * exact cold-boot gap without needing an out-of-home tmp root.
+ *
+ * Run: timeout 300 npx vitest run src/main/lib/__tests__/coldBootPromptSessionsWrite.test.cjs
+ */
+
+'use strict';
+
+import { test, expect, afterEach } from 'vitest';
+const fsp = require('node:fs/promises');
+const os = require('node:os');
+const path = require('node:path');
+const { mergeActiveIndex } = require('../activeIndexMerge.cjs');
+const { readActiveIndex } = require('../epicMint.cjs');
+const config = require('../../config.cjs');
+
+const tmpDirs = [];
+afterEach(async () => {
+  while (tmpDirs.length) {
+    const d = tmpDirs.pop();
+    await fsp.rm(d, { recursive: true, force: true });
+  }
+});
+
+async function mkColdBootCwd(prefix) {
+  // Deliberately under homedir (so validatePath's read boundary passes via
+  // the default homedir root) and deliberately NOT registered via
+  // config.addAllowedRoot() — simulates the exact state of allowedRoots
+  // right after app boot, before any Terminal/PRD activity for this project.
+  const cwd = await fsp.mkdtemp(path.join(os.homedir(), prefix));
+  tmpDirs.push(cwd);
+  return cwd;
+}
+
+function session(id, overrides = {}) {
+  return {
+    id,
+    cwd: overrides.cwd || '/proj',
+    goalText: overrides.goalText || `goal for ${id}`,
+    claudeSessionId: overrides.claudeSessionId || `claude-${id}`,
+    status: overrides.status || 'active',
+    createdAt: overrides.createdAt || '2026-08-06T13:48:00.000Z',
+    completedAt: overrides.completedAt ?? null,
+  };
+}
+
+test('mergeActiveIndex writes active-index.json on a cold boot with only the homedir registered', async () => {
+  const cwd = await mkColdBootCwd('.sm-test-activeindex-coldboot-');
+  const s = session('psess-coldboot-1');
+
+  await mergeActiveIndex(cwd, { sessions: { [s.id]: s }, events: {} });
+
+  const index = readActiveIndex(cwd);
+  expect(index.sessions[s.id]).toEqual(s);
+});
+
+// Mirrors what the 'config:write-json' IPC handler now does before calling
+// writeJson (config.cjs's registerPromptSessionsRoot) — the main-process fix
+// for state/promptSessions.ts's markCompleted -> writeJson(promptSessionArchivePath).
+test('an Epic archive write succeeds on a cold boot with only the homedir registered', async () => {
+  const cwd = await mkColdBootCwd('.sm-test-archive-coldboot-');
+  const archivePath = path.join(cwd, 'session-manager-operations', 'prompt-sessions', 'psess-archived-1.json');
+  const archive = { ...session('psess-archived-1', { status: 'completed' }), completedAt: '2026-08-06T14:00:00.000Z' };
+
+  config.registerPromptSessionsRoot(archivePath);
+  await config.writeJson(archivePath, archive, { writer: 'epics' });
+
+  const result = await config.readJson(archivePath);
+  expect(result.exists).toBe(true);
+  expect(result.data).toEqual(archive);
+});

package/src/main/lib/activeIndexMerge.cjs

@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
  * explicit "un-tombstone" path; today one would be dead code.
  */
 
+const path = require('path');
 const { activeIndexPath, withPathLock } = require('./epicMint.cjs');
 const config = require('../config.cjs');
 
@@ -69,6 +70,14 @@ function compareEventsChainAware(a, b) {
  */
 async function mergeActiveIndex(cwd, { sessions: rawMemorySessions = {}, events: rawMemoryEvents = {}, removedIds = [] } = {}) {
   if (!cwd || typeof cwd !== 'string') throw new Error('mergeActiveIndex: cwd is required');
+  // Register this project's cwd as a write-allowed root (config.cjs's
+  // validateWrite gate) — mirrors the precedent + comment in
+  // lib/prdCreate.cjs:152-155. A chat-only Epic (headless claude -p, no
+  // Terminal PTY ever spawned for this cwd) reaches this merge on a cold
+  // boot before pty.cjs's addAllowedRoot call has ever run for it — without
+  // this, every active-index.json write for such a project fails with
+  // "Write outside allowed write boundaries".
+  config.addAllowedRoot(path.resolve(cwd));
   const filePath = activeIndexPath(cwd);
   // Null-prototype copies of the CALLER'S OWN payload too: an Epic id equal
   // to "__proto__" is a plain string key from the caller's perspective, but

package/src/main/lib/opsOwnership.cjs

@@ -48,8 +48,6 @@ const OWNERS = Object.freeze({
   'scheduler': 'scheduler',
   // Project Home owns the synthesized Brief (generate + hand-edit).
   'project-brief': 'project-home',
-  // Browser tab scratch saves (DOM captures, screenshots, recorded flows).
-  'browser': 'browser',
   // Structured per-tab error log lines (JSONL), tagged for tracing/analysis.
   'logs': 'logs',
   // Host on Bilko.run tab's deterministic bundle prep (dist/index.html +

package/src/main/lib/summarize.cjs

@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@
  *
  * Single source of truth for the Anthropic summarization call. Used by:
  *   - exchanges.cjs (records durable per-exchange summaries)
- *   - webRemote.cjs (mobile summary push — refactored to import from here)
  *
  * Degrade contracts (never throw — always return a record):
  *   no API key → { summary: text.slice(0,600), model:'raw', degraded:'no_api_key' }