claude-code-pilot 2.0.0 → 3.0.0

package/src/pilot/bin/lib/model-profiles.cjs

@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+/**
+ * Mapping of CCP agent to model for each profile.
+ *
+ * This is the single source of truth for agent-to-model mappings.
+ * All modules that need MODEL_PROFILES should require this module
+ * rather than defining their own inline table.
+ */
+const MODEL_PROFILES = {
+  'ccp-planner': { quality: 'opus', balanced: 'opus', budget: 'sonnet' },
+  'ccp-roadmapper': { quality: 'opus', balanced: 'sonnet', budget: 'sonnet' },
+  'ccp-executor': { quality: 'opus', balanced: 'sonnet', budget: 'sonnet' },
+  'ccp-phase-researcher': { quality: 'opus', balanced: 'sonnet', budget: 'haiku' },
+  'ccp-project-researcher': { quality: 'opus', balanced: 'sonnet', budget: 'haiku' },
+  'ccp-research-synthesizer': { quality: 'sonnet', balanced: 'sonnet', budget: 'haiku' },
+  'ccp-debugger': { quality: 'opus', balanced: 'sonnet', budget: 'sonnet' },
+  'ccp-codebase-mapper': { quality: 'sonnet', balanced: 'haiku', budget: 'haiku' },
+  'ccp-verifier': { quality: 'sonnet', balanced: 'sonnet', budget: 'haiku' },
+  'ccp-plan-checker': { quality: 'sonnet', balanced: 'sonnet', budget: 'haiku' },
+  'ccp-integration-checker': { quality: 'sonnet', balanced: 'sonnet', budget: 'haiku' },
+  'ccp-nyquist-auditor': { quality: 'sonnet', balanced: 'sonnet', budget: 'haiku' },
+  'ccp-ui-researcher': { quality: 'opus', balanced: 'sonnet', budget: 'haiku' },
+  'ccp-ui-checker': { quality: 'sonnet', balanced: 'sonnet', budget: 'haiku' },
+  'ccp-ui-auditor': { quality: 'sonnet', balanced: 'sonnet', budget: 'haiku' },
+};
+const VALID_PROFILES = Object.keys(MODEL_PROFILES['ccp-planner']);
+
+/**
+ * Formats the agent-to-model mapping as a human-readable table (in string format).
+ *
+ * @param {Object<string, string>} agentToModelMap - A mapping from agent to model
+ * @returns {string} A formatted table string
+ */
+function formatAgentToModelMapAsTable(agentToModelMap) {
+  const agentWidth = Math.max('Agent'.length, ...Object.keys(agentToModelMap).map((a) => a.length));
+  const modelWidth = Math.max(
+    'Model'.length,
+    ...Object.values(agentToModelMap).map((m) => m.length)
+  );
+  const sep = '\u2500'.repeat(agentWidth + 2) + '\u2524' + '\u2500'.repeat(modelWidth + 2);
+  const header = ' ' + 'Agent'.padEnd(agentWidth) + ' \u2502 ' + 'Model'.padEnd(modelWidth);
+  let agentToModelTable = header + '\n' + sep + '\n';
+  for (const [agent, model] of Object.entries(agentToModelMap)) {
+    agentToModelTable += ' ' + agent.padEnd(agentWidth) + ' \u2502 ' + model.padEnd(modelWidth) + '\n';
+  }
+  return agentToModelTable;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Returns a mapping from agent to model for the given model profile.
+ *
+ * @param {string} normalizedProfile - The normalized (lowercase and trimmed) profile name
+ * @returns {Object<string, string>} A mapping from agent to model for the given profile
+ */
+function getAgentToModelMapForProfile(normalizedProfile) {
+  const agentToModelMap = {};
+  for (const [agent, profileToModelMap] of Object.entries(MODEL_PROFILES)) {
+    agentToModelMap[agent] = profileToModelMap[normalizedProfile];
+  }
+  return agentToModelMap;
+}
+
+module.exports = {
+  MODEL_PROFILES,
+  VALID_PROFILES,
+  formatAgentToModelMapAsTable,
+  getAgentToModelMapForProfile,
+};

package/{gsd/get-shit-done → src/pilot}/bin/lib/phase.cjs

@@ -340,7 +340,7 @@ function cmdPhaseAdd(cwd, description, raw) {
   fs.writeFileSync(path.join(dirPath, '.gitkeep'), '');
 
   // Build phase entry
-  const phaseEntry = `\n### Phase ${newPhaseNum}: ${description}\n\n**Goal:** [To be planned]\n**Requirements**: TBD\n**Depends on:** Phase ${maxPhase}\n**Plans:** 0 plans\n\nPlans:\n- [ ] TBD (run /gsd:plan-phase ${newPhaseNum} to break down)\n`;
+  const phaseEntry = `\n### Phase ${newPhaseNum}: ${description}\n\n**Goal:** [To be planned]\n**Requirements**: TBD\n**Depends on:** Phase ${maxPhase}\n**Plans:** 0 plans\n\nPlans:\n- [ ] TBD (run /ccp:plan-phase ${newPhaseNum} to break down)\n`;
 
   // Find insertion point: before last "---" or at end
   let updatedContent;
@@ -411,7 +411,7 @@ function cmdPhaseInsert(cwd, afterPhase, description, raw) {
   fs.writeFileSync(path.join(dirPath, '.gitkeep'), '');
 
   // Build phase entry
-  const phaseEntry = `\n### Phase ${decimalPhase}: ${description} (INSERTED)\n\n**Goal:** [Urgent work - to be planned]\n**Requirements**: TBD\n**Depends on:** Phase ${afterPhase}\n**Plans:** 0 plans\n\nPlans:\n- [ ] TBD (run /gsd:plan-phase ${decimalPhase} to break down)\n`;
+  const phaseEntry = `\n### Phase ${decimalPhase}: ${description} (INSERTED)\n\n**Goal:** [Urgent work - to be planned]\n**Requirements**: TBD\n**Depends on:** Phase ${afterPhase}\n**Plans:** 0 plans\n\nPlans:\n- [ ] TBD (run /ccp:plan-phase ${decimalPhase} to break down)\n`;
 
   // Insert after the target phase section
   const headerPattern = new RegExp(`(#{2,4}\\s*Phase\\s+0*${afterPhaseEscaped}:[^\\n]*\\n)`, 'i');

package/src/pilot/bin/lib/security.cjs

@@ -0,0 +1,382 @@
+/**
+ * Security — Input validation, path traversal prevention, and prompt injection guards
+ *
+ * This module centralizes security checks for CCP tooling. Because CCP generates
+ * markdown files that become LLM system prompts (agent instructions, workflow state,
+ * phase plans), any user-controlled text that flows into these files is a potential
+ * indirect prompt injection vector.
+ *
+ * Threat model:
+ *   1. Path traversal: user-supplied file paths escape the project directory
+ *   2. Prompt injection: malicious text in arguments/PRDs embeds LLM instructions
+ *   3. Shell metacharacter injection: user text interpreted by shell
+ *   4. JSON injection: malformed JSON crashes or corrupts state
+ *   5. Regex DoS: crafted input causes catastrophic backtracking
+ */
+'use strict';
+
+const fs = require('fs');
+const path = require('path');
+
+// ─── Path Traversal Prevention ──────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+/**
+ * Validate that a file path resolves within an allowed base directory.
+ * Prevents path traversal attacks via ../ sequences, symlinks, or absolute paths.
+ *
+ * @param {string} filePath - The user-supplied file path
+ * @param {string} baseDir - The allowed base directory (e.g., project root)
+ * @param {object} [opts] - Options
+ * @param {boolean} [opts.allowAbsolute=false] - Allow absolute paths (still must be within baseDir)
+ * @returns {{ safe: boolean, resolved: string, error?: string }}
+ */
+function validatePath(filePath, baseDir, opts = {}) {
+  if (!filePath || typeof filePath !== 'string') {
+    return { safe: false, resolved: '', error: 'Empty or invalid file path' };
+  }
+
+  if (!baseDir || typeof baseDir !== 'string') {
+    return { safe: false, resolved: '', error: 'Empty or invalid base directory' };
+  }
+
+  // Reject null bytes (can bypass path checks in some environments)
+  if (filePath.includes('\0')) {
+    return { safe: false, resolved: '', error: 'Path contains null bytes' };
+  }
+
+  // Resolve symlinks in base directory to handle macOS /var -> /private/var
+  // and similar platform-specific symlink chains
+  let resolvedBase;
+  try {
+    resolvedBase = fs.realpathSync(path.resolve(baseDir));
+  } catch {
+    resolvedBase = path.resolve(baseDir);
+  }
+
+  let resolvedPath;
+
+  if (path.isAbsolute(filePath)) {
+    if (!opts.allowAbsolute) {
+      return { safe: false, resolved: '', error: 'Absolute paths not allowed' };
+    }
+    resolvedPath = path.resolve(filePath);
+  } else {
+    resolvedPath = path.resolve(baseDir, filePath);
+  }
+
+  // Resolve symlinks in the target path too
+  try {
+    resolvedPath = fs.realpathSync(resolvedPath);
+  } catch {
+    // File may not exist yet (e.g., about to be created) — use logical resolution
+    // but still resolve the parent directory if it exists
+    const parentDir = path.dirname(resolvedPath);
+    try {
+      const realParent = fs.realpathSync(parentDir);
+      resolvedPath = path.join(realParent, path.basename(resolvedPath));
+    } catch {
+      // Parent doesn't exist either — keep the resolved path as-is
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Normalize both paths and check containment
+  const normalizedBase = resolvedBase + path.sep;
+  const normalizedPath = resolvedPath + path.sep;
+
+  // The resolved path must start with the base directory
+  // (or be exactly the base directory)
+  if (resolvedPath !== resolvedBase && !normalizedPath.startsWith(normalizedBase)) {
+    return {
+      safe: false,
+      resolved: resolvedPath,
+      error: `Path escapes allowed directory: ${resolvedPath} is outside ${resolvedBase}`,
+    };
+  }
+
+  return { safe: true, resolved: resolvedPath };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Validate a file path and throw on traversal attempt.
+ * Convenience wrapper around validatePath for use in CLI commands.
+ */
+function requireSafePath(filePath, baseDir, label, opts = {}) {
+  const result = validatePath(filePath, baseDir, opts);
+  if (!result.safe) {
+    throw new Error(`${label || 'Path'} validation failed: ${result.error}`);
+  }
+  return result.resolved;
+}
+
+// ─── Prompt Injection Detection ─────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+/**
+ * Patterns that indicate prompt injection attempts in user-supplied text.
+ * These patterns catch common indirect prompt injection techniques where
+ * an attacker embeds LLM instructions in text that will be read by an agent.
+ *
+ * Note: This is defense-in-depth — not a complete solution. The primary defense
+ * is proper input/output boundaries in agent prompts.
+ */
+const INJECTION_PATTERNS = [
+  // Direct instruction override attempts
+  /ignore\s+(all\s+)?previous\s+instructions/i,
+  /ignore\s+(all\s+)?above\s+instructions/i,
+  /disregard\s+(all\s+)?previous/i,
+  /forget\s+(all\s+)?(your\s+)?instructions/i,
+  /override\s+(system|previous)\s+(prompt|instructions)/i,
+
+  // Role/identity manipulation
+  /you\s+are\s+now\s+(?:a|an|the)\s+/i,
+  /act\s+as\s+(?:a|an|the)\s+(?!plan|phase|wave)/i,  // allow "act as a plan"
+  /pretend\s+(?:you(?:'re| are)\s+|to\s+be\s+)/i,
+  /from\s+now\s+on,?\s+you\s+(?:are|will|should|must)/i,
+
+  // System prompt extraction
+  /(?:print|output|reveal|show|display|repeat)\s+(?:your\s+)?(?:system\s+)?(?:prompt|instructions)/i,
+  /what\s+(?:are|is)\s+your\s+(?:system\s+)?(?:prompt|instructions)/i,
+
+  // Hidden instruction markers (XML/HTML tags that mimic system messages)
+  // Note: <instructions> is excluded — CCP uses it as legitimate prompt structure
+  // Requires > to close the tag (not just whitespace) to avoid matching generic types like Promise<User | null>
+  /<\/?(?:system|assistant|human)>/i,
+  /\[SYSTEM\]/i,
+  /\[INST\]/i,
+  /<<\s*SYS\s*>>/i,
+
+  // Exfiltration attempts
+  /(?:send|post|fetch|curl|wget)\s+(?:to|from)\s+https?:\/\//i,
+  /(?:base64|btoa|encode)\s+(?:and\s+)?(?:send|exfiltrate|output)/i,
+
+  // Tool manipulation
+  /(?:run|execute|call|invoke)\s+(?:the\s+)?(?:bash|shell|exec|spawn)\s+(?:tool|command)/i,
+];
+
+/**
+ * Scan text for potential prompt injection patterns.
+ * Returns an array of findings (empty = clean).
+ *
+ * @param {string} text - The text to scan
+ * @param {object} [opts] - Options
+ * @param {boolean} [opts.strict=false] - Enable stricter matching (more false positives)
+ * @returns {{ clean: boolean, findings: string[] }}
+ */
+function scanForInjection(text, opts = {}) {
+  if (!text || typeof text !== 'string') {
+    return { clean: true, findings: [] };
+  }
+
+  const findings = [];
+
+  for (const pattern of INJECTION_PATTERNS) {
+    if (pattern.test(text)) {
+      findings.push(`Matched injection pattern: ${pattern.source}`);
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (opts.strict) {
+    // Check for suspicious Unicode that could hide instructions
+    // (zero-width chars, RTL override, homoglyph attacks)
+    if (/[\u200B-\u200F\u2028-\u202F\uFEFF\u00AD]/.test(text)) {
+      findings.push('Contains suspicious zero-width or invisible Unicode characters');
+    }
+
+    // Check for extremely long strings that could be prompt stuffing
+    if (text.length > 50000) {
+      findings.push(`Suspicious text length: ${text.length} chars (potential prompt stuffing)`);
+    }
+  }
+
+  return { clean: findings.length === 0, findings };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Sanitize text that will be embedded in agent prompts or planning documents.
+ * Strips known injection markers while preserving legitimate content.
+ *
+ * This does NOT alter user intent — it neutralizes control characters and
+ * instruction-mimicking patterns that could hijack agent behavior.
+ *
+ * @param {string} text - Text to sanitize
+ * @returns {string} Sanitized text
+ */
+function sanitizeForPrompt(text) {
+  if (!text || typeof text !== 'string') return text;
+
+  let sanitized = text;
+
+  // Strip zero-width characters that could hide instructions
+  sanitized = sanitized.replace(/[\u200B-\u200F\u2028-\u202F\uFEFF\u00AD]/g, '');
+
+  // Neutralize XML/HTML tags that mimic system boundaries
+  // Replace < > with full-width equivalents to prevent tag interpretation
+  // Note: <instructions> is excluded — CCP uses it as legitimate prompt structure
+  sanitized = sanitized.replace(/<(\/?)(?:system|assistant|human)>/gi,
+    (_, slash) => `\uFF1C${slash || ''}system-text\uFF1E`);
+
+  // Neutralize [SYSTEM] / [INST] markers
+  sanitized = sanitized.replace(/\[(SYSTEM|INST)\]/gi, '[$1-TEXT]');
+
+  // Neutralize <<SYS>> markers
+  sanitized = sanitized.replace(/<<\s*SYS\s*>>/gi, '\u00ABSYS-TEXT\u00BB');
+
+  return sanitized;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Sanitize text that will be displayed back to the user.
+ * Removes protocol-like leak markers that should never surface in checkpoints.
+ *
+ * @param {string} text - Text to sanitize
+ * @returns {string} Sanitized text
+ */
+function sanitizeForDisplay(text) {
+  if (!text || typeof text !== 'string') return text;
+
+  let sanitized = sanitizeForPrompt(text);
+
+  const protocolLeakPatterns = [
+    /^\s*(?:assistant|user|system)\s+to=[^:\s]+:[^\n]+$/i,
+    /^\s*<\|(?:assistant|user|system)[^|]*\|>\s*$/i,
+  ];
+
+  sanitized = sanitized
+    .split('\n')
+    .filter(line => !protocolLeakPatterns.some(pattern => pattern.test(line)))
+    .join('\n');
+
+  return sanitized;
+}
+
+// ─── Shell Safety ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+/**
+ * Validate that a string is safe to use as a shell argument when quoted.
+ * This is a defense-in-depth check — callers should always use array-based
+ * exec (spawnSync) where possible.
+ *
+ * @param {string} value - The value to check
+ * @param {string} label - Description for error messages
+ * @returns {string} The validated value
+ */
+function validateShellArg(value, label) {
+  if (!value || typeof value !== 'string') {
+    throw new Error(`${label || 'Argument'}: empty or invalid value`);
+  }
+
+  // Reject null bytes
+  if (value.includes('\0')) {
+    throw new Error(`${label || 'Argument'}: contains null bytes`);
+  }
+
+  // Reject command substitution attempts
+  if (/[$`]/.test(value) && /\$\(|`/.test(value)) {
+    throw new Error(`${label || 'Argument'}: contains potential command substitution`);
+  }
+
+  return value;
+}
+
+// ─── JSON Safety ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+/**
+ * Safely parse JSON with error handling and optional size limits.
+ * Wraps JSON.parse to prevent uncaught exceptions from malformed input.
+ *
+ * @param {string} text - JSON string to parse
+ * @param {object} [opts] - Options
+ * @param {number} [opts.maxLength=1048576] - Maximum input length (1MB default)
+ * @param {string} [opts.label='JSON'] - Description for error messages
+ * @returns {{ ok: boolean, value?: any, error?: string }}
+ */
+function safeJsonParse(text, opts = {}) {
+  const maxLength = opts.maxLength || 1048576;
+  const label = opts.label || 'JSON';
+
+  if (!text || typeof text !== 'string') {
+    return { ok: false, error: `${label}: empty or invalid input` };
+  }
+
+  if (text.length > maxLength) {
+    return { ok: false, error: `${label}: input exceeds ${maxLength} byte limit (got ${text.length})` };
+  }
+
+  try {
+    const value = JSON.parse(text);
+    return { ok: true, value };
+  } catch (err) {
+    return { ok: false, error: `${label}: parse error — ${err.message}` };
+  }
+}
+
+// ─── Phase/Argument Validation ──────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+/**
+ * Validate a phase number argument.
+ * Phase numbers must match: integer, decimal (2.1), or letter suffix (12A).
+ * Rejects arbitrary strings that could be used for injection.
+ *
+ * @param {string} phase - The phase number to validate
+ * @returns {{ valid: boolean, normalized?: string, error?: string }}
+ */
+function validatePhaseNumber(phase) {
+  if (!phase || typeof phase !== 'string') {
+    return { valid: false, error: 'Phase number is required' };
+  }
+
+  const trimmed = phase.trim();
+
+  // Standard numeric: 1, 01, 12A, 12.1, 12A.1.2
+  if (/^\d{1,4}[A-Z]?(?:\.\d{1,3})*$/i.test(trimmed)) {
+    return { valid: true, normalized: trimmed };
+  }
+
+  // Custom project IDs: PROJ-42, AUTH-101 (uppercase alphanumeric with hyphens)
+  if (/^[A-Z][A-Z0-9]*(?:-[A-Z0-9]+){1,4}$/i.test(trimmed) && trimmed.length <= 30) {
+    return { valid: true, normalized: trimmed };
+  }
+
+  return { valid: false, error: `Invalid phase number format: "${trimmed}"` };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Validate a STATE.md field name to prevent injection into regex patterns.
+ * Field names must be alphanumeric with spaces, hyphens, underscores, or dots.
+ *
+ * @param {string} field - The field name to validate
+ * @returns {{ valid: boolean, error?: string }}
+ */
+function validateFieldName(field) {
+  if (!field || typeof field !== 'string') {
+    return { valid: false, error: 'Field name is required' };
+  }
+
+  // Allow typical field names: "Current Phase", "active_plan", "Phase 1.2"
+  if (/^[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9 _.\-/]{0,60}$/.test(field)) {
+    return { valid: true };
+  }
+
+  return { valid: false, error: `Invalid field name: "${field}"` };
+}
+
+module.exports = {
+  // Path safety
+  validatePath,
+  requireSafePath,
+
+  // Prompt injection
+  INJECTION_PATTERNS,
+  scanForInjection,
+  sanitizeForPrompt,
+  sanitizeForDisplay,
+
+  // Shell safety
+  validateShellArg,
+
+  // JSON safety
+  safeJsonParse,
+
+  // Input validation
+  validatePhaseNumber,
+  validateFieldName,
+};

package/{gsd/get-shit-done → src/pilot}/bin/lib/state.cjs

@@ -637,7 +637,7 @@ function buildStateFrontmatter(bodyContent, cwd) {
     normalizedStatus = 'executing';
   }
 
-  const fm = { gsd_state_version: '1.0' };
+  const fm = { ccp_state_version: '1.0' };
 
   if (milestone) fm.milestone = milestone;
   if (milestoneName) fm.milestone_name = milestoneName;