circle-ir 3.181.0 → 3.185.0

package/dist/analysis/config-loader.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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package/dist/analysis/config-loader.js

@@ -522,6 +522,49 @@ export const DEFAULT_SOURCES = [
     // Server-side interceptor receives `Metadata headers`; `headers.get(KEY)`
     // returns caller-supplied header values.
     { method: 'get', class: 'Metadata', type: 'http_header', severity: 'high', return_tainted: true, languages: ['java'] },
+    // --- WebSocket transport channels (cognium-dev #213 second slice) ---
+    //
+    // Server-side WebSocket handlers receive attacker-authored frames on
+    // every call to a receive-shaped method. Untrusted the moment they
+    // return, regardless of any application-level auth on the socket.
+    //
+    // Python — FastAPI / Starlette (`from fastapi import WebSocket`):
+    //   data = await websocket.receive_text()
+    //   data = await websocket.receive_bytes()
+    //   data = await websocket.receive_json()   # parsed dict/list
+    //   data = await websocket.receive()        # {'type', 'text'|'bytes'}
+    { method: 'receive_text', class: 'WebSocket', type: 'network_input', severity: 'high', return_tainted: true, languages: ['python'] },
+    { method: 'receive_bytes', class: 'WebSocket', type: 'network_input', severity: 'high', return_tainted: true, languages: ['python'] },
+    { method: 'receive_json', class: 'WebSocket', type: 'http_body', severity: 'high', return_tainted: true, languages: ['python'] },
+    //
+    // `receive` intentionally class-scoped to WebSocket (Starlette pattern).
+    // Broadening to unqualified would collide with queue/signal `.receive()`.
+    { method: 'receive', class: 'WebSocket', type: 'network_input', severity: 'high', return_tainted: true, languages: ['python'] },
+    // Django Channels `AsyncJsonWebsocketConsumer` / `WebsocketConsumer`
+    // expose the same receive_* names on `self`; the class filter matches
+    // `WebSocket` only, so add unqualified fallbacks for the receive_json /
+    // receive_text convention (broad — no class filter possible without
+    // hardcoding Django's consumer names).
+    { method: 'receive_json', type: 'http_body', severity: 'high', return_tainted: true, languages: ['python'] },
+    { method: 'receive_text', type: 'network_input', severity: 'high', return_tainted: true, languages: ['python'] },
+    { method: 'receive_bytes', type: 'network_input', severity: 'high', return_tainted: true, languages: ['python'] },
+    // Go — gorilla/websocket (`github.com/gorilla/websocket`):
+    //   messageType, message, err := conn.ReadMessage()
+    //   _, r, err := conn.NextReader()
+    { method: 'ReadMessage', class: 'Conn', type: 'network_input', severity: 'high', return_tainted: true, languages: ['go'] },
+    { method: 'NextReader', class: 'Conn', type: 'network_input', severity: 'high', return_tainted: true, languages: ['go'] },
+    // nhooyr.io/websocket exposes a `Read` method on `*websocket.Conn`;
+    // signature is `func (c *Conn) Read(ctx) (MessageType, []byte, error)`.
+    { method: 'Read', class: 'Conn', type: 'network_input', severity: 'high', return_tainted: true, languages: ['go'] },
+    // Java — Jakarta / Java WebSocket API (`javax.websocket` / `jakarta.websocket`):
+    //   session.getBasicRemote().sendText(input);      // OUT (not a source)
+    //   @OnMessage public void onMessage(String msg) — `msg` is a callback
+    //   param, not a return; handled via param_tainted when annotation is set.
+    { annotation: 'OnMessage', type: 'network_input', severity: 'high', param_tainted: true, languages: ['java'] },
+    // Spring `@MessageMapping` STOMP-over-WebSocket handlers receive
+    // untrusted payloads on every dispatched frame.
+    { annotation: 'MessageMapping', type: 'http_body', severity: 'high', param_tainted: true, languages: ['java'] },
+    { annotation: 'SubscribeMapping', type: 'http_body', severity: 'high', param_tainted: true, languages: ['java'] },
     // --- Cache reads (second-order taint — Redis / Memcached / Django cache) ---
     // The cache round-trip is a canonical second-order sink: whatever was
     // written previously (potentially attacker-controlled) resurfaces on read.
@@ -2627,6 +2670,60 @@ export const DEFAULT_SANITIZERS = [
     // Python Type coercion
     { method: 'int', removes: ['sql_injection', 'command_injection', 'xss'] },
     { method: 'float', removes: ['sql_injection', 'command_injection'] },
+    // Python URL encoding (cognium-dev #213 fifth slice).
+    //
+    //   urllib.parse.quote(x)      — RFC-3986 percent-encode; safe for URL path
+    //   urllib.parse.quote_plus(x) — same + space→+; safe for query string
+    //   urllib.parse.urlencode(d)  — encode a dict of pairs
+    //
+    // Bounded to URL-context sinks. Class-scoped to the specific
+    // `urllib.parse` receiver to avoid colliding with unrelated bare
+    // `quote(...)` calls in other libraries.
+    { method: 'quote', class: 'urllib.parse', removes: ['ssrf', 'open_redirect', 'xss', 'path_traversal'] },
+    { method: 'quote_plus', class: 'urllib.parse', removes: ['ssrf', 'open_redirect', 'xss', 'path_traversal'] },
+    { method: 'urlencode', class: 'urllib.parse', removes: ['ssrf', 'open_redirect', 'xss'] },
+    // Bare aliases — `from urllib.parse import quote` then unqualified.
+    { method: 'quote_plus', removes: ['ssrf', 'open_redirect', 'xss', 'path_traversal'] },
+    { method: 'urlencode', removes: ['ssrf', 'open_redirect', 'xss'] },
+    // `quote` bare is intentionally NOT registered — it collides with
+    // shlex.quote (bare-imported) which is a command_injection sanitizer,
+    // not a URL sanitizer. The class-scoped variant above catches the
+    // qualified `urllib.parse.quote(...)` shape; unqualified callers who
+    // want URL-context credit should use `quote_plus` (which does not
+    // collide with any command_injection sanitizer).
+    // Python XSS — additional common sanitizers.
+    //
+    //   bleach.clean(...)   — already covered above (line 2898)
+    //   bleach.linkify(...) — turns URLs into anchor tags; sanitizes as well
+    //   django.utils.html.escape / strip_tags — Django's XSS escape helpers
+    //   jinja2.escape       — Jinja2's Markup escape (aliased from markupsafe)
+    //   flask.escape        — Flask re-export of markupsafe.escape
+    //   saxutils.escape     — stdlib xml.sax.saxutils.escape for XML docs
+    { method: 'linkify', class: 'bleach', removes: ['xss'] },
+    // Bare `linkify(...)` alias — `from bleach import linkify`.
+    { method: 'linkify', removes: ['xss'] },
+    { method: 'escape', class: 'django.utils.html', removes: ['xss'] },
+    { method: 'strip_tags', class: 'django.utils.html', removes: ['xss'] },
+    { method: 'escape', class: 'jinja2', removes: ['xss'] },
+    { method: 'escape', class: 'flask', removes: ['xss'] },
+    { method: 'escape', class: 'saxutils', removes: ['xss'] },
+    { method: 'escape', class: 'xml.sax.saxutils', removes: ['xss'] },
+    { method: 'quoteattr', class: 'saxutils', removes: ['xss'] },
+    { method: 'quoteattr', class: 'xml.sax.saxutils', removes: ['xss'] },
+    // Python ReDoS — `re.escape(user)` when building a regex from user input
+    // strips regex metacharacters. Downstream `re.compile / re.match` cannot
+    // interpret user-supplied alternations or quantifiers. Also covers the
+    // `code_injection` categorization that `re.compile` currently emits
+    // (a re.escape-wrapped pattern cannot execute anything, so both are safe).
+    { method: 'escape', class: 're', removes: ['redos', 'code_injection'] },
+    // Python SQLAlchemy — `text(...).bindparams(...)` binds params safely.
+    // The `bindparams` call is the sanitizer; the parent `text` wraps the
+    // template. Also add `expression.literal` for explicit SQL literals.
+    { method: 'bindparams', removes: ['sql_injection'] },
+    // psycopg2 sql-composition helpers
+    { method: 'Identifier', class: 'sql', removes: ['sql_injection'] },
+    { method: 'Literal', class: 'sql', removes: ['sql_injection'] },
+    { method: 'Placeholder', class: 'sql', removes: ['sql_injection'] },
     // =========================================================================
     // Rust Sanitizers
     // =========================================================================