circle-ir 3.180.0 → 3.181.0

package/dist/browser/circle-ir.js

@@ -11282,6 +11282,35 @@ var DEFAULT_SOURCES = [
   { method: "get", class: "Jedis", type: "db_input", severity: "medium", return_tainted: true, languages: ["java"] },
   { method: "hget", class: "Jedis", type: "db_input", severity: "medium", return_tainted: true, languages: ["java"] },
   { method: "mget", class: "Jedis", type: "db_input", severity: "medium", return_tainted: true, languages: ["java"] },
+  // --- Serverless transport channels (cognium-dev #213 first slice) ---
+  //
+  // AWS Lambda / API Gateway invocation-event properties. The Lambda
+  // handler signature `(event, context) => …` (JS/TS) or
+  // `def handler(event, context)` (Python) receives an `event` object
+  // whose properties carry the untrusted HTTP-request-shaped payload:
+  //
+  //   event.body                              — request body (string)
+  //   event.queryStringParameters             — `?a=b` params
+  //   event.multiValueQueryStringParameters   — `?a=1&a=2` params
+  //   event.pathParameters                    — path template captures
+  //   event.headers                           — request headers
+  //   event.multiValueHeaders                 — repeated headers
+  //   event.requestContext                    — API Gateway request context
+  //
+  // Vercel Serverless Functions and Cloudflare Workers both use `req`
+  // / `request` receivers that are already covered by the Express-
+  // style patterns above (line ~398). This block specifically covers
+  // the `event`-shaped API Gateway convention that those don't reach.
+  { property: "body", object: "event", type: "http_body", severity: "high", property_tainted: true, languages: ["javascript", "typescript"] },
+  { property: "queryStringParameters", object: "event", type: "http_query", severity: "high", property_tainted: true, languages: ["javascript", "typescript"] },
+  { property: "multiValueQueryStringParameters", object: "event", type: "http_query", severity: "high", property_tainted: true, languages: ["javascript", "typescript"] },
+  { property: "pathParameters", object: "event", type: "http_path", severity: "high", property_tainted: true, languages: ["javascript", "typescript"] },
+  { property: "headers", object: "event", type: "http_header", severity: "high", property_tainted: true, languages: ["javascript", "typescript"] },
+  { property: "multiValueHeaders", object: "event", type: "http_header", severity: "high", property_tainted: true, languages: ["javascript", "typescript"] },
+  { property: "body", object: "event", type: "http_body", severity: "high", property_tainted: true, languages: ["python"] },
+  { property: "queryStringParameters", object: "event", type: "http_query", severity: "high", property_tainted: true, languages: ["python"] },
+  { property: "pathParameters", object: "event", type: "http_path", severity: "high", property_tainted: true, languages: ["python"] },
+  { property: "headers", object: "event", type: "http_header", severity: "high", property_tainted: true, languages: ["python"] },
   // --- JWT claims (unverified decode — PyJWT / jose / jsonwebtoken / auth0 java-jwt / golang-jwt) ---
   // A JWT's payload is *always* attacker-authored. Even after verification
   // the *contents* of the claims (username, role, custom fields) are not
@@ -25504,7 +25533,19 @@ var JS_TAINTED_PATTERNS = [
   { pattern: /\bdocument\.title\b/, type: "dom_input" },
   { pattern: /\bhistory\.state\b/, type: "dom_input" },
   { pattern: /\blocalStorage\.getItem\b/, type: "dom_input" },
-  { pattern: /\bsessionStorage\.getItem\b/, type: "dom_input" }
+  { pattern: /\bsessionStorage\.getItem\b/, type: "dom_input" },
+  // AWS Lambda / API Gateway event-shape sources (cognium-dev #213
+  // transport-channel first slice). The `event` parameter of a
+  // Lambda handler carries the untrusted HTTP payload; forward-taint
+  // tracking through `const q = event.body; sink(q)` needs the
+  // regex here in addition to the property patterns in
+  // config-loader.ts:DEFAULT_SOURCES.
+  { pattern: /\bevent\.body\b/, type: "http_body" },
+  { pattern: /\bevent\.queryStringParameters\b/, type: "http_param" },
+  { pattern: /\bevent\.multiValueQueryStringParameters\b/, type: "http_param" },
+  { pattern: /\bevent\.pathParameters\b/, type: "http_path" },
+  { pattern: /\bevent\.headers\b/, type: "http_header" },
+  { pattern: /\bevent\.multiValueHeaders\b/, type: "http_header" }
 ];
 var PYTHON_TAINTED_PATTERNS2 = [
   { pattern: /\brequest\.args\b/, type: "http_param" },
@@ -30022,7 +30063,7 @@ function findPythonTaintedFormatStringFindings(code, file) {
   }
   if (taintedVars.size === 0) return findings;
   const percentRe = /\b(\w+)\s*%\s*[\(\[\{"'\w]/;
-  const dotFormatRe = /\b(\w+)\s*\.\s*format\s*\(/;
+  const dotFormatRe = /\b(\w+)\s*\.\s*(?:format|format_map)\s*\(/;
   const seen = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
   for (let i2 = 0; i2 < lines.length; i2++) {
     const line = lines[i2];
@@ -38896,28 +38937,36 @@ var PythonReceiverTaintFormatPass = class {
     if (ctx.language !== "python") {
       return { findingsEmitted: 0 };
     }
-    const { calls, meta } = ctx.graph.ir;
-    const constProp = ctx.getResult(
-      "constant-propagation"
-    );
-    const tainted = constProp.tainted;
+    const { calls, meta, taint } = ctx.graph.ir;
+    const taintedVarNames = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
+    for (const s of taint.sources) {
+      if (typeof s.variable === "string" && s.variable.length > 0) {
+        taintedVarNames.add(s.variable);
+      }
+    }
+    if (taintedVarNames.size === 0) {
+      return { findingsEmitted: 0 };
+    }
+    const seen = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
     let count = 0;
     for (const call of calls) {
-      if (call.method_name !== "format") continue;
+      if (call.method_name !== "format" && call.method_name !== "format_map") continue;
       const receiver = call.receiver;
       if (!receiver) continue;
       if (!/^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*$/.test(receiver)) continue;
-      const scopedName = call.in_method ? `${call.in_method}:${receiver}` : receiver;
-      if (!tainted.has(receiver) && !tainted.has(scopedName)) continue;
+      if (!taintedVarNames.has(receiver)) continue;
+      const seenKey = `${call.location.line}:${receiver}`;
+      if (seen.has(seenKey)) continue;
+      seen.add(seenKey);
       ctx.addFinding({
-        id: `format_string-${meta.file}-${call.location.line}-${receiver}`,
+        id: `format_string-${meta.file}-${call.location.line}-${receiver}-${call.method_name}`,
         pass: this.name,
         category: "security",
         rule_id: "format_string",
         cwe: "CWE-134",
         severity: "medium",
         level: "warning",
-        message: `Format-string vulnerability: the format template \`${receiver}\` is tainted (traces back to a taint source). Attacker can leak object attributes via \`{obj.__class__.__mro__[\u2026]}\` chains or crash the process via unbounded specifiers. Use a literal format string and pass user input as an argument instead.`,
+        message: `Format-string vulnerability: the format template \`${receiver}\` is tainted (traces back to a taint source) and used as the receiver of \`${call.method_name}(...)\`. Attacker can leak object attributes via \`{obj.__class__.__mro__[\u2026]}\` chains or crash the process via unbounded specifiers. Use a literal format string and pass user input as an argument instead.`,
         file: meta.file,
         line: call.location.line
       });

package/dist/core/circle-ir-core.cjs

@@ -10677,6 +10677,35 @@ var DEFAULT_SOURCES = [
   { method: "get", class: "Jedis", type: "db_input", severity: "medium", return_tainted: true, languages: ["java"] },
   { method: "hget", class: "Jedis", type: "db_input", severity: "medium", return_tainted: true, languages: ["java"] },
   { method: "mget", class: "Jedis", type: "db_input", severity: "medium", return_tainted: true, languages: ["java"] },
+  // --- Serverless transport channels (cognium-dev #213 first slice) ---
+  //
+  // AWS Lambda / API Gateway invocation-event properties. The Lambda
+  // handler signature `(event, context) => …` (JS/TS) or
+  // `def handler(event, context)` (Python) receives an `event` object
+  // whose properties carry the untrusted HTTP-request-shaped payload:
+  //
+  //   event.body                              — request body (string)
+  //   event.queryStringParameters             — `?a=b` params
+  //   event.multiValueQueryStringParameters   — `?a=1&a=2` params
+  //   event.pathParameters                    — path template captures
+  //   event.headers                           — request headers
+  //   event.multiValueHeaders                 — repeated headers
+  //   event.requestContext                    — API Gateway request context
+  //
+  // Vercel Serverless Functions and Cloudflare Workers both use `req`
+  // / `request` receivers that are already covered by the Express-
+  // style patterns above (line ~398). This block specifically covers
+  // the `event`-shaped API Gateway convention that those don't reach.
+  { property: "body", object: "event", type: "http_body", severity: "high", property_tainted: true, languages: ["javascript", "typescript"] },
+  { property: "queryStringParameters", object: "event", type: "http_query", severity: "high", property_tainted: true, languages: ["javascript", "typescript"] },
+  { property: "multiValueQueryStringParameters", object: "event", type: "http_query", severity: "high", property_tainted: true, languages: ["javascript", "typescript"] },
+  { property: "pathParameters", object: "event", type: "http_path", severity: "high", property_tainted: true, languages: ["javascript", "typescript"] },
+  { property: "headers", object: "event", type: "http_header", severity: "high", property_tainted: true, languages: ["javascript", "typescript"] },
+  { property: "multiValueHeaders", object: "event", type: "http_header", severity: "high", property_tainted: true, languages: ["javascript", "typescript"] },
+  { property: "body", object: "event", type: "http_body", severity: "high", property_tainted: true, languages: ["python"] },
+  { property: "queryStringParameters", object: "event", type: "http_query", severity: "high", property_tainted: true, languages: ["python"] },
+  { property: "pathParameters", object: "event", type: "http_path", severity: "high", property_tainted: true, languages: ["python"] },
+  { property: "headers", object: "event", type: "http_header", severity: "high", property_tainted: true, languages: ["python"] },
   // --- JWT claims (unverified decode — PyJWT / jose / jsonwebtoken / auth0 java-jwt / golang-jwt) ---
   // A JWT's payload is *always* attacker-authored. Even after verification
   // the *contents* of the claims (username, role, custom fields) are not

package/dist/core/circle-ir-core.js

@@ -10611,6 +10611,35 @@ var DEFAULT_SOURCES = [
   { method: "get", class: "Jedis", type: "db_input", severity: "medium", return_tainted: true, languages: ["java"] },
   { method: "hget", class: "Jedis", type: "db_input", severity: "medium", return_tainted: true, languages: ["java"] },
   { method: "mget", class: "Jedis", type: "db_input", severity: "medium", return_tainted: true, languages: ["java"] },
+  // --- Serverless transport channels (cognium-dev #213 first slice) ---
+  //
+  // AWS Lambda / API Gateway invocation-event properties. The Lambda
+  // handler signature `(event, context) => …` (JS/TS) or
+  // `def handler(event, context)` (Python) receives an `event` object
+  // whose properties carry the untrusted HTTP-request-shaped payload:
+  //
+  //   event.body                              — request body (string)
+  //   event.queryStringParameters             — `?a=b` params
+  //   event.multiValueQueryStringParameters   — `?a=1&a=2` params
+  //   event.pathParameters                    — path template captures
+  //   event.headers                           — request headers
+  //   event.multiValueHeaders                 — repeated headers
+  //   event.requestContext                    — API Gateway request context
+  //
+  // Vercel Serverless Functions and Cloudflare Workers both use `req`
+  // / `request` receivers that are already covered by the Express-
+  // style patterns above (line ~398). This block specifically covers
+  // the `event`-shaped API Gateway convention that those don't reach.
+  { property: "body", object: "event", type: "http_body", severity: "high", property_tainted: true, languages: ["javascript", "typescript"] },
+  { property: "queryStringParameters", object: "event", type: "http_query", severity: "high", property_tainted: true, languages: ["javascript", "typescript"] },
+  { property: "multiValueQueryStringParameters", object: "event", type: "http_query", severity: "high", property_tainted: true, languages: ["javascript", "typescript"] },
+  { property: "pathParameters", object: "event", type: "http_path", severity: "high", property_tainted: true, languages: ["javascript", "typescript"] },
+  { property: "headers", object: "event", type: "http_header", severity: "high", property_tainted: true, languages: ["javascript", "typescript"] },
+  { property: "multiValueHeaders", object: "event", type: "http_header", severity: "high", property_tainted: true, languages: ["javascript", "typescript"] },
+  { property: "body", object: "event", type: "http_body", severity: "high", property_tainted: true, languages: ["python"] },
+  { property: "queryStringParameters", object: "event", type: "http_query", severity: "high", property_tainted: true, languages: ["python"] },
+  { property: "pathParameters", object: "event", type: "http_path", severity: "high", property_tainted: true, languages: ["python"] },
+  { property: "headers", object: "event", type: "http_header", severity: "high", property_tainted: true, languages: ["python"] },
   // --- JWT claims (unverified decode — PyJWT / jose / jsonwebtoken / auth0 java-jwt / golang-jwt) ---
   // A JWT's payload is *always* attacker-authored. Even after verification
   // the *contents* of the claims (username, role, custom fields) are not

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "circle-ir",
-  "version": "3.180.0",
+  "version": "3.181.0",
   "description": "High-performance Static Application Security Testing (SAST) library for detecting security vulnerabilities through taint analysis",
   "main": "dist/index.js",
   "module": "dist/index.js",