circle-ir 3.178.0 → 3.180.0

package/dist/analysis/config-loader.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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package/dist/analysis/config-loader.js

@@ -1580,6 +1580,20 @@ export const DEFAULT_SINKS = [
     // Sandbox/script security
     { method: 'onNewInstance', class: 'SandboxInterceptor', type: 'command_injection', cwe: 'CWE-78', severity: 'critical', arg_positions: [0] },
     // Java Log Injection (slf4j / logback / java.util.logging) — CWE-117
+    //
+    // Classification decision — cognium-dev #264: Logger receivers stay
+    // as log_injection (CWE-117), NOT format_string (CWE-134). The real
+    // vulnerability with tainted data flowing into Logger.log(fmt, ...)
+    // is log-forgery via CRLF injection, not format-string exploitation.
+    // A genuine format_string vulnerability requires the FORMAT STRING
+    // itself to be attacker-controlled, which is virtually never the
+    // case in Logger APIs (the format string is a literal at the call
+    // site). Adding format_string sinks for these same receivers would
+    // duplicate the existing log_injection findings on every call site
+    // without adding real signal. The rare edge case where a caller
+    // passes `taintedFmt` at arg[0] is still caught by these entries
+    // (via arg_positions[0] on the SLF4J-family methods), classified as
+    // log_injection.
     // Issue #44: log.info/warn/error/debug emit the message argument and any
     // {} format arguments to the log stream. Untrusted input forwarded into
     // these calls allows log forging (newline injection) and downstream log
@@ -2177,6 +2191,16 @@ export const DEFAULT_SINKS = [
     { method: 'format', class: 'String', type: 'format_string', cwe: 'CWE-134', severity: 'high', arg_positions: [0], languages: ['java'] },
     { method: 'format', class: 'Formatter', type: 'format_string', cwe: 'CWE-134', severity: 'high', arg_positions: [0], languages: ['java'] },
     { method: 'printf', class: 'System.out', type: 'format_string', cwe: 'CWE-134', severity: 'high', arg_positions: [0], languages: ['java'] },
+    // cognium-dev #264 — extend the Java format-string surface.
+    // MessageFormat.format(pattern, args) — same receiver-family as String.format
+    // but on the java.text side. PrintStream/PrintWriter.{printf,format} —
+    // arbitrary streams (not just System.out) also honour format-string
+    // specifiers, so a tainted first arg is a genuine CWE-134 sink.
+    { method: 'format', class: 'MessageFormat', type: 'format_string', cwe: 'CWE-134', severity: 'high', arg_positions: [0], languages: ['java'] },
+    { method: 'printf', class: 'PrintStream', type: 'format_string', cwe: 'CWE-134', severity: 'high', arg_positions: [0], languages: ['java'] },
+    { method: 'format', class: 'PrintStream', type: 'format_string', cwe: 'CWE-134', severity: 'high', arg_positions: [0], languages: ['java'] },
+    { method: 'printf', class: 'PrintWriter', type: 'format_string', cwe: 'CWE-134', severity: 'high', arg_positions: [0], languages: ['java'] },
+    { method: 'format', class: 'PrintWriter', type: 'format_string', cwe: 'CWE-134', severity: 'high', arg_positions: [0], languages: ['java'] },
     // NOTE: Python `userFmt.format(...)` and `userFmt % args` require
     // receiver-taint or operator-LHS-taint tracking — the format string is the
     // receiver, not an argument. Deferred to Sprint 6 (#86 follow-up).
@@ -2188,6 +2212,12 @@ export const DEFAULT_SINKS = [
     { method: 'Printf', class: 'fmt', type: 'format_string', cwe: 'CWE-134', severity: 'medium', arg_positions: [0], languages: ['go'] },
     { method: 'Errorf', class: 'fmt', type: 'format_string', cwe: 'CWE-134', severity: 'medium', arg_positions: [0], languages: ['go'] },
     { method: 'Fprintf', class: 'fmt', type: 'format_string', cwe: 'CWE-134', severity: 'medium', arg_positions: [1], languages: ['go'] },
+    // cognium-dev #264 — Go stdlib `log` package format-string entry points.
+    // log.Printf / Fatalf / Panicf take the format string at arg[0]; tainted
+    // format string reaches the same fmt.Sprintf machinery internally.
+    { method: 'Printf', class: 'log', type: 'format_string', cwe: 'CWE-134', severity: 'medium', arg_positions: [0], languages: ['go'] },
+    { method: 'Fatalf', class: 'log', type: 'format_string', cwe: 'CWE-134', severity: 'medium', arg_positions: [0], languages: ['go'] },
+    { method: 'Panicf', class: 'log', type: 'format_string', cwe: 'CWE-134', severity: 'medium', arg_positions: [0], languages: ['go'] },
     // CRLF / HTTP response splitting (CWE-113) — Sprint 6, #86.
     // Node.js / Express response header / cookie sinks. The header *name* (arg 0)
     // is also CRLF-sensitive but is almost always a string literal; we model