circle-ir 3.137.0 → 3.138.0

package/dist/browser/circle-ir.js

@@ -23690,6 +23690,18 @@ var LanguageSourcesPass = class {
       )) {
         ctx.addFinding(finding);
       }
+      for (const finding of findGoGobDeserializationFindings(
+        code,
+        graph.ir.meta.file
+      )) {
+        ctx.addFinding(finding);
+      }
+      for (const finding of findGoXmlDecoderXxeFindings(
+        code,
+        graph.ir.meta.file
+      )) {
+        ctx.addFinding(finding);
+      }
     }
     if (language === "python") {
       additionalSanitizers.push(...findPythonNetlocAllowlistGuardSanitizers(code));
@@ -23738,6 +23750,12 @@ var LanguageSourcesPass = class {
       )) {
         ctx.addFinding(finding);
       }
+      for (const finding of findPythonJinjaTemplateSstiFindings(
+        code,
+        graph.ir.meta.file
+      )) {
+        ctx.addFinding(finding);
+      }
     }
     if (language === "rust") {
       additionalSanitizers.push(...findRustSetAllowlistGuardSanitizers(code));
@@ -23825,6 +23843,24 @@ var LanguageSourcesPass = class {
       )) {
         ctx.addFinding(finding);
       }
+      for (const finding of findJsJsonParseBodyFindings(
+        code,
+        graph.ir.meta.file
+      )) {
+        ctx.addFinding(finding);
+      }
+      for (const finding of findJsDomXpathInjectionFindings(
+        code,
+        graph.ir.meta.file
+      )) {
+        ctx.addFinding(finding);
+      }
+      for (const finding of findJsTemplateInjectionSstiFindings(
+        code,
+        graph.ir.meta.file
+      )) {
+        ctx.addFinding(finding);
+      }
     }
     if (language === "java") {
       additionalSanitizers.push(...findJavaSafeJsonParseSanitizers(code));
@@ -28454,6 +28490,402 @@ function findRustLogInjectionFindings(code, file) {
   }
   return findings;
 }
+function findGoGobDeserializationFindings(code, file) {
+  const findings = [];
+  if (typeof code !== "string" || code.length === 0) return findings;
+  if (!/\bgob\s*\.\s*NewDecoder\s*\(/.test(code)) return findings;
+  if (!/\*http\.Request\b/.test(code) && !/\bhttp\.HandlerFunc\b/.test(code)) {
+    return findings;
+  }
+  const lines = code.split("\n");
+  const decoderFromBody = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
+  const newDecoderAssignRe = /^(\w+)\s*(?::=|=)\s*gob\s*\.\s*NewDecoder\s*\(\s*([^)]+)\)/;
+  for (const raw of lines) {
+    const t = raw.trim();
+    if (t.startsWith("//")) continue;
+    const m = t.match(newDecoderAssignRe);
+    if (!m) continue;
+    const lhs = m[1];
+    const arg = m[2];
+    if (/\b\w+\s*\.\s*Body\b/.test(arg)) {
+      decoderFromBody.add(lhs);
+    }
+  }
+  const seen = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
+  if (decoderFromBody.size > 0) {
+    for (let i2 = 0; i2 < lines.length; i2++) {
+      const line = lines[i2];
+      if (line.trim().startsWith("//")) continue;
+      const m = line.match(/\b(\w+)\s*\.\s*Decode\s*\(/);
+      if (!m) continue;
+      if (!decoderFromBody.has(m[1])) continue;
+      if (seen.has(i2 + 1)) continue;
+      seen.add(i2 + 1);
+      findings.push({
+        id: `insecure_deserialization-${file}-${i2 + 1}-go-gob`,
+        pass: "language-sources",
+        category: "security",
+        rule_id: "insecure_deserialization",
+        cwe: "CWE-502",
+        severity: "critical",
+        level: "error",
+        message: "Insecure deserialization: `gob.NewDecoder(req.Body).Decode(...)` reconstructs arbitrary registered Go types from attacker-controlled bytes. Use an authenticated framing (signed/MAC payloads), avoid decoding interface{} values, or switch to a schema-bound format (JSON with explicit types, Protocol Buffers).",
+        file,
+        line: i2 + 1,
+        snippet: line.trim()
+      });
+    }
+  }
+  for (let i2 = 0; i2 < lines.length; i2++) {
+    const line = lines[i2];
+    if (line.trim().startsWith("//")) continue;
+    if (!/\bgob\s*\.\s*NewDecoder\s*\(\s*\w+\s*\.\s*Body\s*\)\s*\.\s*Decode\s*\(/.test(
+      line
+    )) {
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (seen.has(i2 + 1)) continue;
+    seen.add(i2 + 1);
+    findings.push({
+      id: `insecure_deserialization-${file}-${i2 + 1}-go-gob-inline`,
+      pass: "language-sources",
+      category: "security",
+      rule_id: "insecure_deserialization",
+      cwe: "CWE-502",
+      severity: "critical",
+      level: "error",
+      message: "Insecure deserialization: `gob.NewDecoder(req.Body).Decode(...)` reconstructs arbitrary registered Go types from attacker-controlled bytes. Use an authenticated framing (signed/MAC payloads), avoid decoding interface{} values, or switch to a schema-bound format (JSON with explicit types, Protocol Buffers).",
+      file,
+      line: i2 + 1,
+      snippet: line.trim()
+    });
+  }
+  return findings;
+}
+function findJsJsonParseBodyFindings(code, file) {
+  const findings = [];
+  if (typeof code !== "string" || code.length === 0) return findings;
+  if (!/\bJSON\s*\.\s*parse\s*\(/.test(code)) return findings;
+  if (!/\breq\s*\.\s*body\b/.test(code)) return findings;
+  const lines = code.split("\n");
+  const reqBodyRe = /\breq\s*\.\s*body\b/;
+  const taintedVars = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
+  for (let pass = 0; pass < 3; pass++) {
+    const before = taintedVars.size;
+    for (let i2 = 0; i2 < lines.length; i2++) {
+      const t = lines[i2].trim();
+      if (t.startsWith("//")) continue;
+      const m = t.match(/^(?:const|let|var)\s+(\w+)(?:\s*:\s*[^=]+)?\s*=\s*(.+?);?$/);
+      if (!m) continue;
+      const lhs = m[1];
+      const rhs = m[2];
+      if (taintedVars.has(lhs)) continue;
+      if (reqBodyRe.test(rhs)) {
+        taintedVars.add(lhs);
+        continue;
+      }
+      for (const v of taintedVars) {
+        if (new RegExp(`\\b${v}\\b`).test(rhs)) {
+          taintedVars.add(lhs);
+          break;
+        }
+      }
+    }
+    if (taintedVars.size === before) break;
+  }
+  const callRe = /\bJSON\s*\.\s*parse\s*\(\s*([^)]+?)\s*\)/g;
+  const seen = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
+  for (let i2 = 0; i2 < lines.length; i2++) {
+    const line = lines[i2];
+    if (line.trim().startsWith("//")) continue;
+    callRe.lastIndex = 0;
+    let m;
+    while ((m = callRe.exec(line)) !== null) {
+      const arg = m[1];
+      let tainted = reqBodyRe.test(arg);
+      if (!tainted) {
+        for (const v of taintedVars) {
+          if (new RegExp(`\\b${v}\\b`).test(arg)) {
+            tainted = true;
+            break;
+          }
+        }
+      }
+      if (!tainted) continue;
+      if (seen.has(i2 + 1)) continue;
+      seen.add(i2 + 1);
+      findings.push({
+        id: `insecure_deserialization-${file}-${i2 + 1}-js-jsonparse-body`,
+        pass: "language-sources",
+        category: "security",
+        rule_id: "insecure_deserialization",
+        cwe: "CWE-502",
+        severity: "high",
+        level: "warning",
+        message: "`JSON.parse(req.body)` deserializes attacker-controlled bytes directly. With `express.text()` / `bodyParser.raw()` middleware `req.body` is an unvetted string; the parsed object can carry a `__proto__` payload that pollutes downstream property lookups. Validate against a schema (zod/ajv) before consuming the value.",
+        file,
+        line: i2 + 1,
+        snippet: line.trim()
+      });
+    }
+  }
+  return findings;
+}
+function findJsDomXpathInjectionFindings(code, file) {
+  const findings = [];
+  if (typeof code !== "string" || code.length === 0) return findings;
+  if (!/\.\s*evaluate\s*\(/.test(code)) return findings;
+  if (!/\bXPathResult\b/.test(code)) return findings;
+  const browserSourceRe = /\b(?:location\s*\.\s*(?:search|hash|href)|URLSearchParams|window\s*\.\s*name|document\s*\.\s*cookie)\b/;
+  if (!browserSourceRe.test(code)) return findings;
+  const lines = code.split("\n");
+  const taintedVars = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
+  for (let pass = 0; pass < 3; pass++) {
+    const before = taintedVars.size;
+    for (let i2 = 0; i2 < lines.length; i2++) {
+      const t = lines[i2].trim();
+      if (t.startsWith("//")) continue;
+      const m = t.match(/^(?:const|let|var)\s+(\w+)(?:\s*:\s*[^=]+)?\s*=\s*(.+?);?$/);
+      if (!m) continue;
+      const lhs = m[1];
+      const rhs = m[2];
+      if (taintedVars.has(lhs)) continue;
+      if (browserSourceRe.test(rhs)) {
+        taintedVars.add(lhs);
+        continue;
+      }
+      for (const v of taintedVars) {
+        if (new RegExp(`\\b${v}\\b`).test(rhs)) {
+          taintedVars.add(lhs);
+          break;
+        }
+      }
+    }
+    if (taintedVars.size === before) break;
+  }
+  if (taintedVars.size === 0) return findings;
+  const evalRe = /\.\s*evaluate\s*\(\s*([^,)]+)/;
+  const seen = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
+  for (let i2 = 0; i2 < lines.length; i2++) {
+    const line = lines[i2];
+    if (line.trim().startsWith("//")) continue;
+    const m = line.match(evalRe);
+    if (!m) continue;
+    const arg = m[1].trim();
+    let tainted = false;
+    for (const v of taintedVars) {
+      if (new RegExp(`\\b${v}\\b`).test(arg)) {
+        tainted = true;
+        break;
+      }
+    }
+    if (!tainted) continue;
+    if (seen.has(i2 + 1)) continue;
+    seen.add(i2 + 1);
+    findings.push({
+      id: `xpath_injection-${file}-${i2 + 1}-js-dom-evaluate`,
+      pass: "language-sources",
+      category: "security",
+      rule_id: "xpath_injection",
+      cwe: "CWE-643",
+      severity: "high",
+      level: "warning",
+      message: "XPath injection: `document.evaluate(<tainted>, ...)` lets the attacker break out of the XPath expression and read sibling nodes. Bind user input through XPath variables / parameterized expressions, or escape with an allowlist before concatenation.",
+      file,
+      line: i2 + 1,
+      snippet: line.trim()
+    });
+  }
+  return findings;
+}
+function findGoXmlDecoderXxeFindings(code, file) {
+  const findings = [];
+  if (typeof code !== "string" || code.length === 0) return findings;
+  if (!/\bxml\s*\.\s*NewDecoder\s*\(/.test(code)) return findings;
+  if (!/\*http\.Request\b/.test(code) && !/\bhttp\.HandlerFunc\b/.test(code)) {
+    return findings;
+  }
+  const lines = code.split("\n");
+  const decoderFromBody = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+  for (let i2 = 0; i2 < lines.length; i2++) {
+    const t = lines[i2].trim();
+    if (t.startsWith("//")) continue;
+    const m = t.match(
+      /^(\w+)\s*(?::=|=)\s*xml\s*\.\s*NewDecoder\s*\(\s*([^)]+)\)/
+    );
+    if (!m) continue;
+    if (/\b\w+\s*\.\s*Body\b/.test(m[2])) decoderFromBody.set(m[1], i2);
+  }
+  if (decoderFromBody.size === 0) return findings;
+  const seen = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
+  for (let i2 = 0; i2 < lines.length; i2++) {
+    const line = lines[i2];
+    if (line.trim().startsWith("//")) continue;
+    const m = line.match(
+      /\b(\w+)\s*\.\s*(?:Strict\s*=\s*false|Entity\s*=)\b/
+    );
+    if (!m) continue;
+    if (!decoderFromBody.has(m[1])) continue;
+    if (seen.has(i2 + 1)) continue;
+    seen.add(i2 + 1);
+    findings.push({
+      id: `xml_entity_expansion-${file}-${i2 + 1}-go-xml-decoder`,
+      pass: "language-sources",
+      category: "security",
+      rule_id: "xml_entity_expansion",
+      cwe: "CWE-611",
+      severity: "high",
+      level: "warning",
+      message: "XXE: Go `xml.NewDecoder(req.Body)` with `Strict = false` (or a custom `Entity` map) allows entity references that the standard library normally rejects. Keep `Strict = true` and avoid setting `Entity` from attacker-controlled inputs.",
+      file,
+      line: i2 + 1,
+      snippet: line.trim()
+    });
+  }
+  return findings;
+}
+function findPythonJinjaTemplateSstiFindings(code, file) {
+  const findings = [];
+  if (typeof code !== "string" || code.length === 0) return findings;
+  if (!/\bfrom\s+jinja2\s+import\s+[^#\n]*\bTemplate\b/.test(code) && !/\bjinja2\s*\.\s*Template\b/.test(code)) {
+    return findings;
+  }
+  const reqExtractRe = /\brequest\s*\.\s*(?:args|form|values|json|data|cookies|headers)\b/;
+  if (!reqExtractRe.test(code)) return findings;
+  const lines = code.split("\n");
+  const taintedVars = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
+  for (let pass = 0; pass < 3; pass++) {
+    const before = taintedVars.size;
+    for (let i2 = 0; i2 < lines.length; i2++) {
+      const t = lines[i2].trim();
+      if (t.startsWith("#")) continue;
+      const m = t.match(/^(\w+)\s*=\s*(.+?)$/);
+      if (!m) continue;
+      const lhs = m[1];
+      const rhs = m[2];
+      if (taintedVars.has(lhs)) continue;
+      if (reqExtractRe.test(rhs)) {
+        taintedVars.add(lhs);
+        continue;
+      }
+      for (const v of taintedVars) {
+        if (new RegExp(`\\b${v}\\b`).test(rhs)) {
+          taintedVars.add(lhs);
+          break;
+        }
+      }
+    }
+    if (taintedVars.size === before) break;
+  }
+  if (taintedVars.size === 0) return findings;
+  const ctorRe = /\b(?:jinja2\s*\.\s*)?Template\s*\(\s*([^)]+?)\s*\)/;
+  const seen = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
+  for (let i2 = 0; i2 < lines.length; i2++) {
+    const line = lines[i2];
+    if (line.trim().startsWith("#")) continue;
+    const m = line.match(ctorRe);
+    if (!m) continue;
+    const arg = m[1].trim();
+    let tainted = reqExtractRe.test(arg);
+    if (!tainted) {
+      for (const v of taintedVars) {
+        if (new RegExp(`\\b${v}\\b`).test(arg)) {
+          tainted = true;
+          break;
+        }
+      }
+    }
+    if (!tainted) continue;
+    if (seen.has(i2 + 1)) continue;
+    seen.add(i2 + 1);
+    findings.push({
+      id: `template_injection-${file}-${i2 + 1}-py-jinja-template`,
+      pass: "language-sources",
+      category: "security",
+      rule_id: "template_injection",
+      cwe: "CWE-1336",
+      severity: "critical",
+      level: "error",
+      message: "Server-side template injection: `jinja2.Template(<tainted>).render()` compiles attacker-controlled source. Sandbox-escape gadgets such as `{{ ().__class__.__bases__[0].__subclasses__() }}` lead to RCE. Render fixed templates with user data passed as context variables.",
+      file,
+      line: i2 + 1,
+      snippet: line.trim()
+    });
+  }
+  return findings;
+}
+function findJsTemplateInjectionSstiFindings(code, file) {
+  const findings = [];
+  if (typeof code !== "string" || code.length === 0) return findings;
+  if (!/\bHandlebars\s*\.\s*compile\s*\(/.test(code) && !/\bejs\s*\.\s*(?:render|compile)\s*\(/.test(code)) {
+    return findings;
+  }
+  if (!/\breq\s*\.\s*(?:query|body|params|headers|cookies)\b/.test(code)) {
+    return findings;
+  }
+  const lines = code.split("\n");
+  const reqExtractRe = /\breq\s*\.\s*(?:query|body|params|headers|cookies)\b/;
+  const taintedVars = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
+  for (let pass = 0; pass < 3; pass++) {
+    const before = taintedVars.size;
+    for (let i2 = 0; i2 < lines.length; i2++) {
+      const t = lines[i2].trim();
+      if (t.startsWith("//")) continue;
+      const m = t.match(/^(?:const|let|var)\s+(\w+)(?:\s*:\s*[^=]+)?\s*=\s*(.+?);?$/);
+      if (!m) continue;
+      const lhs = m[1];
+      const rhs = m[2];
+      if (taintedVars.has(lhs)) continue;
+      if (reqExtractRe.test(rhs)) {
+        taintedVars.add(lhs);
+        continue;
+      }
+      for (const v of taintedVars) {
+        if (new RegExp(`\\b${v}\\b`).test(rhs)) {
+          taintedVars.add(lhs);
+          break;
+        }
+      }
+    }
+    if (taintedVars.size === before) break;
+  }
+  if (taintedVars.size === 0) return findings;
+  const callRe = /\b(Handlebars\s*\.\s*compile|ejs\s*\.\s*(?:render|compile))\s*\(\s*([^,)]+)/;
+  const seen = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
+  for (let i2 = 0; i2 < lines.length; i2++) {
+    const line = lines[i2];
+    if (line.trim().startsWith("//")) continue;
+    const m = line.match(callRe);
+    if (!m) continue;
+    const arg = m[2].trim();
+    let tainted = reqExtractRe.test(arg);
+    if (!tainted) {
+      for (const v of taintedVars) {
+        if (new RegExp(`\\b${v}\\b`).test(arg)) {
+          tainted = true;
+          break;
+        }
+      }
+    }
+    if (!tainted) continue;
+    if (seen.has(i2 + 1)) continue;
+    seen.add(i2 + 1);
+    findings.push({
+      id: `template_injection-${file}-${i2 + 1}-js-${m[1].replace(/[\s.]/g, "").toLowerCase()}`,
+      pass: "language-sources",
+      category: "security",
+      rule_id: "template_injection",
+      cwe: "CWE-1336",
+      severity: "critical",
+      level: "error",
+      message: "Server-side template injection: compiling/rendering a template whose source is attacker-controlled (`Handlebars.compile(...)` / `ejs.render(...)`) opens helper-shadowing and prototype-gadget RCE paths. Use a fixed template and pass user data as context.",
+      file,
+      line: i2 + 1,
+      snippet: line.trim()
+    });
+  }
+  return findings;
+}
 
 // src/analysis/passes/sink-filter-pass.ts
 var JS_XSS_SANITIZERS = [

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "circle-ir",
-  "version": "3.137.0",
+  "version": "3.138.0",
   "description": "High-performance Static Application Security Testing (SAST) library for detecting security vulnerabilities through taint analysis",
   "main": "dist/index.js",
   "module": "dist/index.js",