chit402-verify 0.3.4 → 0.4.0

package/README.md

@@ -1,82 +1,270 @@
-# chit402-verify
-
-Offline verification for Chit402 receipts — verify payment binding and output commitment without calling the API.
-
-npm: `chit402-verify` · License: Apache-2.0 · Docs: https://chit402.com
-
-## Installation
-
-```bash
-npm install chit402-verify
-```
-
-## Usage
-
-### Library
-
-```typescript
-import { verifyReceipt, verifyBinding, verifyNullifier } from 'chit402-verify';
-
-// Verify a receipt offline (binding only, no network)
-const receipt = { /* Chit402 receipt JSON */ };
-const result = verifyBinding(receipt);
-console.log(result.matches); // true if binding verified
-
-// Full verification including on-chain nullifier check
-const fullResult = await verifyReceipt(receipt, { checkNullifier: true });
-console.log(fullResult.overall); // 'verified' | 'partial' | 'failed'
-```
-
-### CLI
-
-```bash
-# Local binding verification (no network required)
-npx chit402-verify receipt.json
-
-# Hash the canonical object (must match signed payload_hash) and read not_after
-# from a pinned issuer-history snapshot. Both flags are offline.
-npx chit402-verify receipt.json --canonical-preimage preimage.json --issuer-history-file issuer-history.json
-
-# With on-chain nullifier check (requires network)
-npx chit402-verify receipt.json --check-nullifier
-
-# Output as JSON
-npx chit402-verify receipt.json --json
-
-# From stdin
-curl -s https://api.chit402.com/receipt/task-123?format=json | npx chit402-verify -
-```
-
-## What This Verifies
-
-| Check | Requires Network? | Description |
-|-------|-------------------|-------------|
-| Payment binding | No | Recompute commitment from receipt fields |
-| Issuer signature | No, unless `--fetch-jwks` | ES256. Trusted via JWKS (by kid) or the pinned production kid. Embedded `issuer_jwk` alone is not enough. |
-| Output hash | No | Hash is on the receipt |
-| On-chain settlement | Yes | Query Base RPC for tx |
-| Nullifier anchor | Yes | Query ZKVerifierSP1 contract |
-| Canonical preimage | No | `--canonical-preimage` is SHA-256'd and matched to signed `payload_hash` |
-| Issuer history | No, with `--issuer-history-file` | `iat` is inside the kid's `not_before` / `not_after`. A payload v10 pin must match |
-
-## Exit Codes (CLI)
-
-| Code | Meaning |
-|------|---------|
-| 0 | Verified |
-| 1 | Verification failed |
-| 2 | Partial (binding ok, nullifier not checked) |
-| 3 | Input error |
-
-## Publish
-
-`publishConfig` sets `access` to `public` and does not name an owner. On the registry, `chit402-verify` (latest `0.2.0`) and `@xfuel/verify` (latest `0.2.1`) are both maintained by the npm user `xfuel`. Publish `@xfuel/verify` first. `npm whoami` must print `xfuel`. A `404` on `PUT https://registry.npmjs.org/chit402-verify` is that login, not a missing package and not a new scope: the name already exists.
-
-## Documentation
-
-- [Chit402 Docs](https://chit402.com)
-- [API Reference](https://api.chit402.com)
-
-## License
-
-Apache-2.0
+# chit402-verify
+
+Offline verification for Chit402 receipts — verify payment binding and output commitment without calling the API.
+
+npm: `chit402-verify` · License: Apache-2.0 · Docs: https://chit402.com
+
+`@xfuel/verify` 0.4.0 is an alias pinned to exactly this version. The `xfuel-verify` command stays.
+
+## Installation
+
+```bash
+npm install chit402-verify
+```
+
+## Usage
+
+### Library
+
+```typescript
+import { verifyReceipt, verifyBinding, verifyNullifier } from '@xfuel/verify';
+
+// Verify a receipt offline (binding only, no network)
+const receipt = { /* Chit402 receipt JSON */ };
+const result = verifyBinding(receipt);
+console.log(result.matches); // true if binding verified
+
+// Full verification including on-chain nullifier check
+const fullResult = await verifyReceipt(receipt, { checkNullifier: true });
+console.log(fullResult.overall); // 'verified' | 'partial' | 'failed'
+console.log(fullResult.receipt_lane.freeze); // unsigned; does not change overall
+```
+
+### CLI
+
+```bash
+# History is always checked. With no file, a live snapshot must prefix-extend
+# the copy shipped in this package, or that copy is used (as of 2026-10-14).
+npx xfuel-verify receipt.json
+
+# Offline history. --no-issuer-history, --strict, --accept-no-key-window,
+# and --accept-shell are removed.
+npx xfuel-verify receipt.json --issuer-history issuer-history.json
+
+# Hash the canonical object (must match signed payload_hash).
+npx xfuel-verify receipt.json --canonical-preimage preimage.json --issuer-history issuer-history.json
+
+# A signed refusal (schema chit402.refusal.v1) is not a payment.
+# The check proves the issuer refused, at the signed anchor, for that code.
+# It does not prove a payment or that the block still stands.
+npx xfuel-verify refusal.json
+
+# With on-chain nullifier check (requires network)
+npx xfuel-verify receipt.json --check-nullifier
+
+# Output as JSON
+npx xfuel-verify receipt.json --json
+
+# From stdin
+curl -s https://api.chit402.com/receipt/task-123?format=json | npx xfuel-verify -
+
+# Dual anchor: inclusion, Solana memo, Base calldata
+npx xfuel-verify receipt.json inclusion.json head.json --rpc
+```
+
+## What This Verifies
+
+| Check | Requires Network? | Description |
+|-------|-------------------|-------------|
+| Payment binding | No | Recompute commitment from receipt fields |
+| Issuer signature | No, unless `--fetch-jwks` | ES256. Trusted only via JWKS (by kid) or a pinned RFC 7638 kid |
+| Output hash | No | Hash is on the receipt |
+| On-chain settlement | Yes | Query Base RPC for tx |
+| Nullifier anchor | Yes | Query ZKVerifierSP1 contract |
+| Tree head and inclusion | No | Head ES256 signature over size and root, then an index-and-size-bound inclusion proof |
+| Anchored receipt root | Yes, with `--rpc` | The offline head and inclusion checks, then Solana memo and fee payer and Base calldata and sender |
+| Canonical preimage | No | SHA-256 of `--canonical-preimage`, or the stored canonical object, matches signed `payload_hash` |
+| Issuer history | Always. File, else a live prefix of the shipped snapshot, else the shipped snapshot | `iat` is inside the latest `not_before` and the earliest `not_after` for that kid. A changed `not_before` is `kid_status_regression` (exit 1). No covering key is exit 2 |
+
+## Issuer Signature Verification (ES256)
+
+Receipts include `issuer_signature.jws` (compact ES256 / P-256). The signature
+counts only when the verifying key is trusted:
+
+1. **JWKS by kid** — a key in `--jwks-file`, `--jwks-url`, or `--fetch-jwks`
+   (allowlisted host, default `api.chit402.com`) whose `kid` matches the JWS.
+2. **Pinned thumbprint** — the embedded `issuer_jwk` is used only when its
+   RFC 7638 thumbprint equals a trusted kid. The default offline pin is the
+   production kid `IvFpmC-vPhkY_v0vidsrWVT9uzlE5XWKZgAEOeJTq1Q`. Override with
+   `--trusted-kid`, or disable with `--no-trusted-kid`.
+
+The epoch record and the tree head use those same sources, with or without `--rpc`. `xfuel-verify receipt.json inclusion.json head.json` checks the head signature and the inclusion proof offline. `--rpc` adds the chain checks. An embedded key still has to match the trusted-kid pin, or the kid has to be in a verified issuer-history entry. The head's signed `anchors.base.from` and `anchors.solana.fee_payer` must be on the anchor-wallet list (the package pin, or a verified `/.well-known/anchor-wallets.json`). The chain sender and fee payer must be those wallets. `--version` prints the package version.
+
+Anchor mode also checks a content-addressed issuer pin when the receipt or the head carries `issuer_key_pin`, or when you pass `--issuer-pin`. The pin is a 40-hex commit plus the SHA-256 of `docs/well-known/issuer-key.json`. A branch name is not fetched. A claimed pin requires `issuer_signature.jws` verified under that key. Unsigned envelope kids do not satisfy the check. The registration self-signature is checked when the file has one. A claimed era with no pin fails `ISSUER_PIN_DOWNGRADE`. Receipts that do not claim the era skip this check. The pin chain is Base Sepolia (`eip155:84532`). See [issuer-key-pin.md](../../docs/product/issuer-key-pin.md).
+
+`issuer_jwk` on the receipt is not a trust root. A copy re-signed with an
+arbitrary P-256 key reports `key untrusted` (`issuer_signature.valid === false`),
+including when `--jwks-file` points at the real JWKS.
+
+```bash
+# History is always on. A local snapshot:
+npx xfuel-verify receipt.json --issuer-history issuer-history.json
+
+# Recompute a published canonical preimage and check the kid window.
+# curl -f stops on HTTP errors. Most receipts have no /preimage (a 404).
+# A missing preimage is not a verification failure: omit --canonical-preimage.
+curl -fsS "https://api.chit402.com/receipt/RECEIPT_ID?format=json" -o receipt.json
+curl -fsS "https://api.chit402.com/.well-known/issuer-history.json?version=1" -o issuer-history.json
+if curl -fsS "https://api.chit402.com/receipt/RECEIPT_ID/preimage" -o preimage.json; then
+  npx xfuel-verify receipt.json --canonical-preimage preimage.json --issuer-history issuer-history.json
+else
+  npx xfuel-verify receipt.json --issuer-history issuer-history.json
+fi
+
+# Trust the published JWKS instead of (or in addition to) the pin
+curl -o issuer-jwks.json https://api.chit402.com/.well-known/jwks.json
+npx xfuel-verify receipt.json --jwks-file issuer-jwks.json --no-trusted-kid
+
+# Fetch the issuer JWKS (https://api.chit402.com/.well-known/jwks.json)
+npx xfuel-verify receipt.json --fetch-jwks
+```
+
+```typescript
+import { verifyReceipt } from '@xfuel/verify';
+
+const result = await verifyReceipt(receipt);
+console.log(result.issuer_signature.valid);      // true only for a trusted key
+console.log(result.issuer_signature.key_trusted);
+console.log(result.amount_usdc);                 // from verified claims, not the outer copy
+console.log(result.claim_mismatches);            // any signed path whose outer copy disagrees
+console.log(result.unsigned_fields);             // outer paths the signature does not cover
+console.log(result.verified_scope);              // 'signed_claims'
+```
+
+Amount, payer, payee, asset, and tx are read from the verified JWS claims.
+Every signed path is compared with the outer receipt. A mismatch fails.
+Paths the signature does not cover are `unsigned_fields` and are printed as
+`UNVERIFIED`. Overall does not verify them. The outer document `schema` is
+not a copy of the JWS `schema`. `--check-payer` on Base confirms payer, payee,
+asset, and amount in the USDC `Transfer` log.
+
+`xfuel-verify receipt.json inclusion.json head.json` also runs those receipt
+checks. A matching inclusion proof does not make a tampered receipt VERIFIED.
+
+A paid USDC receipt whose signed `binding.expected_commitment` is null is
+reported as “No payment-binding commitment”, not as an unmetered or TFUEL receipt.
+
+The CLI does **not** fetch JWKS unless `--fetch-jwks` or `--jwks-url` is set.
+Exit code 1 is returned when the key is untrusted, the signature is invalid, or
+a signed claim disagrees with the outer copy.
+
+## Frozen Fields
+
+These fields are immutable once set and verifiable by any third party:
+
+- `task_id` — unique task identifier
+- `route.provider` — compute hub (theta-edgecloud, akash-network)
+- `route.model` — model that served the request
+- `payment.gross_amount` — total charged in USDC atomic units
+- `payment.ref` — settlement reference (network:txHash)
+- `output.hash` — commitment to model output
+- `proof.nullifier` — single-use nullifier anchored on-chain
+
+## Verification Algorithm
+
+The binding commitment is computed as:
+
+```solidity
+// Payment-only binding
+keccak256(abi.encodePacked(
+  keccak256(payment_ref),
+  keccak256(task_id),
+  rail_discriminant,  // 1=usdc, 2=tfuel
+  amount
+))
+
+// PBR (Payment-Bound Receipt) — includes model + output
+keccak256(abi.encodePacked(
+  keccak256(payment_ref),
+  keccak256(task_id),
+  rail_discriminant,
+  amount,
+  model_commitment,
+  output_hash
+))
+```
+
+This matches `SP1ProofHooks.computePaymentCommitment` on-chain.
+
+## Exit Codes (CLI)
+
+| Code | Meaning |
+|------|---------|
+| 0 | Verified |
+| 1 | Verification failed |
+| 2 | Partial (binding ok, nullifier not checked) |
+| 3 | Input error |
+
+`unsupported_version` uses exit 1. No flag (`--check-payer`, `--rpc`, `--fetch-jwks`, `--no-issuer-history`, `--no-preimage`, `--no-trusted-kid`, `--accept-shell`) turns an unknown version into a pass. The check runs before any chain RPC.
+
+## Receipt versions
+
+The signed JWS payload is the version. It is an exact JSON number. Strings, booleans, arrays, null, and non-integers are `unsupported_version`. `11.0` and `1.1e1` are the number 11.
+
+| Signed field | Accepted |
+|---|---|
+| `v` | `11`, and the claims must not contain `payload_version` |
+| `payload_version` | integers `1` through `10`, and `11` only when `issuer_root` is signed |
+| refusal `payload_version` | integers `1`, `2`, `3` |
+| neither field | outer version `4` or `5`, and no field introduced at v6 or later (`version_source: inferred`) |
+
+An outer `v` or `issuer_signature.payload_version` that differs in value or type is `version_mismatch`. A `v` or `payload_version` in the JWS protected header is ignored.
+
+Receipts issued after 2026-10-08 require `@xfuel/verify` >= 0.3.5. Older versions may print VERIFIED for formats they do not understand. `--help` and `--version` print this list.
+
+## API Reference
+
+### `verifyBinding(receipt)`
+
+Verify payment binding locally. Returns:
+
+```typescript
+{
+  verified: boolean;
+  expected: string | null;
+  recomputed: string | null;
+  matches: boolean;
+  covers: string[];
+  reason?: string;
+}
+```
+
+### `verifyNullifier(receipt, options?)`
+
+Verify nullifier is anchored on-chain. Requires network access.
+
+```typescript
+{
+  verified: boolean;
+  nullifier: string | null;
+  anchored: boolean | null;
+  reason?: string;
+}
+```
+
+### `verifyReceipt(receipt, options?)`
+
+Full verification combining binding and optional nullifier check.
+
+```typescript
+{
+  receipt_id: string;
+  binding: BindingVerification;
+  nullifier: NullifierVerification;
+  output_hash: string | null;
+  hub: string | null;
+  model: string | null;
+  amount_usdc: string | null;
+  tx: string | null;
+  overall: 'verified' | 'partial' | 'failed';
+  errors: string[];
+}
+```
+
+## Build digest
+
+`npm run digest` writes `BUILD_DIGEST.txt`. That file is the SHA-256 of the sorted `src/**/*.ts` listing, not a bit-reproducible `tsc` binary. The same sources produce the same digest. The receipt-tree genesis leaf copies this digest so a holder can see which verifier source the issuer vouches for. It does not prove the process that served the receipt ran that exact binary.
+
+## License
+
+Apache-2.0

package/dist/anchor-trust.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
+/**
+ * Bind an anchored tree head to the issuer.
+ *
+ * Anchor mode trusts a head only when its ES256 `issuer_signature` verifies
+ * under the same rules as a receipt: a JWKS key matched by kid, an embedded
+ * key whose RFC 7638 thumbprint is a pinned kid, or a kid in a verified
+ * issuer-history document. The signed payload must match the outer fields
+ * the anchor check uses.
+ *
+ * The Base sender and the Solana fee payer in that payload must be on the
+ * issuer's anchor-wallet list, and the transactions the RPC returns must
+ * have been sent by those wallets.
+ *
+ * The list is the package pin, plus wallets inside a verified
+ * `chit402.anchor_wallets.v1` document or a verified issuer-history
+ * payload's `anchor_wallets`. Two later sources are named and not read:
+ * the Base `ChitIssuerRoot` registry (draft #485) and the DNS TXT at
+ * `_issuer.chit402.com`. This module does not embed a registry address
+ * and does not resolve DNS.
+ */
+import { type Es256Jwk } from './jws.js';
+import { type IssuerHistoryDocument } from './issuer-history.js';
+/** Confirmed sender of Base tx 0x1d8d7ea255170c8d4b87bef9382e13555dded2072fd877ce35f995f1ab54ee09. */
+export declare const PINNED_BASE_ANCHOR_WALLET = "0x1844D1F5FE42aff1Cce6F776514Fd40374079582";
+/** Fee payer of Solana memo 61RHMsPPseUc35v5oxDEtANEDCvXk5fmxZdrFDMknGWc5m7U8YhMfz4En1eFFj3z9n67ZtMiha1zkwnneL2LUiXk. */
+export declare const PINNED_SOLANA_ANCHOR_FEE_PAYER = "BHTnbPu6UZ7zQZ7Qpkpz4LcUQbMN73YDsMtvaNXpEioD";
+/** A head signed before `anchors.base.from` and `anchors.solana.fee_payer` existed. Never VERIFIED. */
+export declare const LEGACY_HEAD_UNPINNED_SIGNER = "LEGACY_HEAD_UNPINNED_SIGNER";
+export declare const ANCHOR_WALLETS_SCHEMA = "chit402.anchor_wallets.v1";
+export declare const ANCHOR_WALLETS_JWT_TYP = "chit402-anchor-wallets+jwt";
+/** Sources this version does not query. A later build can fill the same list. */
+export declare const ANCHOR_WALLET_SOURCES_NOT_CONSULTED: readonly ["issuer_root", "dns"];
+export declare const HEAD_TRUST_MESSAGES: Record<string, string>;
+interface JwksLike {
+    keys?: Es256Jwk[];
+}
+export interface TreeHeadDocument {
+    schema?: string;
+    payload_version?: number;
+    root?: string | null;
+    tree_size?: number | null;
+    epoch?: number | null;
+    prev_epoch_root?: string | null;
+    prev_epoch_size?: number | null;
+    published_at?: string | null;
+    anchors?: {
+        base?: {
+            status?: string | null;
+            tx?: string | null;
+            calldata?: string | null;
+            chain_id?: number | null;
+            from?: string | null;
+        } | null;
+        solana?: {
+            status?: string | null;
+            signature?: string | null;
+            slot?: number | null;
+            cluster?: string | null;
+            memo?: string | null;
+            fee_payer?: string | null;
+        } | null;
+    } | null;
+    issuer_signature?: {
+        jws?: string;
+        kid?: string;
+        issuer_jwk?: Es256Jwk;
+    };
+}
+export interface HeadTrustResult {
+    ok: boolean;
+    reason: string | null;
+    message: string | null;
+    kid: string | null;
+    trust: 'jwks' | 'pinned_kid' | 'issuer_history' | null;
+    payload: Record<string, unknown> | null;
+}
+export interface AnchorWalletList {
+    base: string[];
+    solana: string[];
+    sources: Array<'pin' | 'well_known' | 'issuer_history'>;
+    not_consulted: readonly ['issuer_root', 'dns'];
+}
+/**
+ * True when a verified head anchors a chain but the signature does not name
+ * that chain's signer. Those fields were added after the epoch-1 head and
+ * after the epoch-2 head signed at 07:43 ET on 2026-10-07. A pending side
+ * is not this case.
+ */
+export declare function headOmitsPinnedSigner(payload: Record<string, unknown> | null | undefined): boolean;
+/** Signed payload must carry the same root, size, epoch, and anchors the check uses. */
+export declare function headClaimsMatch(outer: TreeHeadDocument, payload: Record<string, unknown>): string | null;
+export declare function verifyTreeHeadTrust(head: TreeHeadDocument | null | undefined, { jwks, trustedKids, issuerHistory, strictIssuerHistory, }?: {
+    jwks?: JwksLike;
+    trustedKids?: readonly string[];
+    issuerHistory?: IssuerHistoryDocument | null;
+    strictIssuerHistory?: boolean;
+}): HeadTrustResult;
+/**
+ * Named inclusion head. The gateway summary is `{ root, tree_size, signature }`
+ * and is not a tree-head document, so `headClaimsMatch` cannot run on it.
+ * Trust the JWS under JWKS or a pinned kid first, then use the verified
+ * payload as the head. A key carried on the summary is ignored unless that
+ * key is pinned. The summary root and size, when present, must match the payload.
+ * Returns null when the JWS is missing or untrusted: the caller must not
+ * treat the summary as a head.
+ */
+export declare function headTrustedFromInclusion(inclusion: {
+    head?: unknown;
+} | null | undefined, { jwks, trustedKids, }?: {
+    jwks?: JwksLike;
+    trustedKids?: readonly string[];
+}): TreeHeadDocument | null;
+export declare function verifyAnchorWalletDocument(doc: {
+    schema?: string;
+    base?: unknown;
+    solana?: unknown;
+    issuer_signature?: {
+        jws?: string;
+        issuer_jwk?: Es256Jwk;
+    };
+} | null | undefined, { jwks, trustedKids }?: {
+    jwks?: JwksLike;
+    trustedKids?: readonly string[];
+}): {
+    ok: true;
+    base: string[];
+    solana: string[];
+} | {
+    ok: false;
+    reason: string;
+};
+export declare function compileAnchorWallets({ jwks, trustedKids, issuerHistory, published, }?: {
+    jwks?: JwksLike;
+    trustedKids?: readonly string[];
+    issuerHistory?: IssuerHistoryDocument | null;
+    published?: {
+        base: string[];
+        solana: string[];
+    } | null;
+}): AnchorWalletList;
+export declare function walletListed(list: readonly string[], value: string, chain: 'base' | 'solana'): boolean;
+export declare function sameBaseAddress(left: string, right: string): boolean;
+export {};
+//# sourceMappingURL=anchor-trust.d.ts.map

package/dist/anchor-trust.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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