chainlesschain 0.162.125 → 0.162.127

package/src/runtime/coding-agent-shell-policy.cjs

@@ -288,7 +288,7 @@ const DECISION_SEVERITY = Object.freeze({
 });
 
 /** Classify ONE command segment (no separators). */
-function evaluateSegmentPolicy(segment, overrideRuleIds) {
+function evaluateSegmentPolicy(segment, overrideRuleIds, classifyAllShell) {
   const normalized = normalizeShellCommand(segment);
   const tokens = tokenizeShellCommand(normalized);
   const firstToken = (tokens[0] || "").toLowerCase();
@@ -326,6 +326,20 @@ function evaluateSegmentPolicy(segment, overrideRuleIds) {
     rule.test(context),
   );
   if (allowlistedRule) {
+    // `classifyAllShell` (Claude-Code 2.1.193 `autoMode.classifyAllShell`):
+    // don't fast-path the built-in verification allowlist to ALLOW (risk LOW,
+    // auto-approved). Downgrade to WARN so EVERY shell command is classified
+    // and routed through the ApprovalGate confirm — the allowlist still
+    // documents intent, but the agent can't silently run even `npm test`.
+    if (classifyAllShell) {
+      return {
+        allowed: true,
+        decision: SHELL_POLICY_DECISIONS.WARN,
+        reason: `${allowlistedRule.reason} (classifyAllShell: confirm required)`,
+        ruleId: allowlistedRule.id,
+        normalizedCommand: normalized,
+      };
+    }
     return {
       allowed: true,
       decision: SHELL_POLICY_DECISIONS.ALLOW,
@@ -350,6 +364,9 @@ function evaluateShellCommandPolicy(command, options = {}) {
   const overrideRuleIds = Array.isArray(options.overrideRuleIds)
     ? new Set(options.overrideRuleIds)
     : new Set();
+  // When set, allowlisted commands are classified (WARN) instead of fast-pathed
+  // (ALLOW) — see evaluateSegmentPolicy.
+  const classifyAllShell = options.classifyAllShell === true;
 
   // Inspect EVERY segment of a compound command, not just the first — a
   // dangerous segment after `&&` / `;` / `|` must still be caught. The most
@@ -368,7 +385,11 @@ function evaluateShellCommandPolicy(command, options = {}) {
 
   let worst = null;
   for (const segment of segments) {
-    const result = evaluateSegmentPolicy(segment, overrideRuleIds);
+    const result = evaluateSegmentPolicy(
+      segment,
+      overrideRuleIds,
+      classifyAllShell,
+    );
     const sev = DECISION_SEVERITY[result.decision] ?? 1;
     const worstSev = worst ? (DECISION_SEVERITY[worst.decision] ?? 1) : -1;
     if (sev > worstSev) worst = result;

package/src/runtime/file-ref-expander.js

@@ -24,6 +24,10 @@
 
 import fsDefault from "fs";
 import pathDefault from "path";
+import {
+  credentialFileReasonResolved,
+  credentialGuardDisabled,
+} from "../lib/credential-guard.js";
 
 export const DEFAULT_MAX_BYTES = 100 * 1024; // 100 KB per referenced file
 export const DEFAULT_MAX_DIR_ENTRIES = 200;
@@ -181,6 +185,27 @@ function resolveRef(raw, { cwd, fs, path, maxBytes, maxDirEntries }) {
       };
     }
     if (stat.isFile()) {
+      // Refuse to inline a credential / secret file. `@file` expansion pulls
+      // file contents straight into the (possibly cloud) LLM prompt, so it is a
+      // second channel for file→LLM exfiltration that must honour the same guard
+      // as read_file / run_shell / the project-memory @import path. Checked on
+      // the RESOLVED path (the read follows symlinks, so a notes.txt → id_rsa
+      // link would otherwise leak the key) and BEFORE any read, so the secret
+      // bytes are never loaded. CC_CREDENTIAL_GUARD=0 opts out.
+      if (!credentialGuardDisabled()) {
+        const credReason = credentialFileReasonResolved(abs, {
+          cwd,
+          deps: { realpathSync: fs.realpathSync, resolve: path.resolve },
+        });
+        if (credReason) {
+          return {
+            kind: "blocked",
+            raw: cand,
+            rel: fsPath,
+            reason: credReason,
+          };
+        }
+      }
       // PDFs (pdf-parse needs the bytes) and line ranges (must reach the end
       // line) need the whole file; a plain inline only ever shows the first
       // maxBytes, so cap the read there instead of slurping the entire file.
@@ -222,7 +247,12 @@ function resolveRef(raw, { cwd, fs, path, maxBytes, maxDirEntries }) {
       }
       if (range) {
         // Slice the requested lines (clamped to the file), then byte-cap them.
-        const sl = sliceLines(buf.toString("utf-8"), range.start, range.end, maxBytes);
+        const sl = sliceLines(
+          buf.toString("utf-8"),
+          range.start,
+          range.end,
+          maxBytes,
+        );
         return {
           kind: "file",
           raw: cand,
@@ -296,7 +326,9 @@ function renderBlock(refs) {
     } else if (ref.kind === "pdf") {
       if (typeof ref.content === "string") {
         const pageAttr =
-          ref.pageStart != null ? ` pages="${ref.pageStart}-${ref.pageEnd}"` : "";
+          ref.pageStart != null
+            ? ` pages="${ref.pageStart}-${ref.pageEnd}"`
+            : "";
         const attrs =
           `path="${escapeAttr(ref.rel)}" bytes="${ref.bytes}" type="pdf"` +
           pageAttr +
@@ -306,7 +338,9 @@ function renderBlock(refs) {
         parts.push(`<file ${attrs}>`);
         parts.push(ref.content);
         if (ref.truncated) {
-          parts.push(`\n… [truncated — PDF text exceeds ${DEFAULT_MAX_BYTES} bytes]`);
+          parts.push(
+            `\n… [truncated — PDF text exceeds ${DEFAULT_MAX_BYTES} bytes]`,
+          );
         }
         parts.push("</file>");
       } else {
@@ -369,6 +403,13 @@ function _resolveAllRefs(text, opts) {
       warnings.push(`@${ref.raw} — ${ref.message} (left as-is)`);
       continue;
     }
+    if (ref.kind === "blocked") {
+      // Credential/secret file — never read or injected; only a visible warning.
+      warnings.push(
+        `@${ref.raw} — refused: ${ref.reason}; not injected into the prompt`,
+      );
+      continue;
+    }
     refs.push(ref);
   }
   return { refs, warnings, maxBytes };
@@ -440,7 +481,10 @@ export async function expandFileRefsAsync(prompt, opts = {}) {
  * when those are null), byte-capped at maxBytes. Throws code `PDF_LIB_MISSING`
  * when the optional dependency is not installed.
  */
-async function _extractPdfPages(buffer, { firstPage, lastPage, maxBytes } = {}) {
+async function _extractPdfPages(
+  buffer,
+  { firstPage, lastPage, maxBytes } = {},
+) {
   let pdfParse;
   try {
     // pdf-parse's index.js runs debug code under ESM (no module.parent), so
@@ -459,9 +503,9 @@ async function _extractPdfPages(buffer, { firstPage, lastPage, maxBytes } = {})
         if (firstPage && n < firstPage) return "";
         if (lastPage && n > lastPage) return "";
       }
-      return pageData.getTextContent().then((tc) =>
-        (tc.items || []).map((it) => it.str).join(" "),
-      );
+      return pageData
+        .getTextContent()
+        .then((tc) => (tc.items || []).map((it) => it.str).join(" "));
     },
   });
   let out = String(data?.text || "").trim();

package/src/runtime/headless-runner.js

@@ -50,6 +50,11 @@ import { mergeConsecutiveMessages } from "./message-roles.js";
 import { isHeadlessConfigCommand } from "../lib/headless-config-command.js";
 import { withQuietStdout } from "./quiet-stdout.js";
 import { CostBudget } from "../lib/cost-budget.js";
+import {
+  classifyDenial,
+  recordDenial,
+  formatDenials,
+} from "../lib/repl-denials.js";
 
 /** Tools that cannot mutate the filesystem or run commands. */
 export const READ_ONLY_TOOLS = Object.freeze([
@@ -294,17 +299,46 @@ export async function runAgentHeadless(options = {}, deps = {}) {
   let settingsHooks = options.settingsHooks || null;
   if (!settingsHooks) {
     try {
-      const { loadHooks } = await import("../lib/settings-hooks.cjs");
+      const { loadHooks, projectHookTrustNotice } =
+        await import("../lib/settings-hooks.cjs");
       const loaded = loadHooks({ cwd, settingsFile: options.settingsFile });
       settingsHooks =
         loaded.hooks && Object.keys(loaded.hooks).length > 0
           ? loaded.hooks
           : null;
+      // First-run trust notice for an untrusted/cloned repo's shell-running
+      // hooks (Claude-Code 2.1.195 parity). Best-effort, stderr-only.
+      try {
+        const notice = projectHookTrustNotice({
+          cwd,
+          settingsFile: options.settingsFile,
+        });
+        if (notice) process.stderr.write(notice + "\n");
+      } catch {
+        /* trust notice is best-effort */
+      }
     } catch {
       settingsHooks = null; // fail-open
     }
   }
 
+  // autoMode.classifyAllShell (Claude-Code 2.1.193): route the built-in
+  // verification allowlist through the shell-policy classifier instead of
+  // fast-pathing it. Explicit option wins; otherwise read settings.json.
+  let classifyAllShell = options.classifyAllShell || false;
+  if (!classifyAllShell) {
+    try {
+      const { readBooleanSetting } = await import("../lib/settings-loader.cjs");
+      classifyAllShell =
+        readBooleanSetting("autoMode.classifyAllShell", {
+          cwd,
+          settingsFile: options.settingsFile,
+        }) === true;
+    } catch {
+      classifyAllShell = false; // fail-open
+    }
+  }
+
   const runLoop = deps.agentLoop || coreAgentLoop;
   const doBootstrap = deps.bootstrap || bootstrap;
   const getApprovalGate =
@@ -776,6 +810,7 @@ export async function runAgentHeadless(options = {}, deps = {}) {
     approvalGate,
     permissionRules,
     settingsHooks,
+    classifyAllShell,
     enabledToolNames,
     disabledTools,
     iterationBudget: budget,
@@ -847,6 +882,10 @@ export async function runAgentHeadless(options = {}, deps = {}) {
 
   const startedAt = deps.now ? deps.now() : Date.now();
   const toolCalls = [];
+  // Policy denials (blocked tool calls) collected for an end-of-run summary,
+  // so a non-interactive run surfaces what got blocked the way the REPL's
+  // `/permissions denials` does (Claude-Code 2.1.193 denial reasons).
+  const denials = [];
   const usage = {
     input_tokens: 0,
     output_tokens: 0,
@@ -924,6 +963,26 @@ export async function runAgentHeadless(options = {}, deps = {}) {
           if (toolCalls.length > 0) {
             toolCalls[toolCalls.length - 1].is_error = Boolean(err);
           }
+          // Track policy denials (not plain tool failures) for the end-of-run
+          // summary. The preceding tool-executing pushed the args.
+          if (err) {
+            const last = toolCalls[toolCalls.length - 1];
+            const denial = classifyDenial({
+              tool: event.tool,
+              result: event.result,
+              error: event.error,
+              argsSummary:
+                last && last.tool === event.tool
+                  ? formatToolArgs(event.tool, last.args)
+                  : "",
+            });
+            if (denial) {
+              recordDenial(denials, {
+                ...denial,
+                at: deps.now ? deps.now() : Date.now(),
+              });
+            }
+          }
           break;
         }
         case "token-usage": {
@@ -1013,6 +1072,7 @@ export async function runAgentHeadless(options = {}, deps = {}) {
             usage,
             numTurns: budget.consumed,
             durationMs: (deps.now ? deps.now() : Date.now()) - startedAt,
+            denials,
           }),
         ) + "\n",
       );
@@ -1132,6 +1192,21 @@ export async function runAgentHeadless(options = {}, deps = {}) {
     }
   }
 
+  // End-of-run policy-denial summary so a non-interactive run surfaces what was
+  // blocked (mirrors the REPL's `/permissions denials`). Text → stderr lines;
+  // stream → a `denials_summary` event before the final result.
+  if (denials.length) {
+    if (isText) {
+      writeErr(
+        `\n  ${denials.length} tool call(s) were denied by policy this run:\n` +
+          formatDenials(denials, { now: deps.now ? deps.now() : Date.now() }) +
+          "\n",
+      );
+    } else if (isStream) {
+      emitStream({ type: "denials_summary", count: denials.length, denials });
+    }
+  }
+
   if (isStream) {
     emitStream({
       type: "result",
@@ -1155,6 +1230,7 @@ export async function runAgentHeadless(options = {}, deps = {}) {
           usage,
           numTurns: budget.consumed,
           durationMs,
+          denials,
         }),
       ) + "\n",
     );
@@ -1175,8 +1251,9 @@ function buildResultEnvelope({
   usage,
   numTurns,
   durationMs,
+  denials,
 }) {
-  return {
+  const env = {
     type: "result",
     subtype,
     is_error: isError,
@@ -1187,4 +1264,8 @@ function buildResultEnvelope({
     tool_calls: toolCalls,
     usage,
   };
+  // Only present when something was blocked — keeps the no-denial envelope
+  // byte-identical to before (Claude-Code 2.1.193 denial reasons, json mode).
+  if (Array.isArray(denials) && denials.length) env.denials = denials;
+  return env;
 }

package/src/runtime/headless-stream.js

@@ -318,9 +318,26 @@ export function sanitizeLlmHint(raw) {
 /**
  * Yield NDJSON lines from a byte/string stream (stdin). Splits on "\n" and
  * flushes any trailing partial line when the stream ends.
+ *
+ * A single line with no terminating "\n" must never accumulate without bound:
+ * a stuck / garbage producer (or a runaway multi-MB inline payload) that never
+ * emits a newline would otherwise grow `buf` unbounded and OOM this long-lived
+ * stream process. When a line exceeds the cap, a short head is yielded (so the
+ * caller surfaces it as an invalid-JSON error rather than dropping it silently)
+ * and the rest of that monster line is discarded until its newline — the stream
+ * resyncs cleanly to the next well-formed line. Cap precedence:
+ * `opts.maxLineLength` > `CC_MAX_INPUT_LINE_BYTES` env > 16 MB default.
  */
-export async function* readJsonLines(input) {
+export async function* readJsonLines(input, opts = {}) {
+  const envCap = Number(process.env.CC_MAX_INPUT_LINE_BYTES);
+  const maxLineLength =
+    Number.isFinite(opts.maxLineLength) && opts.maxLineLength > 0
+      ? opts.maxLineLength
+      : Number.isFinite(envCap) && envCap > 0
+        ? envCap
+        : 16 * 1024 * 1024;
   let buf = "";
+  let overflow = false; // discarding the tail of an over-long line until its \n
   // Reuse ONE streaming decoder across chunks so a multi-byte UTF-8 character
   // (e.g. a 3-byte Chinese char) split across two Buffer chunks is reassembled
   // rather than corrupted. process.stdin yields Buffers with no setEncoding, so
@@ -332,14 +349,34 @@ export async function* readJsonLines(input) {
       typeof chunk === "string"
         ? chunk
         : decoder.decode(chunk, { stream: true });
+    // Still skipping past an over-long line: drop everything up to (and
+    // including) the next newline, then resume normal line parsing. While no
+    // newline has arrived, keep `buf` empty so we don't re-grow it.
+    if (overflow) {
+      const nl = buf.indexOf("\n");
+      if (nl < 0) {
+        buf = "";
+        continue;
+      }
+      buf = buf.slice(nl + 1);
+      overflow = false;
+    }
     let idx;
     while ((idx = buf.indexOf("\n")) >= 0) {
       yield buf.slice(0, idx);
       buf = buf.slice(idx + 1);
     }
+    // No newline in the remaining buffer and it has blown past the cap — this is
+    // a pathological unterminated line. Yield a short head (an invalid-JSON
+    // error for the caller) and discard the rest until the next newline.
+    if (buf.length > maxLineLength) {
+      yield buf.slice(0, 200);
+      buf = "";
+      overflow = true;
+    }
   }
   buf += decoder.decode(); // flush any bytes held from a final partial char
-  if (buf.trim()) yield buf;
+  if (!overflow && buf.trim()) yield buf;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -497,17 +534,45 @@ export async function runAgentHeadlessStream(options = {}, deps = {}) {
   let settingsHooks = options.settingsHooks || null;
   if (!settingsHooks) {
     try {
-      const { loadHooks } = await import("../lib/settings-hooks.cjs");
+      const { loadHooks, projectHookTrustNotice } =
+        await import("../lib/settings-hooks.cjs");
       const loaded = loadHooks({ cwd, settingsFile: options.settingsFile });
       settingsHooks =
         loaded.hooks && Object.keys(loaded.hooks).length > 0
           ? loaded.hooks
           : null;
+      // First-run trust notice for an untrusted/cloned repo's shell-running
+      // hooks (Claude-Code 2.1.195 parity). stderr keeps the NDJSON stdout clean.
+      try {
+        const notice = projectHookTrustNotice({
+          cwd,
+          settingsFile: options.settingsFile,
+        });
+        if (notice) process.stderr.write(notice + "\n");
+      } catch {
+        /* trust notice is best-effort */
+      }
     } catch {
       settingsHooks = null; // fail-open
     }
   }
 
+  // autoMode.classifyAllShell (Claude-Code 2.1.193): classify the built-in
+  // verification allowlist through the shell-policy instead of fast-pathing it.
+  let classifyAllShell = options.classifyAllShell || false;
+  if (!classifyAllShell) {
+    try {
+      const { readBooleanSetting } = await import("../lib/settings-loader.cjs");
+      classifyAllShell =
+        readBooleanSetting("autoMode.classifyAllShell", {
+          cwd,
+          settingsFile: options.settingsFile,
+        }) === true;
+    } catch {
+      classifyAllShell = false; // fail-open
+    }
+  }
+
   const input = deps.input || process.stdin;
   const runLoop = deps.agentLoop || coreAgentLoop;
   const doBootstrap = deps.bootstrap || bootstrap;
@@ -914,6 +979,7 @@ export async function runAgentHeadlessStream(options = {}, deps = {}) {
     approvalGate,
     permissionRules,
     settingsHooks,
+    classifyAllShell,
     enabledToolNames,
     disabledTools,
     // --interactive-approvals: settings/hook `ask` (and, with an IDE bridge,

package/src/runtime/mcp-config.js

@@ -65,6 +65,22 @@ export function mcpToolName(server, tool) {
   return `mcp__${server}__${tool}`;
 }
 
+/**
+ * Case-insensitive "does this header map already carry `name`?". HTTP header
+ * names are case-insensitive, so a caller-supplied `AUTHORIZATION` must count
+ * the same as `Authorization` — otherwise the OAuth-injection guard below would
+ * not see it and would add a SECOND, conflicting auth header, leaking our
+ * stored token where the user explicitly pinned their own credential.
+ */
+export function hasHeaderInsensitive(headers, name) {
+  if (!headers || typeof headers !== "object") return false;
+  const want = String(name).toLowerCase();
+  for (const k of Object.keys(headers)) {
+    if (k.toLowerCase() === want) return true;
+  }
+  return false;
+}
+
 /**
  * When an MCP connect fails with an authentication error (HTTP 401/403, or an
  * explicit Unauthorized/Forbidden) on a URL-based server, return an actionable
@@ -143,7 +159,7 @@ export async function setupMcpFromConfig(servers, deps = {}) {
     // unless the config already supplies an Authorization header. Best-effort:
     // no token / a refresh failure just connects unauthenticated.
     let connectCfg = cfg;
-    if (cfg.url && !cfg.headers?.Authorization && !cfg.headers?.authorization) {
+    if (cfg.url && !hasHeaderInsensitive(cfg.headers, "Authorization")) {
       try {
         const { ensureValidToken } = await import("../lib/mcp-oauth.js");
         const token = await ensureValidToken(cfg.url);
@@ -152,6 +168,31 @@ export async function setupMcpFromConfig(servers, deps = {}) {
             ...cfg,
             headers: { ...cfg.headers, Authorization: `Bearer ${token}` },
           };
+          // Auto-recover from a mid-session 401/403 (server-side token rotation
+          // / revocation while the locally-stored copy still looks unexpired):
+          // register a reconnector that force-refreshes the bearer, so the
+          // mcp-client's callTool retry path reconnects and re-runs the call
+          // once with a fresh token (Claude-Code 2.1.193: "MCP auth re-runs and
+          // reconnects automatically on 401/403"). Best-effort, and skipped for
+          // a server whose config carries its own Authorization header (handled
+          // by the guard above) — an explicit IDE-bridge reconnector registered
+          // after setup still wins on any name clash.
+          if (typeof mcpClient.setReconnector === "function") {
+            const baseCfg = cfg;
+            mcpClient.setReconnector(name, async () => {
+              const { ensureValidToken: reauth } =
+                await import("../lib/mcp-oauth.js");
+              const fresh = await reauth(baseCfg.url, { forceRefresh: true });
+              if (!fresh) return null;
+              return {
+                ...baseCfg,
+                headers: {
+                  ...baseCfg.headers,
+                  Authorization: `Bearer ${fresh}`,
+                },
+              };
+            });
+          }
         }
       } catch {
         // OAuth wiring is best-effort

package/src/runtime/message-roles.js

@@ -64,6 +64,17 @@ function joinContent(a, b) {
  */
 const MERGEABLE_ROLES = new Set(["user", "assistant"]);
 
+/**
+ * Does this message carry tool calls? An assistant turn with `tool_calls` is a
+ * STRUCTURED turn whose calls must stay paired with their `tool` results —
+ * folding it loses one side's tool_calls (orphaning results / unanswered calls)
+ * and the strict-API 400s. Such turns are never merged (left to alternate; the
+ * tool-pair fix lives in sanitizeToolPairs, not here).
+ */
+function hasToolCalls(msg) {
+  return Array.isArray(msg && msg.tool_calls) && msg.tool_calls.length > 0;
+}
+
 /**
  * Merge consecutive same-role messages so the conversation alternates roles for
  * the provider. Only `user`/`assistant` turns fold; `tool` and `system` turns
@@ -85,7 +96,9 @@ export function mergeConsecutiveMessages(messages) {
       msg &&
       typeof msg.role === "string" &&
       MERGEABLE_ROLES.has(msg.role) &&
-      prev.role === msg.role
+      prev.role === msg.role &&
+      !hasToolCalls(prev) && // never fold a structured tool-call turn — merging
+      !hasToolCalls(msg) //     drops one side's tool_calls and breaks pairing
     ) {
       out[out.length - 1] = {
         ...prev,

package/src/assets/web-panel/assets/ChatBubbleRenderer-Pg7dIsiE.js

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-import{I as v,P as u,J as y,U as a,R as n,S,K as C,Q as x,V as w,_ as B,b as s}from"./vendor-BvqAck49.js";import{_ as k}from"./index-BWgNn9As.js";import"./icons-DP3uiYxy.js";const T={__name:"ChatBubbleRenderer",props:{event:{type:Object,required:!0}},setup(c,{expose:d}){d();const t=c,r=s(()=>{const e=t.event.content||{};return e.text||e.body||e.message||e.title||JSON.stringify(e).slice(0,200)}),i=s(()=>{const e=t.event.content||{};return e.from||e.sender||e.senderName||t.event.actor||"(unknown)"}),l=s(()=>{const e=(t.event.actor||"").toLowerCase();return e.includes("self")||e==="me"||e.endsWith("_self")}),o=s(()=>{const e=t.event.source.adapter||"";return e.startsWith("messaging-qq")?"magenta":e==="wechat"?"green":"blue"}),m=s(()=>{if(!t.event.occurredAt)return"";try{const e=new Date(t.event.occurredAt),p=e.getFullYear(),f=String(e.getMonth()+1).padStart(2,"0"),g=String(e.getDate()).padStart(2,"0"),b=String(e.getHours()).padStart(2,"0"),h=String(e.getMinutes()).padStart(2,"0");return`${p}-${f}-${g} ${b}:${h}`}catch{return""}}),_={props:t,messageText:r,actorLabel:i,isMine:l,adapterColor:o,formattedTime:m,computed:s};return Object.defineProperty(_,"__isScriptSetup",{enumerable:!1,value:!0}),_}},N={class:"bubble"},R={class:"meta"},M={class:"actor"},O={class:"time"},V={class:"body"};function q(c,d,t,r,i,l){const o=v("a-tag");return u(),y("div",{class:B(["chat-row",{mine:r.isMine}])},[a("div",N,[a("div",R,[a("span",M,n(r.actorLabel),1),a("span",O,n(r.formattedTime),1)]),a("div",V,n(r.messageText),1),t.event.source.adapter?(u(),S(o,{key:0,class:"src",color:r.adapterColor},{default:C(()=>[x(n(t.event.source.adapter),1)]),_:1},8,["color"])):w("v-if",!0)])],2)}const A=k(T,[["render",q],["__scopeId","data-v-49238629"],["__file","/tmp/cc-web-panel-aRyQTO/repo/packages/web-panel/src/components/pdh/renderers/ChatBubbleRenderer.vue"]]);export{A as default};

package/src/assets/web-panel/assets/TimelineRenderer-acXS5N5h.js

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-import{I as S,P as n,J as i,U as l,S as h,R as o,c,K as d,Q as u,V as g,b as a}from"./vendor-BvqAck49.js";import{_ as b}from"./index-BWgNn9As.js";import{aD as O,aH as D}from"./icons-DP3uiYxy.js";const C={__name:"TimelineRenderer",props:{event:{type:Object,required:!0}},setup(v,{expose:_}){_();const r=v,e=a(()=>r.event.content||{}),p=a(()=>{const t=r.event.source.adapter||"";return t.startsWith("travel-12306")||t.startsWith("travel-ctrip")}),m=a(()=>e.value.from&&e.value.to?`${e.value.from} → ${e.value.to}`:e.value.origin&&e.value.destination?`${e.value.origin} → ${e.value.destination}`:null),s=a(()=>r.event.place||e.value.placeName||e.value.poi),N=a(()=>e.value.trainNo),T=a(()=>e.value.flightNo),y=a(()=>e.value.title||e.value.text||e.value.description||"—"),k=a(()=>{const t=[];return e.value.departureTime&&t.push(`出发 ${e.value.departureTime}`),e.value.arrivalTime&&t.push(`到达 ${e.value.arrivalTime}`),e.value.duration&&t.push(`${e.value.duration}`),e.value.distance&&t.push(`${e.value.distance}`),t.length?t.join(" · "):null}),x=a(()=>{if(!r.event.occurredAt)return"";const t=new Date(r.event.occurredAt);return`${t.getFullYear()}-${String(t.getMonth()+1).padStart(2,"0")}-${String(t.getDate()).padStart(2,"0")} ${String(t.getHours()).padStart(2,"0")}:${String(t.getMinutes()).padStart(2,"0")}`}),f={props:r,c:e,isTravel:p,route:m,placeName:s,trainNo:N,flightNo:T,fallbackText:y,extraDetail:k,formattedTime:x,computed:a,get CarOutlined(){return D},get EnvironmentOutlined(){return O}};return Object.defineProperty(f,"__isScriptSetup",{enumerable:!1,value:!0}),f}},R={class:"timeline-event"},V={class:"dot"},w={class:"card"},B={class:"head"},E={class:"time"},j={class:"primary"},A={key:0},H={key:1},I={key:2},M={key:0,class:"trip-no"},P={key:1,class:"extra"};function Q(v,_,r,e,p,m){const s=S("a-tag");return n(),i("div",R,[l("div",V,[e.isTravel?(n(),h(e.CarOutlined,{key:0})):(n(),h(e.EnvironmentOutlined,{key:1}))]),l("div",w,[l("div",B,[l("span",E,o(e.formattedTime),1),c(s,{color:"cyan"},{default:d(()=>[u(o(r.event.source.adapter),1)]),_:1}),c(s,null,{default:d(()=>[u(o(r.event.subtype),1)]),_:1})]),l("div",j,[e.route?(n(),i("span",A,o(e.route),1)):e.placeName?(n(),i("span",H,"📍 "+o(e.placeName),1)):(n(),i("span",I,o(e.fallbackText),1))]),e.trainNo||e.flightNo?(n(),i("div",M,[c(s,{color:"blue"},{default:d(()=>[u(o(e.trainNo||e.flightNo),1)]),_:1})])):g("v-if",!0),e.extraDetail?(n(),i("div",P,o(e.extraDetail),1)):g("v-if",!0)])])}const J=b(C,[["render",Q],["__scopeId","data-v-18400280"],["__file","/tmp/cc-web-panel-aRyQTO/repo/packages/web-panel/src/components/pdh/renderers/TimelineRenderer.vue"]]);export{J as default};

package/src/assets/web-panel/assets/devWarning-D_lwLZ6O.js

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-import{R as r}from"./index-BWgNn9As.js";const o=((n,a,e)=>{r(n,`[ant-design-vue: ${a}] ${e}`)});export{o as d};

package/src/assets/web-panel/assets/index-CEwuCM44.js

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-import{C as o}from"./Col-BHonE9fU.js";import{a0 as t}from"./index-BWgNn9As.js";import"./vendor-BvqAck49.js";import"./index-BSpFe6j5.js";import"./icons-DP3uiYxy.js";const s=t(o);export{s as default};

package/src/assets/web-panel/assets/index-DzzgU4IU.js

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-import{A as o}from"./Row-1MEtrgtF.js";import{a0 as t}from"./index-BWgNn9As.js";import"./vendor-BvqAck49.js";import"./responsiveObserve-BQFRzFeZ.js";import"./useFlexGapSupport-Q7bDZ3EI.js";import"./styleChecker-B-Suj978.js";import"./index-BSpFe6j5.js";import"./icons-DP3uiYxy.js";const l=t(o);export{l as default};