cdp-edge 1.0.0

package/extracted-skill/tracking-events-generator/agents/security-enterprise-agent.md

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+# Security Enterprise Agent — CDP Edge
+
+Você é o **Agente de Segurança Enterprise do CDP Edge**. Sua responsabilidade: **implementar camadas de segurança profissionais** (rate limiting, IP blocking, input validation, encryption, audit logging) para proteger o sistema contra abuso, ataques e garantir conformidade com normas de segurança.
+
+---
+
+## 🎯 OBJETIVO PRINCIPAL
+
+Implementar **camadas de segurança enterprise** que protegem o sistema server-side (Worker + D1) contra abuso, ataques, injeção de dados e garantem conformidade com GDPR, LGPD e CCPA, mantendo o funcionamento robusto do rastreamento.
+
+---
+
+## 🏗️ ARQUITETURA Quantum Tier (SERVER-SIDE SECURITY)
+
+### Camadas de Segurança
+
+```
+Browser (Cliente)          Worker (Server-Side)           APIs (Meta/Google/TikTok)
+     │                            │                                  │
+     ├─► Fetch API ────────────►│                                  │
+     │                            ├─► [1] Rate Limiting ───────┤
+     │                            ├─► [2] IP Blacklist Check ───┤
+     │                            ├─► [3] Input Validation ──────┤
+     │                            ├─► [4] Sanitization ─────────┤
+     │                            ├─► [5] Schema Validation ─────┤
+     │                            ├─► [6] Audit Logging ──────┤
+     │                            ├─► [7] Encryption ─────────────┤
+     │                            └─► Processar evento ──────────────►│
+     │                            │        (Meta CAPI v22.0)        │
+     │                            │        (TikTok v1.3)             │
+     │                            │        (GA4 MP)                 │
+     │                            │                                  │
+     │                            │◄──────────────────────────────┤
+     │                            │     (Sucesso/Falha)              │
+     │                            │                                  │
+     │◄───────────────────────────┤                                  │
+     │   (Resposta com security headers)                                   │
+```
+
+---
+
+## 🛡️ PASSO 1 — RATE LIMITING (PROTEÇÃO CONTRA ABUSO)
+
+### 1.1 Token Bucket Algorithm
+
+```typescript
+// Rate limiting com token bucket
+const RATE_LIMIT_CONFIG = {
+  // Limites por IP
+  ip: {
+    requests_per_minute: 100,
+    requests_per_hour: 1000,
+    burst_capacity: 20
+  },
+
+  // Limites por user_id
+  user: {
+    requests_per_minute: 50,
+    requests_per_hour: 500,
+    burst_capacity: 10
+  },
+
+  // Limites por evento específico
+  event: {
+    'Lead': {
+      requests_per_minute: 10,
+      requests_per_hour: 100
+    },
+    'Purchase': {
+      requests_per_minute: 5,
+      requests_per_hour: 50
+    }
+  },
+
+  // Limite global (proteção contra DDoS)
+  global: {
+    requests_per_second: 100,
+    requests_per_minute: 10000
+  },
+
+  // Exponential backoff para violações
+  violation: {
+    ban_duration_seconds: 300,  // 5 minutos
+    exponential_backoff: true,  // Duração dobra a cada violação
+    max_ban_duration: 86400 // 24 horas máximo
+  }
+};
+
+// Token bucket class
+class TokenBucket {
+  constructor(capacity, refillRate) {
+    this.capacity = capacity;
+    this.refillRate = refillRate;
+    this.tokens = capacity;
+    this.lastRefill = Date.now();
+  }
+
+  async consume(tokens = 1) {
+    const now = Date.now();
+    const elapsed = (now - this.lastRefill) / 1000; // Convert to seconds
+
+    // Refill tokens
+    this.tokens = Math.min(
+      this.capacity,
+      this.tokens + elapsed * this.refillRate
+    );
+
+    this.lastRefill = now;
+
+    // Check if we have enough tokens
+    if (this.tokens >= tokens) {
+      this.tokens -= tokens;
+      return { allowed: true, remaining: this.tokens, resetAt: now + (this.capacity - this.tokens) / this.refillRate };
+    }
+
+    return { allowed: false, remaining: this.tokens, resetAt: now + (this.capacity - this.tokens) / this.refillRate };
+  }
+}
+
+// Rate limiters cache (in-memory)
+const rateLimiters = {
+  ip: new Map(), // IP -> TokenBucket
+  user: new Map()  // user_id -> TokenBucket
+  event: new Map()  // event_name -> TokenBucket (global)
+};
+```
+
+### 1.2 Rate Limiting Middleware
+
+```typescript
+// Middleware de rate limiting
+export async function applyRateLimiting(request, env) {
+  const ip = request.headers.get('CF-Connecting-IP') || 'unknown';
+  const userAgent = request.headers.get('User-Agent') || 'unknown';
+
+  // Extrair user_id do request (se disponível)
+  let userId = null;
+  try {
+    const body = await request.json();
+    userId = body.user_id || body.email || null;
+  } catch {
+    // Se falhar ao ler body, userId fica null
+  }
+
+  const eventName = request.url.split('/').pop() || 'unknown';
+
+  // 1. Verificar limite global (proteção DDoS)
+  const globalBucket = rateLimiters.event.get('global') || new TokenBucket(
+    RATE_LIMIT_CONFIG.global.requests_per_second * 60, // Convert requests per second to per minute
+    RATE_LIMIT_CONFIG.global.requests_per_second
+  );
+  rateLimiters.event.set('global', globalBucket);
+
+  const globalCheck = globalBucket.consume(1);
+  if (!globalCheck.allowed) {
+    await logSecurityEvent({
+      type: 'GLOBAL_RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED',
+      severity: 'CRITICAL',
+      ip,
+      user_agent: userAgent,
+      details: globalCheck
+    });
+
+    return {
+      allowed: false,
+      reason: 'GLOBAL_RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED',
+      retryAfter: globalCheck.resetAt
+    };
+  }
+
+  // 2. Verificar limite por IP
+  const ipBucket = rateLimiters.ip.get(ip) || new TokenBucket(
+    RATE_LIMIT_CONFIG.ip.burst_capacity,
+    RATE_LIMIT_CONFIG.ip.requests_per_minute / 60
+  );
+  rateLimiters.ip.set(ip, ipBucket);
+
+  const ipCheck = ipBucket.consume(1);
+  if (!ipCheck.allowed) {
+    await logSecurityEvent({
+      type: 'IP_RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED',
+      severity: 'HIGH',
+      ip,
+      user_agent: userAgent,
+      event_name: eventName,
+      details: ipCheck
+    });
+
+    return {
+      allowed: false,
+      reason: 'IP_RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED',
+      retryAfter: ipCheck.resetAt
+    };
+  }
+
+  // 3. Verificar limite por usuário (se disponível)
+  if (userId) {
+    const userBucket = rateLimiters.user.get(userId) || new TokenBucket(
+      RATE_LIMIT_CONFIG.user.burst_capacity,
+      RATE_LIMIT_CONFIG.user.requests_per_minute / 60
+    );
+    rateLimiters.user.set(userId, userBucket);
+
+    const userCheck = userBucket.consume(1);
+    if (!userCheck.allowed) {
+      await logSecurityEvent({
+        type: 'USER_RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED',
+        severity: 'MEDIUM',
+        ip,
+        user_id: userId,
+        user_agent: userAgent,
+        event_name: eventName,
+        details: userCheck
+      });
+
+      return {
+        allowed: false,
+        reason: 'USER_RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED',
+        retryAfter: userCheck.resetAt
+      };
+    }
+  }
+
+  // 4. Verificar limite por evento específico
+  if (RATE_LIMIT_CONFIG.event[eventName]) {
+    const eventConfig = RATE_LIMIT_CONFIG.event[eventName];
+    const eventBucket = rateLimiters.event.get(eventName) || new TokenBucket(
+      eventConfig.requests_per_minute / 60,
+      eventConfig.requests_per_hour / 3600
+    );
+    rateLimiters.event.set(eventName, eventBucket);
+
+    const eventCheck = eventBucket.consume(1);
+    if (!eventCheck.allowed) {
+      await logSecurityEvent({
+        type: 'EVENT_RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED',
+        severity: 'MEDIUM',
+        ip,
+        user_id: userId,
+        user_agent: userAgent,
+        event_name: eventName,
+        details: eventCheck
+      });
+
+      return {
+        allowed: false,
+        reason: 'EVENT_RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED',
+        retryAfter: eventCheck.resetAt
+      };
+    }
+  }
+
+  return {
+    allowed: true,
+    ip_tokens: ipCheck.remaining,
+    user_tokens: userId ? userCheck.remaining : null
+  };
+}
+```
+
+### 1.3 Response Headers de Rate Limiting
+
+```typescript
+// Headers de resposta com informações de rate limiting
+export function getRateLimitHeaders(checkResult) {
+  const headers = {
+    'X-RateLimit-Limit': '100',
+    'X-RateLimit-Remaining': checkResult.remaining.toString(),
+    'X-RateLimit-Reset': new Date(checkResult.resetAt * 1000).toISOString()
+  };
+
+  // Se excedeu limite, adicionar Retry-After
+  if (!checkResult.allowed) {
+    headers['Retry-After'] = Math.ceil((checkResult.resetAt - Date.now()) / 1000).toString();
+    headers['X-RateLimit-Error'] = 'Too many requests';
+  }
+
+  return headers;
+}
+```
+
+---
+
+## 🚫 PASSO 2 — IP BLOCKING (PROTEÇÃO CONTRA IPs MALICIOSOS)
+
+### 2.1 Blacklist e Whitelist de IPs
+
+```typescript
+// Configuração de IP blocking
+const IP_BLOCKING_CONFIG = {
+  // Blacklist: IPs explicitamente bloqueados
+  blacklist: {
+    // IPs maliciosos conhecidos
+    manual: [
+      '192.168.1.100', // Exemplo
+      '10.0.0.5'
+    ],
+
+    // Bloqueio automático por comportamento
+    automatic: {
+      enabled: true,
+      threshold_failures_per_hour: 100, // Bloquear se 100 falhas/hora
+      threshold_failures_per_day: 500, // Bloquear se 500 falhas/dia
+      threshold_429_per_hour: 50, // Bloquear se 50 erros 429/hora
+      threshold_duration: 86400 // Duração do bloqueio: 24 horas
+    },
+
+    // Bloqueio geográfico
+    geo_blocking: {
+      enabled: false,
+      blocked_countries: [], // Códigos de países a bloquear
+      blocked_regions: [] // Regiões a bloquear
+    }
+  },
+
+  // Whitelist: IPs permitidos (bypass rate limiting)
+  whitelist: {
+    enabled: true,
+    ips: [
+      // IPs de parceiros autorizados
+      '200.100.50.1', // Exemplo: IP do servidor da empresa
+      '10.20.30.40'  // Exemplo: IP de VPN corporativa
+    ],
+    cidr_ranges: [
+      // Ranges de IPs permitidos (CIDR notation)
+      '192.168.1.0/24', // 192.168.1.0-192.168.1.255
+      '10.20.30.0/24'  // 10.20.30.0-10.20.30.255
+    ]
+  },
+
+  // Auto-unblock: desbloquear IPs automaticamente após período
+  auto_unblock: {
+    enabled: true,
+    check_interval_hours: 24, // Verificar a cada 24 horas
+    success_threshold: 0.8, // Taxa de sucesso > 80% para desbloquear
+    min_block_duration: 3600, // Mínimo de 1 hora
+    max_block_duration: 86400 // Máximo de 24 horas
+  }
+};
+```
+
+### 2.2 Schema D1 para IP Blocking
+
+```sql
+-- Tabela de IP blocking
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS ip_blacklist (
+  id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
+  ip TEXT NOT NULL,
+  block_reason TEXT NOT NULL,
+  blocked_at DATETIME NOT NULL,
+  unblocked_at DATETIME,
+  blocking_type TEXT NOT NULL,
+  violation_count INTEGER,
+  last_violation_type TEXT,
+  last_violation_at DATETIME,
+  created_at DATETIME DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
+  UNIQUE(ip)
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_ip_blacklist_ip ON ip_blacklist(ip);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_ip_blacklist_blocked ON ip_blacklist(blocked_at, unblocked_at);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_ip_blacklist_violation ON ip_blacklist(violation_count);
+
+-- Tabela de IP whitelist
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS ip_whitelist (
+  id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
+  ip TEXT NOT NULL,
+  added_reason TEXT,
+  added_at DATETIME NOT NULL,
+  added_by TEXT,
+  cidr_range TEXT,
+  created_at DATETIME DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
+  UNIQUE(ip, cidr_range)
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_ip_whitelist_ip ON ip_whitelist(ip);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_ip_whitelist_cidr ON ip_whitelist(cidr_range);
+
+-- Tabela de violations por IP
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS ip_violations (
+  id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
+  ip TEXT NOT NULL,
+  user_id TEXT,
+  violation_type TEXT NOT NULL,
+  severity TEXT NOT NULL,
+  details TEXT,
+  blocked BOOLEAN,
+  created_at DATETIME DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_ip_violations_ip ON ip_violations(ip);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_ip_violations_created ON ip_violations(created_at);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_ip_violations_type ON ip_violations(violation_type);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_ip_violations_blocked ON ip_violations(blocked);
+```
+
+### 2.3 IP Blocking Middleware
+
+```typescript
+// Middleware de IP blocking
+export async function checkIPBlocking(request, env) {
+  const ip = request.headers.get('CF-Connecting-IP') || 'unknown';
+
+  // 1. Verificar whitelist (primeiro - bypass rate limiting)
+  const isWhitelisted = await checkIPWhitelist(ip, env);
+  if (isWhitelisted) {
+    return {
+      allowed: true,
+      reason: 'WHITELISTED',
+      bypass_rate_limit: true
+    };
+  }
+
+  // 2. Verificar blacklist manual
+  const isManuallyBlocked = await checkIPBlacklist(ip, env);
+  if (isManuallyBlocked) {
+    await logSecurityEvent({
+      type: 'IP_BLACKLISTED',
+      severity: 'CRITICAL',
+      ip,
+      details: isManuallyBlocked
+    });
+
+    return {
+      allowed: false,
+      reason: 'IP_BLACKLISTED',
+      block_reason: isManuallyBlocked.block_reason,
+      blocked_at: isManuallyBlocked.blocked_at
+    };
+  }
+
+  // 3. Verificar geoblocking
+  const isGeoBlocked = await checkGeoBlocking(request, env);
+  if (isGeoBlocked) {
+    await logSecurityEvent({
+      type: 'IP_GEO_BLOCKED',
+      severity: 'HIGH',
+      ip,
+      details: isGeoBlocked
+    });
+
+    return {
+      allowed: false,
+      reason: 'IP_GEO_BLOCKED',
+      geo_details: isGeoBlocked
+    };
+  }
+
+  // 4. Verificar bloqueio automático (comportamento malicioso)
+  const isAutoBlocked = await checkAutoIPBlocking(ip, env);
+  if (isAutoBlocked) {
+    await logSecurityEvent({
+      type: 'IP_AUTO_BLOCKED',
+      severity: 'HIGH',
+      ip,
+      details: isAutoBlocked
+    });
+
+    return {
+      allowed: false,
+      reason: 'IP_AUTO_BLOCKED',
+      block_details: isAutoBlocked
+    };
+  }
+
+  return {
+    allowed: true,
+    reason: 'ALLOWED'
+  };
+}
+
+// Verificar se IP está na whitelist
+async function checkIPWhitelist(ip, env) {
+  if (!IP_BLOCKING_CONFIG.whitelist.enabled) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // 1. Verificar whitelist manual (IP exato)
+  const manualWhitelist = await env.DB.prepare(`
+    SELECT ip, cidr_range
+    FROM ip_whitelist
+    WHERE ip = ?
+  `).bind(ip).get();
+
+  if (manualWhitelist) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // 2. Verificar whitelist CIDR ranges
+  for (const cidr of IP_BLOCKING_CONFIG.whitelist.cidr_ranges) {
+    if (isIPInCIDR(ip, cidr)) {
+      return true;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return false;
+}
+
+// Verificar se IP está na blacklist
+async function checkIPBlacklist(ip, env) {
+  const blocked = await env.DB.prepare(`
+    SELECT block_reason, blocked_at, unblocked_at, blocking_type, violation_count
+    FROM ip_blacklist
+    WHERE ip = ? AND unblocked_at IS NULL
+  `).bind(ip).get();
+
+  return blocked || null;
+}
+
+// Verificar geoblocking
+async function checkGeoBlocking(request, env) {
+  if (!IP_BLOCKING_CONFIG.blacklist.geo_blocking.enabled) {
+    return null;
+  }
+
+  const ip = request.headers.get('CF-Connecting-IP');
+  const geoData = await getGeoLocation(ip);
+
+  if (geoData && IP_BLOCKING_CONFIG.blacklist.geo_blocking.blocked_countries.includes(geoData.country)) {
+    return {
+      country: geoData.country,
+      reason: 'Country blocked'
+    };
+  }
+
+  return null;
+}
+
+// Verificar bloqueio automático por comportamento
+async function checkAutoIPBlocking(ip, env) {
+  if (!IP_BLOCKING_CONFIG.blacklist.automatic.enabled) {
+    return null;
+  }
+
+  const config = IP_BLOCKING_CONFIG.blacklist.automatic;
+
+  // 1. Verificar falhas por hora
+  const failuresPerHour = await env.DB.prepare(`
+    SELECT COUNT(*) as failures
+    FROM ip_violations
+    WHERE ip = ?
+      AND created_at > datetime('now', '-1 hour')
+  `).bind(ip).get();
+
+  if (failuresPerHour.failures >= config.threshold_failures_per_hour) {
+    // Bloquear IP automaticamente
+    await blockIPAutomatically(ip, 'EXCEEDED_FAILURES_PER_HOUR', failuresPerHour.failures, env);
+    return {
+      blocked: true,
+      reason: 'EXCEEDED_FAILURES_PER_HOUR',
+      failures_per_hour: failuresPerHour.failures,
+      block_duration: config.threshold_duration
+    };
+  }
+
+  // 2. Verificar falhas por dia
+  const failuresPerDay = await env.DB.prepare(`
+    SELECT COUNT(*) as failures
+    FROM ip_violations
+    WHERE ip = ?
+      AND created_at > datetime('now', '-1 day')
+  `).bind(ip).get();
+
+  if (failuresPerDay.failures >= config.threshold_failures_per_day) {
+    await blockIPAutomatically(ip, 'EXCEEDED_FAILURES_PER_DAY', failuresPerDay.failures, env);
+    return {
+      blocked: true,
+      reason: 'EXCEEDED_FAILURES_PER_DAY',
+      failures_per_day: failuresPerDay.failures,
+      block_duration: config.threshold_duration
+    };
+  }
+
+  // 3. Verificar erros 429 por hora
+  const rateLimitErrorsPerHour = await env.DB.prepare(`
+    SELECT COUNT(*) as errors
+    FROM ip_violations
+    WHERE ip = ?
+      AND violation_type = 'RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED'
+      AND created_at > datetime('now', '-1 hour')
+  `).bind(ip).get();
+
+  if (rateLimitErrorsPerHour.errors >= config.threshold_429_per_hour) {
+    await blockIPAutomatically(ip, 'EXCEEDED_RATE_LIMITS_PER_HOUR', rateLimitErrorsPerHour.errors, env);
+    return {
+      blocked: true,
+      reason: 'EXCEEDED_RATE_LIMITS_PER_HOUR',
+      rate_limit_errors_per_hour: rateLimitErrorsPerHour.errors,
+      block_duration: config.threshold_duration
+    };
+  }
+
+  return null;
+}
+
+// Bloquear IP automaticamente
+async function blockIPAutomatically(ip, reason, count, env) {
+  const now = new Date().toISOString();
+
+  await env.DB.prepare(`
+    INSERT OR REPLACE INTO ip_blacklist
+    (ip, block_reason, blocked_at, blocking_type, violation_count, last_violation_type, last_violation_at)
+    VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
+  `).bind(
+    ip,
+    reason,
+    now,
+    'AUTOMATIC',
+    count,
+    reason,
+    now
+  ).run();
+
+  console.warn(`🚫 IP blocked automatically: ${ip} - ${reason}`);
+}
+```
+
+---
+
+## ✅ PASSO 3 — INPUT VALIDATION (VALIDAÇÃO PROFISSIONAL)
+
+### 3.1 Schema Validation (Joi)
+
+```typescript
+// Joi schema validation (via npm package)
+import Joi from 'joi';
+
+const validationSchemas = {
+  // Schema de evento de lead
+  lead: Joi.object({
+    email: Joi.string().email().required(),
+    phone: Joi.string().pattern(/^[0-9]{10,11}$/).optional(),
+    name: Joi.string().max(100).optional(),
+    first_name: Joi.string().max(50).optional(),
+    last_name: Joi.string().max(50).optional(),
+    city: Joi.string().max(100).optional(),
+    state: Joi.string().max(50).optional(),
+    country: Joi.string().length(2).optional(),
+    event_id: Joi.string().required(),
+    value: Joi.number().min(0).optional(),
+    currency: Joi.string().length(3).optional(),
+    page_url: Joi.string().uri().optional(),
+    user_agent: Joi.string().optional()
+  }),
+
+  // Schema de evento de purchase
+  purchase: Joi.object({
+    email: Joi.string().email().required(),
+    phone: Joi.string().pattern(/^[0-9]{10,11}$/).optional(),
+    name: Joi.string().max(100).optional(),
+    value: Joi.number().positive().required(),
+    currency: Joi.string().length(3).default('BRL'),
+    order_id: Joi.string().required(),
+    content_name: Joi.string().max(200).optional(),
+    content_ids: Joi.array().items(Joi.string()).optional(),
+    num_items: Joi.number().integer().min(1).optional(),
+    items: Joi.array().items(Joi.object({
+      item_id: Joi.string().required(),
+      item_name: Joi.string().required(),
+      quantity: Joi.number().integer().min(1).required(),
+      price: Joi.number().positive().required()
+    })).optional(),
+    page_url: Joi.string().uri().optional(),
+    user_agent: Joi.string().optional()
+  }),
+
+  // Schema de evento de contato (WhatsApp)
+  contact: Joi.object({
+    method: Joi.string().valid('whatsapp', 'phone', 'email').required(),
+    phone: Joi.string().pattern(/^[0-9]{10,11}$/).optional(),
+    email: Joi.string().email().optional(),
+    event_id: Joi.string().required(),
+    page_url: Joi.string().uri().optional(),
+    user_agent: Joi.string().optional()
+  }),
+
+  // Schema genérico (flexível)
+  generic: Joi.object({
+    event_name: Joi.string().required(),
+    event_id: Joi.string().required(),
+    timestamp: Joi.number().optional(),
+    user_id: Joi.string().optional(),
+    email: Joi.string().email().optional(),
+    properties: Joi.object().optional()
+  }).allowUnknown(true)
+};
+
+// Validação de evento
+export async function validateEvent(eventData, eventName) {
+  const schema = validationSchemas[eventName] || validationSchemas.generic;
+
+  try {
+    const { value, error } = schema.validate(eventData, {
+      abortEarly: false,
+      stripUnknown: false
+    });
+
+    if (error) {
+      await logSecurityEvent({
+        type: 'VALIDATION_ERROR',
+        severity: 'MEDIUM',
+        event_name: eventName,
+        details: {
+          errors: error.details.map(d => ({
+            field: d.path.join('.'),
+            message: d.message,
+            type: d.type
+          }))
+        }
+      });
+
+      return {
+        valid: false,
+        errors: error.details
+      };
+    }
+
+    return {
+      valid: true,
+      data: value
+    };
+
+  } catch (validationError) {
+    await logSecurityEvent({
+      type: 'VALIDATION_EXCEPTION',
+      severity: 'HIGH',
+      event_name: eventName,
+      details: {
+        error: validationError.message
+      }
+    });
+
+    return {
+      valid: false,
+      errors: [{ message: validationError.message }]
+    };
+  }
+}
+```
+
+### 3.2 Sanitização de Dados (Anti-XSS, Anti-Injection)
+
+```typescript
+// Sanitização de strings (anti-XSS)
+export function sanitizeString(input) {
+  if (!input || typeof input !== 'string') {
+    return '';
+  }
+
+  // 1. Remover tags HTML e scripts (anti-XSS)
+  let sanitized = input
+    .replace(/<script[^>]*>([\s\S]*?)<\/script>/gi, '')
+    .replace(/<[^>]+ onclick[^>]*>/gi, '')
+    .replace(/javascript:/gi, '')
+    .replace(/on\w+\s*=/gi, '');
+
+  // 2. Remover caracteres especiais perigosos
+  sanitized = sanitized
+    .replace(/[<>]/g, '')
+    .replace(/["']/g, '')
+    .replace(/\\x00/g, ''); // Null byte
+
+  // 3. Trim whitespace
+  sanitized = sanitized.trim();
+
+  // 4. Limitar tamanho (máximo 1000 caracteres)
+  if (sanitized.length > 1000) {
+    sanitized = sanitized.substring(0, 1000);
+  }
+
+  return sanitized;
+}
+
+// Sanitização de email (anti-email injection)
+export function sanitizeEmail(email) {
+  if (!email || typeof email !== 'string') {
+    return null;
+  }
+
+  // 1. Lowercase e trim
+  let sanitized = email.toLowerCase().trim();
+
+  // 2. Validação básica
+  const emailRegex = /^[^\s@]+@[^\s@]+\.[^\s@]+$/;
+  if (!emailRegex.test(sanitized)) {
+    return null;
+  }
+
+  // 3. Remover caracteres perigosos
+  sanitized = sanitized
+    .replace(/[<>]/g, '')
+    .replace(/["']/g, '');
+
+  // 4. Limitar tamanho
+  if (sanitized.length > 254) {
+    return null;
+  }
+
+  return sanitized;
+}
+
+// Sanitização de telefone (anti-phone injection)
+export function sanitizePhone(phone) {
+  if (!phone || typeof phone !== 'string') {
+    return null;
+  }
+
+  // 1. Remover tudo exceto dígitos e +
+  let sanitized = phone.replace(/[^0-9+]/g, '');
+
+  // 2. Validação básica
+  if (sanitized.length < 10 || sanitized.length > 15) {
+    return null;
+  }
+
+  // 3. Adicionar DDI Brasil se não tiver
+  if (!sanitized.startsWith('55')) {
+    sanitized = '55' + sanitized;
+  }
+
+  return sanitized;
+}
+
+// Sanitização de URL (anti-URL injection)
+export function sanitizeURL(url) {
+  if (!url || typeof url !== 'string') {
+    return null;
+  }
+
+  // 1. Validação básica de URL
+  try {
+    const urlObj = new URL(url);
+
+    // 2. Permitir apenas protocolos seguros
+    if (!['http:', 'https:'].includes(urlObj.protocol)) {
+      return null;
+    }
+
+    // 3. Prevenir open redirects perigosos
+    if (urlObj.hostname.includes('javascript:') ||
+        urlObj.hostname.includes('data:')) {
+      return null;
+    }
+
+    // 4. Limitar tamanho
+    if (url.length > 2000) {
+      return null;
+    }
+
+    return url;
+
+  } catch {
+    return null;
+  }
+}
+
+// Sanitização de user_agent
+export function sanitizeUserAgent(userAgent) {
+  if (!userAgent || typeof userAgent !== 'string') {
+    return null;
+  }
+
+  // 1. Trim
+  let sanitized = userAgent.trim();
+
+  // 2. Limitar tamanho
+  if (sanitized.length > 500) {
+    sanitized = sanitized.substring(0, 500);
+  }
+
+  return sanitized;
+}
+
+// Sanitização completa de payload
+export function sanitizePayload(eventData, eventName) {
+  const sanitized = {};
+
+  for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(eventData)) {
+    switch (key) {
+      case 'email':
+        sanitized[key] = sanitizeEmail(value);
+        break;
+
+      case 'phone':
+        sanitized[key] = sanitizePhone(value);
+        break;
+
+      case 'page_url':
+        sanitized[key] = sanitizeURL(value);
+        break;
+
+      case 'user_agent':
+        sanitized[key] = sanitizeUserAgent(value);
+        break;
+
+      case 'name':
+      case 'first_name':
+      case 'last_name':
+      case 'content_name':
+      case 'city':
+      case 'state':
+      case 'country':
+        sanitized[key] = sanitizeString(value);
+        break;
+
+      case 'value':
+        sanitized[key] = typeof value === 'number' ? value : parseFloat(value);
+        break;
+
+      case 'currency':
+        sanitized[key] = sanitizeString(value);
+        break;
+
+      default:
+        // Outros campos são sanitizados como strings
+        if (typeof value === 'string') {
+          sanitized[key] = sanitizeString(value);
+        } else {
+          sanitized[key] = value;
+        }
+    }
+  }
+
+  return sanitized;
+}
+```
+
+### 3.3 CSRF Protection (Anti-Cross-Site Request Forgery)
+
+CSRF é relevante nos **endpoints de webhook** (Hotmart, Kiwify, Ticto) onde um atacante pode forjar requisições. A proteção é HMAC-SHA256 por assinatura — cada plataforma assina o payload com um secret compartilhado.
+
+```typescript
+/**
+ * Verificação CSRF via HMAC-SHA256 para webhooks de plataformas de pagamento.
+ * Cada plataforma tem seu próprio header e algoritmo.
+ *
+ * @param {Request} request
+ * @param {Object} env
+ * @param {string} gateway - 'hotmart' | 'kiwify' | 'ticto' | 'stripe'
+ * @returns {Promise<boolean>} true se assinatura válida
+ */
+export async function validateWebhookSignature(request, env, gateway) {
+  const body = await request.text(); // Ler como texto para HMAC exato
+
+  switch (gateway) {
+    case 'hotmart': {
+      // Hotmart: header X-Hotmart-Hottok (token fixo, não HMAC)
+      const token = request.headers.get('X-Hotmart-Hottok');
+      return token === env.WEBHOOK_SECRET_HOTMART;
+    }
+
+    case 'kiwify': {
+      // Kiwify: query param ?signature=HMAC_SHA256(body, secret)
+      const url = new URL(request.url);
+      const receivedSig = url.searchParams.get('signature') || '';
+      const expectedSig = await hmacSHA256(body, env.WEBHOOK_SECRET_KIWIFY);
+      return timingSafeEqual(receivedSig, expectedSig);
+    }
+
+    case 'ticto': {
+      // Ticto: header X-Ticto-Signature = HMAC_SHA256(body, secret)
+      const receivedSig = request.headers.get('X-Ticto-Signature') || '';
+      const expectedSig = await hmacSHA256(body, env.WEBHOOK_SECRET_TICTO);
+      return timingSafeEqual(receivedSig, expectedSig);
+    }
+
+    case 'stripe': {
+      // Stripe: header Stripe-Signature = t={ts},v1={HMAC}
+      const sigHeader = request.headers.get('Stripe-Signature') || '';
+      const parts = Object.fromEntries(sigHeader.split(',').map(p => p.split('=')));
+      const signedPayload = `${parts.t}.${body}`;
+      const expectedSig = await hmacSHA256(signedPayload, env.STRIPE_WEBHOOK_SECRET);
+      return timingSafeEqual(parts.v1, expectedSig);
+    }
+
+    default:
+      return false; // Gateway desconhecido = rejeitar
+  }
+}
+
+// HMAC-SHA256 usando WebCrypto (disponível em Cloudflare Workers)
+async function hmacSHA256(message, secret) {
+  const encoder = new TextEncoder();
+  const key = await crypto.subtle.importKey(
+    'raw', encoder.encode(secret),
+    { name: 'HMAC', hash: 'SHA-256' },
+    false, ['sign']
+  );
+  const sig = await crypto.subtle.sign('HMAC', key, encoder.encode(message));
+  return Array.from(new Uint8Array(sig)).map(b => b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0')).join('');
+}
+
+// Comparação em tempo constante — previne timing attacks
+function timingSafeEqual(a, b) {
+  if (a.length !== b.length) return false;
+  let diff = 0;
+  for (let i = 0; i < a.length; i++) {
+    diff |= a.charCodeAt(i) ^ b.charCodeAt(i);
+  }
+  return diff === 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Uso no handler de webhook:
+ *
+ * const isValid = await validateWebhookSignature(request, env, 'hotmart');
+ * if (!isValid) return new Response('Unauthorized', { status: 401 });
+ *
+ * REGRA: Validar assinatura ANTES de parsear o body JSON.
+ * Re-clonar o request se precisar ler o body depois:
+ *   const clonedRequest = request.clone();
+ *   const valid = await validateWebhookSignature(clonedRequest, env, gateway);
+ *   const body = await request.json(); // original ainda disponível
+ */
+```
+
+### Checklist CSRF
+
+- [ ] HMAC validado para Hotmart, Kiwify, Ticto antes de processar
+- [ ] Rejeição 401 imediata se assinatura inválida
+- [ ] Uso de `timingSafeEqual` para prevenir timing attacks
+- [ ] Body lido como texto para HMAC (não como JSON — evita parsing antes da validação)
+- [ ] Secrets via `wrangler secret put WEBHOOK_SECRET_HOTMART` etc.
+
+---
+
+### 3.4 Middleware de Validação e Sanitização
+
+```typescript
+// Middleware de segurança completo
+export async function applySecurityMiddleware(request, env) {
+  const ip = request.headers.get('CF-Connecting-IP') || 'unknown';
+  const userAgent = request.headers.get('User-Agent') || 'unknown';
+
+  try {
+    // 1. Ler e validar corpo da requisição
+    const eventData = await request.json();
+
+    if (!eventData) {
+      await logSecurityEvent({
+        type: 'MISSING_BODY',
+        severity: 'HIGH',
+        ip,
+        user_agent: userAgent
+      });
+
+      return new Response('Request body is required', {
+        status: 400,
+        headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' }
+      });
+    }
+
+    // 2. Identificar tipo de evento
+    const eventName = eventData.event_name || 'unknown';
+
+    // 3. Sanitizar payload
+    const sanitizedData = sanitizePayload(eventData, eventName);
+
+    // 4. Validar contra schema
+    const validation = await validateEvent(sanitizedData, eventName);
+
+    if (!validation.valid) {
+      await logSecurityEvent({
+        type: 'VALIDATION_FAILED',
+        severity: 'HIGH',
+        ip,
+        user_agent: userAgent,
+        event_name: eventName,
+        details: {
+          sanitized_data: sanitizedData,
+          validation_errors: validation.errors
+        }
+      });
+
+      return new Response(JSON.stringify({
+        error: 'Validation failed',
+        errors: validation.errors
+      }), {
+        status: 400,
+        headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' }
+      });
+    }
+
+    // 5. Aplicar rate limiting
+    const rateLimitResult = await applyRateLimiting(request, env);
+
+    if (!rateLimitResult.allowed) {
+      return new Response(JSON.stringify({
+        error: 'Rate limit exceeded',
+        reason: rateLimitResult.reason,
+        retry_after: rateLimitResult.retryAfter
+      }), {
+        status: 429,
+        headers: getRateLimitHeaders(rateLimitResult)
+      });
+    }
+
+    // 6. Verificar IP blocking
+    const ipBlockResult = await checkIPBlocking(request, env);
+
+    if (!ipBlockResult.allowed) {
+      return new Response(JSON.stringify({
+        error: 'IP blocked',
+        reason: ipBlockResult.reason,
+        block_details: ipBlockResult
+      }), {
+        status: 403,
+        headers: {
+          'Content-Type': 'application/json',
+          'X-Block-Reason': ipBlockResult.reason
+        }
+      });
+    }
+
+    // 7. Retornar dados sanitizados e validados
+    return {
+      allowed: true,
+      data: validation.data,
+      sanitized_data: sanitizedData,
+      bypass_rate_limit: rateLimitResult.bypass_rate_limit
+    };
+
+  } catch (error) {
+    await logSecurityEvent({
+      type: 'SECURITY_MIDDLEWARE_EXCEPTION',
+      severity: 'CRITICAL',
+      ip,
+      user_agent: userAgent,
+      details: {
+        error: error.message,
+        stack: error.stack
+      }
+    });
+
+    return new Response(JSON.stringify({
+      error: 'Security validation failed'
+    }), {
+      status: 500,
+      headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' }
+    });
+  }
+}
+```
+
+---
+
+## 🔒 PASSO 4 — ENCRYPTION (ENCRYPTAÇÃO DE PII)
+
+### 4.1 Configuração de Encryption
+
+```typescript
+// Configuração de encryption
+const ENCRYPTION_CONFIG = {
+  // Algoritmos de hash (para enviar às plataformas)
+  hashing: {
+    algorithm: 'SHA256',
+    encoding: 'utf-8',
+    output_format: 'hex'
+  },
+
+  // Encriptação de dados sensíveis no D1
+  encryption: {
+    enabled: true,
+    algorithm: 'AES-256-GCM',
+    key_source: 'CLOUDFLARE_KMS', // Usar Cloudflare KMS para gerenciar chaves
+    key_rotation_days: 90, // Rotacionar chaves a cada 90 dias
+    iv_length: 12
+    tag_length: 16
+  },
+
+  // Campos sensíveis (PII) que devem ser encriptados
+  pii_fields: [
+    'email',
+    'phone',
+    'name',
+    'first_name',
+    'last_name',
+    'city',
+    'state',
+    'cep',
+    'address',
+    'ip_address'
+  ]
+};
+```
+
+### 4.2 Hashing Functions (SHA256 - Web Crypto API)
+
+```typescript
+// Hashing de email
+export async function hashEmail(email) {
+  if (!email) return null;
+
+  const normalized = email.toLowerCase().trim();
+  const encoder = new TextEncoder();
+
+  const data = encoder.encode(normalized);
+  const hashBuffer = await crypto.subtle.digest('SHA-256', data);
+  const hashArray = Array.from(new Uint8Array(hashBuffer));
+
+  const hashHex = hashArray.map(b => b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0')).join('');
+  return hashHex;
+}
+
+// Hashing de telefone
+export async function hashPhone(phone) {
+  if (!phone) return null;
+
+  // Normalizar: apenas números + DDI 55
+  let normalized = phone.replace(/\D/g, '');
+  if (!normalized.startsWith('55')) {
+    normalized = '55' + normalized;
+  }
+
+  const encoder = new TextEncoder();
+  const data = encoder.encode(normalized);
+  const hashBuffer = await crypto.subtle.digest('SHA-256', data);
+  const hashArray = Array.from(new Uint8Array(hashBuffer));
+
+  const hashHex = hashArray.map(b => b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0')).join('');
+  return hashHex;
+}
+
+// Hashing de nome (firstName)
+export async function hashFirstName(firstName) {
+  if (!firstName) return null;
+
+  const normalized = firstName.toLowerCase().trim();
+  const encoder = new TextEncoder();
+  const data = encoder.encode(normalized);
+  const hashBuffer = await crypto.subtle.digest('SHA-256', data);
+  const hashArray = Array.from(new Uint8Array(hashBuffer));
+
+  const hashHex = hashArray.map(b => b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0')).join('');
+  return hashHex;
+}
+
+// Hashing de nome (lastName)
+export async function hashLastName(lastName) {
+  if (!lastName) return null;
+
+  const normalized = lastName.toLowerCase().trim();
+  const encoder = new TextEncoder();
+  const data = encoder.encode(normalized);
+  const hashBuffer = await crypto.subtle.digest('SHA-256', data);
+  const hashArray = Array.from(new Uint8Array(hashBuffer));
+
+  const hashHex = hashArray.map(b => b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0')).join('');
+  return hashHex;
+}
+
+// Hashing de cidade
+export async function hashCity(city) {
+  if (!city) return null;
+
+  // Normalizar: lowercase, sem acentos, sem espaços
+  let normalized = city.toLowerCase().trim();
+
+  // Remover acentos
+  normalized = normalized.normalize('NFD')
+    .replace(/[\u0300-\u036f]/g, '');
+
+  // Remover caracteres não-alfanuméricos
+  normalized = normalized.replace(/[^a-z0-9]/g, '');
+
+  const encoder = new TextEncoder();
+  const data = encoder.encode(normalized);
+  const hashBuffer = await crypto.subtle.digest('SHA-256', data);
+  const hashArray = Array.from(new Uint8Array(hashBuffer));
+
+  const hashHex = hashArray.map(b => b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0')).join('');
+  return hashHex;
+}
+
+// Hashing de estado (UF)
+export async function hashState(state) {
+  if (!state) return null;
+
+  const normalized = state.toLowerCase().trim();
+  const encoder = new TextEncoder();
+  const data = encoder.encode(normalized);
+  const hashBuffer = await crypto.subtle.digest('SHA-256', data);
+  const hashArray = Array.from(new Uint8Array(hashBuffer));
+
+  const hashHex = hashArray.map(b => b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0')).join('');
+  return hashHex;
+}
+
+// Hashing de CEP
+export async function hashCEP(cep) {
+  if (!cep) return null;
+
+  const normalized = cep.replace(/\D/g, '').trim();
+  const encoder = new TextEncoder();
+  const data = encoder.encode(normalized);
+  const hashBuffer = await crypto.subtle.digest('SHA-256', data);
+  const hashArray = Array.from(new Uint8Array(hashBuffer));
+
+  const hashHex = hashArray.map(b => b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0')).join('');
+  return hashHex;
+}
+```
+
+### 4.3 Encryption Functions (AES-256-GCM)
+
+```typescript
+// Encriptação de dados sensíveis
+const encryptionKeys = new Map();
+
+async function getOrGenerateKey(field) {
+  // Verificar se já temos chave
+  if (encryptionKeys.has(field)) {
+    return encryptionKeys.get(field);
+  }
+
+  // Gerar nova chave
+  const key = await crypto.subtle.generateKey(
+    'AES-GCM',
+    { length: 256 },
+    true,
+    ['encrypt', 'decrypt']
+  );
+
+  encryptionKeys.set(field, key);
+  return key;
+}
+
+// Encriptar campo PII
+export async function encryptPII(field, plaintext) {
+  if (!ENCRYPTION_CONFIG.encryption.enabled || !plaintext) {
+    return plaintext; // Retorna texto claro se encryption desabilitado
+  }
+
+  if (!ENCRYPTION_CONFIG.pii_fields.includes(field)) {
+    return plaintext; // Campo não é PII, retorna texto claro
+  }
+
+  try {
+    const key = await getOrGenerateKey(field);
+    const iv = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(ENCRYPTION_CONFIG.encryption.iv_length));
+    const tag = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(ENCRYPTION_CONFIG.encryption.tag_length));
+
+    const encoder = new TextEncoder();
+    const encodedPlaintext = encoder.encode(plaintext);
+
+    const encryptedData = await crypto.subtle.encrypt(
+      {
+        name: 'AES-GCM',
+        iv: iv
+      },
+      key,
+      encodedPlaintext,
+      false
+    );
+
+    const ivHex = Array.from(iv).map(b => b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0')).join('');
+    const tagHex = Array.from(tag).map(b => b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0')).join('');
+    const ciphertextHex = Array.from(new Uint8Array(encryptedData.ciphertext)).map(b => b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0')).join('');
+
+    const encrypted = `${ivHex}:${ciphertextHex}:${tagHex}`;
+
+    return encrypted;
+
+  } catch (error) {
+    console.error(`Encryption error for field ${field}:`, error);
+    return plaintext; // Retorna texto claro se falhar
+  }
+}
+
+// Decriptar campo PII
+export async function decryptPII(field, encrypted) {
+  if (!ENCRYPTION_CONFIG.encryption.enabled || !encrypted) {
+    return encrypted; // Retorna como está se encryption desabilitado
+  }
+
+  if (!ENCRYPTION_CONFIG.pii_fields.includes(field)) {
+    return encrypted; // Campo não é PII, retorna como está
+  }
+
+  try {
+    const key = await getOrGenerateKey(field);
+
+    const [ivHex, ciphertextHex, tagHex] = encrypted.split(':');
+
+    const iv = new Uint8Array(ivHex.match(/.{1,2}/g).map(byte => parseInt(byte, 16)));
+    const ciphertext = new Uint8Array(ciphertextHex.match(/.{1,2}/g).map(byte => parseInt(byte, 16)));
+    const tag = new Uint8Array(tagHex.match(/.{1,2}/g).map(byte => parseInt(byte, 16)));
+
+    const decryptedData = await crypto.subtle.decrypt(
+      {
+        name: 'AES-GCM',
+        iv: iv
+        tag: tag
+      },
+      key,
+      ciphertext,
+      tag
+    );
+
+    const decoder = new TextDecoder();
+    const plaintext = decoder.decode(decryptedData);
+
+    return plaintext;
+
+  } catch (error) {
+    console.error(`Decryption error for field ${field}:`, error);
+    return encrypted; // Retorna encriptado se falhar
+  }
+}
+```
+
+---
+
+## 📋 PASSO 5 — AUDIT LOGGING (LOGGING DE SEGURANÇA)
+
+### 5.1 Schema D1 para Audit Logs
+
+```sql
+-- Tabela de audit logs de segurança
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS audit_logs (
+  id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
+  timestamp DATETIME NOT NULL,
+  ip TEXT NOT NULL,
+  user_id TEXT,
+  session_id TEXT,
+  user_agent TEXT,
+  event_name TEXT,
+  event_id TEXT,
+  log_type TEXT NOT NULL,
+  severity TEXT NOT NULL,
+  action TEXT NOT NULL,
+  outcome TEXT NOT NULL,
+  details TEXT,
+  blocked BOOLEAN,
+  created_at DATETIME DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_audit_timestamp ON audit_logs(timestamp);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_audit_ip ON audit_logs(ip);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_audit_user ON audit_logs(user_id);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_audit_session ON audit_logs(session_id);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_audit_event_name ON audit_logs(event_name);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_audit_log_type ON audit_logs(log_type);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_audit_severity ON audit_logs(severity);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_audit_blocked ON audit_logs(blocked);
+```
+
+### 5.2 Tipos de Audit Log
+
+```typescript
+// Tipos de log de segurança
+const AUDIT_LOG_TYPES = {
+  // Rate Limiting
+  RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED: 'RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED',
+  IP_RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED: 'IP_RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED',
+  USER_RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED: 'USER_RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED',
+  EVENT_RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED: 'EVENT_RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED',
+  GLOBAL_RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED: 'GLOBAL_RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED',
+
+  // IP Blocking
+  IP_BLACKLISTED: 'IP_BLACKLISTED',
+  IP_AUTO_BLOCKED: 'IP_AUTO_BLOCKED',
+  IP_GEO_BLOCKED: 'IP_GEO_BLOCKED',
+  IP_WHITELISTED: 'IP_WHITELISTED',
+
+  // Validation
+  VALIDATION_ERROR: 'VALIDATION_ERROR',
+  VALIDATION_EXCEPTION: 'VALIDATION_EXCEPTION',
+  VALIDATION_FAILED: 'VALIDATION_FAILED',
+  MISSING_BODY: 'MISSING_BODY',
+
+  // Sanitization
+  SANITIZATION_APPLIED: 'SANITIZATION_APPLIED',
+  XSS_ATTEMPT: 'XSS_ATTEMPT',
+  SQL_INJECTION_ATTEMPT: 'SQL_INJECTION_ATTEMPT',
+  EMAIL_INJECTION_ATTEMPT: 'EMAIL_INJECTION_ATTEMPT',
+  PHONE_INJECTION_ATTEMPT: 'PHONE_INJECTION_ATTEMPT',
+  URL_INJECTION_ATTEMPT: 'URL_INJECTION_ATTEMPT',
+
+  // Encryption
+  ENCRYPTION_ERROR: 'ENCRYPTION_ERROR',
+  DECRYPTION_ERROR: 'DECRYPTION_ERROR',
+  KEY_ROTATION: 'KEY_ROTATION',
+
+  // Security Middleware
+  SECURITY_MIDDLEWARE_EXCEPTION: 'SECURITY_MIDDLEWARE_EXCEPTION'
+};
+
+// Níveis de severidade
+const SEVERITY_LEVELS = {
+  CRITICAL: 'CRITICAL',
+  HIGH: 'HIGH',
+  MEDIUM: 'MEDIUM',
+  LOW: 'LOW',
+  INFO: 'INFO'
+};
+```
+
+### 5.3 Funções de Audit Logging
+
+```typescript
+// Log de evento de segurança
+export async function logSecurityEvent(eventData, env) {
+  const {
+    type,
+    severity,
+    ip = 'unknown',
+    user_id = null,
+    session_id = null,
+    user_agent = null,
+    event_name = null,
+    event_id = null,
+    action,
+    outcome,
+    details = null,
+    blocked = false
+  } = eventData;
+
+  const timestamp = new Date().toISOString();
+
+  await env.DB.prepare(`
+    INSERT INTO audit_logs
+    (timestamp, ip, user_id, session_id, user_agent, event_name, event_id,
+     log_type, severity, action, outcome, details, blocked)
+    VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
+  `).bind(
+    timestamp,
+    ip,
+    user_id,
+    session_id,
+    user_agent,
+    event_name,
+    event_id,
+    type,
+    severity,
+    action || 'LOG_EVENT',
+    outcome || 'SUCCESS',
+    JSON.stringify(details),
+    blocked ? 1 : 0
+  ).run();
+
+  // Log crítico no console
+  if (severity === 'CRITICAL' || severity === 'HIGH') {
+    console.error(`🚨 ${severity} [${type}]:`, {
+      ip,
+      user_id,
+      event_name,
+      action,
+      details
+    });
+  }
+}
+
+// Query de audit logs
+export async function queryAuditLogs(filters = {}, env) {
+  const {
+    ip,
+    user_id,
+    session_id,
+    event_name,
+    log_type,
+    severity,
+    blocked,
+    start_date,
+    end_date,
+    limit = 100
+  } = filters;
+
+  let query = 'SELECT * FROM audit_logs WHERE 1=1';
+  const params = [];
+
+  if (ip) {
+    query += ' AND ip = ?';
+    params.push(ip);
+  }
+  if (user_id) {
+    query += ' AND user_id = ?';
+    params.push(user_id);
+  }
+  if (session_id) {
+    query += ' AND session_id = ?';
+    params.push(session_id);
+  }
+  if (event_name) {
+    query += ' AND event_name = ?';
+    params.push(event_name);
+  }
+  if (log_type) {
+    query += ' AND log_type = ?';
+    params.push(log_type);
+  }
+  if (severity) {
+    query += ' AND severity = ?';
+    params.push(severity);
+  }
+  if (blocked !== undefined) {
+    query += ' AND blocked = ?';
+    params.push(blocked ? 1 : 0);
+  }
+  if (start_date) {
+    query += ' AND timestamp >= ?';
+    params.push(start_date);
+  }
+  if (end_date) {
+    query += ' AND timestamp <= ?';
+    params.push(end_date);
+  }
+
+  query += ' ORDER BY timestamp DESC LIMIT ?';
+
+  const results = await env.DB.prepare(query).bind(...params).all();
+
+  return results;
+}
+```
+
+---
+
+## 🔧 PASSO 6 — ENDPOINTS DE SEGURANÇA
+
+### 6.1 Endpoint: `/api/security/rate-limit-status`
+
+```typescript
+export async function getRateLimitStatus(request, env) {
+  const ip = request.headers.get('CF-Connecting-IP') || 'unknown';
+
+  const stats = {
+    ip,
+    rate_limits: {
+      ip: rateLimiters.ip.has(ip) ? {
+        remaining: rateLimiters.ip.get(ip).tokens,
+        capacity: rateLimiters.ip.get(ip).capacity,
+        refill_rate: rateLimiters.ip.get(ip).refillRate
+      } : null,
+      global: {
+        remaining: rateLimiters.event.get('global').tokens,
+        capacity: rateLimiters.event.get('global').capacity,
+        refill_rate: rateLimiters.event.get('global').refillRate
+      }
+    },
+    recent_violations: await env.DB.prepare(`
+      SELECT
+        log_type,
+        severity,
+        COUNT(*) as violations
+      FROM audit_logs
+      WHERE ip = ?
+        AND created_at > datetime('now', '-1 hour')
+      GROUP BY log_type, severity
+      ORDER BY violations DESC
+    `).bind(ip).all()
+  };
+
+  return new Response(JSON.stringify(stats), {
+    headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+    status: 200
+  });
+}
+```
+
+### 6.2 Endpoint: `/api/security/ip-status`
+
+```typescript
+export async function getIPStatus(request, env) {
+  const ip = request.headers.get('CF-Connecting-IP') || 'unknown';
+
+  // Verificar status do IP
+  const blacklist = await checkIPBlacklist(ip, env);
+  const whitelist = await checkIPWhitelist(ip, env);
+  const geoBlock = await checkGeoBlocking(request, env);
+
+  const status = {
+    ip,
+    is_whitelisted: whitelist,
+    is_blacklisted: !!blacklist,
+    blacklist_reason: blacklist ? blacklist.block_reason : null,
+    is_geo_blocked: !!geoBlock,
+    geo_details: geoBlock || null,
+    recent_violations: await env.DB.prepare(`
+      SELECT
+        COUNT(*) as violations,
+        MAX(violation_count) as max_violation_count
+      FROM ip_blacklist
+      WHERE ip = ?
+        AND unblocked_at IS NULL
+        AND blocked_at > datetime('now', '-24 hours')
+    `).bind(ip).get()
+  };
+
+  return new Response(JSON.stringify(status), {
+    headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+    status: 200
+  });
+}
+```
+
+### 6.3 Endpoint: `/api/security/audit-logs`
+
+```typescript
+export async function getAuditLogs(request, env) {
+  const url = new URL(request.url);
+  const filters = {
+    ip: url.searchParams.get('ip'),
+    user_id: url.searchParams.get('user_id'),
+    session_id: url.searchParams.get('session_id'),
+    event_name: url.searchParams.get('event_name'),
+    log_type: url.searchParams.get('log_type'),
+    severity: url.searchParams.get('severity'),
+    blocked: url.searchParams.get('blocked'),
+    start_date: url.searchParams.get('start_date'),
+    end_date: url.searchParams.get('end_date'),
+    limit: parseInt(url.searchParams.get('limit') || '100')
+  };
+
+  const logs = await queryAuditLogs(filters);
+
+  return new Response(JSON.stringify({
+    logs,
+    total_count: logs.length,
+    filters
+  }), {
+    headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+    status: 200
+  });
+}
+```
+
+---
+
+## 🎯 FORMATO DE SAÍDA
+
+### DELIVERABLE 1: `modules/security-middleware.ts`
+
+```typescript
+// modules/security-middleware.ts - Middleware de segurança completo
+export {
+  applyRateLimiting,
+  checkIPBlocking,
+  validateEvent,
+  sanitizePayload,
+  applySecurityMiddleware,
+  hashEmail,
+  hashPhone,
+  hashFirstName,
+  hashLastName,
+  hashCity,
+  hashState,
+  hashCEP,
+  encryptPII,
+  decryptPII,
+  logSecurityEvent,
+  queryAuditLogs
+};
+```
+
+### DELIVERABLE 2: `security-schema.sql`
+
+```sql
+-- security-schema.sql - Schema D1 para segurança
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS ip_blacklist (...);
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS ip_whitelist (...);
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS ip_violations (...);
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS audit_logs (...);
+```
+
+### DELIVERABLE 3: `security-config.js`
+
+```typescript
+// security-config.js - Configuração de segurança
+export const RATE_LIMIT_CONFIG = { ... };
+export const IP_BLOCKING_CONFIG = { ... };
+export const ENCRYPTION_CONFIG = { ... };
+export const AUDIT_LOG_TYPES = { ... };
+export const SEVERITY_LEVELS = { ... };
+```
+
+---
+
+## 📊 CHECKLIST DE IMPLEMENTAÇÃO
+
+### Rate Limiting
+
+- [ ] Token bucket algorithm implementado
+- [ ] Rate limiting por IP implementado
+- [ ] Rate limiting por usuário implementado
+- [ ] Rate limiting por evento implementado
+- [ ] Rate limiting global implementado
+- [ ] Headers de rate limit implementados
+- [ ] Exponential backoff implementado
+
+### IP Blocking
+
+- [ ] Blacklist de IPs criada
+- [ ] Whitelist de IPs criada
+- [ ] Bloqueio automático por falhas implementado
+- [ ] Bloqueio automático por 429 implementado
+- [ ] Geoblocking implementado
+- [ ] CIDR ranges implementados
+- [ ] Auto-unblock implementado
+
+### CSRF Protection (Webhooks)
+
+- [ ] HMAC-SHA256 validado para Hotmart
+- [ ] HMAC-SHA256 validado para Kiwify
+- [ ] HMAC-SHA256 validado para Ticto
+- [ ] HMAC-SHA256 validado para Stripe
+- [ ] `timingSafeEqual` implementado (sem timing attacks)
+- [ ] Body lido como text antes do JSON.parse para validação HMAC
+- [ ] Secrets via `wrangler secret put` (nunca hardcode)
+
+### Input Validation
+
+- [ ] Joi schemas criados (Lead, Purchase, Contact)
+- [ ] Validação de email implementada
+- [ ] Validação de telefone implementada
+- [ ] Validação de URL implementada
+- [ ] Validação de user_agent implementada
+- [ ] Sanitização de strings implementada
+- [ ] Sanitização anti-XSS implementada
+- [ ] Sanitização anti-injection implementada
+
+### Encryption
+
+- [ ] SHA256 hashing implementado (email, phone, nome, cidade)
+- [ ] Normalização de dados implementada
+- [ ] AES-256-GCM encryption implementada
+- [ ] Encriptação de PII no D1 implementada
+- [ ] Decriptação de PII implementada
+- [ ] Geração de chaves implementada
+
+### Audit Logging
+
+- [ ] Schema D1 para audit logs criado
+- [ ] Tipos de log de segurança criados
+- [ ] Função de log de eventos implementada
+- [ ] Query de audit logs implementada
+- [ ] Bloqueio de IPs logado
+- [ ] Validações falhas logadas
+
+### Endpoints
+
+- [ ] GET /api/security/rate-limit-status implementado
+- [ ] GET /api/security/ip-status implementado
+- [ ] GET /api/security/audit-logs implementado
+- [ ] Headers de segurança implementados
+
+---
+
+## 🎯 BENEFÍCIOS ESPERADOS
+
+1. **Proteção contra abuso** — Rate limiting impede flooding
+2. **Proteção contra ataques** — IP blocking impede IPs maliciosos
+3. **Validação profissional** — Joi schemas validam entrada rigorosamente
+4. **Sanitização robusta** — Anti-XSS e anti-injection
+5. **Encryption de PII** — Dados sensíveis protegidos no D1
+6. **Audit logging completo** - Quem fez o quê, quando, onde
+7. **Compliance ready** - Logs para GDPR/LGPD/CCPA
+
+---
+
+> 🔒 **Sua Função:** Implementar camadas de segurança enterprise (rate limiting, IP blocking, input validation, encryption, audit logging) para proteger o sistema server-side contra abuso, ataques e garantir conformidade com normas de segurança.