cctally 1.65.0 → 1.66.0

package/bin/_cctally_dashboard_conversation.py

@@ -0,0 +1,771 @@
+"""Dashboard conversation-viewer handlers (#279 S5 F4 — line-budget seam).
+
+Consumer-only sibling of ``bin/_cctally_dashboard.py`` — it re-imports every
+name below, so ``bin/cctally``'s re-exports and the conversation pytest
+files (``tests/test_conversation_endpoints.py``,
+``tests/test_conversation_query.py``) keep resolving unchanged (spec §6).
+
+What lives here (spec §6):
+- the conversation constants/helpers ``_CONV_SEARCH_KINDS`` /
+  ``_CONV_FIND_KINDS`` / ``_BadConversationFilter`` / ``_cached_file_sigs``
+  (the ``/api/debug/backend`` helpers + ``_DEBUG_CACHE_TABLES`` +
+  ``_handle_get_debug_backend`` are debug-coupled and STAY in the dashboard,
+  gate P3-2);
+- the query plumbing (``_conversation_query_impl`` / ``_parse_search_kind_impl``
+  / ``_run_conversation_query_impl`` / ``_parse_conversation_filters_impl``);
+- the eleven ``_handle_get_conversation*_impl(handler, …)`` handlers
+  (including ``_handle_get_conversation_events_impl``, the live-tail SSE
+  watch loop, with its ``_lib_conversation_watch`` usage). The dashboard
+  keeps thin bound delegators on ``DashboardHTTPHandler``; the privacy gates
+  (``_require_transcripts_allowed`` / ``_transcript_gate`` / …) STAY on the
+  class and are reached via the ``handler`` parameter (spec §6).
+
+Late-binding (spec §6): the two bare ``open_cache_db`` calls (in
+``_run_conversation_query_impl`` + the events handler) reach
+``sys.modules["_cctally_dashboard"].open_cache_db(...)`` — patched on the
+dashboard module object at ``tests/test_conversation_endpoints.py:674``.
+
+Cross-module reaches (spec §2.1 "fully-qualify cross-module refs"): the
+cctally-forwarding shims the moved code called by bare name
+(``_resolve_display_tz_obj`` / ``_apply_display_tz_override`` / ``load_config``)
+are inlined to their ``sys.modules["cctally"].X`` call-time reach — behavior
++ ns["X"] patch surface preserved (none is dashboard-object-patched;
+audited). The generic query-string helpers ``_qs_str`` / ``_qs_int`` stay in
+the dashboard (used across every handler); they have 24 call sites here, so
+they are reached via module-local forwarders (below) rather than 24 inline
+edits — the forwarders hit ``sys.modules["_cctally_dashboard"]`` at call time
+(no cycle: the dashboard is fully loaded before any handler runs).
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import socket
+import sqlite3
+import sys
+
+from _cctally_cache import sync_cache
+
+# Live-tail watch-loop tuning — used ONLY by _handle_get_conversation_events_impl
+# below, so moved here with the events handler (spec §4.1 / §6).
+_LIVE_TAIL_POLL_INTERVAL = 1.0      # seconds between stat polls of the open file(s)
+_LIVE_TAIL_DEBOUNCE = 0.25          # settle window after first detected growth
+_LIVE_TAIL_KEEPALIVE = 15.0         # idle keep-alive cadence (proxy guard)
+_LIVE_TAIL_FILE_RESET_EVERY = 10    # re-resolve the session file set every N cycles
+
+
+# Module-local forwarders for the two generic query-string helpers that STAY
+# in the dashboard (24 call sites in the moved handlers; the dashboard is fully
+# loaded before any handler runs, so the call-time reach is cycle-free).
+def _qs_str(*args, **kwargs):
+    return sys.modules["_cctally_dashboard"]._qs_str(*args, **kwargs)
+
+
+def _qs_int(*args, **kwargs):
+    return sys.modules["_cctally_dashboard"]._qs_int(*args, **kwargs)
+
+
+# #177 S6 / #217 S2: valid kind facets for the conversation routes. Kept in
+# lockstep with the kernel (``_lib_conversation_query._SEARCH_KINDS`` /
+# ``_FIND_KINDS``; the kernel re-raises ValueError on an unknown kind, and the
+# handlers reject with a 400 BEFORE the call — ``_run_conversation_query``
+# collapses every kernel exception to a 500, so a per-route 4xx must be decided
+# in the handler, not via try/except around the kernel).
+#
+# P1-1 (load-bearing kind-validation SPLIT): the cross-session search route
+# accepts ``title`` and ``files``; the in-conversation ``/find`` route does NOT —
+# its kernel (``find_in_conversation``) indexes ``_FIND_KIND_COLUMNS[kind]``,
+# which has no ``title``/``files`` entry, so accepting them there would be a 500
+# KeyError. Two distinct tuples keep ``/find?kind=title`` and ``/find?kind=files``
+# a clean 400.
+_CONV_SEARCH_KINDS = (
+    "all", "prompts", "assistant", "tools", "thinking", "title", "files")
+_CONV_FIND_KINDS = ("all", "prompts", "assistant", "tools", "thinking")
+
+
+class _BadConversationFilter(Exception):
+    """Internal sentinel: a browse-filter query param failed validation. The
+    parse helper has ALREADY sent the 400 response when this is raised, so the
+    caller just unwinds and returns (the conversation routes all 400 on bad
+    input, consistent with the search ``kind`` facet). Module-private."""
+
+
+def _cached_file_sigs(conn, paths):
+    """{path: size_bytes} from session_files for the given paths — the cache's
+    own view of how far each file is ingested. Size-only by design, matching the
+    watch kernel's size-only signature (`file_sig`) and sync_cache's size-only
+    delta signal: mtime is NOT consulted, because a size-unchanged ingest does
+    not refresh session_files.mtime_ns and a stale mtime would re-detect
+    'changed' every cycle forever. Used to baseline the live-tail watch so a file
+    the cache hasn't caught up on reads as 'changed' on cycle 1 (spec §2.4).
+    Paths with no row are simply absent → treated as changed."""
+    out = {}
+    if not paths:
+        return out
+    placeholders = ",".join("?" for _ in paths)
+    try:
+        rows = conn.execute(
+            f"SELECT path, size_bytes FROM session_files "
+            f"WHERE path IN ({placeholders})", list(paths)).fetchall()
+    except sqlite3.OperationalError:
+        return out
+    for p, size in rows:
+        out[p] = size
+    return out
+
+
+def _conversation_query_impl():
+    """Lazy-load the pure conversation query kernel (Plan 2, §3)."""
+    return sys.modules["cctally"]._load_sibling("_lib_conversation_query")
+
+def _parse_search_kind_impl(handler, q, valid=_CONV_SEARCH_KINDS):
+    """Read + validate the ``kind`` facet for a conversation route (#177 S6 /
+    #217 S2). Returns the kind on success, or ``None`` after having ALREADY
+    sent a 400 — callers just ``return`` on ``None``.
+
+    ``valid`` is the per-route kind set (P1-1 split): the cross-session search
+    route passes ``_CONV_SEARCH_KINDS`` (includes ``title``), the
+    in-conversation ``/find`` route passes ``_CONV_FIND_KINDS`` (excludes
+    ``title``/``files``), so ``/find?kind=title`` is a 400 here — never a 500
+    KeyError downstream in ``find_in_conversation``. Kept in lockstep with the
+    kernel's ``_SEARCH_KINDS`` / ``_FIND_KINDS`` (the kernel module is
+    resolved lazily per-request, so the handler keeps literal tuples rather
+    than reaching across that import edge for a nit)."""
+    kind = _qs_str(q, "kind", "all")
+    if kind not in valid:
+        handler._respond_json(400, {"error": f"unknown kind: {kind}"})
+        return None
+    return kind
+
+def _run_conversation_query_impl(handler, kernel_call, log_label):
+    """Open cache.db, run ``kernel_call(conn)``, close — with the uniform
+    500 envelopes the three conversation routes share (#151).
+
+    Collapses the triplicated open-cache → try/except/finally → 500
+    scaffold to one site. Returns ``(ok, body)``: ``ok=False`` means a 500
+    has ALREADY been sent and the caller must just ``return``; ``ok=True``
+    carries the kernel result (which may itself be ``None`` — the reader's
+    404 sentinel — so the explicit flag, not ``body is None``, signals
+    failure). An ``open_cache_db`` failure is a ``cache unavailable:`` 500;
+    a kernel exception is logged as ``<log_label> failed: %r`` and returned
+    as a ``{type}: {msg}`` 500 — byte-identical to the inlined handlers.
+    """
+    try:
+        conn = sys.modules["_cctally_dashboard"].open_cache_db()  # late-binding: patched at test_conversation_endpoints.py:674
+    except (sqlite3.DatabaseError, OSError) as exc:
+        handler._respond_json(500, {"error": f"cache unavailable: {exc}"})
+        return False, None
+    try:
+        body = kernel_call(conn)
+    except Exception as exc:  # noqa: BLE001
+        handler.log_error("%s failed: %r", log_label, exc)
+        handler._respond_json(500, {"error": f"{type(exc).__name__}: {exc}"})
+        return False, None
+    finally:
+        conn.close()
+    return True, body
+
+def _parse_conversation_filters_impl(handler, q):
+    """Parse the browse-list filter params (spec §2) from a ``parse_qs``
+    mapping. On any malformed value this sends a **400** and returns
+    ``None`` — the caller just ``return``s (the conversation routes all 400
+    on bad input). On success returns a dict of ``list_conversations``
+    kwargs: ``date_from``/``date_to`` (UTC-ISO bounds), ``projects``
+    (list[str] | None), ``cost_min``/``cost_max`` (float | None),
+    ``rebuild_min`` (int | None), ``models`` (list[str] | None — the #278
+    Theme C model-family axis). Empty/blank params drop to ``None``.
+
+    Numeric axes validate strictly (a non-numeric cost / non-integer
+    rebuild threshold is a hard 400). Date bounds route through the pure
+    ``_lib_dashboard_dates.parse_filter_date_range`` helper, which resolves
+    naive date-only bounds in ``display.tz`` and raises ``ValueError`` (→
+    400) on a malformed date. Projects AND models accept BOTH repeated
+    ``?projects=a&projects=b`` and a single comma-joined ``?projects=a,b``.
+    """
+    def _float(name):
+        v = _qs_str(q, name, "")
+        if v is None or v == "":
+            return None
+        try:
+            return float(v)
+        except ValueError:
+            handler._respond_json(400, {"error": f"bad {name}: {v}"})
+            raise _BadConversationFilter
+
+    def _int(name):
+        v = _qs_str(q, name, "")
+        if v is None or v == "":
+            return None
+        try:
+            return int(v)
+        except ValueError:
+            handler._respond_json(400, {"error": f"bad {name}: {v}"})
+            raise _BadConversationFilter
+
+    try:
+        cost_min = _float("cost_min")
+        cost_max = _float("cost_max")
+        rebuild_min = _int("rebuild_min")
+    except _BadConversationFilter:
+        return None  # 400 already sent
+
+    projects = [p for p in q.get("projects", []) if p] or None
+    # Single comma-joined value -> split (the client may send either form).
+    if projects and len(projects) == 1 and "," in projects[0]:
+        projects = [s for s in projects[0].split(",") if s] or None
+
+    # #278 Theme C: the model-family axis, mirroring projects. Accepts both
+    # repeated ?models=opus&models=sonnet and a single comma-joined
+    # ?models=opus,sonnet; blank/empty -> None. No numeric validation (enum-ish
+    # strings); an unknown/typo'd family is a PRESENT axis that resolves to
+    # zero ids in _model_clause -> zero results, never a silent unrestrict.
+    models = [m for m in q.get("models", []) if m] or None
+    if models and len(models) == 1 and "," in models[0]:
+        models = [s for s in models[0].split(",") if s] or None
+
+    date_from = _qs_str(q, "date_from", "") or None
+    date_to = _qs_str(q, "date_to", "") or None
+    if date_from or date_to:
+        from importlib import import_module
+        tz = sys.modules["cctally"]._resolve_display_tz_obj(
+            sys.modules["cctally"]._apply_display_tz_override(
+                sys.modules["cctally"].load_config(), type(handler).display_tz_pref_override
+            )
+        ).key
+        try:
+            df, dtt = import_module(
+                "_lib_dashboard_dates"
+            ).parse_filter_date_range(date_from, date_to, tz_name=tz)
+        except ValueError as exc:
+            handler._respond_json(400, {"error": str(exc)})
+            return None
+    else:
+        df = dtt = None
+
+    return {
+        "date_from": df,
+        "date_to": dtt,
+        "projects": projects,
+        "cost_min": cost_min,
+        "cost_max": cost_max,
+        "rebuild_min": rebuild_min,
+        "models": models,
+    }
+
+def _handle_get_conversations_impl(handler) -> None:
+    """``GET /api/conversations`` — the browse rail (spec §3.1).
+
+    Gated first (loopback / Host allowlist). ``sort``/``limit``/``offset``
+    are read from the query string; the kernel clamps bounds. The browse
+    filters (date/project/cost/rebuild — spec §2) are parsed/validated here
+    (malformed → 400) and threaded into the kernel. Cache-open failures are
+    500s, never 5xx-with-stacktrace.
+    """
+    if not handler._require_transcripts_allowed():
+        return
+    import urllib.parse as _u
+    q = _u.parse_qs(handler.path.partition("?")[2])
+    sort = _qs_str(q, "sort", "recent")
+    limit = _qs_int(q, "limit", 50)
+    offset = _qs_int(q, "offset", 0)
+    filters = handler._parse_conversation_filters(q)
+    if filters is None:
+        return  # a 400 has already been sent
+    ok, body = handler._run_conversation_query(
+        lambda conn: handler._conversation_query().list_conversations(
+            conn, sort=sort, limit=limit, offset=offset, **filters),
+        "/api/conversations")
+    if not ok:
+        return
+    handler._respond_json(200, body)
+
+def _handle_get_conversations_facets_impl(handler) -> None:
+    """``GET /api/conversations/facets`` — distinct project labels + their
+    conversation counts, for the browse filter's project multi-select (spec
+    §2). Behind the SAME loopback/Host privacy gate as the list route; a
+    cheap indexed GROUP BY over the rollup. The popover loads its options
+    once from here (deriving from a paginated page would be incomplete).
+    """
+    if not handler._require_transcripts_allowed():
+        return
+    ok, body = handler._run_conversation_query(
+        lambda conn: handler._conversation_query().list_conversation_facets(conn),
+        "/api/conversations/facets")
+    if not ok:
+        return
+    handler._respond_json(200, body)
+
+def _handle_get_conversation_detail_impl(handler, path: str) -> None:
+    """``GET /api/conversation/<session-id>`` — the reader (spec §3.2).
+
+    The id is percent-decoded so clients that encode reserved chars
+    round-trip. Unknown id → 404. ``after``/``before``/``tail``/``limit``
+    page the items; ``after``/``before``/``tail`` are mutually exclusive
+    (>1 supplied → 400). ``tail=1`` opens at the bottom; ``before=<id>``
+    pages backward (#217 S2 / U4).
+    """
+    if not handler._require_transcripts_allowed():
+        return
+    import urllib.parse as _u
+    # ``path`` is already query-stripped by ``do_GET`` (``self.path.split("?")``),
+    # so the cursor params (?after=/?before=/?tail=/?limit=) live ONLY on the
+    # raw ``self.path``. Sibling handlers read ``self.path`` directly — the
+    # detail route must too, or every request re-serves the head and
+    # pagination is dead.
+    query_str = handler.path.partition("?")[2]
+    session_id = _u.unquote(path[len("/api/conversation/"):])
+    if not session_id:
+        handler.send_error(404, "conversation not found")
+        return
+    q = _u.parse_qs(query_str)
+    after = _qs_str(q, "after", None)
+    before = _qs_str(q, "before", None)
+    tail = _qs_str(q, "tail", None) in ("1", "true", "yes")
+    limit = _qs_int(q, "limit", 500)
+    # Mutual-exclusion 400 (#217 S2 / U4). The kernel ALSO raises ValueError
+    # on >1 cursor as its own invariant, but ``_run_conversation_query``
+    # collapses every kernel exception to a 500, so the 400 must be decided
+    # HERE, before the kernel call — this explicit pre-call check is the
+    # authoritative backstop for the handler path.
+    if sum(1 for x in (after is not None, before is not None, tail) if x) > 1:
+        handler.send_error(400, "after/before/tail are mutually exclusive")
+        return
+    ok, body = handler._run_conversation_query(
+        lambda conn: handler._conversation_query().get_conversation(
+            conn, session_id, after=after, before=before, tail=tail,
+            limit=limit),
+        "/api/conversation")
+    if not ok:
+        return
+    if body is None:
+        handler.send_error(404, "conversation not found")
+        return
+    handler._respond_json(200, body)
+
+def _handle_get_conversation_events_impl(handler, path: str) -> None:
+    """``GET /api/conversation/<id>/events`` — per-conversation live-tail
+    SSE (spec §2). Fail-closed behind the same transcript privacy gate as
+    the other conversation routes. Watches only this session's file(s);
+    emits ``event: tail`` on growth, ``: keep-alive`` when idle. Passive
+    (no ingest, no emit) under ``--no-sync``."""
+    if not handler._require_transcripts_allowed():
+        return
+    import time as _time
+    import urllib.parse as _u
+    watch = sys.modules["cctally"]._load_sibling("_lib_conversation_watch")
+    cq = handler._conversation_query()
+    session_id = _u.unquote(path[len("/api/conversation/"):-len("/events")])
+    if not session_id:
+        handler.send_error(404, "conversation not found")
+        return
+
+    handler.send_response(200)
+    handler.send_header("Content-Type", "text/event-stream; charset=utf-8")
+    handler.send_header("Cache-Control", "no-cache")
+    handler.send_header("Connection", "keep-alive")
+    handler.send_header("X-Accel-Buffering", "no")
+    handler.end_headers()
+
+    passive = bool(type(handler).no_sync)
+
+    try:
+        conn = sys.modules["_cctally_dashboard"].open_cache_db()  # late-binding: patched at test_conversation_endpoints.py:674
+    except (sqlite3.DatabaseError, OSError):
+        # Cache unavailable — degrade to keep-alive only; client backstop
+        # tick still surfaces turns. (Headers already sent; can't 500.)
+        passive = True
+        conn = None
+
+    def _resolve():
+        return cq.session_source_paths(conn, session_id) if conn else []
+
+    def _ingest(changed):
+        return sync_cache(conn, only_paths=set(changed))
+
+    try:
+        if passive:
+            # Frozen-data contract: no ingest, no emit. Keep-alive only.
+            while True:
+                _time.sleep(_LIVE_TAIL_KEEPALIVE)
+                handler.wfile.write(b": keep-alive\n\n")
+                handler.wfile.flush()
+
+        # #278 Theme B: signal that this connection is ACTIVELY live-tailing
+        # (not degraded to keep-alive). The client sets `live` only on this, so
+        # passive/cache-open-failed streams fall back to the memo-backed global
+        # tick instead of stranding updates (Codex F4). Passive branch above
+        # emits only ': keep-alive', so 'ready' is unambiguous.
+        handler.wfile.write(b"event: ready\ndata: {}\n\n")
+        handler.wfile.flush()
+
+        files = _resolve()
+        # Best-effort connect ingest for immediacy, then baseline `seen`
+        # from the cache's own offsets (session_files) so any pre-connect
+        # growth the connect-ingest declined is still caught on cycle 1.
+        try:
+            if files:
+                sync_cache(conn, only_paths=set(files))
+        except sqlite3.DatabaseError:
+            pass
+        seen = _cached_file_sigs(conn, files)
+
+        idle = 0.0
+        cycles = 0
+        while True:
+            _time.sleep(_LIVE_TAIL_POLL_INTERVAL)
+            cycles += 1
+            changed = watch.changed_paths(files, seen)
+            if changed:
+                _time.sleep(_LIVE_TAIL_DEBOUNCE)
+                new_seen, emitted = watch.watch_step(
+                    files, seen, ingest_fn=_ingest,
+                    committed_sig_fn=lambda p: _cached_file_sigs(conn, [p]).get(p))
+                seen = new_seen
+                if emitted:
+                    handler.wfile.write(
+                        ("event: tail\ndata: "
+                         + json.dumps({"sessionId": session_id})
+                         + "\n\n").encode("utf-8"))
+                    handler.wfile.flush()
+                    idle = 0.0
+                    # §6 P2-H — a brand-new subagent file's FIRST content was
+                    # just ingested by this emitting cycle, so the session's
+                    # source-path set may have grown. Re-resolve it now (vs
+                    # waiting up to _LIVE_TAIL_FILE_RESET_EVERY cycles) so the
+                    # new thread (incl. a skill invoked inside it) live-tails
+                    # promptly. A new path seeds seen=None (cur lacks a row),
+                    # so changed_paths flags it next cycle → it ingests + emits.
+                    # setdefault never disturbs an existing cursor.
+                    new_files = _resolve()
+                    if set(new_files) != set(files):
+                        files = new_files
+                        cur = _cached_file_sigs(conn, files)
+                        for p in files:
+                            seen.setdefault(p, cur.get(p))
+                    continue
+            idle += _LIVE_TAIL_POLL_INTERVAL
+            if idle >= _LIVE_TAIL_KEEPALIVE:
+                handler.wfile.write(b": keep-alive\n\n")
+                handler.wfile.flush()
+                idle = 0.0
+            if cycles % _LIVE_TAIL_FILE_RESET_EVERY == 0:
+                files = _resolve()
+                seen = {p: s for p, s in seen.items() if p in set(files)}
+    except (BrokenPipeError, ConnectionResetError,
+            ConnectionAbortedError, socket.timeout):
+        # #279 S1 F3: a stalled send past the handler timeout raises
+        # socket.timeout inside the SSE loop — treat it as a client
+        # disconnect (same as the other peer-gone classes), not an error.
+        pass            # client disconnect is normal
+    except Exception as exc:  # noqa: BLE001
+        # #279 S5 F6.2 (spec §8): a genuine bug mid-stream used to kill the
+        # live-tail SSE silently via handle_error. Headers are already
+        # committed — route the operator signal through the _lib_log chokepoint
+        # (handler.log_error) + a deliberate clean close via the finally below.
+        handler.log_error("api/conversation/events stream failed: %r", exc)
+    finally:
+        if conn is not None:
+            conn.close()
+
+def _handle_get_conversation_search_impl(handler) -> None:
+    """``GET /api/conversation/search?q=...&kind=...`` — cross-session
+    FTS/LIKE search (spec §3.3). Matched BEFORE the ``<id>`` reader in
+    ``do_GET``. ``kind`` (#177 S6) is validated to ``_CONV_SEARCH_KINDS``
+    (else 400) before the kernel call.
+
+    #217 S2 / Filtered-search: the browse filters (date/project/cost/rebuild)
+    are parsed by the SAME ``_parse_conversation_filters`` the browse rail uses
+    (malformed → 400 already sent) and threaded into the kernel, applied as a
+    session-scope restriction across every kind. The 400s (bad kind, bad
+    filter) are decided HERE, before the kernel call — ``_run_conversation_query``
+    collapses kernel exceptions to a 500.
+    """
+    if not handler._require_transcripts_allowed():
+        return
+    import urllib.parse as _u
+    q = _u.parse_qs(handler.path.partition("?")[2])
+    query = _qs_str(q, "q", "")
+    limit = _qs_int(q, "limit", 50)
+    offset = _qs_int(q, "offset", 0)
+    kind = handler._parse_search_kind(q)
+    if kind is None:
+        return
+    filters = handler._parse_conversation_filters(q)
+    if filters is None:
+        return  # a 400 has already been sent
+    ok, body = handler._run_conversation_query(
+        lambda conn: handler._conversation_query().search_conversations(
+            conn, query, limit=limit, offset=offset, kind=kind, **filters),
+        "/api/conversation/search")
+    if not ok:
+        return
+    handler._respond_json(200, body)
+
+def _handle_get_conversation_payload_impl(handler, path: str) -> None:
+    """``GET /api/conversation/<sid>/payload?tool_use_id=<id>&which=<result|input>``
+    — the #178 on-demand load-full route. Re-reads the source JSONL line so
+    a clipped result/input can be expanded without enlarging the cache.
+
+    Gated FIRST by the same loopback/Host transcript privacy predicate the
+    three other conversation routes use (fail-closed 403). ``locate_tool_payload``
+    runs against cache.db (via the shared 500-envelope scaffold); the actual
+    full body is re-read from disk by ``read_full_payload`` (no cache conn).
+    ``which`` is validated to ``result``/``input`` (else 400); a missing
+    tool_use_id is 400; an unknown id is 404; a gone/unparseable source line
+    is 410 (the documented consequence of storing only capped text).
+    """
+    if not handler._require_transcripts_allowed():
+        return
+    import urllib.parse as _u
+    session_id = _u.unquote(
+        path[len("/api/conversation/"):-len("/payload")])
+    q = _u.parse_qs(handler.path.partition("?")[2])
+    tool_use_id = _qs_str(q, "tool_use_id", "")
+    which = _qs_str(q, "which", "result")
+    if not session_id or which not in ("result", "input") or not tool_use_id:
+        handler._respond_json(400, {"error": "bad request"})
+        return
+    cq = handler._conversation_query()
+    ok, loc = handler._run_conversation_query(
+        lambda conn: cq.locate_tool_payload(
+            conn, session_id, tool_use_id, which),
+        "/api/conversation/payload")
+    if not ok:
+        return
+    if loc is None:
+        handler._respond_json(404, {"error": "not found"})
+        return
+    payload = cq.read_full_payload(loc[0], loc[1], tool_use_id, which)
+    if payload is None:
+        handler._respond_json(410, {"error": "source no longer available"})
+        return
+    handler._respond_json(200, payload)
+
+def _handle_get_conversation_outline_impl(handler, path: str) -> None:
+    """``GET /api/conversation/<sid>/outline`` — full-session skeleton +
+    session stats (#177 S5). Same fail-closed privacy gate; unknown id → 404.
+    """
+    if not handler._require_transcripts_allowed():
+        return
+    import urllib.parse as _u
+    session_id = _u.unquote(path[len("/api/conversation/"):-len("/outline")])
+    if not session_id:
+        handler.send_error(404, "conversation not found")
+        return
+    ok, body = handler._run_conversation_query(
+        lambda conn: handler._conversation_query().get_conversation_outline(conn, session_id),
+        "/api/conversation/outline")
+    if not ok:
+        return
+    if body is None:
+        handler.send_error(404, "conversation not found")
+        return
+    handler._respond_json(200, body)
+
+def _handle_get_conversation_prompts_impl(handler, path: str) -> None:
+    """``GET /api/conversation/<sid>/prompts`` — ordered main-thread human
+    prompts + full text (#217 S7 F10, the session-comparison spine). Same
+    fail-closed transcript privacy gate as ``/outline`` —
+    ``_require_transcripts_allowed()`` ONLY (no ``_check_origin_csrf``: the
+    sibling transcript GETs gate on this predicate alone). Unknown id → 404.
+    """
+    if not handler._require_transcripts_allowed():
+        return
+    import urllib.parse as _u
+    session_id = _u.unquote(path[len("/api/conversation/"):-len("/prompts")])
+    if not session_id:
+        handler.send_error(404, "conversation not found")
+        return
+    ok, body = handler._run_conversation_query(
+        lambda conn: handler._conversation_query().get_conversation_prompts(conn, session_id),
+        "/api/conversation/prompts")
+    if not ok:
+        return
+    if body is None:
+        handler.send_error(404, "conversation not found")
+        return
+    handler._respond_json(200, body)
+
+_CONV_EXPORT_SCOPES = ("all", "prompts", "chat", "recipe")
+
+def _handle_get_conversation_export_impl(handler, path: str) -> None:
+    """``GET /api/conversation/<sid>/export?scope=<all|prompts|chat|recipe>``
+    — whole-session Markdown (issue #217 S5 F1/F5).
+
+    Same fail-closed transcript privacy gate as ``/outline`` / ``/payload``
+    / ``/find`` — ``_require_transcripts_allowed()`` ONLY. **No
+    ``_check_origin_csrf``** (Codex P0-1): the sibling transcript GETs gate
+    on this predicate alone; ``_check_origin_csrf`` rejects a missing
+    ``Origin`` and would make export STRICTER than its sibling reader routes.
+
+    ``scope`` is validated HERE, BEFORE the kernel (the
+    ``_run_conversation_query``-collapses-kernel-exceptions-to-500 gotcha —
+    an invalid scope is a clean 400, never a 500). Unknown session → 404.
+    Emits ``text/markdown; charset=utf-8`` (the client builds the download
+    Blob/filename, so no ``Content-Disposition`` is needed)."""
+    if not handler._require_transcripts_allowed():
+        return
+    import urllib.parse as _u
+    session_id = _u.unquote(path[len("/api/conversation/"):-len("/export")])
+    q = _u.parse_qs(handler.path.partition("?")[2])
+    scope = _qs_str(q, "scope", "all")
+    if scope not in _CONV_EXPORT_SCOPES:
+        handler._respond_json(400, {"error": f"unknown scope: {scope}"})
+        return
+    if not session_id:
+        handler.send_error(404, "conversation not found")
+        return
+    ok, body = handler._run_conversation_query(
+        lambda conn: handler._conversation_query().get_conversation_export(
+            conn, session_id, scope),
+        "/api/conversation/export")
+    if not ok:
+        return
+    if body is None:
+        handler.send_error(404, "conversation not found")
+        return
+    data = body.encode("utf-8")
+    handler.send_response(200)
+    handler.send_header("Content-Type", "text/markdown; charset=utf-8")
+    handler.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(data)))
+    handler.end_headers()
+    handler.wfile.write(data)
+
+def _handle_get_conversation_find_impl(handler, path: str) -> None:
+    """``GET /api/conversation/<sid>/find?q=...&kind=...`` — in-conversation
+    find → document-ordered rendered-turn anchors (#177 S6). Same fail-closed
+    privacy gate as the sibling routes; unknown id → 404; an invalid ``kind``
+    → 400. Matched BEFORE the ``<id>`` reader catch-all in ``do_GET``.
+
+    P1-1: validates against ``_CONV_FIND_KINDS`` (NOT the search set), so the
+    cross-session-only ``kind=title``/``files`` return 400 here, never a 500.
+
+    #217 S4 / I-1.2: ``regex``/``case`` are truthy params. An invalid regex
+    is PRE-COMPILED here, BEFORE dispatching to the kernel — exactly as the
+    detail route pre-validates ``after/before/tail`` — because
+    ``_run_conversation_query`` collapses every kernel exception to a 500, so
+    a ``re.error`` from the kernel's ``re.compile`` would otherwise leak as a
+    500 instead of the actionable 400 the client maps to "invalid regex".
+    """
+    if not handler._require_transcripts_allowed():
+        return
+    import re as _re
+    import urllib.parse as _u
+    session_id = _u.unquote(path[len("/api/conversation/"):-len("/find")])
+    if not session_id:
+        handler.send_error(404, "conversation not found")
+        return
+    q = _u.parse_qs(handler.path.partition("?")[2])
+    query = _qs_str(q, "q", "")
+    kind = handler._parse_search_kind(q, valid=_CONV_FIND_KINDS)
+    if kind is None:
+        return
+    regex = _qs_str(q, "regex", None) in ("1", "true", "yes")
+    case = _qs_str(q, "case", None) in ("1", "true", "yes")
+    # Pre-validate the regex HERE (Codex P1): the kernel compiles the same
+    # pattern, but its ``re.error`` would be swallowed into the generic 500
+    # envelope below. Compiling first turns a bad pattern into a clean 400.
+    if regex:
+        try:
+            _re.compile(query, 0 if case else _re.IGNORECASE)
+        except _re.error as e:
+            handler._respond_json(400, {"error": f"invalid regex: {e}"})
+            return
+    ok, body = handler._run_conversation_query(
+        lambda conn: handler._conversation_query().find_in_conversation(
+            conn, session_id, query, kind=kind, regex=regex, case=case),
+        "/api/conversation/find")
+    if not ok:
+        return
+    if body is None:
+        handler.send_error(404, "conversation not found")
+        return
+    handler._respond_json(200, body)
+
+_MEDIA_FETCH_SITE_ALLOWED = ("same-origin", "same-site", "none")
+
+def _handle_get_conversation_media_impl(handler, path: str) -> None:
+    """``GET /api/conversation/<sid>/media?tool_use_id=<id>&index=N`` or
+    ``?uuid=<uuid>&index=N`` (#177 S4) — serves decoded image/PDF bytes by
+    re-reading the source JSONL line (the #178 mechanism). Nothing is ever
+    written to cache.db or disk; no outbound requests.
+
+    Gated FIRST by the transcript privacy predicate (fail-closed 403),
+    then by Fetch-Metadata: unlike the JSON routes, images embed
+    cross-origin (an <img src> on any website the user visits passes the
+    Host/loopback gate and leaks existence + dimensions via
+    onload/naturalWidth), so a PRESENT Sec-Fetch-Site header must be
+    same-origin/same-site/none; an absent header (curl, older browsers)
+    is allowed — defense-in-depth, not the primary gate (Codex F1).
+    Exactly one addressing key (tool_use_id XOR uuid) + a non-negative
+    integer index, else 400. Content-Type is the kernel's allowlist
+    constant; images get CSP default-src 'none'; PDFs get inline
+    Content-Disposition instead (a CSP sandbox would break native PDF
+    viewers)."""
+    if not handler._require_transcripts_allowed():
+        return
+    sfs = (handler.headers.get("Sec-Fetch-Site") or "").strip().lower()
+    if sfs and sfs not in _MEDIA_FETCH_SITE_ALLOWED:
+        handler._respond_json(403, {"error": "cross-site media fetch not allowed"})
+        return
+    import urllib.parse as _u
+    session_id = _u.unquote(path[len("/api/conversation/"):-len("/media")])
+    q = _u.parse_qs(handler.path.partition("?")[2])
+    tool_use_id = _qs_str(q, "tool_use_id", "")
+    uuid = _qs_str(q, "uuid", "")
+    index_raw = _qs_str(q, "index", "")
+    if (not session_id or bool(tool_use_id) == bool(uuid)
+            or not index_raw.isdigit()):
+        handler._respond_json(400, {"error": "bad request"})
+        return
+    index = int(index_raw)
+    key = ({"tool_use_id": tool_use_id} if tool_use_id else {"uuid": uuid})
+    cq = handler._conversation_query()
+    ok, loc = handler._run_conversation_query(
+        lambda conn: cq.locate_media(conn, session_id, index=index, **key),
+        "/api/conversation/media")
+    if not ok:
+        return
+    if loc is None:
+        handler._respond_json(404, {"error": "not found"})
+        return
+    # Defensive envelope parity with the sibling byte-serving handlers
+    # (`_handle_get_doctor` / `_serve_static_file`): `locate_media` already
+    # runs inside the `_run_conversation_query` 500-envelope, but the
+    # `read_media_bytes` read + the byte emission did not. `read_media_bytes`
+    # is internally defensive (OSError/ValueError → `gone`), so this guards
+    # only an UNEXPECTED escape — but an unguarded one would kill the handler
+    # thread with no logged 500. `response_started` tracks the commit point:
+    # an exception BEFORE `send_response(200)` sends a clean logged 500; one
+    # AFTER (mid-`wfile.write`, headers already out) can't re-send a status,
+    # so it's logged only — never a silent thread death.
+    response_started = False
+    try:
+        status, media_type, raw = cq.read_media_bytes(
+            loc[0], loc[1], index=index, **key)
+        if status == "unsupported":
+            handler._respond_json(404, {"error": "not found"})
+            return
+        if status == "too_large":
+            handler._respond_json(413, {"error": "media too large"})
+            return
+        if status != "ok":
+            handler._respond_json(410, {"error": "source no longer available"})
+            return
+        handler.send_response(200)
+        response_started = True
+        handler.send_header("Content-Type", media_type)
+        handler.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(raw)))
+        handler.send_header("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff")
+        handler.send_header("Cache-Control", "private, max-age=86400")
+        if media_type == "application/pdf":
+            handler.send_header("Content-Disposition",
+                             f'inline; filename="attachment-{index}.pdf"')
+        else:
+            handler.send_header("Content-Security-Policy", "default-src 'none'")
+        handler.end_headers()
+        handler.wfile.write(raw)
+    except Exception as exc:  # noqa: BLE001
+        handler.log_error("/api/conversation/media failed: %r", exc)
+        if not response_started:
+            handler._respond_json(
+                500, {"error": f"{type(exc).__name__}: {exc}"})