castrum 0.9.7 → 0.9.8

package/src/native/ffi/build/instances-selftest.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,264 @@
+// src/native/ffi/build/instances-selftest.ts — bind-time self-test for the
+// opaque-handle (compiled-instance) BunFFI surface.
+//
+// Extracted from instances.ts so the method builders and the value probes stay
+// separate modules; `selftest.ts` ANDs this with the other per-domain probes.
+
+import { decodeUtf8, encodeUtf8 } from '../../../shared/codec'
+import type { BunFFI } from '../types'
+
+/**
+ * Bind-time self-test for the opaque-handle surface (the methods built in
+ * `buildInstances`). `false` disables the ffi layer and forces the napi
+ * fallback.
+ */
+export function selfTestInstances(b: BunFFI): boolean {
+  const enc = { encode: encodeUtf8 }
+  const dec = { decode: decodeUtf8 }
+
+  // Ingress layout blob (38 × u32 LE). The pinned values catch a reordered
+  // `#[repr(C)] IngressLayout` (drift → self-test fails → napi fallback); the
+  // Rust unit test `ingress_layout_c_abi_matches_output_source` pins every
+  // field against output.rs. Slot order mirrors the struct field order.
+  const layoutBuf = new Uint8Array(38 * 4)
+  b.ingressLayout(layoutBuf)
+  const layoutView = new DataView(layoutBuf.buffer, layoutBuf.byteOffset, layoutBuf.byteLength)
+  if (
+    layoutView.getUint32(0, true) !== 0 || // OUT_VERDICT
+    layoutView.getUint32(2 * 4, true) !== 2 || // OUT_STATUS
+    layoutView.getUint32(12 * 4, true) !== 48 || // OUT_DATA_START
+    layoutView.getUint32(13 * 4, true) !== 1 || // FLAG_HAS_COOKIES
+    layoutView.getUint32(28 * 4, true) !== 32 || // HV_COUNT
+    layoutView.getUint32(37 * 4, true) !== 8 // ERR_INTERNAL
+  ) {
+    return false
+  }
+
+  // Ingress pipeline C-ABI: with a null (0) inner handle the Rust side returns
+  // 0 immediately and the wrapper throws. This exercises the symbol's ABI (arg
+  // count/types/return) at bind time — a signature drift would surface here
+  // instead of crashing under load. Real frame→output parity is covered by
+  // ffi.test.ts against a live napi instance.
+  try {
+    b.ingressHandlePacked(0, enc.encode('/'), null, new Uint8Array(64))
+    return false // a null handle must throw, not return
+  } catch {
+    // expected: null inner handle → 0 → throw
+  }
+
+  // Ingress raw-components C-ABI: with a null (0) inner handle the Rust side
+  // returns 0 immediately and the wrapper throws — exercises the 12-arg ABI
+  // (incl. the two `cstring` slots for url/ip) at bind time. Real frame→output
+  // parity is covered by ffi.test.ts against a live napi instance.
+  try {
+    b.ingressHandleComponents(
+      0,
+      0, // GET
+      '/',
+      '',
+      enc.encode('rid'),
+      new Uint8Array(2), // empty packed headers [u16 0]
+      null,
+      new Uint8Array(64),
+    )
+    return false // a null handle must throw, not return
+  } catch {
+    // expected: null inner handle → 0 → throw
+  }
+
+  // Per-route native stack (castrum_route_*): compile a parseQuery-only
+  // descriptor, run one frame, assert the packed verdict. Exercises all three
+  // symbols' ABI at bind time (handle return, run needed-size, destroy).
+  const routeDesc = new Uint8Array(33)
+  const rd = new DataView(routeDesc.buffer)
+  rd.setUint32(0, 0x524f5554, true) // ROUTE_DESC_MAGIC "ROUT"
+  rd.setUint32(4, 3, true) // ROUTE_DESC_VERSION
+  rd.setUint32(8, 2 * 1024 * 1024, true) // maxBodyBytes
+  rd.setUint32(12, 8192, true) // maxQueryBytes
+  rd.setUint32(16, 8192, true) // maxCookieBytes
+  rd.setUint32(20, 0, true) // maxPairs
+  rd.setUint32(24, 1, true) // stageCount
+  routeDesc[28] = 0 // parseQuery
+  rd.setUint32(29, 0, true) // schemaCount
+  const routeHandle = b.routeCompile(routeDesc)
+  if (routeHandle === 0) {
+    return false
+  }
+  const routeFrame = new Uint8Array(15)
+  const rf = new DataView(routeFrame.buffer)
+  rf.setUint32(0, 0, true) // flags (no body)
+  rf.setUint32(4, 3, true) // qLen
+  routeFrame.set(enc.encode('a=1'), 8)
+  rf.setUint32(11, 0, true) // cLen
+  const routeOut = new Uint8Array(64)
+  const routeW = b.routeRun(routeHandle, routeFrame, routeOut)
+  if (routeW <= 8) {
+    return false // header + a query pair section must exceed 8 bytes
+  }
+  const rv = new DataView(routeOut.buffer)
+  const rFlags = rv.getUint32(0, true)
+  if ((rFlags & 0b1) === 0 || (rFlags & 0b100) === 0) {
+    return false // OK + QUERY_VALID bits must be set
+  }
+  b.routeDestroy(routeHandle)
+
+  // ConditionalRequest opaque-handle: a null (0) handle must return false (the
+  // C side never dereferences freed state) — exercises the symbol's ABI. Real
+  // verdict parity is covered by test/unit/features/etag.test.ts.
+  if (b.conditionalIsNotModified(0, null, null) !== false) {
+    return false
+  }
+
+  // Phase 6 opaque-handle instances: null (0) handles must fail SAFELY (false /
+  // null / throw — never dereference freed state). Real verdict parity is
+  // covered by the per-instance JS tests.
+  if (b.mediaTypeMatcherMatches(0, enc.encode('x')) !== false) return false
+  if (b.acceptNegotiatorNegotiate(0, enc.encode('gzip')) !== null) return false
+  if (b.acceptNegotiatorNegotiateServer(0, enc.encode('gzip')) !== null) return false
+  if (b.schemaValidatorValidate(0, enc.encode('{}')) !== false) return false
+  if (b.jwtSignerVerify(0, enc.encode('a.b.c'), 0) !== null) return false
+  let phase6Threw = false
+  try {
+    b.jwtSignerSign(0, enc.encode('{}'), 0)
+  } catch {
+    phase6Threw = true
+  }
+  if (!phase6Threw) return false
+  phase6Threw = false
+  try {
+    b.templateRender(0, enc.encode('{}'))
+  } catch {
+    phase6Threw = true
+  }
+  if (!phase6Threw) return false
+  phase6Threw = false
+  try {
+    b.rateLimiterCheck(0, 'k', 0)
+  } catch {
+    phase6Threw = true
+  }
+  if (!phase6Threw) return false
+
+  // JWT sign pooled Into: same token as the cstring path.
+  const jwtClaims = enc.encode('{"sub":"user-1"}')
+  const jwtSecret2 = enc.encode('my-secret')
+  const jwtOut = new Uint8Array(512)
+  const jwtW = b.jwtSignBytesInto(jwtClaims, jwtSecret2, 0, 0, jwtOut)
+  if (jwtW === 0 || dec.decode(jwtOut.subarray(0, jwtW)).split('.').length !== 3) {
+    return false
+  }
+
+  // JWT sign with ttl=0 (deterministic — no iat/exp), then verify the
+  // signature with the FFI HMAC to prove the binding is real.
+  const jwtSecret = enc.encode('my-secret')
+  const jwt = b.jwtSignBytes(enc.encode('{"sub":"user-1"}'), jwtSecret, 0, 0)
+  const jwtStr = jwt
+  const segs = jwtStr.split('.')
+  if (segs.length !== 3 || segs[0] === '' || segs[1] === '' || segs[2] === '') {
+    return false
+  }
+  const signingInput = enc.encode(`${segs[0]}.${segs[1]}`)
+  const sigHex = b.hmacSha256(jwtSecret, signingInput)
+  const sigBytes = b.base64Decode(enc.encode(segs[2] ?? ''), true, false)
+  if (sigBytes === null || b.hexEncode(sigBytes) !== sigHex) {
+    return false
+  }
+
+  // jwtVerify: sign (ttl=0 → no iat/exp) then verify → claims JSON; tampered → null.
+  const vjwtSecret = enc.encode('verify-secret')
+  const vjwt = b.jwtSignBytes(enc.encode('{"sub":"u-1"}'), vjwtSecret, 0, 0)
+  const vjwtClaims = b.jwtVerify(enc.encode(vjwt), vjwtSecret, 0)
+  if (vjwtClaims === null || !vjwtClaims.includes('"sub":"u-1"')) {
+    return false
+  }
+  if (b.jwtVerify(enc.encode('tampered.token.value'), vjwtSecret, 0) !== null) {
+    return false
+  }
+
+  // Ed25519 round-trip: generate → sign → verify (and a tampered signature
+  // must be rejected). The generate wrapper also parses the packed blob, so
+  // this pins the `[u32 privLen][priv][u32 pubLen][pub]` layout.
+  const edKp = b.ed25519GenerateKeypair()
+  const edMsg = enc.encode('ed25519 bind-time self-test')
+  const edSig = b.ed25519Sign(edMsg, edKp.privateKey)
+  if (edSig.byteLength !== 64 || !b.ed25519Verify(edMsg, edSig, edKp.publicKey)) {
+    return false
+  }
+  const edTampered = edSig.slice()
+  edTampered[0] = (edTampered[0] ?? 0) ^ 0xff
+  if (b.ed25519Verify(edMsg, edTampered, edKp.publicKey)) {
+    return false
+  }
+  // EdDSA JWT round-trip on the SAME keypair (ttl=0 → no iat/exp, so verify
+  // succeeds at any `now`).
+  const edToken = b.jwtEdDSASign(enc.encode('{"sub":"ffi-self-test"}'), edKp.privateKey, 0, 0)
+  if (edToken === null || edToken.split('.').length !== 3) {
+    return false
+  }
+  const edClaims = b.jwtEdDSAVerify(enc.encode(edToken), edKp.publicKey, 0)
+  if (edClaims === null || !edClaims.includes('"sub":"ffi-self-test"')) {
+    return false
+  }
+  if (b.jwtEdDSAVerify(enc.encode('tampered.token.value'), edKp.publicKey, 0) !== null) {
+    return false
+  }
+
+  // UrlBuilder opaque-handle: a null (0) handle must throw (the C side never
+  // dereferences freed state) — exercises the symbol's ABI. Real resolve
+  // parity is covered by test/unit/features/url-join.test.ts.
+  let urlBuilderThrew = false
+  try {
+    b.urlBuilderResolve(0, enc.encode('g'))
+  } catch {
+    urlBuilderThrew = true
+  }
+  if (!urlBuilderThrew) {
+    return false
+  }
+  // Wire-validate: null inner (0) → false (ABI exercise); real parity lives
+  // in ffi.test.ts with a live compiled instance.
+  if (b.queryValidate(0, 'route=/a') !== false) return false
+  if (b.cookieValidate(0, 'route=/a') !== false) return false
+
+  // Session seal/open round trip through the C ABI.
+  {
+    const tok = b.sessionSeal('sess-9', '{"n":1}', 1234567, 'sekrit')
+    if (tok === null || !tok.includes('.') || !tok.startsWith('{"id":"sess-9"')) return false
+    const out = new Uint8Array(256)
+    const w = b.sessionOpen(tok, 'sekrit', out)
+    if (w <= 13 || out[0] !== 1) return false
+    // bad signature → 0
+    if (b.sessionOpen(tok, 'wrong', out) !== 0) return false
+
+    // Byte-arg siblings. Both forms share ONE core, so the sealed token must be
+    // byte-identical — the strongest available parity check between the two.
+    const enc = new TextEncoder()
+    const tokB = b.sessionSealBytes(
+      enc.encode('sess-9'),
+      enc.encode('{"n":1}'),
+      1234567,
+      enc.encode('sekrit'),
+    )
+    if (tokB === null || tokB !== tok) return false
+    const outB = new Uint8Array(256)
+    const wB = b.sessionOpenBytes(enc.encode(tokB), enc.encode('sekrit'), outB)
+    if (wB !== w || outB[0] !== 1) return false
+    // Bad signature → 0; a too-small buffer reports the EXACT size, not 0.
+    if (b.sessionOpenBytes(enc.encode(tokB), enc.encode('wrong'), outB) !== 0) return false
+    if (b.sessionOpenBytes(enc.encode(tokB), enc.encode('sekrit'), outB.subarray(0, 4)) !== wB)
+      return false
+  }
+
+  // rateLimiterCheckKey: null (0) handle → throw (ABI exercise).
+  let rlKeyThrew = false
+  try {
+    b.rateLimiterCheckKey(0, 12345, 0)
+  } catch {
+    rlKeyThrew = true
+  }
+  if (!rlKeyThrew) {
+    return false
+  }
+
+  return true
+}

package/src/native/ffi/build/instances.ts

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
 // builder) or drives a compiled route / the full ingress pipeline. Receives the
 // raw dlopen'd symbols and the per-bind context from `build()`.
 
-import { decodeUtf8, encodeUtf8 } from '../../../shared/codec'
+import { decodeUtf8 } from '../../../shared/codec'
 import { EMPTY_VIEW } from '../constants'
 import type { BunFFI, Raw2, Raw3, Raw4, Raw5, Raw6, Raw7, Raw8, Raw12, RawCStr } from '../types'
 import type { BuildCtx } from './util'
@@ -83,8 +83,12 @@ export function buildInstances(
       // Server-preference tie-breaking (RFC 7231 server semantics). The C ABI
       // takes `header` as a `cstring` ARG, so decode the bytes to a JS string
       // (the engine transcodes it to the call-scoped NUL-terminated buffer).
+      // A raw NUL is not a valid header byte and would TRUNCATE the arg, so the
+      // negotiator would evaluate a prefix — fail safe to identity instead.
       // `null` = identity (napi Option parity).
-      return acceptNegotiatorNegotiateServerRaw(inner, decodeUtf8(header))
+      const text = decodeUtf8(header)
+      if (hasNul(text)) return null
+      return acceptNegotiatorNegotiateServerRaw(inner, text)
     },
     jwtSignerSign(inner, claimsJson, nowSeconds) {
       // Precompiled key + ttl → compact token. 0 = invalid claims JSON (real
@@ -196,7 +200,10 @@ export function buildInstances(
     rateLimiterCheck(inner, key, nowMs) {
       // Packed [u8 allowed][u32 remaining LE][i64 reset_ms LE] (13 bytes).
       // Reused scratch + cached DataView (no per-call allocs). `key` is a
-      // `cstring` ARG (the engine transcodes the JS string in-engine).
+      // `cstring` ARG (the engine transcodes the JS string in-engine). A NUL
+      // would TRUNCATE the key so distinct keys collapse into ONE budget — deny
+      // fail-closed instead of silently aliasing them.
+      if (hasNul(key)) return { allowed: false, remaining: 0, resetMs: 0 }
       const out = rateScratch
       const w = Number(
         rateLimiterCheckRaw(inner, key, BigInt(Math.trunc(nowMs)), out, lenOrView(out)),
@@ -429,259 +436,3 @@ export function buildInstances(
     },
   }
 }
-
-/**
- * Bind-time self-test for the opaque-handle surface (the methods built in
- * `buildInstances`). `false` disables the ffi layer and forces the napi
- * fallback.
- */
-export function selfTestInstances(b: BunFFI): boolean {
-  const enc = { encode: encodeUtf8 }
-  const dec = { decode: decodeUtf8 }
-
-  // Ingress layout blob (38 × u32 LE). The pinned values catch a reordered
-  // `#[repr(C)] IngressLayout` (drift → self-test fails → napi fallback); the
-  // Rust unit test `ingress_layout_c_abi_matches_output_source` pins every
-  // field against output.rs. Slot order mirrors the struct field order.
-  const layoutBuf = new Uint8Array(38 * 4)
-  b.ingressLayout(layoutBuf)
-  const layoutView = new DataView(layoutBuf.buffer, layoutBuf.byteOffset, layoutBuf.byteLength)
-  if (
-    layoutView.getUint32(0, true) !== 0 || // OUT_VERDICT
-    layoutView.getUint32(2 * 4, true) !== 2 || // OUT_STATUS
-    layoutView.getUint32(12 * 4, true) !== 48 || // OUT_DATA_START
-    layoutView.getUint32(13 * 4, true) !== 1 || // FLAG_HAS_COOKIES
-    layoutView.getUint32(28 * 4, true) !== 32 || // HV_COUNT
-    layoutView.getUint32(37 * 4, true) !== 8 // ERR_INTERNAL
-  ) {
-    return false
-  }
-
-  // Ingress pipeline C-ABI: with a null (0) inner handle the Rust side returns
-  // 0 immediately and the wrapper throws. This exercises the symbol's ABI (arg
-  // count/types/return) at bind time — a signature drift would surface here
-  // instead of crashing under load. Real frame→output parity is covered by
-  // ffi.test.ts against a live napi instance.
-  try {
-    b.ingressHandlePacked(0, enc.encode('/'), null, new Uint8Array(64))
-    return false // a null handle must throw, not return
-  } catch {
-    // expected: null inner handle → 0 → throw
-  }
-
-  // Ingress raw-components C-ABI: with a null (0) inner handle the Rust side
-  // returns 0 immediately and the wrapper throws — exercises the 12-arg ABI
-  // (incl. the two `cstring` slots for url/ip) at bind time. Real frame→output
-  // parity is covered by ffi.test.ts against a live napi instance.
-  try {
-    b.ingressHandleComponents(
-      0,
-      0, // GET
-      '/',
-      '',
-      enc.encode('rid'),
-      new Uint8Array(2), // empty packed headers [u16 0]
-      null,
-      new Uint8Array(64),
-    )
-    return false // a null handle must throw, not return
-  } catch {
-    // expected: null inner handle → 0 → throw
-  }
-
-  // Per-route native stack (castrum_route_*): compile a parseQuery-only
-  // descriptor, run one frame, assert the packed verdict. Exercises all three
-  // symbols' ABI at bind time (handle return, run needed-size, destroy).
-  const routeDesc = new Uint8Array(33)
-  const rd = new DataView(routeDesc.buffer)
-  rd.setUint32(0, 0x524f5554, true) // ROUTE_DESC_MAGIC "ROUT"
-  rd.setUint32(4, 3, true) // ROUTE_DESC_VERSION
-  rd.setUint32(8, 2 * 1024 * 1024, true) // maxBodyBytes
-  rd.setUint32(12, 8192, true) // maxQueryBytes
-  rd.setUint32(16, 8192, true) // maxCookieBytes
-  rd.setUint32(20, 0, true) // maxPairs
-  rd.setUint32(24, 1, true) // stageCount
-  routeDesc[28] = 0 // parseQuery
-  rd.setUint32(29, 0, true) // schemaCount
-  const routeHandle = b.routeCompile(routeDesc)
-  if (routeHandle === 0) {
-    return false
-  }
-  const routeFrame = new Uint8Array(15)
-  const rf = new DataView(routeFrame.buffer)
-  rf.setUint32(0, 0, true) // flags (no body)
-  rf.setUint32(4, 3, true) // qLen
-  routeFrame.set(enc.encode('a=1'), 8)
-  rf.setUint32(11, 0, true) // cLen
-  const routeOut = new Uint8Array(64)
-  const routeW = b.routeRun(routeHandle, routeFrame, routeOut)
-  if (routeW <= 8) {
-    return false // header + a query pair section must exceed 8 bytes
-  }
-  const rv = new DataView(routeOut.buffer)
-  const rFlags = rv.getUint32(0, true)
-  if ((rFlags & 0b1) === 0 || (rFlags & 0b100) === 0) {
-    return false // OK + QUERY_VALID bits must be set
-  }
-  b.routeDestroy(routeHandle)
-
-  // ConditionalRequest opaque-handle: a null (0) handle must return false (the
-  // C side never dereferences freed state) — exercises the symbol's ABI. Real
-  // verdict parity is covered by test/unit/features/etag.test.ts.
-  if (b.conditionalIsNotModified(0, null, null) !== false) {
-    return false
-  }
-
-  // Phase 6 opaque-handle instances: null (0) handles must fail SAFELY (false /
-  // null / throw — never dereference freed state). Real verdict parity is
-  // covered by the per-instance JS tests.
-  if (b.mediaTypeMatcherMatches(0, enc.encode('x')) !== false) return false
-  if (b.acceptNegotiatorNegotiate(0, enc.encode('gzip')) !== null) return false
-  if (b.acceptNegotiatorNegotiateServer(0, enc.encode('gzip')) !== null) return false
-  if (b.schemaValidatorValidate(0, enc.encode('{}')) !== false) return false
-  if (b.jwtSignerVerify(0, enc.encode('a.b.c'), 0) !== null) return false
-  let phase6Threw = false
-  try {
-    b.jwtSignerSign(0, enc.encode('{}'), 0)
-  } catch {
-    phase6Threw = true
-  }
-  if (!phase6Threw) return false
-  phase6Threw = false
-  try {
-    b.templateRender(0, enc.encode('{}'))
-  } catch {
-    phase6Threw = true
-  }
-  if (!phase6Threw) return false
-  phase6Threw = false
-  try {
-    b.rateLimiterCheck(0, 'k', 0)
-  } catch {
-    phase6Threw = true
-  }
-  if (!phase6Threw) return false
-
-  // JWT sign pooled Into: same token as the cstring path.
-  const jwtClaims = enc.encode('{"sub":"user-1"}')
-  const jwtSecret2 = enc.encode('my-secret')
-  const jwtOut = new Uint8Array(512)
-  const jwtW = b.jwtSignBytesInto(jwtClaims, jwtSecret2, 0, 0, jwtOut)
-  if (jwtW === 0 || dec.decode(jwtOut.subarray(0, jwtW)).split('.').length !== 3) {
-    return false
-  }
-
-  // JWT sign with ttl=0 (deterministic — no iat/exp), then verify the
-  // signature with the FFI HMAC to prove the binding is real.
-  const jwtSecret = enc.encode('my-secret')
-  const jwt = b.jwtSignBytes(enc.encode('{"sub":"user-1"}'), jwtSecret, 0, 0)
-  const jwtStr = jwt
-  const segs = jwtStr.split('.')
-  if (segs.length !== 3 || segs[0] === '' || segs[1] === '' || segs[2] === '') {
-    return false
-  }
-  const signingInput = enc.encode(`${segs[0]}.${segs[1]}`)
-  const sigHex = b.hmacSha256(jwtSecret, signingInput)
-  const sigBytes = b.base64Decode(enc.encode(segs[2] ?? ''), true, false)
-  if (sigBytes === null || b.hexEncode(sigBytes) !== sigHex) {
-    return false
-  }
-
-  // jwtVerify: sign (ttl=0 → no iat/exp) then verify → claims JSON; tampered → null.
-  const vjwtSecret = enc.encode('verify-secret')
-  const vjwt = b.jwtSignBytes(enc.encode('{"sub":"u-1"}'), vjwtSecret, 0, 0)
-  const vjwtClaims = b.jwtVerify(enc.encode(vjwt), vjwtSecret, 0)
-  if (vjwtClaims === null || !vjwtClaims.includes('"sub":"u-1"')) {
-    return false
-  }
-  if (b.jwtVerify(enc.encode('tampered.token.value'), vjwtSecret, 0) !== null) {
-    return false
-  }
-
-  // Ed25519 round-trip: generate → sign → verify (and a tampered signature
-  // must be rejected). The generate wrapper also parses the packed blob, so
-  // this pins the `[u32 privLen][priv][u32 pubLen][pub]` layout.
-  const edKp = b.ed25519GenerateKeypair()
-  const edMsg = enc.encode('ed25519 bind-time self-test')
-  const edSig = b.ed25519Sign(edMsg, edKp.privateKey)
-  if (edSig.byteLength !== 64 || !b.ed25519Verify(edMsg, edSig, edKp.publicKey)) {
-    return false
-  }
-  const edTampered = edSig.slice()
-  edTampered[0] = (edTampered[0] ?? 0) ^ 0xff
-  if (b.ed25519Verify(edMsg, edTampered, edKp.publicKey)) {
-    return false
-  }
-  // EdDSA JWT round-trip on the SAME keypair (ttl=0 → no iat/exp, so verify
-  // succeeds at any `now`).
-  const edToken = b.jwtEdDSASign(enc.encode('{"sub":"ffi-self-test"}'), edKp.privateKey, 0, 0)
-  if (edToken === null || edToken.split('.').length !== 3) {
-    return false
-  }
-  const edClaims = b.jwtEdDSAVerify(enc.encode(edToken), edKp.publicKey, 0)
-  if (edClaims === null || !edClaims.includes('"sub":"ffi-self-test"')) {
-    return false
-  }
-  if (b.jwtEdDSAVerify(enc.encode('tampered.token.value'), edKp.publicKey, 0) !== null) {
-    return false
-  }
-
-  // UrlBuilder opaque-handle: a null (0) handle must throw (the C side never
-  // dereferences freed state) — exercises the symbol's ABI. Real resolve
-  // parity is covered by test/unit/features/url-join.test.ts.
-  let urlBuilderThrew = false
-  try {
-    b.urlBuilderResolve(0, enc.encode('g'))
-  } catch {
-    urlBuilderThrew = true
-  }
-  if (!urlBuilderThrew) {
-    return false
-  }
-  // Wire-validate: null inner (0) → false (ABI exercise); real parity lives
-  // in ffi.test.ts with a live compiled instance.
-  if (b.queryValidate(0, 'route=/a') !== false) return false
-  if (b.cookieValidate(0, 'route=/a') !== false) return false
-
-  // Session seal/open round trip through the C ABI.
-  {
-    const tok = b.sessionSeal('sess-9', '{"n":1}', 1234567, 'sekrit')
-    if (tok === null || !tok.includes('.') || !tok.startsWith('{"id":"sess-9"')) return false
-    const out = new Uint8Array(256)
-    const w = b.sessionOpen(tok, 'sekrit', out)
-    if (w <= 13 || out[0] !== 1) return false
-    // bad signature → 0
-    if (b.sessionOpen(tok, 'wrong', out) !== 0) return false
-
-    // Byte-arg siblings. Both forms share ONE core, so the sealed token must be
-    // byte-identical — the strongest available parity check between the two.
-    const enc = new TextEncoder()
-    const tokB = b.sessionSealBytes(
-      enc.encode('sess-9'),
-      enc.encode('{"n":1}'),
-      1234567,
-      enc.encode('sekrit'),
-    )
-    if (tokB === null || tokB !== tok) return false
-    const outB = new Uint8Array(256)
-    const wB = b.sessionOpenBytes(enc.encode(tokB), enc.encode('sekrit'), outB)
-    if (wB !== w || outB[0] !== 1) return false
-    // Bad signature → 0; a too-small buffer reports the EXACT size, not 0.
-    if (b.sessionOpenBytes(enc.encode(tokB), enc.encode('wrong'), outB) !== 0) return false
-    if (b.sessionOpenBytes(enc.encode(tokB), enc.encode('sekrit'), outB.subarray(0, 4)) !== wB)
-      return false
-  }
-
-  // rateLimiterCheckKey: null (0) handle → throw (ABI exercise).
-  let rlKeyThrew = false
-  try {
-    b.rateLimiterCheckKey(0, 12345, 0)
-  } catch {
-    rlKeyThrew = true
-  }
-  if (!rlKeyThrew) {
-    return false
-  }
-
-  return true
-}