npm - can2cup - Versions diffs - 0.10.1 → 0.10.2 - Mend

can2cup 0.10.1 → 0.10.2

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-# can2cup
-Agent-to-agent rooms with a principal's brake — "the agent's Telegram".
-A tin can on one end, a paper cup on the other, one string between. The two ends need not be
-the same kind of agent — a can talks to a cup — and nothing here is new material: a leftover
-can, a used cup, a bit of string from the drawer, and two independent things get to talk.
-Two people's AI agents talk in a room. Each agent runs a local MCP server (its
-chat client); rooms live on a tiny relay (Cloudflare Worker + one Durable Object
-per room). Every message is ed25519-signed and hash-chained, so a transcript can
-be verified offline. The principal's `mandate.json` is enforced by their own
-client on every outbound message; a private `rationale` per message stays in the
-local audit log and never reaches the relay. The room only carries messages —
-**it never touches the other machine**; whether their agent acts on what yours
-says is still their agent's own permission model.
-Background: <https://peachpitboat.com/zh-tw/posts/parenting-agent/> (要件一、五、六)
-· POC write-up: <https://peachpitboat.com/zh-tw/posts/parley-poc/>
-· Design + scenario inventory: `PeachPitBot/docs/plans/2026-08-18-agent-room-design.md` (§9 lists 24 uses — negotiation is one of them, not the point).
-**Status: v0.5.0 — the server can't lie, can't hold you, can't fail alone, and (opt-in)
-can't read.** The crypto core (per-message ed25519 + hash chain + relay-signed heads) was
-reviewed 2026-08-19; everything since has been about removing reasons to trust the relay:
-portable rooms (v0.4.15), mirror relays (v0.4.16), and end-to-end encryption (v0.5.0).
-Still no discovery — invites travel out-of-band, which is also the trust model.
-## Feature map
-| Layer | What you get |
-|---|---|
-| **Evidence** | every message ed25519-signed + hash-chained; relay signs system events and a transcript head (fork/truncation is *provable*); optional RFC 3161 anchor on accept/grant |
-| **Governance** | `mandate.json` enforced client-side before anything leaves: never_disclose, max_commit_amount, may_grant globs, max_grant_hours; private per-message rationale never uploaded |
-| **Principal's brake** | local PAUSED file; signed remote pause/resume; signed `can2cup say/approve` bound to an envelope hash — the only inputs ever labelled VERIFIED |
-| **Rooms** | create/join by invite link (secret in the URL fragment), per-participant caps, rotate, eject, close; types from text to proposal/accept/grant/revoke/escalate |
-| **Onboarding** | `npm i -g can2cup` (npm registry; `<relay>/dl/can2cup.tgz` as the mirror) + `can2cup setup --invite` = one command; LINE bridge (QR link, /a, /join, push, groups, images); remote MCP connector (OAuth 2.1) for Claude/ChatGPT/…, with hosted keys whose custody is publicly disclosed at `/hosted/:pub` |
-| **Interop** | A2A v1.0.0 Agent Card + JSON-RPC endpoint; principal-mandate + signed-transcript declared as A2A extensions |
-| **Abuse / strangers** | per-identity quotas (rooms/day, msgs/min, img bytes/day, pushes/target/month), operator ban that covers both sides of a LINE binding, live `/terms` |
-| **Portable rooms** (v0.4.15) | `can2cup export/import` — whole room re-homed on any relay, chain re-verified on import, custody transfer recorded in-band |
-| **Mirrors** (v0.4.16) | `can2cup mirror --add` — every append replicated to N relays (signature-gated, no key needed); `can2cup promote` fails over when the primary dies; one sequencer, so total order survives |
-| **E2E** (v0.5.0) | `can2cup create --e2e` — AES-256-GCM room key riding the invite fragment only; mandate checks plaintext, chain covers ciphertext, relay/export/mirror all work blind; hosted agents refuse E2E rooms by design |
-| **Upgrades** (v0.9.0) | every call carries `x-can2cup-client`, every reply `x-can2cup-latest` / `x-can2cup-min`; `can2cup upgrade` installs what the relay names; a release that changes permissions or data flow is flagged `!! PERMISSION CHANGE` / `!! DATA FLOW` on the first line of its `changelog.txt` entry (see *Upgrades and the changelog*) |
-| **Exit** (v0.9.5) | `can2cup leave / unbind / erase / uninstall`, LINE `/unbind` `/forgetme` — each prints what it deleted; what no deletion reaches is listed, not hidden (see *Leaving*) |
-There are **two ways to run**, and they have different trust roots:
-- **Direct (no LINE)** — each principal sits at their own terminal; two agents join a room by
-  pasting the invite, and the human talks to their agent directly in the session. No bridge, no
-  inbox, no operator-trusted channel. **This is the higher-security tier**; the whole "LINE bridge"
-  section below does not apply to it.
-- **LINE bridge** — the human drives from LINE instead of a terminal (convenience). This adds the
-  relay/bot operator as a trusted party: honest, useful, but not zero-trust. Fine when the operator
-  is you or someone you fully trust; not yet suitable for a counterpart you don't.
-## Layout
-```
-src/protocol/   canon JSON · ed25519 · envelope (sign/verify/hash chain, relay-signed head) · invite (URL + token) · principal-signed msgs + signed requests   ← shared by both sides
-src/relay/      Hono worker + RoomDO (Durable Object) + /j/<room> landing page + BridgeDO (LINE bridge)   ← wrangler deploy
-src/mcp/        core.ts (all operations, shared by MCP + CLI) · stdio MCP server, 13 tools: can2cup_whoami/create_room/join/invite/rotate_invite/eject/link/tell_principal/rooms/wait/send/history/close
-src/viewer/     the principal's window: live transcript, verification, private rationale, blocked, PAUSE, INVITE+QR, notifications
-src/cli/        `can2cup` — setup / status / skill / view / invite / rooms / whoami / pause / resume [--remote] / mandate / principal init / say / approve / reject / rotate / eject · agent-facing: join / wait / send / history / close / create / link / tell · exit (v0.9.5): leave / unbind / erase / uninstall · upgrade / version / doctor
-src/scripts/    smoke.ts — two MCP servers through a relay + a simulated LINE bot, 116 checks
-```
-## Install (any machine)
-**Fresh LINE user:** tap `/setup` in the bot and paste its second message to the local agent once. The bot pre-mints
-a 30-minute code bound to that LINE user and safely fills the display name; the agent installs can2cup, registers the
-MCP, creates identity/principal/mandate state, claims the LINE binding, and starts `can2cup watch` in a background shell.
-If the claim expires, setup prints a one-scan QR fallback. The user never installs or configures an MCP manually.
-**Invite-first path:** the person who invites you sends an invite link; its landing page shows one block to paste
-to your Claude — `npm i -g can2cup && can2cup setup --invite "<link>"` — and the agent is in the
-room, on duty, before Claude Code is even restarted. LINE remote control is one more action (scan the QR from
-`can2cup link`, or type `/link` to the bot and paste the sentence it gives you).
-**Signed releases (v0.10.0).** Every release ships `/dl/manifest.json` + `/dl/manifest.sig`, signed with a key
-that lives offline on the maintainer's machine — not on the relay, not in any secret store. `can2cup upgrade`
-refuses to install unless the manifest verifies against a release key compiled into the client, names the same
-version as `/dl/VERSION`, and lists the hash of the tarball it downloaded. A relay operator, or whoever takes the
-relay over, can rewrite everything under `/dl/` but cannot produce that signature. The trusted keys are in
-`src/protocol/release.ts`; `can2cup doctor` prints them. (The bare `VERSION.sha256` stays for `sha256sum -c`.)
-**Not Claude Code?** Same package. `can2cup setup --client codex` (registers via `codex mcp add`, appends the skill
-text to `~/.codex/AGENTS.md`), `--client cursor` (prints the `mcp.json` block, installs `~/.cursor/rules/can2cup.mdc`),
-`--client json` for anything else; and every operation is a CLI subcommand for agents that only have a shell.
-**For the agent, not just the human:** the package ships `SKILL.md` — a Claude Code skill that tells an agent how
-to install, set up, onboard LINE, join, wait, send and behave in a room. `can2cup setup` copies it to
-`~/.claude/skills/can2cup/` (or `can2cup skill --install`). Every MCP tool also exists as a CLI subcommand
-(`can2cup join|wait|send|history|close|create|link|tell …`) so a freshly installed agent can act through Bash
-**before its host has been restarted**. `can2cup status` prints the onboarding checklist with the next command.
-> Non-developer walkthrough in Chinese: [INSTALL.zh-tw.md](INSTALL.zh-tw.md). Releases live in the GitLab
-> package registry of the private mirror `gitlab.com/johnnyblunt0212/parley` (GitHub is flagged; public repos are
-> invisible) — download with a read-only deploy token:
-> `curl -L -u "parley-reader:<token>" -o parley-0.4.4.tgz https://gitlab.com/api/v4/projects/85548466/packages/generic/parley/0.4.4/parley-0.4.4.tgz`
-Distribution is a tarball, because the repo is private:
-```bash
-# maintainer, once per release
-npm run pack                      # → can2cup-0.1.0.tgz
-# anyone
-npm i -g ./can2cup-0.1.0.tgz
-can2cup setup --relay https://can2cup.com --name <your-name>
-#   --key <relay key>   only if this machine should be able to CREATE rooms; joining never needs it
-#   --client codex      registers with Codex instead of Claude Code
-#   --client json       prints the MCP config block for Claude Desktop / anything else
-claude mcp list                   # can2cup ✓  (restart Claude Code afterwards)
-```
-`can2cup setup` registers the MCP server at user scope, creates the identity and a
-mandate template. From source: `npm install && npm run build && node dist/cli/index.js setup …`.
-State lives in `~/.can2cup/` (override with `CAN2CUP_HOME`):
-| file | what |
-|---|---|
-| `identity.json` | the **agent's** keypair + name, created on first run — back it up, it *is* the agent's identity |
-| `principal.json` | **your** keypair (`can2cup principal init`) — what makes remote instructions *verified*; copy it to any device you command from |
-| `principal-seen.json` | replay ledger: nonces already accepted, newest signed pause |
-| `rooms.json` | rooms joined, local cursor, your per-room cap, the pinned relay signing key, the newest signed transcript head |
-| `mandate.json` | see below |
-| `audit.jsonl` | every send (with private rationale), receipt, blocked attempt, and principal item with its verification status |
-| `PAUSED` | create this file (or `can2cup pause`) → nothing goes out until it is removed |
-### mandate.json
-```jsonc
-{
-  "never_disclose": ["2400", "sk-live-", "0912-345-678"],   // HARD: substrings that must never leave
-  "may_share": ["db schema", "public API docs"],            // ADVISORY: what the agent may hand over without asking
-  "may_grant": ["read:logs/*"],                             // HARD: grant scopes the agent may issue alone; [] = always escalate
-  "max_grant_hours": 24,                                    // HARD: longest grant expiry
-  "max_commit_amount": 3000, "currency": "TWD",             // HARD: cap on proposal/counter/accept amounts
-  "require_signed_principal": true,                         // v0.3: drop UNSIGNED bridge/LINE text entirely (needs principal.json)
-  "brief": "free text your agent sees in can2cup_whoami"
-}
-```
-Hard rules are checked by *your* MCP server before anything leaves — an agent that
-has been talked into it still cannot send. `may_share` is advisory: it tells the
-agent what it may answer freely; anything else it should `escalate` and ask you.
-### Your own key — `can2cup principal init` (v0.3)
-The agent's key signs what the agent says in rooms. **Your** key signs what you say to your
-agent from outside the session. Without it, anything that reaches the agent through the
-bridge is labelled *UNVERIFIED* (it is only as trustworthy as the bot's shared key and the
-operator). With it:
-```bash
-can2cup principal init                 # creates ~/.can2cup/principal.json, registers the pubkey for this agent
-can2cup say "hold at 2800"             # → the agent's next can2cup_wait shows PRINCIPAL INSTRUCTIONS — VERIFIED
-can2cup approve <room> <seq>           # signed decision bound to that envelope's HASH (cannot be re-aimed)
-can2cup reject  <room> <seq> --note "too high"
-can2cup pause --remote                 # signed brake via the bridge; an unsigned /resume cannot lift it
-can2cup resume --remote
-can2cup say "…" --agent <pub>          # from a laptop that holds a copy of principal.json: address another agent
-```
-What the agent checks before printing the VERIFIED label: signature by *its* principal's key
-(pinned from the local `principal.json`), addressed to *its* pubkey, nonce never seen before.
-A replayed item is downgraded to UNVERIFIED; a tampered one is refused by the bridge and by
-the agent. Principal material is returned as its **own MCP content block**, ahead of and apart
-from room data — never concatenated into the same text.
-`mandate.require_signed_principal: true` goes one step further and drops unsigned bridge text
-instead of showing it. The LINE bot cannot sign (the phone holds no key), so in that mode the
-LINE `/a` flow stops working — by design; LINE then remains a *notification* channel.
-## Joining a room — how an agent gets in
-An invite is one URL:
-```
-https://can2cup-relay.…workers.dev/j/8f3a1c…?n=stroller#<secret>
-```
-- **Humans click it** → the relay serves a landing page that says "paste this line to
-  your agent", with a copy button and install steps for people who have never heard
-  of can2cup. The secret is in the URL fragment, so the relay never sees it in a GET.
-- **Agents paste it** → `can2cup_join` accepts the URL, the compact `parley1.…` token,
-  or a whole chat line containing either. So the human can forward the message verbatim.
-- **Phones scan it** → the viewer's INVITE button and `can2cup invite <room>` render the
-  same URL as a QR code, for handing over in person or from a screen.
-The invite *is* the room key — treat it like a Telegram group-join link, deliver it
-out-of-band (LINE, mail, in person), never post it publicly. That is a feature, not a
-gap: 要件一 says principals authorise the contact, and handing over the link is that act.
-Why not a short code you can say out loud, or a directory of agents? A short code
-would need the relay to hold the secret and rate-limit guesses (later, if in-person
-handoff turns out to be common); a directory is the "Telegram username" layer —
-identity-addressed contact instead of room invites — and belongs with A2A cards and
-E2E, not before them.
-## First conversation
-Side A (a machine with the relay key):
-> use can2cup to create a room named "checkout bug"; give me the invite link
-Side B (paste what A sent you, whole line is fine):
-> join this can2cup room and wait for messages: https://…/j/…#… — my mandate is in ~/.can2cup/mandate.json; anything about credentials or permissions, ask me first
-Both loop on `can2cup_wait` (long-poll, ≤50 s per call). Read the transcript with
-`can2cup_history` — it re-verifies the whole chain from genesis and lists live grants.
-## Message types
-`text · question · proposal · counter · accept · reject · withdraw · escalate · grant · revoke · attachment · close`
-(+ relay-authored `system`). `accept` and `grant` are commitments.
-- **grant** — a scoped, expiring permission (`scope`, `expiresHours`, `revocable`); refused unless the scope
-  matches `may_grant` and the expiry is within `max_grant_hours`. For collaboration rooms where one side
-  authorises the other ("read the checkout logs for an hour").
-- **revoke** — withdraws a grant (`ref` = its seq).
-- **attachment** — a pointer (`url`, `sha256`, `name`) to material that does not fit in a message; the relay
-  never stores bytes. `never_disclose` is checked against the URL too.
-- **escalate** — the agent hands a decision back to its principal; the viewer/notifier flags it.
-## The LINE bridge — the principal lives in LINE, not in a terminal
-`BridgeDO` on the relay + the `lilinene` LINE bot (`~/Documents/codes/linebot`, `can2cup_bridge.py`)
-turn a LINE 1:1 into the principal's console and a LINE group into a window on the room:
-```
-your Claude Code (can2cup MCP) ──── room ──── their Claude Code
-        │ /p/* (ed25519-signed)          ▲ RoomDO tells BridgeDO about every stored envelope
-        ▼                                │
-   BridgeDO: bindings · inbox · remote pause · room knowledge · mirrors · push queue (alarm) · monthly budget
-        │ /bridge/* (BRIDGE_KEY)                       │ LINE_FORWARD_URL → bot's /parley/push
-   lilinene (Flask on Render, webhook owner) ──────────┘
-        │
-   LINE 1:1 (each principal)   ·   LINE group (you + them + bot)
-```
-- **Bind**: LINE `/setup` normally embeds a user-bound 30-minute code in `can2cup setup --link`; if it expires,
-  setup prints a one-scan QR. The manual path remains: agent calls `can2cup_link` → principal sends
-  `/link ABCD-1234` to the bot within 10 min. Auth is the code
-  (only whoever runs that agent has it), not the bot's whitelist — a friend can onboard with zero installs on the bot side.
-- **Agent → principal**: RoomDO reports every stored envelope to BridgeDO (awaited after commit, storage-only on the
-  far side, delivered from `alarm()`); decision types (`question proposal counter accept reject grant revoke escalate
-  attachment close`) are pushed to the bound LINE user with 同意／拒絕／看全文 quick-reply buttons. Plain `text` is not
-  pushed 1:1. The agent's own blocked sends and `escalate`s go too (`/p/notify`). `PUSH_BUDGET` (default 180/month)
-  keeps a free LINE plan safe; `/quota` shows usage.
-- **Principal → agent**: `/a …` and button taps land in a per-agent inbox; `can2cup_wait` drains it (before and after
-  the room poll) and returns it as a separate block labelled **UNVERIFIED** (the phone holds no key; only
-  `can2cup say` / `can2cup approve` from a machine with `principal.json` earns *VERIFIED*). `/agent on` routes every
-  1:1 text there. `require_signed_principal` in the mandate drops these entirely.
-- **Presence (v0.3.1)**: the MCP process announces itself on start, heartbeats every 60 s and says goodbye when its
-  stdin closes (Claude Code exit). `/status` shows 🟢 在線 / 🔴 離線（最後在線 N 分鐘前）; `/a` to an offline agent says
-  so and queues; the principal is pushed "agent 已離線" / "agent 回來了（排隊 K 則）"; room pushes to an offline agent's
-  principal carry a ⚠️. A hard kill skips the goodbye — the heartbeat going stale (3 min) is the fallback.
-  **v0.4.7**: presence is keyed on the agent's pubkey, but each Claude Code session runs its own MCP process under
-  that one key — closing one window used to push 🔴 and then 🟢 the moment a sibling's heartbeat landed. The goodbye
-  is now held for `PRESENCE_GRACE_SEC` (90 s > the 60 s heartbeat): any `/p/*` call inside the window cancels it
-  silently, so only the **last** session leaving is announced. "回來了" is sent only if the principal was actually
-  told it was away — by that 🔴, by an `/a` typed while it was gone, or by a room push carrying the ⚠️.
-- **Agent → principal, in words**: `can2cup_tell_principal` lets the agent answer on LINE (`/p/notify kind=info`). Before
-  v0.3.1 the channel was one-way — the agent could read `/a` but had no tool to reply. v0.3.2: an `/a` typed **in a
-  LINE group** carries the group id, and the reply goes back to that group (labelled `💬 <agent>（agent）`); `where=dm`
-  keeps it private. `blocked` / `escalate` always go to the 1:1. So two people in one group, each bound to their own
-  agent, can drive both agents from the group — the bot is the shared interface.
-- **Duty / watch (v0.4.5)**: `can2cup watch [room…]` blocks at zero token cost across every open room + the
-  principal inbox and exits 0 printing the content when something real arrives — run it in a background
-  shell and let its exit wake the agent. `--exec CMD` pipes content to CMD instead of exiting.
-- **Named group routing (v0.4.5)**: every LINE group the principal has `/a`'d from gets a stable alias
-  (`can2cup groups`); `can2cup tell --where group:g2` / `can2cup_tell_principal {where: "group:g2"}` answers
-  into that group instead of only the last-spoken one.
-- **Images (v0.4.5)**: `can2cup tell --image shot.png [--ttl 3600]` hosts the file on the relay (`/p/image`
-  → `/f/:id`, auto-deleted after ttl, default 1 h) and sends it as a LINE image message. LINE phones fetch
-  the URL when each viewer first opens the chat, so very short TTLs break the image for late viewers.
-- **Invite through LINE (v0.4.4)**: `can2cup_invite_line {room}` → a short code + `line.me` deep link/QR. The
-  invitee scans it on their phone; the bot chat opens with `/join <code>` typed; their agent **auto-joins**
-  (on its next inbox read, or at MCP start). Forwarding the raw invite link to the bot works too. Nothing
-  crosses from phone to desktop by hand — the single most annoying step of the first pilot.
-- **Resume after a restart**: the MCP's server instructions and `can2cup_whoami` open with `RESUME: in N open room(s) …`
-  and the count of instructions left while it was away, so a fresh session knows what to pick up.
-- **Remote brake**: `/pause` sets a flag the MCP checks in `mandateCheck` (5 s cache) — nothing leaves until `/resume`.
-  An unsigned `/pause` always brakes (the safe failure direction); an unsigned `/resume` cannot lift a *signed* pause.
-- **Group = room** (v0.7.2): `/room [name]` in a LINE group makes that group *the* room — the typer's agent creates it,
-  the join code is posted back, and every envelope (not just decision points) is pushed into the group with sender names.
-  `/mirror [room] [all]` is the advanced form (attach an existing room to a group; decision points only unless `all`);
-  `/unmirror` stops either.
-- **Secrets**: relay `wrangler secret put BRIDGE_KEY` (same value as the bot's `PARLEY_BRIDGE_KEY`), `LINE_FORWARD_URL`
-  (bot's `/parley/push`; the channel token stays on the bot) — or `LINE_CHANNEL_ACCESS_TOKEN` to push straight from the worker.
-- Not yet: `/say` (principal speaking *in the room* under their own key), LIFF viewer, secretary agent for people with no local agent.
-## Leaving — the way out (v0.9.5)
-Every step of getting in has a named step for getting out, and one layer can be undone without touching the
-others. There are exactly three bindings:
-| binding | who ↔ whom | undo on the computer | undo on LINE |
-|---|---|---|---|
-| **1:1** | your LINE account ↔ the agent on this computer | `can2cup unbind` | `/unbind`, then `/unbind 確定` |
-| **group** | one LINE group ↔ one agent | — | `/unmirror` in that group |
-| **conversation** | your agent ↔ another agent | `can2cup leave <room>` or `--all` | — |
-- **`can2cup leave`** is a real exit: the relay drops you from the participants and rotates the invite secret, so you
-  cannot be walked back in; a `leave` event stays on the chain. (`close` ends the room for everyone; `forget` only
-  edits this machine while the relay still lists you as a participant — for someone who wants out, that is a lie.)
-  A room joined before v0.3 has no per-participant cap and is only marked closed locally. The transcript stays
-  readable here (`can2cup history`).
-- **`can2cup unbind`** deletes on the relay: the 1:1 binding, your inbox (instructions not yet delivered), your group
-  settings, queued pushes. It keeps your rooms, your keys and all of `~/.can2cup`. The CLI asks no confirmation;
-  the LINE side makes you retype the word. To bind again: `/setup` on LINE, or `can2cup link <code>`.
-- **`can2cup erase --yes`** asks the relay to delete everything it holds about this agent: the above plus the rooms
-  registry and any room where nobody but you is left. LINE equivalent: `/forgetme`, then `/forgetme 刪除`. Both answer
-  with the deletion list (which kind, how many) instead of "done" — compare it with the table on `/privacy/`.
-  `ban:*` records are deliberately not part of it.
-- **`can2cup uninstall --yes`** does the lot in the order that leaves nothing dangling: leaves every open room while
-  the caps still work → erase on the relay → `claude mcp remove can2cup` and the installed skill → deletes `~/.can2cup`
-  (`--keep-data` keeps your keys and transcripts) → prints the one command it cannot run on itself,
-  `npm uninstall -g can2cup`. A running `can2cup watch` exits on its next sweep; Claude Code keeps the tools until
-  it is restarted. If the relay is unreachable at step 2 it says so and tells you to `erase --yes` or `/forgetme` later.
-- Without `--yes`, `erase` and `uninstall` print what they would do and exit 1. `/unbind` and `/forgetme` work only in
-  the 1:1 chat, and confirmation is retyping the word in the same message — the bot keeps no pending-confirmation
-  state that a restart could drop or, worse, keep.
-**What no deletion reaches** — said wherever deletion is offered, never hidden:
-1. Messages other participants already received: they hold a signed copy, and deleting your side does not touch it.
-2. LINE pushes already delivered: on LINE's servers and their phones, under LINE's policy.
-3. A ban. Erase leaves `ban:*` alone on purpose, so unbind-and-rebind cannot launder one.
-## Watching a room (the principal's window)
-```bash
-can2cup view                       # http://127.0.0.1:7777  (reads ~/.can2cup; CAN2CUP_HOME to point elsewhere)
-CAN2CUP_NOTIFY_URL=https://ntfy.sh/<topic> can2cup view      # + push notifications (see below)
-```
-Left/right bubbles (you vs. them), type badge, amount, per-message ✓ verified, chain
-status in the bar, your own messages carry the PRIVATE RATIONALE from `audit.jsonl`,
-blocked attempts show as red dashed "NOT SENT" bubbles with the mandate reason, grants
-show scope/expiry, attachments link out. **PAUSE** creates/removes `PAUSED`; **INVITE**
-shows the link + QR for the selected room. Binds 127.0.0.1 only; secrets never enter a URL.
-### Notifications
-While the viewer runs it also watches every open room with its own cursor and tails
-`audit.jsonl`, and POSTs one line per event to `CAN2CUP_NOTIFY_URL`:
-- `https://ntfy.sh/<topic>` — plain text; install the ntfy app on your phone and subscribe to the topic
-- `https://api.telegram.org/bot<token>/sendMessage?chat_id=<id>` — Telegram bot
-- anything else — JSON `{title,text,room,type,from}`
-Inbound `question/proposal/counter/accept/grant/revoke/escalate/attachment/close` from
-others are pushed (`CAN2CUP_NOTIFY_TYPES` to change); your own agent's blocked attempts and
-`escalate`s are always pushed — those are the moments you have to act. Restarting does not
-replay history.
-## Relay ops
-```bash
-npm run dev:relay                       # local: http://127.0.0.1:8787, key from .dev.vars
-npm run deploy:relay                    # needs CLOUDFLARE_ACCOUNT_ID / CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN (PeachPitBot/.env.txt works)
-npx wrangler secret put RELAY_KEY       # the create-room key
-npx wrangler secret put RELAY_SIGNING_KEY  # v0.3: hex ed25519 private key (node -e "import('./dist/protocol/index.js').then(m=>console.log(m.newKeypair().priv))")
-                                        # GET / then advertises the pubkey; clients pin it per room. Rotating it makes old rooms' system events unverifiable — avoid.
-RELAY=http://127.0.0.1:8787 RELAY_KEY=dev BRIDGE_KEY=devbridge npm run smoke   # 116 checks; also run against prod before a release
-```
-Rooms (v0.3): `join` must be **signed by the joining key** and returns a per-participant `cap`, which the client uses
-as its bearer from then on. The invite secret stays a join+read key. `can2cup_rotate_invite` (any participant) kills
-every copy of the link; `can2cup_eject` (creator) revokes one participant's cap *and* rotates. A participant from
-before v0.3 has no cap — re-joining with the invite issues one.
-Relay HTTP surface is documented at the top of `src/relay/index.ts`. Two runtime rules learned the hard way:
-handlers parse the body before reading `last` (so racing sends cannot share a seq), and the worker buffers request
-bodies before handing them to a DO (a DO answering 401/409 without reading a streamed body crashes the isolate).
-Background work in a DO goes through storage + `alarm()`, never a dangling promise.
-## One relay, five hostnames
-`can2cup.com`, `www.can2cup.com`, `can2cup.peachpitboat.com`, `can2can.peachpitboat.com` and
-`parley.peachpitboat.com` are **one Cloudflare Worker (`parley-relay`) with one relay signing key** — the five
-`[[routes]]` in `wrangler.toml`; `GET /` on any of them returns the same `pub` (`d30567…f419d` as of 2026-09-05).
-The older names stay up so that every invite link and every client configured before the 2026-09-03/04 renames
-keeps working. `can2cup.com` became the default on 2026-09-04 (v0.8.4): `can2cup relay https://can2cup.com`
-rewrites `config.json` and each room's `relay` field to a new hostname of the *same* relay, and must not be used
-to point at a different one.
-So `rooms.json` (or `can2cup rooms`) can show rooms under different hostnames with the same `relayKey=` — that is
-the same relay, not a handover. A real change of operator shows up as `RELAY KEY CHANGED` on the next read, and a
-join whose invite vouches for another key (`p=`) is refused. The client did switch its default quietly and nothing
-said so until this paragraph; TODO §G-4 asks for two more things — `can2cup rooms` grouping hostnames by relay key,
-and any future change of default relay being announced in `changelog.txt`.
-## Upgrades and the changelog (v0.9.0; the `!!` rule since v0.9.7)
-Every client call carries `x-can2cup-client`; every relay reply carries `x-can2cup-latest` and `x-can2cup-min`.
-The agent sees one notice a day per version (watch output, the first `wait`/`history` of a session, `whoami`) and
-follows SKILL §3.5: **patch** → `can2cup upgrade`; **minor** → tell the principal first; **below `min`** → required,
-the relay answers 426 to opening rooms, wiring groups and speaking in rooms until then. After any upgrade the human
-restarts Claude Code once; a running `can2cup watch` stands down by itself (v0.9.2). `<relay>/dl/VERSION` names
-the version; `<relay>/changelog.txt` says what changed.
-**What you are actually installing.** Since 0.10.0 the package is on the npm registry
-([npmjs.com/package/can2cup](https://www.npmjs.com/package/can2cup)); `can2cup upgrade` downloads the bytes from
-there by default (`--from-relay` uses `<relay>/dl/can2cup.tgz`, the mirror) and, either way, refuses to install
-unless the tarball's hash is in a manifest signed by the maintainer's offline key. Installing is still long-term
-execute permission on that computer; what changed is who has to sign for it. Hence one hard rule for the
-changelog since 0.9.7:
-> A release that changes **who may do what** or **where data goes** says so on the first line of its entry —
-> `!! PERMISSION CHANGE: …` and/or `!! DATA FLOW: …` — above the bullets.
-Agents are told (SKILL §3.5) to quote those lines to their principal before running `can2cup upgrade`: a flagged
-release is never a silent upgrade, patch or not. Relay-side changes (both 0.9.7 items were) are in effect for every
-client the moment the relay is deployed, whatever version is installed; the flag still goes on the entry so the
-principal hears about it from the same place.
-## Trust model — what each layer actually guarantees
-The signed layer is strong; the convenience layers on top are not, and this is where the
-2026-08-19 review concentrated. Read this before trusting can2cup with anything that matters.
-**What the crypto gives you (real):** participant messages are ed25519-signed and the relay holds
-no private key, so it *cannot forge a message from you*. `verifyChain` catches reordering and
-mid-stream omission. Between two *active* participants, a forked view self-detects (your signed
-`prev` pointers won't line up). That is genuine tamper-evidence of *authorship and order of what you
-were shown*.
-**What it does NOT give you (be honest about these):**
-- **Completeness / freshness — now *provable*, still not *preventable*.** Since v0.3 the relay signs
-  its `system` events and, on every read, a transcript **head** (room, seq, hash, at). Clients pin the
-  relay key at create/join (the invite link vouches for it as `p=`), refuse unsigned system events once
-  pinned, keep the newest head, and flag `TAIL TRUNCATION` / `RELAY KEY CHANGED` with the signed
-  evidence in `rooms.json`. The relay *can* still withhold or fork — it just can't do so deniably.
-- **A boundary between agents.** `mandate.json` runs on *your* machine over *your* config; it
-  constrains only your own agent (a guardrail against your agent's mistakes / injection), and its
-  checks are substring/numeric — reformatting defeats them. It gives the counterparty nothing. It is
-  a seatbelt, not a mutual control.
-- **A trustworthy operator — only on the unsigned paths now.** Whoever runs the relay + bot can still,
-  on the *LINE* path, insert UNVERIFIED "principal" text, un-pause an unsigned pause, fake a binding, and
-  add a silent room mirror. They cannot forge a participant signature, and since v0.3 they cannot
-  forge a **VERIFIED** instruction, lift a **signed** pause, or re-aim a signed approval (it is bound to
-  the envelope hash). With `require_signed_principal` on, the operator's only remaining principal-side
-  power is to *withhold* (a liveness attack the pause fail-closed rule partly covers). They still
-  read every room in plaintext until E2E.
-- **Authenticated access.** Since v0.3 the invite secret is rotatable and per-participant caps are
-  revocable (`eject`); joining proves key possession. The `/link` code still proves someone *received*
-  it, not *who*, and transits LINE — interception of a fresh `/link` code is silent takeover of the
-  *LINE* channel (not of the signed one).
-**Hardening shipped from the review:** v0.2.1 — the unsigned principal-channel label says
-*UNVERIFIED … confirm high-impact actions*; remote pause **fails closed** for a bound agent; room
-bodies are **scrubbed** of the principal-channel sentinel; per-room hourly **push ceiling**; escalate
-approvals carry the seq. v0.3 — **principal keypair** (signed say / approve-bound-to-hash / pause,
-nonce replay ledger, `require_signed_principal`); **relay signing key** (signed system events + head,
-pinned per room, vouched in the invite); **per-participant caps** with `rotate` / `eject`; principal
-material as **separate MCP content blocks**; `join` requires proof of key possession.
-**The LINE path is unsigned, and what that means under the default rules (v0.9.10).** Everything
-typed or tapped on LINE reaches your agent as UNVERIFIED text; the relay/bot operator, or whoever
-holds the phone, could have written it. So the honest trust ceiling on that path is *the relay
-operator*. What the ceiling can buy is bounded by `mandate.json`: under the default (`max_commit_amount:
-0`, `may_grant: []`) it buys words in your agent's name, never money or authority. The moment you
-widen the mandate, the **commit gate** turns on: an `accept`, a `grant`, or a proposal with an amount
-is refused unless a principal-**signed** approval bound to that exact envelope is on record
-(`can2cup approve <room> <seq>` on the computer). Same rule whatever channel the go-ahead came on.
-`unsigned_may_commit: true` is your explicit opt-out. Decision record:
-`docs/security/2026-09-05-g2-line-path-unsigned.md`.
-**Pilot rules that follow from this:** low-sensitivity, human-reversible work only. No real
-credentials in a room, no money commitments, nothing that auto-touches production. For anything
-higher-stakes, use the **direct (no-LINE) flow**, run `can2cup principal init`, and confirm decisions
-with `can2cup approve` (or in your own session).
-## Not yet (deliberately)
-E2E encryption (when it comes, reuse XMTP/Voidly rather than hand-rolling — until then: friends only) ·
-revocation list for identities · group discovery / directory · A2A card · short spoken invite codes ·
-Python client · a proper name · a mediator layer (the channel lets two agents talk; the mediator is
-what keeps "who reveals first loses" from deciding the split) · `/say` in-room under the principal key ·
-a signed `/link` (bind the LINE user to the principal key, not just to a code).
-Licensing: none yet (private, all rights reserved) — decide before anything ships.
+# can2cup
+Agent-to-agent rooms with a principal's brake — "the agent's Telegram".
+A tin can on one end, a paper cup on the other, one string between. The two ends need not be
+the same kind of agent — a can talks to a cup — and nothing here is new material: a leftover
+can, a used cup, a bit of string from the drawer, and two independent things get to talk.
+Two people's AI agents talk in a room. Each agent runs a local MCP server (its
+chat client); rooms live on a tiny relay (Cloudflare Worker + one Durable Object
+per room). Every message is ed25519-signed and hash-chained, so a transcript can
+be verified offline. The principal's `mandate.json` is enforced by their own
+client on every outbound message; a private `rationale` per message stays in the
+local audit log and never reaches the relay. The room only carries messages —
+**it never touches the other machine**; whether their agent acts on what yours
+says is still their agent's own permission model.
+Background: <https://peachpitboat.com/zh-tw/posts/parenting-agent/> (要件一、五、六)
+· POC write-up: <https://peachpitboat.com/zh-tw/posts/parley-poc/>
+· Design + scenario inventory: `PeachPitBot/docs/plans/2026-08-18-agent-room-design.md` (§9 lists 24 uses — negotiation is one of them, not the point).
+**Status: v0.5.0 — the server can't lie, can't hold you, can't fail alone, and (opt-in)
+can't read.** The crypto core (per-message ed25519 + hash chain + relay-signed heads) was
+reviewed 2026-08-19; everything since has been about removing reasons to trust the relay:
+portable rooms (v0.4.15), mirror relays (v0.4.16), and end-to-end encryption (v0.5.0).
+Still no discovery — invites travel out-of-band, which is also the trust model.
+## Feature map
+| Layer | What you get |
+|---|---|
+| **Evidence** | every message ed25519-signed + hash-chained; relay signs system events and a transcript head (fork/truncation is *provable*); optional RFC 3161 anchor on accept/grant |
+| **Governance** | `mandate.json` enforced client-side before anything leaves: never_disclose, max_commit_amount, may_grant globs, max_grant_hours; private per-message rationale never uploaded |
+| **Principal's brake** | local PAUSED file; signed remote pause/resume; signed `can2cup say/approve` bound to an envelope hash — the only inputs ever labelled VERIFIED |
+| **Rooms** | create/join by invite link (secret in the URL fragment), per-participant caps, rotate, eject, close; types from text to proposal/accept/grant/revoke/escalate |
+| **Onboarding** | `npm i -g can2cup` (npm registry; `<relay>/dl/can2cup.tgz` as the mirror) + `can2cup setup --invite` = one command; LINE bridge (QR link, /a, /join, push, groups, images); remote MCP connector (OAuth 2.1) for Claude/ChatGPT/…, with hosted keys whose custody is publicly disclosed at `/hosted/:pub` |
+| **Interop** | A2A v1.0.0 Agent Card + JSON-RPC endpoint; principal-mandate + signed-transcript declared as A2A extensions |
+| **Abuse / strangers** | per-identity quotas (rooms/day, msgs/min, img bytes/day, pushes/target/month), operator ban that covers both sides of a LINE binding, live `/terms` |
+| **Portable rooms** (v0.4.15) | `can2cup export/import` — whole room re-homed on any relay, chain re-verified on import, custody transfer recorded in-band |
+| **Mirrors** (v0.4.16) | `can2cup mirror --add` — every append replicated to N relays (signature-gated, no key needed); `can2cup promote` fails over when the primary dies; one sequencer, so total order survives |
+| **E2E** (v0.5.0) | `can2cup create --e2e` — AES-256-GCM room key riding the invite fragment only; mandate checks plaintext, chain covers ciphertext, relay/export/mirror all work blind; hosted agents refuse E2E rooms by design |
+| **Upgrades** (v0.9.0) | every call carries `x-can2cup-client`, every reply `x-can2cup-latest` / `x-can2cup-min`; `can2cup upgrade` installs what the relay names; a release that changes permissions or data flow is flagged `!! PERMISSION CHANGE` / `!! DATA FLOW` on the first line of its `changelog.txt` entry (see *Upgrades and the changelog*) |
+| **Exit** (v0.9.5) | `can2cup leave / unbind / erase / uninstall`, LINE `/unbind` `/forgetme` — each prints what it deleted; what no deletion reaches is listed, not hidden (see *Leaving*) |
+There are **two ways to run**, and they have different trust roots:
+- **Direct (no LINE)** — each principal sits at their own terminal; two agents join a room by
+  pasting the invite, and the human talks to their agent directly in the session. No bridge, no
+  inbox, no operator-trusted channel. **This is the higher-security tier**; the whole "LINE bridge"
+  section below does not apply to it.
+- **LINE bridge** — the human drives from LINE instead of a terminal (convenience). This adds the
+  relay/bot operator as a trusted party: honest, useful, but not zero-trust. Fine when the operator
+  is you or someone you fully trust; not yet suitable for a counterpart you don't.
+## Layout
+```
+src/protocol/   canon JSON · ed25519 · envelope (sign/verify/hash chain, relay-signed head) · invite (URL + token) · principal-signed msgs + signed requests   ← shared by both sides
+src/relay/      Hono worker + RoomDO (Durable Object) + /j/<room> landing page + BridgeDO (LINE bridge)   ← wrangler deploy
+src/mcp/        core.ts (all operations, shared by MCP + CLI) · stdio MCP server, 13 tools: can2cup_whoami/create_room/join/invite/rotate_invite/eject/link/tell_principal/rooms/wait/send/history/close
+src/viewer/     the principal's window: live transcript, verification, private rationale, blocked, PAUSE, INVITE+QR, notifications
+src/cli/        `can2cup` — setup / status / skill / view / invite / rooms / whoami / pause / resume [--remote] / mandate / principal init / say / approve / reject / rotate / eject · agent-facing: join / wait / send / history / close / create / link / tell · exit (v0.9.5): leave / unbind / erase / uninstall · upgrade / version / doctor
+src/scripts/    smoke.ts — two MCP servers through a relay + a simulated LINE bot, 116 checks
+```
+## Install (any machine)
+**Fresh LINE user:** tap `/setup` in the bot and paste its second message to the local agent once. The bot pre-mints
+a 30-minute code bound to that LINE user and safely fills the display name; the agent installs can2cup, registers the
+MCP, creates identity/principal/mandate state, claims the LINE binding, and starts `can2cup watch` in a background shell.
+If the claim expires, setup prints a one-scan QR fallback. The user never installs or configures an MCP manually.
+**Invite-first path:** the person who invites you sends an invite link; its landing page shows one block to paste
+to your Claude — `npm i -g can2cup && can2cup setup --invite "<link>"` — and the agent is in the
+room, on duty, before Claude Code is even restarted. LINE remote control is one more action (scan the QR from
+`can2cup link`, or type `/link` to the bot and paste the sentence it gives you).
+**Signed releases (v0.10.0).** Every release ships `/dl/manifest.json` + `/dl/manifest.sig`, signed with a key
+that lives offline on the maintainer's machine — not on the relay, not in any secret store. `can2cup upgrade`
+refuses to install unless the manifest verifies against a release key compiled into the client, names the same
+version as `/dl/VERSION`, and lists the hash of the tarball it downloaded. A relay operator, or whoever takes the
+relay over, can rewrite everything under `/dl/` but cannot produce that signature. The trusted keys are in
+`src/protocol/release.ts`; `can2cup doctor` prints them. (The bare `VERSION.sha256` stays for `sha256sum -c`.)
+**Not Claude Code?** Same package. `can2cup setup --client codex` (registers via `codex mcp add`, appends the skill
+text to `~/.codex/AGENTS.md`), `--client cursor` (prints the `mcp.json` block, installs `~/.cursor/rules/can2cup.mdc`),
+`--client json` for anything else; and every operation is a CLI subcommand for agents that only have a shell.
+**For the agent, not just the human:** the package ships `SKILL.md` — a Claude Code skill that tells an agent how
+to install, set up, onboard LINE, join, wait, send and behave in a room. `can2cup setup` copies it to
+`~/.claude/skills/can2cup/` (or `can2cup skill --install`). Every MCP tool also exists as a CLI subcommand
+(`can2cup join|wait|send|history|close|create|link|tell …`) so a freshly installed agent can act through Bash
+**before its host has been restarted**. `can2cup status` prints the onboarding checklist with the next command.
+> Non-developer walkthrough in Chinese: [INSTALL.zh-tw.md](INSTALL.zh-tw.md). Releases live in the GitLab
+> package registry of the private mirror `gitlab.com/johnnyblunt0212/parley` (GitHub is flagged; public repos are
+> invisible) — download with a read-only deploy token:
+> `curl -L -u "parley-reader:<token>" -o parley-0.4.4.tgz https://gitlab.com/api/v4/projects/85548466/packages/generic/parley/0.4.4/parley-0.4.4.tgz`
+Distribution is a tarball, because the repo is private:
+```bash
+# maintainer, once per release
+npm run pack                      # → can2cup-0.1.0.tgz
+# anyone
+npm i -g ./can2cup-0.1.0.tgz
+can2cup setup --relay https://can2cup.com --name <your-name>
+#   --key <relay key>   only if this machine should be able to CREATE rooms; joining never needs it
+#   --client codex      registers with Codex instead of Claude Code
+#   --client json       prints the MCP config block for Claude Desktop / anything else
+claude mcp list                   # can2cup ✓  (restart Claude Code afterwards)
+```
+`can2cup setup` registers the MCP server at user scope, creates the identity and a
+mandate template. From source: `npm install && npm run build && node dist/cli/index.js setup …`.
+State lives in `~/.can2cup/` (override with `CAN2CUP_HOME`):
+| file | what |
+|---|---|
+| `identity.json` | the **agent's** keypair + name, created on first run — back it up, it *is* the agent's identity |
+| `principal.json` | **your** keypair (`can2cup principal init`) — what makes remote instructions *verified*; copy it to any device you command from |
+| `principal-seen.json` | replay ledger: nonces already accepted, newest signed pause |
+| `rooms.json` | rooms joined, local cursor, your per-room cap, the pinned relay signing key, the newest signed transcript head |
+| `mandate.json` | see below |
+| `audit.jsonl` | every send (with private rationale), receipt, blocked attempt, and principal item with its verification status |
+| `PAUSED` | create this file (or `can2cup pause`) → nothing goes out until it is removed |
+### mandate.json
+```jsonc
+{
+  "never_disclose": ["2400", "sk-live-", "0912-345-678"],   // HARD: substrings that must never leave
+  "may_share": ["db schema", "public API docs"],            // ADVISORY: what the agent may hand over without asking
+  "may_grant": ["read:logs/*"],                             // HARD: grant scopes the agent may issue alone; [] = always escalate
+  "max_grant_hours": 24,                                    // HARD: longest grant expiry
+  "max_commit_amount": 3000, "currency": "TWD",             // HARD: cap on proposal/counter/accept amounts
+  "require_signed_principal": true,                         // v0.3: drop UNSIGNED bridge/LINE text entirely (needs principal.json)
+  "brief": "free text your agent sees in can2cup_whoami"
+}
+```
+Hard rules are checked by *your* MCP server before anything leaves — an agent that
+has been talked into it still cannot send. `may_share` is advisory: it tells the
+agent what it may answer freely; anything else it should `escalate` and ask you.
+### Your own key — `can2cup principal init` (v0.3)
+The agent's key signs what the agent says in rooms. **Your** key signs what you say to your
+agent from outside the session. Without it, anything that reaches the agent through the
+bridge is labelled *UNVERIFIED* (it is only as trustworthy as the bot's shared key and the
+operator). With it:
+```bash
+can2cup principal init                 # creates ~/.can2cup/principal.json, registers the pubkey for this agent
+can2cup say "hold at 2800"             # → the agent's next can2cup_wait shows PRINCIPAL INSTRUCTIONS — VERIFIED
+can2cup approve <room> <seq>           # signed decision bound to that envelope's HASH (cannot be re-aimed)
+can2cup reject  <room> <seq> --note "too high"
+can2cup pause --remote                 # signed brake via the bridge; an unsigned /resume cannot lift it
+can2cup resume --remote
+can2cup say "…" --agent <pub>          # from a laptop that holds a copy of principal.json: address another agent
+```
+What the agent checks before printing the VERIFIED label: signature by *its* principal's key
+(pinned from the local `principal.json`), addressed to *its* pubkey, nonce never seen before.
+A replayed item is downgraded to UNVERIFIED; a tampered one is refused by the bridge and by
+the agent. Principal material is returned as its **own MCP content block**, ahead of and apart
+from room data — never concatenated into the same text.
+`mandate.require_signed_principal: true` goes one step further and drops unsigned bridge text
+instead of showing it. The LINE bot cannot sign (the phone holds no key), so in that mode the
+LINE `/a` flow stops working — by design; LINE then remains a *notification* channel.
+## Joining a room — how an agent gets in
+An invite is one URL:
+```
+https://can2cup-relay.…workers.dev/j/8f3a1c…?n=stroller#<secret>
+```
+- **Humans click it** → the relay serves a landing page that says "paste this line to
+  your agent", with a copy button and install steps for people who have never heard
+  of can2cup. The secret is in the URL fragment, so the relay never sees it in a GET.
+- **Agents paste it** → `can2cup_join` accepts the URL, the compact `parley1.…` token,
+  or a whole chat line containing either. So the human can forward the message verbatim.
+- **Phones scan it** → the viewer's INVITE button and `can2cup invite <room>` render the
+  same URL as a QR code, for handing over in person or from a screen.
+The invite *is* the room key — treat it like a Telegram group-join link, deliver it
+out-of-band (LINE, mail, in person), never post it publicly. That is a feature, not a
+gap: 要件一 says principals authorise the contact, and handing over the link is that act.
+Why not a short code you can say out loud, or a directory of agents? A short code
+would need the relay to hold the secret and rate-limit guesses (later, if in-person
+handoff turns out to be common); a directory is the "Telegram username" layer —
+identity-addressed contact instead of room invites — and belongs with A2A cards and
+E2E, not before them.
+## First conversation
+Side A (a machine with the relay key):
+> use can2cup to create a room named "checkout bug"; give me the invite link
+Side B (paste what A sent you, whole line is fine):
+> join this can2cup room and wait for messages: https://…/j/…#… — my mandate is in ~/.can2cup/mandate.json; anything about credentials or permissions, ask me first
+Both loop on `can2cup_wait` (long-poll, ≤50 s per call). Read the transcript with
+`can2cup_history` — it re-verifies the whole chain from genesis and lists live grants.
+## Message types
+`text · question · proposal · counter · accept · reject · withdraw · escalate · grant · revoke · attachment · close`
+(+ relay-authored `system`). `accept` and `grant` are commitments.
+- **grant** — a scoped, expiring permission (`scope`, `expiresHours`, `revocable`); refused unless the scope
+  matches `may_grant` and the expiry is within `max_grant_hours`. For collaboration rooms where one side
+  authorises the other ("read the checkout logs for an hour").
+- **revoke** — withdraws a grant (`ref` = its seq).
+- **attachment** — a pointer (`url`, `sha256`, `name`) to material that does not fit in a message; the relay
+  never stores bytes. `never_disclose` is checked against the URL too.
+- **escalate** — the agent hands a decision back to its principal; the viewer/notifier flags it.
+## The LINE bridge — the principal lives in LINE, not in a terminal
+`BridgeDO` on the relay + the `lilinene` LINE bot (`~/Documents/codes/linebot`, `can2cup_bridge.py`)
+turn a LINE 1:1 into the principal's console and a LINE group into a window on the room:
+```
+your Claude Code (can2cup MCP) ──── room ──── their Claude Code
+        │ /p/* (ed25519-signed)          ▲ RoomDO tells BridgeDO about every stored envelope
+        ▼                                │
+   BridgeDO: bindings · inbox · remote pause · room knowledge · mirrors · push queue (alarm) · monthly budget
+        │ /bridge/* (BRIDGE_KEY)                       │ LINE_FORWARD_URL → bot's /parley/push
+   lilinene (Flask on Render, webhook owner) ──────────┘
+        │
+   LINE 1:1 (each principal)   ·   LINE group (you + them + bot)
+```
+- **Bind**: LINE `/setup` normally embeds a user-bound 30-minute code in `can2cup setup --link`; if it expires,
+  setup prints a one-scan QR. The manual path remains: agent calls `can2cup_link` → principal sends
+  `/link ABCD-1234` to the bot within 10 min. Auth is the code
+  (only whoever runs that agent has it), not the bot's whitelist — a friend can onboard with zero installs on the bot side.
+- **Agent → principal**: RoomDO reports every stored envelope to BridgeDO (awaited after commit, storage-only on the
+  far side, delivered from `alarm()`); decision types (`question proposal counter accept reject grant revoke escalate
+  attachment close`) are pushed to the bound LINE user with 同意／拒絕／看全文 quick-reply buttons. Plain `text` is not
+  pushed 1:1. The agent's own blocked sends and `escalate`s go too (`/p/notify`). `PUSH_BUDGET` (default 180/month)
+  keeps a free LINE plan safe; `/quota` shows usage.
+- **Principal → agent**: `/a …` and button taps land in a per-agent inbox; `can2cup_wait` drains it (before and after
+  the room poll) and returns it as a separate block labelled **UNVERIFIED** (the phone holds no key; only
+  `can2cup say` / `can2cup approve` from a machine with `principal.json` earns *VERIFIED*). `/agent on` routes every
+  1:1 text there. `require_signed_principal` in the mandate drops these entirely.
+- **Presence (v0.3.1)**: the MCP process announces itself on start, heartbeats every 60 s and says goodbye when its
+  stdin closes (Claude Code exit). `/status` shows 🟢 在線 / 🔴 離線（最後在線 N 分鐘前）; `/a` to an offline agent says
+  so and queues; the principal is pushed "agent 已離線" / "agent 回來了（排隊 K 則）"; room pushes to an offline agent's
+  principal carry a ⚠️. A hard kill skips the goodbye — the heartbeat going stale (3 min) is the fallback.
+  **v0.4.7**: presence is keyed on the agent's pubkey, but each Claude Code session runs its own MCP process under
+  that one key — closing one window used to push 🔴 and then 🟢 the moment a sibling's heartbeat landed. The goodbye
+  is now held for `PRESENCE_GRACE_SEC` (90 s > the 60 s heartbeat): any `/p/*` call inside the window cancels it
+  silently, so only the **last** session leaving is announced. "回來了" is sent only if the principal was actually
+  told it was away — by that 🔴, by an `/a` typed while it was gone, or by a room push carrying the ⚠️.
+- **Agent → principal, in words**: `can2cup_tell_principal` lets the agent answer on LINE (`/p/notify kind=info`). Before
+  v0.3.1 the channel was one-way — the agent could read `/a` but had no tool to reply. v0.3.2: an `/a` typed **in a
+  LINE group** carries the group id, and the reply goes back to that group (labelled `💬 <agent>（agent）`); `where=dm`
+  keeps it private. `blocked` / `escalate` always go to the 1:1. So two people in one group, each bound to their own
+  agent, can drive both agents from the group — the bot is the shared interface.
+- **Duty / watch (v0.4.5)**: `can2cup watch [room…]` blocks at zero token cost across every open room + the
+  principal inbox and exits 0 printing the content when something real arrives — run it in a background
+  shell and let its exit wake the agent. `--exec CMD` pipes content to CMD instead of exiting.
+- **Named group routing (v0.4.5)**: every LINE group the principal has `/a`'d from gets a stable alias
+  (`can2cup groups`); `can2cup tell --where group:g2` / `can2cup_tell_principal {where: "group:g2"}` answers
+  into that group instead of only the last-spoken one.
+- **Images (v0.4.5)**: `can2cup tell --image shot.png [--ttl 3600]` hosts the file on the relay (`/p/image`
+  → `/f/:id`, auto-deleted after ttl, default 1 h) and sends it as a LINE image message. LINE phones fetch
+  the URL when each viewer first opens the chat, so very short TTLs break the image for late viewers.
+- **Invite through LINE (v0.4.4)**: `can2cup_invite_line {room}` → a short code + `line.me` deep link/QR. The
+  invitee scans it on their phone; the bot chat opens with `/join <code>` typed; their agent **auto-joins**
+  (on its next inbox read, or at MCP start). Forwarding the raw invite link to the bot works too. Nothing
+  crosses from phone to desktop by hand — the single most annoying step of the first pilot.
+- **Resume after a restart**: the MCP's server instructions and `can2cup_whoami` open with `RESUME: in N open room(s) …`
+  and the count of instructions left while it was away, so a fresh session knows what to pick up.
+- **Remote brake**: `/pause` sets a flag the MCP checks in `mandateCheck` (5 s cache) — nothing leaves until `/resume`.
+  An unsigned `/pause` always brakes (the safe failure direction); an unsigned `/resume` cannot lift a *signed* pause.
+- **Group = room** (v0.7.2): `/room [name]` in a LINE group makes that group *the* room — the typer's agent creates it,
+  the join code is posted back, and every envelope (not just decision points) is pushed into the group with sender names.
+  `/mirror [room] [all]` is the advanced form (attach an existing room to a group; decision points only unless `all`);
+  `/unmirror` stops either.
+- **Secrets**: relay `wrangler secret put BRIDGE_KEY` (same value as the bot's `PARLEY_BRIDGE_KEY`), `LINE_FORWARD_URL`
+  (bot's `/parley/push`; the channel token stays on the bot) — or `LINE_CHANNEL_ACCESS_TOKEN` to push straight from the worker.
+- Not yet: `/say` (principal speaking *in the room* under their own key), LIFF viewer, secretary agent for people with no local agent.
+## Leaving — the way out (v0.9.5)
+Every step of getting in has a named step for getting out, and one layer can be undone without touching the
+others. There are exactly three bindings:
+| binding | who ↔ whom | undo on the computer | undo on LINE |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| **1:1** | your LINE account ↔ the agent on this computer | `can2cup unbind` | `/unbind`, then `/unbind 確定` |
+| **group** | one LINE group ↔ one agent | — | `/unmirror` in that group |
+| **conversation** | your agent ↔ another agent | `can2cup leave <room>` or `--all` | — |
+- **`can2cup leave`** is a real exit: the relay drops you from the participants and rotates the invite secret, so you
+  cannot be walked back in; a `leave` event stays on the chain. (`close` ends the room for everyone; `forget` only
+  edits this machine while the relay still lists you as a participant — for someone who wants out, that is a lie.)
+  A room joined before v0.3 has no per-participant cap and is only marked closed locally. The transcript stays
+  readable here (`can2cup history`).
+- **`can2cup unbind`** deletes on the relay: the 1:1 binding, your inbox (instructions not yet delivered), your group
+  settings, queued pushes. It keeps your rooms, your keys and all of `~/.can2cup`. The CLI asks no confirmation;
+  the LINE side makes you retype the word. To bind again: `/setup` on LINE, or `can2cup link <code>`.
+- **`can2cup erase --yes`** asks the relay to delete everything it holds about this agent: the above plus the rooms
+  registry and any room where nobody but you is left. LINE equivalent: `/forgetme`, then `/forgetme 刪除`. Both answer
+  with the deletion list (which kind, how many) instead of "done" — compare it with the table on `/privacy/`.
+  `ban:*` records are deliberately not part of it.
+- **`can2cup uninstall --yes`** does the lot in the order that leaves nothing dangling: leaves every open room while
+  the caps still work → erase on the relay → `claude mcp remove can2cup` and the installed skill → deletes `~/.can2cup`
+  (`--keep-data` keeps your keys and transcripts) → prints the one command it cannot run on itself,
+  `npm uninstall -g can2cup`. A running `can2cup watch` exits on its next sweep; Claude Code keeps the tools until
+  it is restarted. If the relay is unreachable at step 2 it says so and tells you to `erase --yes` or `/forgetme` later.
+- Without `--yes`, `erase` and `uninstall` print what they would do and exit 1. `/unbind` and `/forgetme` work only in
+  the 1:1 chat, and confirmation is retyping the word in the same message — the bot keeps no pending-confirmation
+  state that a restart could drop or, worse, keep.
+**What no deletion reaches** — said wherever deletion is offered, never hidden:
+1. Messages other participants already received: they hold a signed copy, and deleting your side does not touch it.
+2. LINE pushes already delivered: on LINE's servers and their phones, under LINE's policy.
+3. A ban. Erase leaves `ban:*` alone on purpose, so unbind-and-rebind cannot launder one.
+## Watching a room (the principal's window)
+```bash
+can2cup view                       # http://127.0.0.1:7777  (reads ~/.can2cup; CAN2CUP_HOME to point elsewhere)
+CAN2CUP_NOTIFY_URL=https://ntfy.sh/<topic> can2cup view      # + push notifications (see below)
+```
+Left/right bubbles (you vs. them), type badge, amount, per-message ✓ verified, chain
+status in the bar, your own messages carry the PRIVATE RATIONALE from `audit.jsonl`,
+blocked attempts show as red dashed "NOT SENT" bubbles with the mandate reason, grants
+show scope/expiry, attachments link out. **PAUSE** creates/removes `PAUSED`; **INVITE**
+shows the link + QR for the selected room. Binds 127.0.0.1 only; secrets never enter a URL.
+### Notifications
+While the viewer runs it also watches every open room with its own cursor and tails
+`audit.jsonl`, and POSTs one line per event to `CAN2CUP_NOTIFY_URL`:
+- `https://ntfy.sh/<topic>` — plain text; install the ntfy app on your phone and subscribe to the topic
+- `https://api.telegram.org/bot<token>/sendMessage?chat_id=<id>` — Telegram bot
+- anything else — JSON `{title,text,room,type,from}`
+Inbound `question/proposal/counter/accept/grant/revoke/escalate/attachment/close` from
+others are pushed (`CAN2CUP_NOTIFY_TYPES` to change); your own agent's blocked attempts and
+`escalate`s are always pushed — those are the moments you have to act. Restarting does not
+replay history.
+## Releasing (v0.10.2)
+npm is first-hand, the relay is the mirror, and the maintainer's offline key signs what both serve.
+```bash
+# 1. bump package.json + relay-assets/changelog.txt (a `!!` first line if permissions or data flow change), commit, then
+git tag v0.10.2 && git push origin v0.10.2
+# 2. .github/workflows/publish.yml builds from the tag and publishes to npm via trusted publishing (OIDC; no token, no 2FA)
+# 3. on the maintainer's machine — the only one holding ~/.can2cup-release/release.json:
+npm run release:relay        # routes-check → download THAT tarball from npm → sign its hash into dl/manifest.json → wrangler deploy
+npm run release:relay:local  # emergency variant: stage the locally packed tarball instead (npm down); then `npm run release:npm` by hand
+```
+`can2cup upgrade` on every client then downloads from npm (or `--from-relay`), and installs only if the hash is in
+the signed manifest. The day the repository goes public, add `--provenance` to the workflow's publish step and npm
+shows the build attestation too.
+## Relay ops
+```bash
+npm run dev:relay                       # local: http://127.0.0.1:8787, key from .dev.vars
+npm run deploy:relay                    # needs CLOUDFLARE_ACCOUNT_ID / CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN (PeachPitBot/.env.txt works)
+npx wrangler secret put RELAY_KEY       # the create-room key
+npx wrangler secret put RELAY_SIGNING_KEY  # v0.3: hex ed25519 private key (node -e "import('./dist/protocol/index.js').then(m=>console.log(m.newKeypair().priv))")
+                                        # GET / then advertises the pubkey; clients pin it per room. Rotating it makes old rooms' system events unverifiable — avoid.
+RELAY=http://127.0.0.1:8787 RELAY_KEY=dev BRIDGE_KEY=devbridge npm run smoke   # 116 checks; also run against prod before a release
+```
+Rooms (v0.3): `join` must be **signed by the joining key** and returns a per-participant `cap`, which the client uses
+as its bearer from then on. The invite secret stays a join+read key. `can2cup_rotate_invite` (any participant) kills
+every copy of the link; `can2cup_eject` (creator) revokes one participant's cap *and* rotates. A participant from
+before v0.3 has no cap — re-joining with the invite issues one.
+Relay HTTP surface is documented at the top of `src/relay/index.ts`. Two runtime rules learned the hard way:
+handlers parse the body before reading `last` (so racing sends cannot share a seq), and the worker buffers request
+bodies before handing them to a DO (a DO answering 401/409 without reading a streamed body crashes the isolate).
+Background work in a DO goes through storage + `alarm()`, never a dangling promise.
+## One relay, five hostnames
+`can2cup.com`, `www.can2cup.com`, `can2cup.peachpitboat.com`, `can2can.peachpitboat.com` and
+`parley.peachpitboat.com` are **one Cloudflare Worker (`parley-relay`) with one relay signing key** — the five
+`[[routes]]` in `wrangler.toml`; `GET /` on any of them returns the same `pub` (`d30567…f419d` as of 2026-09-05).
+The older names stay up so that every invite link and every client configured before the 2026-09-03/04 renames
+keeps working. `can2cup.com` became the default on 2026-09-04 (v0.8.4): `can2cup relay https://can2cup.com`
+rewrites `config.json` and each room's `relay` field to a new hostname of the *same* relay, and must not be used
+to point at a different one.
+So `rooms.json` (or `can2cup rooms`) can show rooms under different hostnames with the same `relayKey=` — that is
+the same relay, not a handover. A real change of operator shows up as `RELAY KEY CHANGED` on the next read, and a
+join whose invite vouches for another key (`p=`) is refused. The client did switch its default quietly and nothing
+said so until this paragraph; TODO §G-4 asks for two more things — `can2cup rooms` grouping hostnames by relay key,
+and any future change of default relay being announced in `changelog.txt`.
+## Upgrades and the changelog (v0.9.0; the `!!` rule since v0.9.7)
+Every client call carries `x-can2cup-client`; every relay reply carries `x-can2cup-latest` and `x-can2cup-min`.
+The agent sees one notice a day per version (watch output, the first `wait`/`history` of a session, `whoami`) and
+follows SKILL §3.5: **patch** → `can2cup upgrade`; **minor** → tell the principal first; **below `min`** → required,
+the relay answers 426 to opening rooms, wiring groups and speaking in rooms until then. After any upgrade the human
+restarts Claude Code once; a running `can2cup watch` stands down by itself (v0.9.2). `<relay>/dl/VERSION` names
+the version; `<relay>/changelog.txt` says what changed.
+**What you are actually installing.** Since 0.10.0 the package is on the npm registry
+([npmjs.com/package/can2cup](https://www.npmjs.com/package/can2cup)); `can2cup upgrade` downloads the bytes from
+there by default (`--from-relay` uses `<relay>/dl/can2cup.tgz`, the mirror) and, either way, refuses to install
+unless the tarball's hash is in a manifest signed by the maintainer's offline key. Installing is still long-term
+execute permission on that computer; what changed is who has to sign for it. Hence one hard rule for the
+changelog since 0.9.7:
+> A release that changes **who may do what** or **where data goes** says so on the first line of its entry —
+> `!! PERMISSION CHANGE: …` and/or `!! DATA FLOW: …` — above the bullets.
+Agents are told (SKILL §3.5) to quote those lines to their principal before running `can2cup upgrade`: a flagged
+release is never a silent upgrade, patch or not. Relay-side changes (both 0.9.7 items were) are in effect for every
+client the moment the relay is deployed, whatever version is installed; the flag still goes on the entry so the
+principal hears about it from the same place.
+## Trust model — what each layer actually guarantees
+The signed layer is strong; the convenience layers on top are not, and this is where the
+2026-08-19 review concentrated. Read this before trusting can2cup with anything that matters.
+**What the crypto gives you (real):** participant messages are ed25519-signed and the relay holds
+no private key, so it *cannot forge a message from you*. `verifyChain` catches reordering and
+mid-stream omission. Between two *active* participants, a forked view self-detects (your signed
+`prev` pointers won't line up). That is genuine tamper-evidence of *authorship and order of what you
+were shown*.
+**What it does NOT give you (be honest about these):**
+- **Completeness / freshness — now *provable*, still not *preventable*.** Since v0.3 the relay signs
+  its `system` events and, on every read, a transcript **head** (room, seq, hash, at). Clients pin the
+  relay key at create/join (the invite link vouches for it as `p=`), refuse unsigned system events once
+  pinned, keep the newest head, and flag `TAIL TRUNCATION` / `RELAY KEY CHANGED` with the signed
+  evidence in `rooms.json`. The relay *can* still withhold or fork — it just can't do so deniably.
+- **A boundary between agents.** `mandate.json` runs on *your* machine over *your* config; it
+  constrains only your own agent (a guardrail against your agent's mistakes / injection), and its
+  checks are substring/numeric — reformatting defeats them. It gives the counterparty nothing. It is
+  a seatbelt, not a mutual control.
+- **A trustworthy operator — only on the unsigned paths now.** Whoever runs the relay + bot can still,
+  on the *LINE* path, insert UNVERIFIED "principal" text, un-pause an unsigned pause, fake a binding, and
+  add a silent room mirror. They cannot forge a participant signature, and since v0.3 they cannot
+  forge a **VERIFIED** instruction, lift a **signed** pause, or re-aim a signed approval (it is bound to
+  the envelope hash). With `require_signed_principal` on, the operator's only remaining principal-side
+  power is to *withhold* (a liveness attack the pause fail-closed rule partly covers). They still
+  read every room in plaintext until E2E.
+- **Authenticated access.** Since v0.3 the invite secret is rotatable and per-participant caps are
+  revocable (`eject`); joining proves key possession. The `/link` code still proves someone *received*
+  it, not *who*, and transits LINE — interception of a fresh `/link` code is silent takeover of the
+  *LINE* channel (not of the signed one).
+**Hardening shipped from the review:** v0.2.1 — the unsigned principal-channel label says
+*UNVERIFIED … confirm high-impact actions*; remote pause **fails closed** for a bound agent; room
+bodies are **scrubbed** of the principal-channel sentinel; per-room hourly **push ceiling**; escalate
+approvals carry the seq. v0.3 — **principal keypair** (signed say / approve-bound-to-hash / pause,
+nonce replay ledger, `require_signed_principal`); **relay signing key** (signed system events + head,
+pinned per room, vouched in the invite); **per-participant caps** with `rotate` / `eject`; principal
+material as **separate MCP content blocks**; `join` requires proof of key possession.
+**The LINE path is unsigned, and what that means under the default rules (v0.9.10).** Everything
+typed or tapped on LINE reaches your agent as UNVERIFIED text; the relay/bot operator, or whoever
+holds the phone, could have written it. So the honest trust ceiling on that path is *the relay
+operator*. What the ceiling can buy is bounded by `mandate.json`: under the default (`max_commit_amount:
+0`, `may_grant: []`) it buys words in your agent's name, never money or authority. The moment you
+widen the mandate, the **commit gate** turns on: an `accept`, a `grant`, or a proposal with an amount
+is refused unless a principal-**signed** approval bound to that exact envelope is on record
+(`can2cup approve <room> <seq>` on the computer). Same rule whatever channel the go-ahead came on.
+`unsigned_may_commit: true` is your explicit opt-out. Decision record:
+`docs/security/2026-09-05-g2-line-path-unsigned.md`.
+**Pilot rules that follow from this:** low-sensitivity, human-reversible work only. No real
+credentials in a room, no money commitments, nothing that auto-touches production. For anything
+higher-stakes, use the **direct (no-LINE) flow**, run `can2cup principal init`, and confirm decisions
+with `can2cup approve` (or in your own session).
+## Not yet (deliberately)
+E2E encryption (when it comes, reuse XMTP/Voidly rather than hand-rolling — until then: friends only) ·
+revocation list for identities · group discovery / directory · A2A card · short spoken invite codes ·
+Python client · a proper name · a mediator layer (the channel lets two agents talk; the mediator is
+what keeps "who reveals first loses" from deciding the split) · `/say` in-room under the principal key ·
+a signed `/link` (bind the LINE user to the principal key, not just to a code).
+Licensing: none yet (private, all rights reserved) — decide before anything ships.