burnledger 0.4.0 → 0.6.0

package/dist/cjs/verify.js

@@ -17,18 +17,21 @@
  *     output at issuance time (transparency_status=PENDING, no transparency).
  */
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
-exports.VALID_REVOCATION_UNKNOWN = exports.VALID_KEY_WINDOW_UNKNOWN = exports.VALID_KEY_COMPROMISED_LATER = exports.KEY_COMPROMISED = exports.KEY_OUTSIDE_VALIDITY = void 0;
+exports.VALID_REVOCATION_UNKNOWN = exports.VALID_KEY_WINDOW_UNKNOWN = exports.VALID_KEY_COMPROMISED_LATER = exports.KEY_COMPROMISED = exports.KEY_OUTSIDE_VALIDITY = exports.KNOWN_FORMAT_VERSIONS = void 0;
 exports.hexToBytes = hexToBytes;
 exports.bytesToHex = bytesToHex;
 exports.publicKeyFromHex = publicKeyFromHex;
+exports.keyIsUsable = keyIsUsable;
 exports.evaluateKey = evaluateKey;
 exports.certificateAnchor = certificateAnchor;
 exports.verifyCertificate = verifyCertificate;
 exports.verifyTransparency = verifyTransparency;
 exports.issuanceBytes = issuanceBytes;
 exports.formatTimestamp = formatTimestamp;
+exports.buildTreeHeadPayload = buildTreeHeadPayload;
 exports.verifyConsistency = verifyConsistency;
 exports.buildCertificateStatusPayload = buildCertificateStatusPayload;
+exports.buildKeyListPayload = buildKeyListPayload;
 exports.verifyCertificateWithStatus = verifyCertificateWithStatus;
 const errors_js_1 = require("./errors.js");
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -49,11 +52,69 @@ const PAYLOAD_TYPE_ATTESTATION_V5 = "burnledger.attestation.v5";
 const PAYLOAD_TYPE_CERTIFICATE_V5 = "burnledger.certificate.v5";
 const FORMAT_VERSION_V5 = "5.0";
 const FORMAT_VERSION_V4 = "4.0";
+// v6 renames the artifact and nothing else: the shape is byte-for-byte v5, and
+// only the tag and the version string differ. It still takes its own tag, for
+// the same reason v4 and v5 each took one -- a signature over a payload calling
+// itself a verification record must not verify as one calling itself a
+// certificate. Two names for one shape sharing a separator is exactly what a
+// separator prevents.
+const PAYLOAD_TYPE_ATTESTATION_V6 = "burnledger.attestation.v6";
+const PAYLOAD_TYPE_VERIFICATION_RECORD_V6 = "burnledger.verification_record.v6";
+const FORMAT_VERSION_V6 = "6.0";
+// v7 changes the SHAPE, not just the name: every system entry gains
+// read_only_enforcement and transport_security, and the issuer gains the
+// algorithm identifier. Its tags move for the reason v4, v5 and v6 each moved
+// theirs, and this time the bytes under them genuinely differ.
+const PAYLOAD_TYPE_ATTESTATION_V7 = "burnledger.attestation.v7";
+const PAYLOAD_TYPE_VERIFICATION_RECORD_V7 = "burnledger.verification_record.v7";
+const FORMAT_VERSION_V7 = "7.0";
+const FORMAT_VERSION_V3 = "3.0";
+/**
+ * The only signature scheme this SDK can check. A v7 record names its own
+ * algorithm, so a record naming anything else must be refused with its own
+ * code rather than fed to ed25519Verify and reported as a bad signature.
+ */
+const ALGORITHM_ED25519 = "ed25519";
+/**
+ * Every format this build can read, oldest first. Mirrors core.FormatVersions()
+ * in the Go source; the cross-language conformance corpus carries a fixture per
+ * version, so a version present in one language and missing here fails there.
+ *
+ * Frozen because `readonly` is erased at build time: it stops a TypeScript
+ * caller from writing to the array, and does nothing at all to the JavaScript
+ * this compiles to — which is what the browser bundle actually runs, where any
+ * script on the page could otherwise push a version onto it.
+ */
+exports.KNOWN_FORMAT_VERSIONS = Object.freeze([
+    FORMAT_VERSION_V3,
+    FORMAT_VERSION_V4,
+    FORMAT_VERSION_V5,
+    FORMAT_VERSION_V6,
+    FORMAT_VERSION_V7,
+]);
+/**
+ * Returns the version, or throws if this SDK cannot read it.
+ *
+ * Rejects a non-string too: JSON carrying `6.0` as a NUMBER would compare
+ * unequal to every known version and silently take the oldest branch, which is
+ * the same trap as an unknown version wearing a different hat.
+ */
+function checkFormatVersion(version) {
+    if (typeof version !== "string" || !exports.KNOWN_FORMAT_VERSIONS.includes(version)) {
+        throw new errors_js_1.VerificationError(`unsupported certificate_format_version ${JSON.stringify(version)}; ` +
+            `this version of the SDK reads ${exports.KNOWN_FORMAT_VERSIONS.join(", ")}. ` +
+            "The record may be genuine and simply newer than this library.", errors_js_1.UNSUPPORTED_FORMAT_VERSION);
+    }
+    return version;
+}
 const PAYLOAD_TYPE_TREE_HEAD = "burnledger.sth.v3";
+// The domain for a tree head that names its log. See buildTreeHeadPayload.
+const PAYLOAD_TYPE_TREE_HEAD_V7 = "burnledger.sth.v7";
 const PAYLOAD_TYPE_LOG_LEAF = "burnledger.log_leaf.v3";
 // There is deliberately no verification payload type: v3 produces those facts
 // in the same enclave call that signs the certificate (ADR-016 §2).
 const PAYLOAD_TYPE_CERTIFICATE_STATUS = "burnledger.certificate_status.v3";
+const PAYLOAD_TYPE_KEY_LIST = "burnledger.key_list.v3";
 function hexToBytes(hex) {
     const len = hex.length >>> 1;
     const out = new Uint8Array(len);
@@ -140,6 +201,29 @@ exports.KEY_OUTSIDE_VALIDITY = "KEY_OUTSIDE_VALIDITY";
 exports.KEY_COMPROMISED = "KEY_COMPROMISED";
 exports.VALID_KEY_COMPROMISED_LATER = "VALID_KEY_COMPROMISED_LATER";
 exports.VALID_KEY_WINDOW_UNKNOWN = "VALID_KEY_WINDOW_UNKNOWN";
+/**
+ * The revocation states a statement may assert. Mirrors
+ * core.ValidCertificateStatusValue: anything else means the statement was read
+ * but not understood, which is not the same as "not revoked".
+ */
+const KNOWN_STATUS_VALUES = new Set(["ACTIVE", "REVOKED"]);
+/**
+ * The key verdicts that permit relying on a signature: VALID plus the two soft
+ * verdicts ADR-017 §2 says a reader must be SHOWN rather than refused. Anything
+ * not named here is refused, including a verdict added in a later release.
+ */
+const USABLE_KEY_VERDICTS = new Set([
+    "VALID",
+    exports.VALID_KEY_WINDOW_UNKNOWN,
+    exports.VALID_KEY_COMPROMISED_LATER,
+]);
+/** Whether a key verdict permits relying on a signature. Mirrors
+ * core.KeyIsUsable; exported so the key-list verifier (keys.ts) refuses the
+ * same set requireUsableKey refuses rather than keeping a second copy of it —
+ * a second copy is exactly how #684's fourth answer came to exist. */
+function keyIsUsable(verdict) {
+    return USABLE_KEY_VERDICTS.has(verdict);
+}
 /** Whether a key was authorized to sign at anchor time `t`.
  *
  * Returns `"VALID"` when the key clears. The anchor is seconds since the epoch
@@ -182,7 +266,17 @@ function evaluateKey(pki, anchor) {
     // for. Fail closed, as the boolean it replaces did.
     return "UNKNOWN_KEY";
 }
-/** The anchor a certificate supplies, or null when it supplies none. */
+/**
+ * The anchor a certificate supplies, or null when it supplies none.
+ *
+ * READS AN UNSIGNED FIELD. `transparency` is stripped before signing, so on a
+ * certificate handed to a verifier the timestamp is holder-editable. Use
+ * {@link verifiedCertificateAnchor} anywhere the anchor decides whether a key
+ * may be relied on; this is safe only where the same timestamp is inside a
+ * payload the caller goes on to verify, which is what verifyTransparency does.
+ *
+ * Exported and unchanged because it is published API.
+ */
 function certificateAnchor(certificate) {
     const transparency = certificate.transparency;
     if (transparency == null)
@@ -197,35 +291,95 @@ function certificateAnchor(certificate) {
         return null;
     }
 }
+/**
+ * The anchor, but only once the tree head carrying it has been checked against
+ * the key being evaluated.
+ *
+ * The bypass this closes: for a key declared compromised, evaluateKey answers
+ * KEY_COMPROMISED with no anchor and VALID_KEY_COMPROMISED_LATER when the
+ * anchor predates the compromise — and the second is a verdict requireUsableKey
+ * passes through as the RESULT of verifyCertificate. Since the timestamp is
+ * covered by no signature, a holder could backdate it and have a certificate
+ * signed with a compromised key reported as verified-with-a-caveat. Deleting
+ * `transparency` failed closed; keeping a doctored one did not.
+ *
+ * A head that does not verify yields no anchor, which is the same conservative
+ * answer as a certificate carrying no transparency block at all.
+ */
+async function verifiedCertificateAnchor(crypto, certificate, pki) {
+    const anchor = certificateAnchor(certificate);
+    if (anchor === null)
+        return null;
+    const transparency = certificate.transparency;
+    const sth = transparency.signed_tree_head;
+    try {
+        const headPayload = buildTreeHeadPayload(sth);
+        const headSig = decodeSignature(sth.signature);
+        if (!(await crypto.ed25519Verify(pki.keyBytes, headPayload, headSig)))
+            return null;
+    }
+    catch {
+        return null;
+    }
+    return anchor;
+}
 /** Throws for a key that cannot be used at all; returns the verdict otherwise.
  *
  * VALID_KEY_COMPROMISED_LATER and VALID_KEY_WINDOW_UNKNOWN are returned rather
  * than thrown because they are not refusals — they are results a caller must
  * show the reader instead of collapsing into green.
  */
-function requireUsableKey(pki, anchor, keyId) {
+function requireUsableKey(pki, anchor, keyId, 
+// Named, because this is also the key that signs a certificate-status
+// statement, and "issuer key is compromised" would send a reader looking at
+// the wrong key.
+role = "issuer key") {
     const verdict = evaluateKey(pki, anchor);
     if (verdict === exports.KEY_COMPROMISED) {
-        throw new errors_js_1.VerificationError(`issuer key is compromised: ${keyId}`);
+        throw new errors_js_1.VerificationError(`${role} is compromised: ${keyId}`);
     }
     if (verdict === exports.KEY_OUTSIDE_VALIDITY) {
-        throw new errors_js_1.VerificationError(`issuer key was not valid when it signed: ${keyId}`);
+        throw new errors_js_1.VerificationError(`${role} was not valid when it signed: ${keyId}`);
     }
     if (verdict === "UNKNOWN_KEY") {
-        throw new errors_js_1.VerificationError(`issuer key has an unusable status "${pki.keyStatus}": ${keyId}`);
+        throw new errors_js_1.VerificationError(`${role} has an unusable status "${pki.keyStatus}": ${keyId}`);
+    }
+    // An ALLOW-list, matching core.KeyIsUsable, which was inverted away from
+    // exactly the shape above. Naming the refusals and returning everything else
+    // means a verdict added to evaluateKey later becomes a PASS by default — and
+    // the value returned here is propagated out of verifyCertificate as its
+    // result, so "everything else" is rendered to a reader as "verified, with a
+    // note". Go would refuse the same document. That is #684's three-verifiers-
+    // two-answers divergence, in the direction that calls a bad document good.
+    if (!USABLE_KEY_VERDICTS.has(verdict)) {
+        throw new errors_js_1.VerificationError(`${role} returned a verdict this SDK does not recognize (${verdict}): ${keyId}`);
     }
     return verdict;
 }
 /** Verify all signatures on a deletion certificate offline. */
 async function verifyCertificate(crypto, certificate, publicKeys) {
+    // Step 0: can this SDK read the format at all? Every check below rebuilds
+    // signed bytes from the version, so an unreadable version makes all of them
+    // meaningless - and "unknown issuer key" would be the wrong thing to tell
+    // someone holding a record that is merely newer than this library.
+    const formatVersion = checkFormatVersion(certificate.certificate_format_version);
     const issuer = certificate.issuer;
+    // Step 0b: can this SDK check the algorithm the record names? Asked before
+    // any signature, because verifying an Ed25519 signature over a record that
+    // says it was signed with something else answers a question nobody asked.
+    // Below v7 no record names one, so there is nothing to check.
+    if (formatVersion === FORMAT_VERSION_V7 && issuer.algorithm !== ALGORITHM_ED25519) {
+        throw new errors_js_1.VerificationError(`record names signature algorithm ${JSON.stringify(issuer.algorithm)}; ` +
+            `this version of the SDK verifies ${ALGORITHM_ED25519}. ` +
+            "The record may be genuine and simply signed with a scheme this library does not implement.", errors_js_1.UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM);
+    }
     const keyId = issuer.key_id;
     const pki = publicKeys.get(keyId);
     if (pki === undefined)
         throw new errors_js_1.VerificationError(`unknown issuer key: ${keyId}`);
     // The key check runs before any signature check: a signature verified
     // against a key nobody vouches for proves nothing about the issuer.
-    const keyVerdict = requireUsableKey(pki, certificateAnchor(certificate), keyId);
+    const keyVerdict = requireUsableKey(pki, await verifiedCertificateAnchor(crypto, certificate, pki), keyId);
     // 1. Certificate signature FIRST — nothing below may trust a field until the
     // bytes carrying it are covered by a verified signature.
     const certPayload = buildCertificatePayload(certificate);
@@ -348,6 +502,17 @@ async function verifyTransparency(crypto, certificate, publicKeys) {
         throw new errors_js_1.VerificationError(`transparency.tree_size (${unsignedSize}) does not match the signed tree head ` +
             `(${treeSize}); it is not covered by any signature`);
     }
+    // Same rule for the log id (Q31). transparency.log_id sits beside log_url and
+    // is the field a reader looks at to answer "which log is this?", and nothing
+    // signs it — so a holder could relabel a genuine proof as belonging to a
+    // different log while every signature still checked out. A head predating log
+    // ids has neither side set and passes.
+    const signedLogId = sth.log_id ?? "";
+    const unsignedLogId = transparency.log_id ?? "";
+    if (unsignedLogId !== signedLogId) {
+        throw new errors_js_1.VerificationError(`transparency.log_id (${JSON.stringify(unsignedLogId)}) does not match the signed ` +
+            `tree head (${JSON.stringify(signedLogId)}); it is not covered by any signature`);
+    }
     if (!(await verifyInclusion(crypto, leaf, index, treeSize, proofHashes, root))) {
         throw new errors_js_1.VerificationError("merkle inclusion proof is invalid");
     }
@@ -582,31 +747,85 @@ function civilFromDays(days) {
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 function buildAttestationPayload(subject, att, certFormatVersion) {
     const attestedAt = formatTimestamp(att.attested_at);
-    const systems = att.systems.map((s) => ({
-        canonical_version: s.canonical_version ?? null,
-        connector_type: s.connector_type,
-        hash_scope: s.hash_scope,
-        merkle_root: s.merkle_root
-            ? toHex(s.merkle_root)
-            : null,
-        // The system's own observation time, not the envelope's.
-        observed_at: formatTimestamp(s.observed_at),
-        query_hash: toHex(s.query_hash),
-        record_count: s.record_count,
-        system_id: s.system_id,
-        system_name: s.system_name,
-    }));
+    // v7 signs two per-system measurements v6 leaves on a mutable row. Gated on
+    // the record's OWN version: emitting them for an older format would rebuild
+    // bytes no signer ever produced and reject every record already issued.
+    const isV7 = certFormatVersion === FORMAT_VERSION_V7;
+    const systems = att.systems.map((s) => {
+        const sys = {
+            canonical_version: s.canonical_version ?? null,
+            connector_type: s.connector_type,
+            hash_scope: s.hash_scope,
+            merkle_root: s.merkle_root
+                ? toHex(s.merkle_root)
+                : null,
+            // The system's own observation time, not the envelope's.
+            observed_at: formatTimestamp(s.observed_at),
+            query_hash: toHex(s.query_hash),
+            record_count: s.record_count,
+            system_id: s.system_id,
+            system_name: s.system_name,
+        };
+        if (isV7) {
+            sys.read_only_enforcement = requireMeasured(s.read_only_enforcement, "read_only_enforcement", s.system_name);
+            sys.transport_security = requireMeasured(s.transport_security, "transport_security", s.system_name);
+        }
+        return sys;
+    });
     const payload = {
         attested_at: attestedAt,
-        payload_type: certFormatVersion === FORMAT_VERSION_V5
-            ? PAYLOAD_TYPE_ATTESTATION_V5
-            : PAYLOAD_TYPE_ATTESTATION,
+        payload_type: attestationPayloadType(certFormatVersion),
         proof_mode: att.proof_mode,
         subject_hash: toHex(subject.identifier_hash),
         systems,
     };
     return canonicalJson(payload);
 }
+/**
+ * Read a v7 measured field that MUST be a non-empty string.
+ *
+ * A missing or non-string value cannot be turned into `""` and canonicalized:
+ * the signer never emits an empty measurement, so an empty one here would
+ * rebuild bytes no signature covers and be reported as forgery. Refusing with a
+ * document-shape message says the true thing — this record is malformed, not
+ * this record is fake.
+ */
+function requireMeasured(value, field, systemName) {
+    if (typeof value !== "string" || value === "") {
+        throw new errors_js_1.VerificationError(`system ${JSON.stringify(systemName)}: ${field} is missing from a 7.0 record, ` +
+            "which signs it; the document is incomplete rather than unverifiable");
+    }
+    return value;
+}
+/** Domain separator for the record itself, by certificate format version. */
+function certificatePayloadType(version) {
+    checkFormatVersion(version);
+    if (version === FORMAT_VERSION_V7)
+        return PAYLOAD_TYPE_VERIFICATION_RECORD_V7;
+    if (version === FORMAT_VERSION_V6)
+        return PAYLOAD_TYPE_VERIFICATION_RECORD_V6;
+    if (version === FORMAT_VERSION_V5)
+        return PAYLOAD_TYPE_CERTIFICATE_V5;
+    if (version === FORMAT_VERSION_V4)
+        return PAYLOAD_TYPE_CERTIFICATE_V4;
+    return PAYLOAD_TYPE_CERTIFICATE;
+}
+/**
+ * Domain separator for the attestation carried by a record of that format. It
+ * follows the record's version because a verifier rebuilds the attestation
+ * payload from the record it is checking, and must reproduce the exact bytes
+ * the enclave signed.
+ */
+function attestationPayloadType(version) {
+    checkFormatVersion(version);
+    if (version === FORMAT_VERSION_V7)
+        return PAYLOAD_TYPE_ATTESTATION_V7;
+    if (version === FORMAT_VERSION_V6)
+        return PAYLOAD_TYPE_ATTESTATION_V6;
+    if (version === FORMAT_VERSION_V5)
+        return PAYLOAD_TYPE_ATTESTATION_V5;
+    return PAYLOAD_TYPE_ATTESTATION;
+}
 function buildCertificatePayload(cert) {
     const att = cert.attestation;
     const issuer = cert.issuer;
@@ -614,19 +833,28 @@ function buildCertificatePayload(cert) {
     // One list, keyed by system_id (ADR-016 §2). v2 signed an attestation list
     // and a verification list joined only on the human-editable system_name,
     // which made a partial deletion indistinguishable from a complete one.
-    const systems = (cert.systems ?? []).map((s) => ({
-        attested_at: formatTimestamp(s.attested_at),
-        attested_count: s.attested_count,
-        canonical_version: s.canonical_version ?? null,
-        connector_type: s.connector_type,
-        hash_scope: s.hash_scope,
-        merkle_root: s.merkle_root ? toHex(s.merkle_root) : null,
-        query_hash: toHex(s.query_hash),
-        system_id: s.system_id,
-        system_name: s.system_name,
-        verified_at: formatTimestamp(s.verified_at),
-        verified_count: s.verified_count,
-    }));
+    const version = cert.certificate_format_version;
+    const isV7 = version === FORMAT_VERSION_V7;
+    const systems = (cert.systems ?? []).map((s) => {
+        const sys = {
+            attested_at: formatTimestamp(s.attested_at),
+            attested_count: s.attested_count,
+            canonical_version: s.canonical_version ?? null,
+            connector_type: s.connector_type,
+            hash_scope: s.hash_scope,
+            merkle_root: s.merkle_root ? toHex(s.merkle_root) : null,
+            query_hash: toHex(s.query_hash),
+            system_id: s.system_id,
+            system_name: s.system_name,
+            verified_at: formatTimestamp(s.verified_at),
+            verified_count: s.verified_count,
+        };
+        if (isV7) {
+            sys.read_only_enforcement = requireMeasured(s.read_only_enforcement, "read_only_enforcement", s.system_name);
+            sys.transport_security = requireMeasured(s.transport_security, "transport_security", s.system_name);
+        }
+        return sys;
+    });
     // The attestation block carries no system list of its own: the merged list
     // above is a superset of it. verification_signature is gone entirely.
     const attObj = {
@@ -637,20 +865,28 @@ function buildCertificatePayload(cert) {
     // Fields added after v3 are gated on the certificate's OWN version. A v3
     // certificate must reconstruct to the same bytes forever; reading these
     // unconditionally would break every certificate already issued.
-    const version = cert.certificate_format_version;
-    const isV5 = version === FORMAT_VERSION_V5;
-    const isV4Plus = version === FORMAT_VERSION_V4 || isV5;
+    // v6 carries v5's shape exactly, so it takes every gate v5 takes. Naming
+    // these "Plus" rather than testing equality at each use is what stops a new
+    // version from silently missing one.
+    const isV5Plus = version === FORMAT_VERSION_V5 || version === FORMAT_VERSION_V6 || isV7;
+    const isV4Plus = version === FORMAT_VERSION_V4 || isV5Plus;
     const issuerObj = {
         key_id: issuer.key_id,
         name: issuer.name,
         public_key: toHex(issuer.public_key),
     };
+    // v7 signs the algorithm, and does so unconditionally: unlike legal_entity
+    // and enclave_pcr0, "which scheme signed this" is never unknown to a signer,
+    // so a v7 record missing it is malformed rather than merely sparse.
+    if (isV7) {
+        issuerObj.algorithm = requireMeasured(issuer.algorithm, "issuer.algorithm", "issuer");
+    }
     if (isV4Plus && typeof issuer.legal_entity === "string" && issuer.legal_entity !== "") {
         issuerObj.legal_entity = issuer.legal_entity;
     }
     // Signed from v5, and omitted when absent or empty: a build with no
     // measurement signs none, and "" is a value a reader could mistake for one.
-    if (isV5 && typeof issuer.enclave_pcr0 === "string" && issuer.enclave_pcr0 !== "") {
+    if (isV5Plus && typeof issuer.enclave_pcr0 === "string" && issuer.enclave_pcr0 !== "") {
         issuerObj.enclave_pcr0 = issuer.enclave_pcr0;
     }
     // v5 drops identifier_type_hint: signed, but always the constant "custom",
@@ -658,7 +894,7 @@ function buildCertificatePayload(cert) {
     const subjectObj = {
         identifier_hash: toHex(subject.identifier_hash),
     };
-    if (!isV5) {
+    if (!isV5Plus) {
         subjectObj.identifier_type_hint = subject.identifier_type_hint;
     }
     // status and revocation are deliberately absent (ADR-016 §3): a signature
@@ -671,11 +907,7 @@ function buildCertificatePayload(cert) {
         certificate_id: cert.certificate_id,
         issued_at: formatTimestamp(cert.issued_at),
         issuer: issuerObj,
-        payload_type: isV5
-            ? PAYLOAD_TYPE_CERTIFICATE_V5
-            : isV4Plus
-                ? PAYLOAD_TYPE_CERTIFICATE_V4
-                : PAYLOAD_TYPE_CERTIFICATE,
+        payload_type: certificatePayloadType(version),
         subject: subjectObj,
         systems,
     };
@@ -718,15 +950,37 @@ function attestationSystems(cert) {
         observed_at: s.attested_at,
         merkle_root: s.merkle_root,
         canonical_version: s.canonical_version,
+        // Carried through so the v7 attestation payload can be rebuilt from the
+        // record. Undefined on older formats, where buildAttestationPayload never
+        // reads them.
+        read_only_enforcement: s.read_only_enforcement,
+        transport_security: s.transport_security,
     }));
 }
+/**
+ * Port of Go's BuildTreeHeadPayload.
+ *
+ * A head that names its log is signed in a DIFFERENT DOMAIN from one that does
+ * not (Q31). That is what makes log_id unstrippable: removing it moves the
+ * rebuild into burnledger.sth.v3 and adding one moves it into
+ * burnledger.sth.v7, and the signature fails either way. Heads signed before
+ * log ids existed carry none and reproduce exactly the bytes they always did.
+ *
+ * Exported for anchor.ts, which rebuilds the preimage of a head fetched from
+ * GET /v1/log/head. Not re-exported from index.ts: it is an internal seam
+ * between two modules of this package, not published surface.
+ */
 function buildTreeHeadPayload(head) {
+    const logId = head.log_id;
+    const named = typeof logId === "string" && logId !== "";
     const payload = {
-        payload_type: PAYLOAD_TYPE_TREE_HEAD,
+        payload_type: named ? PAYLOAD_TYPE_TREE_HEAD_V7 : PAYLOAD_TYPE_TREE_HEAD,
         root_hash: toHex(head.root_hash),
         timestamp: formatTimestamp(head.timestamp),
         tree_size: head.tree_size,
     };
+    if (named)
+        payload.log_id = logId;
     return canonicalJson(payload);
 }
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -881,6 +1135,42 @@ function buildCertificateStatusPayload(stmt) {
     }
     return canonicalJson(payload);
 }
+/**
+ * Port of Go's BuildKeyListPayload (core/key_list.go).
+ *
+ * The key array is sorted by key_id before signing: canonical JSON sorts
+ * object keys but does nothing to array order, and the server has no reason to
+ * preserve any particular order across a rotation. Optional entry fields are
+ * omitted, never emitted as null, for the reason buildCertificateStatusPayload
+ * omits them. `keys` is the array exactly as HANDED to the verifier — the
+ * signature covers the published entries, not a parsed reinterpretation of
+ * them, which is what makes an edited key_status detectable.
+ */
+function buildKeyListPayload(doc) {
+    const entries = doc.keys.map((e) => {
+        const k = {};
+        if (e.compromised_from != null)
+            k.compromised_from = e.compromised_from;
+        k.key_id = e.key_id;
+        k.key_status = e.key_status;
+        if (e.not_after != null)
+            k.not_after = e.not_after;
+        if (e.not_before != null && e.not_before !== "")
+            k.not_before = e.not_before;
+        k.public_key = e.public_key;
+        return k;
+    });
+    entries.sort((a, b) => (a.key_id < b.key_id ? -1 : a.key_id === b.key_id ? 0 : 1));
+    const payload = {
+        payload_type: PAYLOAD_TYPE_KEY_LIST,
+        keys: entries,
+        statement_expires_at: formatTimestamp(doc.statement_expires_at),
+        statement_issued_at: formatTimestamp(doc.statement_issued_at),
+        sth_root_hash: toHex(doc.sth_root_hash),
+        sth_tree_size: doc.sth_tree_size,
+    };
+    return canonicalJson(payload);
+}
 /** The verdict when a certificate verified but nothing said whether it was revoked. */
 exports.VALID_REVOCATION_UNKNOWN = "VALID_REVOCATION_UNKNOWN";
 /**
@@ -896,28 +1186,43 @@ exports.VALID_REVOCATION_UNKNOWN = "VALID_REVOCATION_UNKNOWN";
  * | input | result |
  * |---|---|
  * | fresh statement, REVOKED | throws VerificationError |
- * | fresh statement, ACTIVE | `"VALID"` |
- * | absent or expired statement | `"VALID_REVOCATION_UNKNOWN"` |
+ * | fresh statement, ACTIVE | `"VALID"`, or a soft verdict on either key |
+ * | absent or expired statement | `"VALID_REVOCATION_UNKNOWN"`, or the certificate key's soft verdict |
+ * | statement key unusable (ADR-017) | throws VerificationError |
  *
- * The last row is the point: `verifyCertificate` answers VALID there, which
+ * The third row is the point: `verifyCertificate` answers VALID there, which
  * reads as "not revoked" and is not something it checked.
  */
 async function verifyCertificateWithStatus(crypto, certificate, publicKeys, status, now) {
+    // A refusal throws out of verifyCertificate, so `base` is VALID or one of the
+    // two soft verdicts. Returning a soft verdict here skipped every check below
+    // it: a revoked certificate signed by a compromised-later key answered
+    // VALID_KEY_COMPROMISED_LATER and its statement was never authenticated. The
+    // verdict is held instead, and resolved against what the statement says.
     const base = await verifyCertificate(crypto, certificate, publicKeys);
-    if (base !== "VALID") {
-        return base;
-    }
     if (status == null) {
-        return exports.VALID_REVOCATION_UNKNOWN;
+        return resolveWithBase(base, exports.VALID_REVOCATION_UNKNOWN);
     }
     const keyId = status.key_id;
     const info = keyId ? publicKeys.get(keyId) : undefined;
     if (!info) {
         throw new errors_js_1.VerificationError(`status statement signed by unknown key: ${keyId}`);
     }
-    if (info.revoked) {
-        throw new errors_js_1.VerificationError("status statement signed by a revoked key");
-    }
+    // The whole ADR-017 table, not just the deprecated boolean. `revoked` is
+    // never set by a key loaded from /.well-known/burnledger-keys — that endpoint
+    // publishes key_status — so this check read `false` for a key the issuer had
+    // declared COMPROMISED, and whoever held that key could mint an ACTIVE
+    // statement for a revoked certificate that every SDK and the browser bundle
+    // rendered as a signed "not revoked". core.VerifyCertificateWithStatus has
+    // always evaluated it.
+    //
+    // The anchor is the verifier's own clock, not a field inside the statement: a
+    // statement must already be inside its own validity window to be served at
+    // all, and `now` is a time this verifier observed rather than one the signing
+    // key asserted about itself.
+    const when = now ?? new Date();
+    const at = formatTimestamp(when.toISOString());
+    const statusKeyVerdict = requireUsableKey(info, parseRfc3339(at), keyId, "status statement key");
     const payload = buildCertificateStatusPayload(status);
     // decodeSignature, not hexToBytes: signatures arrive as hex, base64 or a byte
     // array depending on the producer, and every other signature on this path
@@ -945,17 +1250,42 @@ async function verifyCertificateWithStatus(crypto, certificate, publicKeys, stat
     }
     // Compared in the normalized form the payload signs, so the freshness check
     // cannot disagree with what was signed about the same two instants.
-    const at = formatTimestamp((now ?? new Date()).toISOString());
     const issued = formatTimestamp(status.statement_issued_at);
     const expires = formatTimestamp(status.statement_expires_at);
     if (at < issued || at >= expires) {
         // Stale is not a weaker answer, it is no answer — including for a REVOKED
         // statement, which must never decay into VALID.
-        return exports.VALID_REVOCATION_UNKNOWN;
+        return resolveWithBase(base, exports.VALID_REVOCATION_UNKNOWN);
     }
     if (status.status === "REVOKED") {
-        throw new errors_js_1.VerificationError("certificate has been revoked");
+        // Coded, because this is the only status-path rejection that is a fact
+        // about the certificate rather than a failure to authenticate the
+        // statement. A caller that cannot tell the two apart will render an
+        // unsigned statement as a revocation.
+        throw new errors_js_1.VerificationError("certificate has been revoked", errors_js_1.CERTIFICATE_REVOKED);
+    }
+    // A state this SDK does not recognize is NOT active. This tested only for
+    // REVOKED and treated everything else as a pass, so a signed, fresh,
+    // correctly-bound statement saying "SUSPENDED" — or "revoked" in the wrong
+    // case — was reported as revocation CHECKED AND PASSED. Mirrors
+    // core.ValidCertificateStatusValue.
+    if (!KNOWN_STATUS_VALUES.has(status.status)) {
+        return resolveWithBase(base, exports.VALID_REVOCATION_UNKNOWN);
     }
-    return "VALID";
+    // A soft verdict on the status key is the result, not a footnote — but it is
+    // reported only once the statement has authenticated and been read, so it can
+    // neither speak for an unverified statement nor suppress a revocation.
+    return resolveWithBase(base, statusKeyVerdict);
+}
+/**
+ * Picks what to report when the certificate's own key returned a soft verdict
+ * and the status path also has something to say. A doubt about the key that
+ * signed the certificate questions the whole document, so it outranks a doubt
+ * about revocation or about the statement's own key; only one verdict string
+ * comes back, and this is the one a reader most needs. Mirrors
+ * core.resolveWithBase.
+ */
+function resolveWithBase(base, verdict) {
+    return base !== "VALID" ? base : verdict;
 }
 //# sourceMappingURL=verify.js.map