brainblast 0.7.2 → 0.7.4

package/dist/{chunk-IY52XKWL.js → chunk-5H5JQXXU.js}

@@ -996,6 +996,60 @@ function anchorBodyCallPattern(c, p) {
   };
 }
 
+// src/checkers/anchorCpiUnverifiedProgram.ts
+var DEFAULT_PROGRAM_NAME = "(^|_)program$|^program(_id)?$";
+var DEFAULT_CPI = "invoke_signed\\s*\\(|invoke\\s*\\(|CpiContext::|\\.cpi\\(\\)|solana_program::program::invoke";
+var DEFAULT_VERIFIED_TYPE = "Program\\s*<";
+var DEFAULT_ADDRESS_CONSTRAINT = "address\\s*=";
+var RAW_TYPES = ["AccountInfo", "UncheckedAccount"];
+function isRawAccountType(typeName) {
+  return RAW_TYPES.some((t) => typeName.includes(t));
+}
+function isProgramNamed(name, re) {
+  return re.test(name);
+}
+function anchorCpiUnverifiedProgram(c, p) {
+  const programNameRe = new RegExp(p?.programNameRegex ?? DEFAULT_PROGRAM_NAME, "i");
+  const cpiRe = new RegExp(p?.cpiRegex ?? DEFAULT_CPI);
+  const verifiedTypeRe = new RegExp(p?.verifiedTypeRegex ?? DEFAULT_VERIFIED_TYPE);
+  const addressRe = new RegExp(p?.addressConstraintRegex ?? DEFAULT_ADDRESS_CONSTRAINT);
+  const body = c.fnBodyText ?? "";
+  const performsCpi = cpiRe.test(body);
+  if (!performsCpi) {
+    return {
+      result: "cant_tell",
+      detail: p?.absentDetail ?? `Handler '${c.fnName}' performs no cross-program invocation; CPI program-ID verification does not apply.`
+    };
+  }
+  const programFields = c.accountFields.filter((f) => isProgramNamed(f.name, programNameRe));
+  if (programFields.length === 0) {
+    return {
+      result: "cant_tell",
+      detail: p?.absentDetail ?? `Handler '${c.fnName}' performs a CPI but no program-named account field was found on '${c.accountStructName}' to verify.`
+    };
+  }
+  const isVerified = (f) => {
+    if (verifiedTypeRe.test(f.typeName)) return true;
+    if (!isRawAccountType(f.typeName)) return true;
+    if (addressRe.test(f.attrText)) return true;
+    const keyCheck = new RegExp(`${f.name}\\.key\\s*\\(\\s*\\)`);
+    if (keyCheck.test(body)) return true;
+    return false;
+  };
+  const unverified = programFields.filter((f) => !isVerified(f));
+  if (unverified.length > 0) {
+    const names = unverified.map((f) => `${f.name}: ${f.typeName}`).join(", ");
+    return {
+      result: "fail",
+      detail: p?.failDetail ?? `Handler '${c.fnName}' performs a cross-program invocation but the target program account(s) [${names}] are raw AccountInfo/UncheckedAccount with no address verification. An attacker can substitute a malicious program \u2014 this is the Wormhole ($325M, Feb 2022) class of bug. Type the account as Program<'info, T> or add #[account(address = <expected_program_id>)].`
+    };
+  }
+  return {
+    result: "pass",
+    detail: p?.passDetail ?? `Handler '${c.fnName}' performs a CPI and every program account (${programFields.map((f) => f.name).join(", ")}) is identity-verified (Program<'info, _>, address= constraint, or in-body key check).`
+  };
+}
+
 // src/checkers/index.ts
 var registry = {
   "positional-arg-identity": positionalArgIdentity,
@@ -1013,7 +1067,8 @@ var registry = {
   "anchor-account-matches-idl": anchorIdlAccount,
   "anchor-account-missing-constraint": anchorAccountMissingConstraint,
   "anchor-forbidden-account-type": anchorForbiddenAccountType,
-  "anchor-body-call-pattern": anchorBodyCallPattern
+  "anchor-body-call-pattern": anchorBodyCallPattern,
+  "anchor-cpi-unverified-program": anchorCpiUnverifiedProgram
 };
 function runChecker(kind, c, params) {
   const fn = registry[kind];

package/dist/{chunk-B2M3TZSA.js → chunk-5VYTURTO.js}

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ import {
   loadPack,
   resolveRules,
   walk
-} from "./chunk-IY52XKWL.js";
+} from "./chunk-5H5JQXXU.js";
 
 // src/costAnalysis.ts
 import { Project, SyntaxKind } from "ts-morph";
@@ -252,6 +252,123 @@ function renderCostReportMd(r) {
   return lines.join("\n");
 }
 
+// src/exploitPatterns.ts
+var EXPLOIT_PATTERNS = [
+  {
+    id: "wormhole",
+    title: "Wormhole bridge exploit",
+    date: "2022-02-02",
+    lossUsd: 325e6,
+    chain: "Solana",
+    postmortemUrl: "https://rekt.news/wormhole-rekt/",
+    rootCause: "A cross-program invocation / signature-verification load trusted an account by position, not by identity. A deprecated load did not verify the supplied sysvar's address, so an attacker substituted their own account and forged a 'verified' signature set.",
+    ruleId: "cpi-target-program-unverified",
+    detects: "An Anchor handler that performs a CPI (invoke / invoke_signed / CpiContext) against a program-named account typed as raw AccountInfo/UncheckedAccount with no address= constraint and no in-body key check.",
+    fix: "Type the program account as Program<'info, T> (Anchor verifies the program id on deserialization) or add #[account(address = <expected_program_id>)]."
+  },
+  {
+    id: "cashio",
+    title: "Cashio infinite-mint exploit",
+    date: "2022-03-23",
+    lossUsd: 48e6,
+    chain: "Solana",
+    postmortemUrl: "https://rekt.news/cashio-rekt/",
+    rootCause: "A missing account-validation chain: the program accepted attacker-supplied accounts without verifying their owner/identity, letting a fake collateral account mint unbacked CASH.",
+    ruleId: "anchor-unchecked-account-type",
+    detects: "UncheckedAccount<'info> fields in instruction handlers \u2014 accounts Anchor performs zero runtime validation on (owner, signer, data layout all unchecked).",
+    fix: "Replace UncheckedAccount with Account<'info, T>, Signer<'info>, or SystemAccount<'info> so Anchor enforces ownership and type before the handler runs."
+  },
+  {
+    id: "crema",
+    title: "Crema Finance exploit",
+    date: "2022-07-03",
+    lossUsd: 88e5,
+    chain: "Solana",
+    postmortemUrl: "https://rekt.news/crema-finance-rekt/",
+    rootCause: "A forged 'tick' account was passed into the program and accepted without identity validation, letting the attacker report fake fee data and drain liquidity.",
+    ruleId: "anchor-unchecked-account-type",
+    detects: "The same unchecked-account class: a security-critical account taken as UncheckedAccount with no ownership/type enforcement.",
+    fix: "Deserialize the account through a typed Account<'info, T> (or add an explicit owner/address constraint) so a forged account is rejected."
+  },
+  {
+    id: "fake-mint-impersonation",
+    title: "SPL mint impersonation (counterfeit tokens)",
+    chain: "Solana",
+    postmortemUrl: "https://solana.com/developers/guides/token-extensions/metadata-pointer",
+    rootCause: "A counterfeit SPL mint reuses a legitimate token's name/symbol/metadata; integrations that key off symbol or metadata instead of the canonical mint address route value to the wrong token.",
+    ruleId: "solana-token-impersonation",
+    detects: "Code that resolves or trusts a token by symbol/name rather than pinning the canonical mint address, against the bundled canonical-mint registry.",
+    fix: "Pin and compare the canonical mint address (Pubkey) for every supported token; never trust symbol/name/metadata as identity."
+  }
+];
+function getExploitPattern(idOrRule) {
+  return EXPLOIT_PATTERNS.find((e) => e.id === idOrRule || e.ruleId === idOrRule);
+}
+function formatUsd(n) {
+  if (n == null) return "\u2014";
+  if (n >= 1e9) return `$${(n / 1e9).toFixed(2)}B`;
+  if (n >= 1e6) return `$${(n / 1e6).toFixed(1)}M`;
+  if (n >= 1e3) return `$${(n / 1e3).toFixed(0)}K`;
+  return `$${n}`;
+}
+function totalLossUsd(patterns = EXPLOIT_PATTERNS) {
+  return patterns.reduce((s, e) => s + (e.lossUsd ?? 0), 0);
+}
+function renderExploitsMd(patterns = EXPLOIT_PATTERNS) {
+  const L = ["## Exploit Pattern Database\n"];
+  L.push(
+    "Real on-chain incidents, each mapped to the bundled brainblast rule that statically detects its root-cause pattern. The code that lost these funds is the exact code these rules fail on.\n"
+  );
+  L.push("| Incident | Date | Loss | Detecting rule |");
+  L.push("|----------|------|------|----------------|");
+  for (const e of patterns) {
+    L.push(
+      `| [${e.title}](${e.postmortemUrl}) | ${e.date ?? "ongoing"} | ${formatUsd(e.lossUsd)} | \`${e.ruleId}\` |`
+    );
+  }
+  const total = totalLossUsd(patterns);
+  L.push("");
+  L.push(`**Catalogued losses: ${formatUsd(total)} across ${patterns.length} patterns.**
+`);
+  for (const e of patterns) {
+    L.push(`### ${e.title}${e.lossUsd ? ` \u2014 ${formatUsd(e.lossUsd)}` : ""}
+`);
+    L.push(`- **Chain / date:** ${e.chain} \xB7 ${e.date ?? "ongoing class"}`);
+    L.push(`- **Post-mortem:** ${e.postmortemUrl}`);
+    L.push(`- **Root cause:** ${e.rootCause}`);
+    L.push(`- **Detected by:** \`${e.ruleId}\` \u2014 ${e.detects}`);
+    L.push(`- **Fix:** ${e.fix}`);
+    L.push("");
+  }
+  return L.join("\n");
+}
+function renderExploitsText(patterns = EXPLOIT_PATTERNS) {
+  const L = [];
+  L.push("\u2500\u2500 Exploit Pattern Database \u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500");
+  L.push("  real incidents \u2192 the bundled rule that detects each root cause");
+  L.push("");
+  for (const e of patterns) {
+    L.push(`  ${e.title}  (${e.date ?? "ongoing"}, ${formatUsd(e.lossUsd)}, ${e.chain})`);
+    L.push(`    rule:  ${e.ruleId}`);
+    L.push(`    cause: ${e.rootCause}`);
+    L.push("");
+  }
+  L.push(`  catalogued losses: ${formatUsd(totalLossUsd(patterns))} across ${patterns.length} patterns`);
+  return L.join("\n");
+}
+function renderExploitDetailText(e) {
+  const L = [];
+  L.push(`\u2500\u2500 ${e.title} \u2500\u2500`);
+  L.push(`  chain/date: ${e.chain} \xB7 ${e.date ?? "ongoing class"}`);
+  L.push(`  loss:       ${formatUsd(e.lossUsd)}`);
+  L.push(`  postmortem: ${e.postmortemUrl}`);
+  L.push(`  root cause: ${e.rootCause}`);
+  L.push(`  detected by: ${e.ruleId}`);
+  L.push(`    ${e.detects}`);
+  L.push(`  fix: ${e.fix}`);
+  return L.join("\n");
+}
+
 // src/watch.ts
 import { watch as fsWatch } from "fs";
 function runIncrementalScan(targetDir, rules, emit) {
@@ -492,6 +609,13 @@ export {
   lamportsToSol,
   analyzeCosts,
   renderCostReportMd,
+  EXPLOIT_PATTERNS,
+  getExploitPattern,
+  formatUsd,
+  totalLossUsd,
+  renderExploitsMd,
+  renderExploitsText,
+  renderExploitDetailText,
   runIncrementalScan,
   startWatch,
   parseDiff,

package/dist/{chunk-UWE6HAGS.js → chunk-F7QOW3IM.js}

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import {
   buildTrustGraph
-} from "./chunk-SVSVVW6U.js";
+} from "./chunk-GF37ANSW.js";
 
 // src/score.ts
 var W_AUTHORITY = 35;

package/dist/{chunk-SVSVVW6U.js → chunk-GF37ANSW.js}

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 import {
+  getAccountInfo,
   probeUpgradeAuthority
 } from "./chunk-XSVQSK53.js";
 
@@ -39,6 +40,41 @@ function loadDirectory(path = bundledPath()) {
   return m;
 }
 
+// src/trustGraph/classifyAuthority.ts
+var SYSTEM_PROGRAM = "11111111111111111111111111111111";
+var KNOWN_AUTHORITY_OWNERS = {
+  // Squads — the dominant Solana multisig. v3 ("SMPL") and v4 program ids.
+  // https://docs.squads.so/main/development/sdk/program-ids
+  SMPLecH534NA9acpos4G6x7uf3LWbCAwZQE9e8ZekMu: { kind: "multisig", label: "Squads v3" },
+  SQDS4ep65T869zMMBKyuUq6aD6EgTu8psMjkvj52pCf: { kind: "multisig", label: "Squads v4" },
+  // SPL Governance (Realms) — the standard on-chain governance program.
+  // https://github.com/solana-labs/solana-program-library/tree/master/governance
+  GovER5Lthms3bLBqWub97yVrMmEogzX7xNjdXpPPCVZw: { kind: "dao", label: "SPL Governance (Realms)" }
+};
+async function classifyUpgradeAuthority(address, opts = {}) {
+  const acct = await getAccountInfo(address, opts);
+  if (!acct) {
+    return { kind: "unknown" };
+  }
+  if (acct.owner === SYSTEM_PROGRAM) {
+    return { kind: "single-key", ownerProgram: SYSTEM_PROGRAM };
+  }
+  const known = KNOWN_AUTHORITY_OWNERS[acct.owner];
+  if (known) {
+    return { kind: known.kind, ownerProgram: acct.owner, ownerLabel: known.label };
+  }
+  return { kind: "unknown", ownerProgram: acct.owner };
+}
+async function enrichAuthorityClassification(authority, opts = {}) {
+  if (authority.kind !== "unknown" || !authority.address) return authority;
+  const c = await classifyUpgradeAuthority(authority.address, opts);
+  return {
+    ...authority,
+    kind: c.kind,
+    ...c.ownerProgram ? { ownerProgram: c.ownerProgram } : {}
+  };
+}
+
 // src/trustGraph/programCache.ts
 import { readFileSync as readFileSync2, writeFileSync, mkdirSync, existsSync as existsSync2 } from "fs";
 import { join as join2, dirname } from "path";
@@ -146,6 +182,12 @@ async function buildTrustGraph(programIds, opts = {}) {
     let authority;
     try {
       authority = await probeUpgradeAuthority(id, opts);
+      if (opts.classifyAuthority !== false) {
+        try {
+          authority = await enrichAuthorityClassification(authority, opts);
+        } catch {
+        }
+      }
     } catch (e) {
       unresolved.push({ programId: id, reason: `rpc_error: ${e?.message ?? String(e)}` });
       continue;
@@ -174,6 +216,10 @@ async function buildTrustGraph(programIds, opts = {}) {
 
 export {
   loadDirectory,
+  SYSTEM_PROGRAM,
+  KNOWN_AUTHORITY_OWNERS,
+  classifyUpgradeAuthority,
+  enrichAuthorityClassification,
   DEFAULT_TTL_HOURS,
   defaultCachePath,
   loadProgramCache,

package/dist/{chunk-2UZGWXIX.js → chunk-QMJEZ6NO.js}

@@ -1,19 +1,27 @@
 // src/trustGraph/render.ts
 function renderAuthority(p) {
   const a = p.upgradeAuthority;
+  const owner = a.ownerProgram ? ` _(owner: \`${a.ownerProgram}\`)_` : "";
   switch (a.kind) {
     case "renounced":
       return "\u{1F512} **Renounced** \u2014 program is frozen; no key can upgrade it.";
     case "single-key":
-      return `\u26A0\uFE0F **Single key** \`${a.address}\` \u2014 one private key can replace this program at any time.`;
+      return `\u26A0\uFE0F **Single key** \`${a.address}\` \u2014 one private key can replace this program at any time.${owner}`;
     case "multisig":
-      return `\u{1F510} **Multisig** \`${a.address}\` \u2014 a threshold of signers can upgrade.`;
+      return `\u{1F510} **Multisig** \`${a.address}\` \u2014 a threshold of signers can upgrade.${owner}`;
     case "dao":
-      return `\u{1F3DB} **DAO** \`${a.address}\` \u2014 governance program controls upgrades.`;
+      return `\u{1F3DB} **DAO** \`${a.address}\` \u2014 governance program controls upgrades.${owner}`;
     case "unknown":
-      return a.address ? `\u2753 **Unclassified authority** \`${a.address}\` \u2014 needs research to confirm single-key vs multisig/DAO.` : "\u2753 **Unknown** \u2014 could not determine upgrade authority.";
+      return a.address ? `\u2753 **Unclassified authority** \`${a.address}\`${owner} \u2014 needs research to confirm single-key vs multisig/DAO.` : "\u2753 **Unknown** \u2014 could not determine upgrade authority.";
   }
 }
+function renderTrustSummary(p) {
+  const a = p.upgradeAuthority;
+  const authBit = a.kind === "renounced" ? "\u{1F512} immutable" : a.kind === "multisig" ? "\u{1F510} multisig" : a.kind === "dao" ? "\u{1F3DB} DAO-governed" : a.kind === "single-key" ? "\u26A0\uFE0F single-key upgradeable" : "\u2753 authority unclassified";
+  const verifiedBit = p.verifiedBuild.state === "verified" ? "\u2705 verified build" : p.verifiedBuild.state === "unverified" ? "\u274C unverified" : "\u2753 build unchecked";
+  const auditBit = p.audits.length ? `\u2705 audited (${p.audits.map((x) => x.firm).join(", ")})` : "\u274C no audits on file";
+  return `${authBit} \xB7 ${verifiedBit} \xB7 ${auditBit}`;
+}
 function renderVerified(p) {
   const v = p.verifiedBuild;
   switch (v.state) {
@@ -42,6 +50,8 @@ function renderProgram(p) {
     "",
     `\`${p.programId}\`${p.kind ? ` \xB7 kind: \`${p.kind}\`` : ""}`,
     "",
+    `**Trust:** ${renderTrustSummary(p)}`,
+    "",
     `- **Upgrade authority:** ${renderAuthority(p)}`,
     `- **Verified build:** ${renderVerified(p)}`,
     `- **Parity:** ${renderParity(p)}`,

package/dist/chunk-WQFLKWBY.js

@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+import {
+  DEFAULT_RPC
+} from "./chunk-XSVQSK53.js";
+import {
+  isValidSolanaAddress
+} from "./chunk-VG5FMOLW.js";
+
+// src/oracle.ts
+var SLOT_MS = 400;
+var DEFAULT_STALENESS_SLOTS = 150;
+async function rpc(method, params, opts) {
+  const url = opts.rpcUrl ?? DEFAULT_RPC;
+  const fetchImpl = opts.fetchImpl ?? fetch;
+  const ac = new AbortController();
+  const t = setTimeout(() => ac.abort(), opts.timeoutMs ?? 1e4);
+  try {
+    const res = await fetchImpl(url, {
+      method: "POST",
+      headers: { "content-type": "application/json" },
+      body: JSON.stringify({ jsonrpc: "2.0", id: 1, method, params }),
+      signal: ac.signal
+    });
+    if (!res.ok) throw new Error(`rpc ${method}: HTTP ${res.status}`);
+    const body = await res.json();
+    if (body.error) throw new Error(`rpc ${method}: ${body.error.message}`);
+    if (body.result === void 0) throw new Error(`rpc ${method}: empty result`);
+    return body.result;
+  } finally {
+    clearTimeout(t);
+  }
+}
+async function checkOracleFreshness(account, opts = {}) {
+  if (!isValidSolanaAddress(account)) throw new Error(`invalid Solana address: ${account}`);
+  const thresholdSlots = opts.maxStalenessSlots ?? (opts.maxStalenessSeconds != null ? Math.max(1, Math.round(opts.maxStalenessSeconds * 1e3 / SLOT_MS)) : DEFAULT_STALENESS_SLOTS);
+  const checkedAt = (/* @__PURE__ */ new Date()).toISOString();
+  const currentSlot = await rpc("getSlot", [{ commitment: "confirmed" }], opts);
+  const sigs = await rpc(
+    "getSignaturesForAddress",
+    [account, { limit: 1 }],
+    opts
+  );
+  if (!sigs || sigs.length === 0) {
+    return {
+      account,
+      currentSlot,
+      lastSlot: null,
+      lastBlockTime: null,
+      slotsBehind: null,
+      secondsBehind: null,
+      thresholdSlots,
+      fresh: false,
+      verdict: "NO_HISTORY",
+      checkedAt
+    };
+  }
+  const last = sigs[0];
+  const lastSlot = last.slot;
+  const lastBlockTime = last.blockTime ?? null;
+  const slotsBehind = Math.max(0, currentSlot - lastSlot);
+  const secondsBehind = lastBlockTime != null ? Math.max(0, Math.floor(Date.now() / 1e3) - lastBlockTime) : Math.round(slotsBehind * SLOT_MS / 1e3);
+  const fresh = slotsBehind <= thresholdSlots;
+  return {
+    account,
+    currentSlot,
+    lastSlot,
+    lastBlockTime,
+    slotsBehind,
+    secondsBehind,
+    thresholdSlots,
+    fresh,
+    verdict: fresh ? "FRESH" : "STALE",
+    checkedAt
+  };
+}
+function renderOracleText(f) {
+  const L = [];
+  L.push("\u2500\u2500 Oracle Freshness \u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500");
+  L.push(`  account:       ${f.account}`);
+  L.push(`  current slot:  ${f.currentSlot.toLocaleString()}`);
+  if (f.verdict === "NO_HISTORY") {
+    L.push("  last write:    (no transactions found touching this account)");
+    L.push("  verdict:       \u2753 NO_HISTORY \u2014 cannot confirm freshness");
+    return L.join("\n");
+  }
+  L.push(`  last write:    slot ${f.lastSlot.toLocaleString()} (${f.slotsBehind.toLocaleString()} slots / ~${f.secondsBehind}s ago)`);
+  L.push(`  threshold:     ${f.thresholdSlots.toLocaleString()} slots`);
+  L.push(`  verdict:       ${f.fresh ? "\u2705 FRESH" : "\u{1F6A8} STALE \u2014 last update is older than the freshness threshold"}`);
+  return L.join("\n");
+}
+function renderOracleMd(f) {
+  const L = ["## Oracle Freshness\n"];
+  L.push(`**Account:** \`${f.account}\`  \xB7  checked ${f.checkedAt}
+`);
+  if (f.verdict === "NO_HISTORY") {
+    L.push("\u2753 **NO_HISTORY** \u2014 no transactions were found touching this account, so freshness can't be confirmed. Double-check the address.");
+    return L.join("\n");
+  }
+  const badge = f.fresh ? "\u2705 **FRESH**" : "\u{1F6A8} **STALE**";
+  L.push(`${badge} \u2014 last written at slot ${f.lastSlot.toLocaleString()}, ${f.slotsBehind.toLocaleString()} slots (~${f.secondsBehind}s) behind the current slot (${f.currentSlot.toLocaleString()}).`);
+  L.push("");
+  L.push(`Threshold: ${f.thresholdSlots.toLocaleString()} slots. ${f.fresh ? "Within tolerance." : "**Exceeds tolerance \u2014 do not price against this feed until it updates.**"}`);
+  return L.join("\n");
+}
+
+export {
+  DEFAULT_STALENESS_SLOTS,
+  checkOracleFreshness,
+  renderOracleText,
+  renderOracleMd
+};

package/dist/cli.js

@@ -1,33 +1,38 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env node
 import {
+  EXPLOIT_PATTERNS,
   analyzeCosts,
   applyDiffToFile,
+  getExploitPattern,
   initPack,
   isTelemetryEnabled,
   lamportsToSol,
   parseDiff,
   recordGraduationEvents,
   renderCostReportMd,
+  renderExploitDetailText,
+  renderExploitsMd,
+  renderExploitsText,
   rentExemptMinimum,
   startWatch,
   submitTelemetry,
   telemetryFilePath,
   validatePack
-} from "./chunk-B2M3TZSA.js";
+} from "./chunk-5VYTURTO.js";
 import {
   renderTrustGraphMd
-} from "./chunk-2UZGWXIX.js";
+} from "./chunk-QMJEZ6NO.js";
 import {
   buildTrustGraph,
   cacheSize,
   defaultCachePath,
   loadProgramCache
-} from "./chunk-SVSVVW6U.js";
+} from "./chunk-GF37ANSW.js";
 import {
   audit,
   getChangedRanges,
   resolveRules
-} from "./chunk-IY52XKWL.js";
+} from "./chunk-5H5JQXXU.js";
 import "./chunk-2XJORJPQ.js";
 import "./chunk-O5Z4ZJHC.js";
 import "./chunk-XSVQSK53.js";
@@ -475,7 +480,7 @@ if (args[0] === "drift") {
   process.exit(0);
 }
 if (args[0] === "mcp") {
-  const { startMcpServer } = await import("./mcp-AM7MTCSZ.js");
+  const { startMcpServer } = await import("./mcp-EOTWSQK7.js");
   await startMcpServer();
   process.exit(0);
 }
@@ -554,6 +559,14 @@ if (args[0] === "deploy-plan") {
   runDeployPlan(args.slice(1));
   process.exit(0);
 }
+if (args[0] === "exploits") {
+  runExploits(args.slice(1));
+  process.exit(0);
+}
+if (args[0] === "oracle") {
+  await runOracle(args.slice(1));
+  process.exit(0);
+}
 if (args[0] === "fix") {
   await runFix(args.slice(1));
   process.exit(0);
@@ -691,6 +704,81 @@ function runDeployPlan(argv) {
   writeFileSync2(mdPath, renderDeployPlanMd(plan));
   console.log(`  deploy plan: ${mdPath}`);
 }
+async function runOracle(argv) {
+  if (argv.includes("--help") || argv.includes("-h") || argv.filter((a) => !a.startsWith("--")).length === 0) {
+    console.log("usage: brainblast oracle <account> [--rpc URL] [--max-staleness-slots N | --max-staleness-seconds N] [--json]");
+    console.log("  Is the oracle fresh? Reports how many slots/seconds ago the price account was");
+    console.log("  last written (provider-agnostic) and gates FRESH/STALE. Exit 1 on STALE or");
+    console.log("  NO_HISTORY. Pass your own --rpc for reliable results (public RPC is rate-limited).");
+    process.exit(argv.length === 0 ? 2 : 0);
+  }
+  const { checkOracleFreshness, renderOracleText, renderOracleMd } = await import("./oracle-DVZLFJ43.js");
+  const num = (name) => {
+    const i = argv.indexOf(`--${name}`);
+    if (i < 0) return void 0;
+    const v = parseInt(argv[i + 1], 10);
+    return Number.isFinite(v) ? v : void 0;
+  };
+  const rpcIdx = argv.indexOf("--rpc");
+  const rpcUrl = rpcIdx >= 0 ? argv[rpcIdx + 1] : void 0;
+  const account = argv.find(
+    (a, i) => !a.startsWith("--") && argv[i - 1] !== "--rpc" && argv[i - 1] !== "--max-staleness-slots" && argv[i - 1] !== "--max-staleness-seconds"
+  );
+  if (!account) {
+    console.error("error: missing <account>. usage: brainblast oracle <account> [--rpc URL] [--json]");
+    process.exit(2);
+  }
+  let f;
+  try {
+    f = await checkOracleFreshness(account, {
+      rpcUrl,
+      maxStalenessSlots: num("max-staleness-slots"),
+      maxStalenessSeconds: num("max-staleness-seconds")
+    });
+  } catch (e) {
+    console.error(`error: ${e?.message ?? String(e)}`);
+    process.exit(2);
+  }
+  if (argv.includes("--json")) console.log(JSON.stringify(f, null, 2));
+  else console.log(renderOracleText(f));
+  const outDir2 = join3(process.cwd(), ".agent-research");
+  mkdirSync2(outDir2, { recursive: true });
+  writeFileSync2(join3(outDir2, "oracle-freshness.md"), renderOracleMd(f));
+  process.exit(f.fresh ? 0 : 1);
+}
+function runExploits(argv) {
+  if (argv.includes("--help") || argv.includes("-h")) {
+    console.log("usage: brainblast exploits [id] [--json]");
+    console.log("  The Exploit Pattern Database: real on-chain incidents mapped to the bundled");
+    console.log("  rule that statically detects each root-cause pattern. Pass an incident id or");
+    console.log("  rule id to see one in detail. Known ids:");
+    console.log(`    ${EXPLOIT_PATTERNS.map((e) => e.id).join(", ")}`);
+    process.exit(0);
+  }
+  const json = argv.includes("--json");
+  const id = argv.find((a) => !a.startsWith("--"));
+  if (id) {
+    const e = getExploitPattern(id);
+    if (!e) {
+      console.error(`error: no exploit pattern '${id}'. Known: ${EXPLOIT_PATTERNS.map((x) => x.id).join(", ")}`);
+      process.exit(2);
+    }
+    if (json) console.log(JSON.stringify(e, null, 2));
+    else console.log(renderExploitDetailText(e));
+    return;
+  }
+  if (json) {
+    console.log(JSON.stringify(EXPLOIT_PATTERNS, null, 2));
+    return;
+  }
+  console.log(renderExploitsText());
+  const outDir2 = join3(process.cwd(), ".agent-research");
+  mkdirSync2(outDir2, { recursive: true });
+  const mdPath = join3(outDir2, "exploit-patterns.md");
+  writeFileSync2(mdPath, renderExploitsMd());
+  console.log(`
+  database: ${mdPath}`);
+}
 function runPack(argv) {
   const sub = argv[0];
   if (sub === "init") {
@@ -1130,8 +1218,8 @@ async function runIdlRules(argv) {
   }
 }
 async function runScore(argv) {
-  const { scoreProgram, renderScoreText, gradeAtLeast } = await import("./score-VLKER37D.js");
-  const { isValidSolanaAddress: isValidSolanaAddress2 } = await import("./trustGraph-4SSJOQKT.js");
+  const { scoreProgram, renderScoreText, gradeAtLeast } = await import("./score-YXFXD6QG.js");
+  const { isValidSolanaAddress: isValidSolanaAddress2 } = await import("./trustGraph-K5PWNEL4.js");
   const programId = argv.find((a) => !a.startsWith("--"));
   if (!programId) {
     console.error("usage: brainblast score <program-id> [--rpc URL] [--no-probe] [--min A|B|C|D|F] [--json]");

package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -156,6 +156,21 @@ interface Rule {
         kind: string;
         params?: Record<string, any>;
     };
+    /**
+     * Exploit Pattern Database provenance (v0.7.3): links this rule to the real
+     * on-chain incident whose root cause it detects. Optional; present on rules
+     * derived from a public post-mortem. The authoritative, user-facing catalog
+     * lives in src/exploitPatterns.ts — this inline block is rule-local
+     * provenance and is cross-checked against the catalog in tests.
+     */
+    exploit?: {
+        incident: string;
+        date: string;
+        lossUsd?: number;
+        chain?: string;
+        postmortemUrl: string;
+        pattern?: string;
+    };
     /**
      * Provenance for rules loaded from a third-party rule pack (see
      * src/packs.ts). Absent for bundled rules. Stamped by the pack loader from
@@ -373,6 +388,7 @@ interface UpgradeAuthority {
     address: string | null;
     source: UpgradeAuthoritySource;
     checkedAt?: string;
+    ownerProgram?: string;
 }
 type VerifiedBuildState = {
     state: "verified";
@@ -428,6 +444,7 @@ interface RpcOpts {
 
 interface BuildOpts extends RpcOpts {
     probeRpc?: boolean;
+    classifyAuthority?: boolean;
     directoryPath?: string;
     cachePath?: string | null;
 }
@@ -437,6 +454,20 @@ declare function renderTrustGraphMd(g: TrustGraph): string;
 
 declare function loadDirectory(path?: string): Map<string, OnChainProgram>;
 
+declare const SYSTEM_PROGRAM = "11111111111111111111111111111111";
+interface KnownOwner {
+    kind: Exclude<UpgradeAuthorityKind, "renounced">;
+    label: string;
+}
+declare const KNOWN_AUTHORITY_OWNERS: Record<string, KnownOwner>;
+interface AuthorityClassification {
+    kind: UpgradeAuthorityKind;
+    ownerProgram?: string;
+    ownerLabel?: string;
+}
+declare function classifyUpgradeAuthority(address: string, opts?: RpcOpts): Promise<AuthorityClassification>;
+declare function enrichAuthorityClassification(authority: UpgradeAuthority, opts?: RpcOpts): Promise<UpgradeAuthority>;
+
 declare function base58Encode(bytes: Uint8Array): string;
 declare function base58Decode(s: string): Uint8Array;
 declare function isValidSolanaAddress(s: string): boolean;
@@ -861,4 +892,59 @@ declare function batchScan(mints: string[], opts?: BatchScanOpts): Promise<Batch
 declare function parseMintList(content: string): string[];
 declare function renderBatchText(result: BatchResult): string;
 
-export { type AccountFlow, type AnchorIdl, type AuditRef, type BatchResult, type BatchRow, type BatchScanOpts, type BuildOpts, CANONICAL_BY_MINT, CANONICAL_MINTS, type Candidate, type CanonicalMint, type ChainEvent, type ChainWatchOpts, type ChainWatchState, type ChangedRanges, type CheckOutcome, type CheckResult, type CheckResultKind, type Checker, type ConfigCandidate, type ConfigChecker, type CostReport, DEFAULT_REGISTRY_URL, DEFAULT_TTL_HOURS, type DecodedInstruction, type DecodedTx, type DiffResult, type DriftAdvisory, type DriftBaseline, type DriftPackage, type DriftResult, type FirewallFinding, type FirewallOpts, type FirewallProgram, type FirewallReport, type FirewallSeverity, type FirewallVerdict, type Grade, type GraduationEvent, type IdentityStatus, type IdlAccount, type IdlConstraintParams, type IdlInstruction, KNOWN_PROGRAMS, type MintInfo, type OnChainProgram, type OsvAdvisory, PACK_MANIFEST_FILE, type PackInitOptions, type PackManifest, type PackRuleValidation, type PackValidateResult, type ParityNote, type ParsedDiff, type PreflightCheck, type PreflightOpts, type PreflightReport, type PreflightStatus, type PreflightVerdict, type PriorityFeePosture, type ProgramCache, type ProgramCacheEntry, type Recoverability, type RicoOutcome, type RicoResult, type RicoTokenSecurity, type Rule, type RustAccountField, type RustCandidate, type RustChecker, type ScoreFactor, type Severity, type TelemetrySubmitResult, type TokenIdentity, type TrustGraph, type TrustScore, type UpgradeAuthority, type UpgradeAuthorityKind, type UpgradeAuthoritySource, type VerifiedBuildState, type VerifyOpts, type WatchEvent, type WatchOptions, analyzeCosts, analyzeInstructions, analyzeToken, applyDiffToFile, audit, auditWithRule, base58Decode, base58Encode, batchScan, buildConstraintParams, buildTrustGraph, rules as bundledRules, cacheSize, canonicalMintForSymbol, checkDrift, checkerKinds, decodeTransaction, defaultCachePath, deployerFlagsFrom, diffVersions, fileChanged, findCandidates, findConfigCandidates, generateRulesFromIdl, generateTestForResult, getCacheEntry, getCacheEntryMeta, getChangedRanges, getRepoHash, getUserHash, getWorkingTreeChanges, gradeAtLeast, gradeForScore, idlProgramName, initPack, initialChainWatchState, inspectTransaction, isCanonicalMint, isEntryExpired, isTelemetryEnabled, isValidSolanaAddress, lamportsToSol, loadDirectory, loadPack, loadPacksFromDir, loadProgramCache, loadRules, parseCpiPrograms, parseDiff, parseIdl, parseMintAccount, parseMintList, pollChainOnce, pumpPreflight, putCacheEntry, queryOsv, rangeChanged, recordGraduationEvents, renderBatchText, renderCostReportMd, renderDiffMd, renderDiffText, renderDriftText, renderFirewallText, renderPreflightText, renderRicoText, renderRulesYaml, renderScoreText, renderTest, renderTrustGraphMd, rentExemptMinimum, resolveRules, riskScore, runChecker, runIncrementalScan, saveProgramCache, scoreFromProgram, scoreProgram, seedPackages, startChainWatch, startWatch, submitTelemetry, telemetryFilePath, testKinds, toSnakeCase, validatePack, validatePackManifest, verifyTokenIdentity };
+declare const DEFAULT_STALENESS_SLOTS = 150;
+type OracleVerdict = "FRESH" | "STALE" | "NO_HISTORY";
+interface OracleFreshness {
+    account: string;
+    currentSlot: number;
+    /** Slot of the most recent signature touching the account; null if none. */
+    lastSlot: number | null;
+    /** Unix seconds of that signature's block, when the RPC provides it. */
+    lastBlockTime: number | null;
+    slotsBehind: number | null;
+    secondsBehind: number | null;
+    thresholdSlots: number;
+    fresh: boolean;
+    verdict: OracleVerdict;
+    checkedAt: string;
+}
+interface OracleOpts extends RpcOpts {
+    /** Staleness threshold in slots (default 150 ≈ 60s). */
+    maxStalenessSlots?: number;
+    /** Staleness threshold in seconds; converted to slots (~400ms each). */
+    maxStalenessSeconds?: number;
+}
+declare function checkOracleFreshness(account: string, opts?: OracleOpts): Promise<OracleFreshness>;
+declare function renderOracleText(f: OracleFreshness): string;
+declare function renderOracleMd(f: OracleFreshness): string;
+
+interface ExploitPattern {
+    /** Stable slug, e.g. "wormhole". */
+    id: string;
+    /** Human title of the incident. */
+    title: string;
+    /** ISO date of the exploit (YYYY-MM-DD), or undefined for a pattern class. */
+    date?: string;
+    /** Reported loss in USD, when a single figure is meaningful. */
+    lossUsd?: number;
+    chain: string;
+    /** Public post-mortem / incident analysis URL. */
+    postmortemUrl: string;
+    /** The generalized root cause, in one sentence. */
+    rootCause: string;
+    /** Bundled rule id that detects this pattern (must exist in rules/). */
+    ruleId: string;
+    /** What that rule looks for, in plain English. */
+    detects: string;
+    /** The safe pattern that closes the hole. */
+    fix: string;
+}
+declare const EXPLOIT_PATTERNS: ExploitPattern[];
+declare function getExploitPattern(idOrRule: string): ExploitPattern | undefined;
+declare function formatUsd(n: number | undefined): string;
+declare function totalLossUsd(patterns?: ExploitPattern[]): number;
+declare function renderExploitsMd(patterns?: ExploitPattern[]): string;
+declare function renderExploitsText(patterns?: ExploitPattern[]): string;
+declare function renderExploitDetailText(e: ExploitPattern): string;
+
+export { type AccountFlow, type AnchorIdl, type AuditRef, type AuthorityClassification, type BatchResult, type BatchRow, type BatchScanOpts, type BuildOpts, CANONICAL_BY_MINT, CANONICAL_MINTS, type Candidate, type CanonicalMint, type ChainEvent, type ChainWatchOpts, type ChainWatchState, type ChangedRanges, type CheckOutcome, type CheckResult, type CheckResultKind, type Checker, type ConfigCandidate, type ConfigChecker, type CostReport, DEFAULT_REGISTRY_URL, DEFAULT_STALENESS_SLOTS, DEFAULT_TTL_HOURS, type DecodedInstruction, type DecodedTx, type DiffResult, type DriftAdvisory, type DriftBaseline, type DriftPackage, type DriftResult, EXPLOIT_PATTERNS, type ExploitPattern, type FirewallFinding, type FirewallOpts, type FirewallProgram, type FirewallReport, type FirewallSeverity, type FirewallVerdict, type Grade, type GraduationEvent, type IdentityStatus, type IdlAccount, type IdlConstraintParams, type IdlInstruction, KNOWN_AUTHORITY_OWNERS, KNOWN_PROGRAMS, type MintInfo, type OnChainProgram, type OracleFreshness, type OracleOpts, type OracleVerdict, type OsvAdvisory, PACK_MANIFEST_FILE, type PackInitOptions, type PackManifest, type PackRuleValidation, type PackValidateResult, type ParityNote, type ParsedDiff, type PreflightCheck, type PreflightOpts, type PreflightReport, type PreflightStatus, type PreflightVerdict, type PriorityFeePosture, type ProgramCache, type ProgramCacheEntry, type Recoverability, type RicoOutcome, type RicoResult, type RicoTokenSecurity, type Rule, type RustAccountField, type RustCandidate, type RustChecker, SYSTEM_PROGRAM, type ScoreFactor, type Severity, type TelemetrySubmitResult, type TokenIdentity, type TrustGraph, type TrustScore, type UpgradeAuthority, type UpgradeAuthorityKind, type UpgradeAuthoritySource, type VerifiedBuildState, type VerifyOpts, type WatchEvent, type WatchOptions, analyzeCosts, analyzeInstructions, analyzeToken, applyDiffToFile, audit, auditWithRule, base58Decode, base58Encode, batchScan, buildConstraintParams, buildTrustGraph, rules as bundledRules, cacheSize, canonicalMintForSymbol, checkDrift, checkOracleFreshness, checkerKinds, classifyUpgradeAuthority, decodeTransaction, defaultCachePath, deployerFlagsFrom, diffVersions, enrichAuthorityClassification, fileChanged, findCandidates, findConfigCandidates, formatUsd, generateRulesFromIdl, generateTestForResult, getCacheEntry, getCacheEntryMeta, getChangedRanges, getExploitPattern, getRepoHash, getUserHash, getWorkingTreeChanges, gradeAtLeast, gradeForScore, idlProgramName, initPack, initialChainWatchState, inspectTransaction, isCanonicalMint, isEntryExpired, isTelemetryEnabled, isValidSolanaAddress, lamportsToSol, loadDirectory, loadPack, loadPacksFromDir, loadProgramCache, loadRules, parseCpiPrograms, parseDiff, parseIdl, parseMintAccount, parseMintList, pollChainOnce, pumpPreflight, putCacheEntry, queryOsv, rangeChanged, recordGraduationEvents, renderBatchText, renderCostReportMd, renderDiffMd, renderDiffText, renderDriftText, renderExploitDetailText, renderExploitsMd, renderExploitsText, renderFirewallText, renderOracleMd, renderOracleText, renderPreflightText, renderRicoText, renderRulesYaml, renderScoreText, renderTest, renderTrustGraphMd, rentExemptMinimum, resolveRules, riskScore, runChecker, runIncrementalScan, saveProgramCache, scoreFromProgram, scoreProgram, seedPackages, startChainWatch, startWatch, submitTelemetry, telemetryFilePath, testKinds, toSnakeCase, totalLossUsd, validatePack, validatePackManifest, verifyTokenIdentity };

package/dist/index.js

@@ -1,3 +1,9 @@
+import {
+  DEFAULT_STALENESS_SLOTS,
+  checkOracleFreshness,
+  renderOracleMd,
+  renderOracleText
+} from "./chunk-WQFLKWBY.js";
 import {
   checkDrift,
   renderDriftText,
@@ -17,7 +23,7 @@ import {
   renderScoreText,
   scoreFromProgram,
   scoreProgram
-} from "./chunk-UWE6HAGS.js";
+} from "./chunk-F7QOW3IM.js";
 import {
   parseMintAccount,
   pumpPreflight,
@@ -38,8 +44,11 @@ import {
 } from "./chunk-VI2JBH2T.js";
 import {
   DEFAULT_REGISTRY_URL,
+  EXPLOIT_PATTERNS,
   analyzeCosts,
   applyDiffToFile,
+  formatUsd,
+  getExploitPattern,
   getRepoHash,
   getUserHash,
   initPack,
@@ -48,21 +57,29 @@ import {
   parseDiff,
   recordGraduationEvents,
   renderCostReportMd,
+  renderExploitDetailText,
+  renderExploitsMd,
+  renderExploitsText,
   rentExemptMinimum,
   runIncrementalScan,
   startWatch,
   submitTelemetry,
   telemetryFilePath,
+  totalLossUsd,
   validatePack
-} from "./chunk-B2M3TZSA.js";
+} from "./chunk-5VYTURTO.js";
 import {
   renderTrustGraphMd
-} from "./chunk-2UZGWXIX.js";
+} from "./chunk-QMJEZ6NO.js";
 import {
   DEFAULT_TTL_HOURS,
+  KNOWN_AUTHORITY_OWNERS,
+  SYSTEM_PROGRAM,
   buildTrustGraph,
   cacheSize,
+  classifyUpgradeAuthority,
   defaultCachePath,
+  enrichAuthorityClassification,
   getCacheEntry,
   getCacheEntryMeta,
   isEntryExpired,
@@ -70,7 +87,7 @@ import {
   loadProgramCache,
   putCacheEntry,
   saveProgramCache
-} from "./chunk-SVSVVW6U.js";
+} from "./chunk-GF37ANSW.js";
 import {
   PACK_MANIFEST_FILE,
   audit,
@@ -91,7 +108,7 @@ import {
   runChecker,
   testKinds,
   validatePackManifest
-} from "./chunk-IY52XKWL.js";
+} from "./chunk-5H5JQXXU.js";
 import {
   CANONICAL_BY_MINT,
   CANONICAL_MINTS,
@@ -143,9 +160,13 @@ export {
   CANONICAL_BY_MINT,
   CANONICAL_MINTS,
   DEFAULT_REGISTRY_URL,
+  DEFAULT_STALENESS_SLOTS,
   DEFAULT_TTL_HOURS,
+  EXPLOIT_PATTERNS,
+  KNOWN_AUTHORITY_OWNERS,
   KNOWN_PROGRAMS,
   PACK_MANIFEST_FILE,
+  SYSTEM_PROGRAM,
   analyzeCosts,
   analyzeInstructions,
   analyzeToken,
@@ -161,19 +182,24 @@ export {
   cacheSize,
   canonicalMintForSymbol,
   checkDrift,
+  checkOracleFreshness,
   checkerKinds,
+  classifyUpgradeAuthority,
   decodeTransaction,
   defaultCachePath,
   deployerFlagsFrom,
   diffVersions,
+  enrichAuthorityClassification,
   fileChanged,
   findCandidates,
   findConfigCandidates,
+  formatUsd,
   generateRulesFromIdl,
   generateTestForResult,
   getCacheEntry,
   getCacheEntryMeta,
   getChangedRanges,
+  getExploitPattern,
   getRepoHash,
   getUserHash,
   getWorkingTreeChanges,
@@ -209,7 +235,12 @@ export {
   renderDiffMd,
   renderDiffText,
   renderDriftText,
+  renderExploitDetailText,
+  renderExploitsMd,
+  renderExploitsText,
   renderFirewallText,
+  renderOracleMd,
+  renderOracleText,
   renderPreflightText,
   renderRicoText,
   renderRulesYaml,
@@ -231,6 +262,7 @@ export {
   telemetryFilePath,
   testKinds,
   toSnakeCase,
+  totalLossUsd,
   validatePack,
   validatePackManifest,
   verifyTokenIdentity

package/dist/{mcp-AM7MTCSZ.js → mcp-EOTWSQK7.js}

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 import {
   audit,
   resolveRules
-} from "./chunk-IY52XKWL.js";
+} from "./chunk-5H5JQXXU.js";
 import "./chunk-2XJORJPQ.js";
 import "./chunk-O5Z4ZJHC.js";
 import {

package/dist/oracle-DVZLFJ43.js

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+import {
+  DEFAULT_STALENESS_SLOTS,
+  checkOracleFreshness,
+  renderOracleMd,
+  renderOracleText
+} from "./chunk-WQFLKWBY.js";
+import "./chunk-XSVQSK53.js";
+import "./chunk-VG5FMOLW.js";
+import "./chunk-3RG5ZIWI.js";
+export {
+  DEFAULT_STALENESS_SLOTS,
+  checkOracleFreshness,
+  renderOracleMd,
+  renderOracleText
+};

package/dist/rules/cpi-target-program-unverified.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+id: cpi-target-program-unverified
+severity: critical
+title: Anchor CPI invokes a target program account whose identity is never verified (Wormhole pattern)
+component:
+  name: Anchor Framework
+  type: Blockchain
+  version: ">=0.26.0"
+  sourceUrl: https://www.anchor-lang.com/docs/the-program-module
+exploit:
+  incident: Wormhole bridge exploit
+  date: "2022-02-02"
+  lossUsd: 325000000
+  chain: Solana
+  postmortemUrl: https://rekt.news/wormhole-rekt/
+  pattern: >-
+    A cross-program invocation (or signature-verification load) was performed
+    against an account trusted by position rather than by identity. A deprecated
+    load did not verify the supplied account's address, letting an attacker
+    substitute a malicious account and forge verification. Generalized: a CPI
+    target program was used without verifying its program ID.
+detect:
+  lang: rust
+  modules:
+    - "@coral-xyz/anchor"
+    - "@project-serum/anchor"
+  nameRegex: ".*"
+  triggerCalls: []
+check:
+  kind: anchor-cpi-unverified-program
+  params:
+    programNameRegex: "(^|_)program$|^program(_id)?$"
+    cpiRegex: "invoke_signed\\s*\\(|invoke\\s*\\(|CpiContext::|\\.cpi\\(\\)"
+test:
+  kind: anchor-program-test
+  params:
+    scenario: cpi-substituted-program
+    description: >-
+      Invokes the handler with a malicious program substituted for the expected
+      target. With a raw AccountInfo program account the CPI dispatches to the
+      attacker's program; typing it Program<'info, T> (or adding address=)
+      makes Anchor reject the substitution before the handler runs.

package/dist/{score-VLKER37D.js → score-YXFXD6QG.js}

@@ -4,8 +4,8 @@ import {
   renderScoreText,
   scoreFromProgram,
   scoreProgram
-} from "./chunk-UWE6HAGS.js";
-import "./chunk-SVSVVW6U.js";
+} from "./chunk-F7QOW3IM.js";
+import "./chunk-GF37ANSW.js";
 import "./chunk-XSVQSK53.js";
 import "./chunk-VG5FMOLW.js";
 import "./chunk-3RG5ZIWI.js";

package/dist/{trustGraph-4SSJOQKT.js → trustGraph-K5PWNEL4.js}

@@ -1,12 +1,16 @@
 import {
   renderProgram,
   renderTrustGraphMd
-} from "./chunk-2UZGWXIX.js";
+} from "./chunk-QMJEZ6NO.js";
 import {
   DEFAULT_TTL_HOURS,
+  KNOWN_AUTHORITY_OWNERS,
+  SYSTEM_PROGRAM,
   buildTrustGraph,
   cacheSize,
+  classifyUpgradeAuthority,
   defaultCachePath,
+  enrichAuthorityClassification,
   getCacheEntry,
   getCacheEntryMeta,
   isEntryExpired,
@@ -14,7 +18,7 @@ import {
   loadProgramCache,
   putCacheEntry,
   saveProgramCache
-} from "./chunk-SVSVVW6U.js";
+} from "./chunk-GF37ANSW.js";
 import {
   DEFAULT_RPC,
   getAccountInfo,
@@ -29,11 +33,15 @@ import "./chunk-3RG5ZIWI.js";
 export {
   DEFAULT_RPC,
   DEFAULT_TTL_HOURS,
+  KNOWN_AUTHORITY_OWNERS,
+  SYSTEM_PROGRAM,
   base58Decode,
   base58Encode,
   buildTrustGraph,
   cacheSize,
+  classifyUpgradeAuthority,
   defaultCachePath,
+  enrichAuthorityClassification,
   getAccountInfo,
   getCacheEntry,
   getCacheEntryMeta,

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "brainblast",
-  "version": "0.7.2",
+  "version": "0.7.4",
   "type": "module",
   "description": "Deterministic auditor for catastrophic AI-integration bugs: scan a repo, find the silent money/auth traps, and generate the behavioral test that proves they're fixed.",
   "keywords": [