brainblast 0.7.0 → 0.7.1

package/dist/{chunk-34VXOLJF.js → chunk-B2M3TZSA.js}

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ import {
   loadPack,
   resolveRules,
   walk
-} from "./chunk-CRYFCQYM.js";
+} from "./chunk-IY52XKWL.js";
 
 // src/costAnalysis.ts
 import { Project, SyntaxKind } from "ts-morph";

package/dist/{chunk-CRYFCQYM.js → chunk-IY52XKWL.js}

@@ -913,6 +913,89 @@ function anchorIdlAccount(c, params) {
   };
 }
 
+// src/checkers/anchorAccountMissingConstraint.ts
+var DEFAULT_AUTHORITY_RE = /^(authority|admin|owner|payer|caller|signer|user|operator|manager|creator|deployer)$/i;
+function anchorAccountMissingConstraint(c, p) {
+  const namePattern = p?.nameRegex ? new RegExp(p.nameRegex) : DEFAULT_AUTHORITY_RE;
+  const authorityFields = c.accountFields.filter((f) => namePattern.test(f.name));
+  if (authorityFields.length === 0) {
+    return {
+      result: "cant_tell",
+      detail: p?.absentDetail ?? `Handler '${c.fnName}' has no authority-named account fields matching the pattern; rule does not apply.`
+    };
+  }
+  const missing = authorityFields.filter(
+    (f) => f.typeName.includes("AccountInfo") && !f.attrText.includes("signer") && !f.typeName.includes("Signer<")
+  );
+  if (missing.length > 0) {
+    const names = missing.map((f) => `'${f.name}'`).join(", ");
+    return {
+      result: "fail",
+      detail: p?.failDetail ?? `Handler '${c.fnName}': authority-named field(s) ${names} use AccountInfo<'info> without a \`signer\` constraint. Anchor performs no signing check on AccountInfo \u2014 any key can be passed as the authority and privileged instructions will execute without signature validation. Fix: change the type to Signer<'info>, or add #[account(signer)] to the field's constraint.`
+    };
+  }
+  return {
+    result: "pass",
+    detail: p?.passDetail ?? `Handler '${c.fnName}': all authority-named fields use Signer<'info> or have a signer constraint.`
+  };
+}
+
+// src/checkers/anchorForbiddenAccountType.ts
+var DEFAULT_FORBIDDEN = "UncheckedAccount";
+function anchorForbiddenAccountType(c, p) {
+  const forbidden = p?.forbiddenType ?? DEFAULT_FORBIDDEN;
+  const flagged = c.accountFields.filter((f) => f.typeName.includes(forbidden));
+  if (flagged.length === 0) {
+    if (c.accountFields.length > 0) {
+      return {
+        result: "pass",
+        detail: p?.passDetail ?? `Handler '${c.fnName}' has no '${forbidden}' account fields.`
+      };
+    }
+    return {
+      result: "cant_tell",
+      detail: p?.absentDetail ?? `Handler '${c.fnName}' has no account fields to inspect; rule does not apply.`
+    };
+  }
+  const names = flagged.map((f) => `'${f.name}'`).join(", ");
+  return {
+    result: "fail",
+    detail: p?.failDetail ?? `Handler '${c.fnName}' uses ${forbidden}<'info> on account(s) ${names}. ${forbidden} performs no runtime validation \u2014 ownership, signer status, and data layout are entirely unchecked. Replace with a typed account: Account<'info, T> (program-owned data), Signer<'info> (must sign), SystemAccount<'info> (system-owned), or InterfaceAccount<'info, T> (Token-2022 compatible).`
+  };
+}
+
+// src/checkers/anchorBodyCallPattern.ts
+function anchorBodyCallPattern(c, p) {
+  if (!p?.forbiddenPattern) {
+    return { result: "cant_tell", detail: "anchorBodyCallPattern: no forbiddenPattern param provided." };
+  }
+  const forbidden = new RegExp(p.forbiddenPattern);
+  const exempt = p?.exemptPattern ? new RegExp(p.exemptPattern) : null;
+  const hasForbidden = forbidden.test(c.fnBodyText);
+  if (!hasForbidden) {
+    if (c.fnBodyText.trim().length > 0) {
+      return {
+        result: "pass",
+        detail: p?.passDetail ?? `Handler '${c.fnName}' does not contain the forbidden pattern '${p.forbiddenPattern}'.`
+      };
+    }
+    return {
+      result: "cant_tell",
+      detail: p?.absentDetail ?? `Handler '${c.fnName}' has an empty body; rule does not apply.`
+    };
+  }
+  if (exempt && exempt.test(c.fnBodyText)) {
+    return {
+      result: "pass",
+      detail: p?.passDetail ?? `Handler '${c.fnName}' contains '${p.forbiddenPattern}' but also matches the exemption pattern \u2014 considered safe.`
+    };
+  }
+  return {
+    result: "fail",
+    detail: p?.failDetail ?? `Handler '${c.fnName}' body contains '${p.forbiddenPattern}', which is a known footgun pattern. Use the Anchor seeds + bump constraint on the Accounts struct instead of deriving PDAs at runtime.`
+  };
+}
+
 // src/checkers/index.ts
 var registry = {
   "positional-arg-identity": positionalArgIdentity,
@@ -927,7 +1010,10 @@ var registry = {
   "literal-multiplier-wrong-constant": literalMultiplierWrongConstant,
   "forbidden-call-replacement": forbiddenCallReplacement,
   "solana-mint-identity-mismatch": solanaMintIdentity,
-  "anchor-account-matches-idl": anchorIdlAccount
+  "anchor-account-matches-idl": anchorIdlAccount,
+  "anchor-account-missing-constraint": anchorAccountMissingConstraint,
+  "anchor-forbidden-account-type": anchorForbiddenAccountType,
+  "anchor-body-call-pattern": anchorBodyCallPattern
 };
 function runChecker(kind, c, params) {
   const fn = registry[kind];

package/dist/cli.js

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ import {
   submitTelemetry,
   telemetryFilePath,
   validatePack
-} from "./chunk-34VXOLJF.js";
+} from "./chunk-B2M3TZSA.js";
 import {
   renderTrustGraphMd
 } from "./chunk-2UZGWXIX.js";
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ import {
   audit,
   getChangedRanges,
   resolveRules
-} from "./chunk-CRYFCQYM.js";
+} from "./chunk-IY52XKWL.js";
 import "./chunk-2XJORJPQ.js";
 import "./chunk-O5Z4ZJHC.js";
 import "./chunk-XSVQSK53.js";
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ if (args[0] === "drift") {
   process.exit(0);
 }
 if (args[0] === "mcp") {
-  const { startMcpServer } = await import("./mcp-ML2X44WE.js");
+  const { startMcpServer } = await import("./mcp-AM7MTCSZ.js");
   await startMcpServer();
   process.exit(0);
 }

package/dist/index.js

@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ import {
   submitTelemetry,
   telemetryFilePath,
   validatePack
-} from "./chunk-34VXOLJF.js";
+} from "./chunk-B2M3TZSA.js";
 import {
   renderTrustGraphMd
 } from "./chunk-2UZGWXIX.js";
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ import {
   runChecker,
   testKinds,
   validatePackManifest
-} from "./chunk-CRYFCQYM.js";
+} from "./chunk-IY52XKWL.js";
 import {
   CANONICAL_BY_MINT,
   CANONICAL_MINTS,

package/dist/{mcp-ML2X44WE.js → mcp-AM7MTCSZ.js}

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 import {
   audit,
   resolveRules
-} from "./chunk-CRYFCQYM.js";
+} from "./chunk-IY52XKWL.js";
 import "./chunk-2XJORJPQ.js";
 import "./chunk-O5Z4ZJHC.js";
 import {

package/dist/rules/anchor-pda-find-program-address.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+id: anchor-pda-find-program-address
+severity: high
+title: Anchor handler calls find_program_address at runtime instead of using seeds+bump constraint
+component:
+  name: Anchor Framework
+  type: Blockchain
+  version: ">=0.26.0"
+  sourceUrl: https://www.anchor-lang.com/docs/the-accounts-struct#seeds-and-bump
+detect:
+  lang: rust
+  modules:
+    - "@coral-xyz/anchor"
+    - "@project-serum/anchor"
+  nameRegex: ".*"
+  triggerCalls: []
+check:
+  kind: anchor-body-call-pattern
+  params:
+    forbiddenPattern: "Pubkey::find_program_address|find_program_address\\s*\\("
+test:
+  kind: anchor-program-test
+  params:
+    scenario: pda-canonical-bump-mismatch
+    description: >-
+      Initializes the PDA storing the canonical bump, then calls the handler with
+      a non-canonical bump seed. With find_program_address the handler may accept
+      this (re-deriving a different nonce), whereas the seeds+bump constraint
+      enforces the stored canonical bump and will reject it.

package/dist/rules/anchor-signer-constraint-missing.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+id: anchor-signer-constraint-missing
+severity: critical
+title: Anchor authority account missing signer constraint
+component:
+  name: Anchor Framework
+  type: Blockchain
+  version: ">=0.26.0"
+  sourceUrl: https://www.anchor-lang.com/docs/the-accounts-struct#signer
+detect:
+  lang: rust
+  modules:
+    - "@coral-xyz/anchor"
+    - "@project-serum/anchor"
+  nameRegex: ".*"
+  triggerCalls: []
+check:
+  kind: anchor-account-missing-constraint
+  params:
+    nameRegex: "^(authority|admin|owner|payer|caller|signer|user|operator|manager|creator|deployer)$"
+test:
+  kind: anchor-program-test
+  params:
+    scenario: unauthorized-caller
+    description: >-
+      Calls the instruction with a key that does not match the expected authority
+      and has not signed the transaction. Must be rejected with a signing error.
+      If it succeeds, the authority check is absent and privilege escalation is possible.

package/dist/rules/anchor-unchecked-account-type.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+id: anchor-unchecked-account-type
+severity: high
+title: Anchor instruction uses UncheckedAccount — no runtime validation
+component:
+  name: Anchor Framework
+  type: Blockchain
+  version: ">=0.26.0"
+  sourceUrl: https://www.anchor-lang.com/docs/the-accounts-struct#uncheckedaccount
+detect:
+  lang: rust
+  modules:
+    - "@coral-xyz/anchor"
+    - "@project-serum/anchor"
+  nameRegex: ".*"
+  triggerCalls: []
+check:
+  kind: anchor-forbidden-account-type
+  params:
+    forbiddenType: "UncheckedAccount"
+test:
+  kind: anchor-program-test
+  params:
+    scenario: arbitrary-account-substitution
+    description: >-
+      Passes an account owned by an arbitrary program (not the expected program ID)
+      as the UncheckedAccount field. Must be rejected. If it succeeds, an attacker
+      can substitute any account and the instruction will operate on attacker-controlled data.

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "brainblast",
-  "version": "0.7.0",
+  "version": "0.7.1",
   "type": "module",
   "description": "Deterministic auditor for catastrophic AI-integration bugs: scan a repo, find the silent money/auth traps, and generate the behavioral test that proves they're fixed.",
   "keywords": [