brain-memory 0.4.0 → 0.5.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/CHANGELOG.md +99 -0
- package/README.md +4 -0
- package/SECURITY.md +17 -6
- package/bin/brain.js +24 -3
- package/bin/install.js +72 -14
- package/bin/memorize.js +50 -6
- package/bin/port.js +174 -0
- package/bin/recall.js +16 -6
- package/bin/reinforce.js +5 -0
- package/bin/session-start.js +30 -4
- package/bin/verify.js +42 -4
- package/commands/brain/memorize.md +8 -0
- package/commands/brain/verify.md +10 -2
- package/hooks/citation-check.mjs +94 -0
- package/hooks/hooks.json +11 -0
- package/hooks/lib.mjs +6 -0
- package/hooks/prompt-recall.mjs +24 -3
- package/hooks/session-start.mjs +4 -2
- package/integrations/README.md +4 -0
- package/integrations/agentskills/brain-memory/SKILL.md +9 -5
- package/package.json +4 -3
- package/prompts/antigravity.md +4 -2
- package/prompts/claude.md +4 -2
- package/prompts/copilot.md +4 -2
- package/prompts/kilo.md +4 -2
- package/prompts/openai.md +4 -2
- package/prompts/opencode.md +4 -2
- package/src/adapters.js +240 -0
- package/src/anomaly.js +41 -1
- package/src/cloud-sync.js +2 -2
- package/src/content-lint.js +55 -2
- package/src/export-import.js +1 -1
- package/src/git-sync.js +1 -1
- package/src/index-manager.js +9 -5
- package/src/installer.js +35 -1
- package/src/pinning.js +20 -1
- package/src/provenance.js +34 -0
- package/src/quarantine.js +82 -5
- package/src/receipt.js +9 -4
- package/src/surfaced.js +188 -0
- package/store/conformance/helpers.js +70 -16
- package/store/test/oidc.test.js +13 -8
package/CHANGELOG.md
CHANGED
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@@ -6,6 +6,105 @@ The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/), and this
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## [Unreleased]
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## [0.5.0] - 2026-10-18
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Memory stops being a way to smuggle instructions or permissions into an agent.
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Memories from outside the user/agent dialogue are now left out of recall until
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the user approves them, not merely marked. A remembered permission is its own
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class that needs the user's own words behind it. Every receipt the agent cites
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is checked against what brain actually surfaced. On a poisoned LongMemEval run,
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down-weighting left the planted memory at rank 1 for 90% of questions, while
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exclusion restored the clean-run R@1 of 0.551. `brain port` moves memories to
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and from other memory systems.
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### Added
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- **Permissions are their own class of memory.** A write that says the agent
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may act without asking ("the user approved force-pushes to main", "no need to
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confirm deploys", "pre-approved") is an authorization claim. From any origin
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but `user` it lands pending verification (`authz:unbacked`); a `user` one does
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too (`authz:no-source`) unless it carries the user's own words in
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`authorized_by.quote`. Such memories are pinnable only when user-origin and
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backed or approved, are marked `authorization_claim` in recall and
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session-start results, and carry `⚠ authorization` on their receipts. The
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agent prompts say a remembered permission is never consent for the action at
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hand. `brain audit` reports older memories the new lint rule would have
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caught. The connector's `brain_memorize` accepts `authorized_by`.
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- **Citation lock.** Recall, session start and prompt-time recall record what
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they surfaced in a device-local ledger (`~/.brain/.local/`, excluded from
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every sync, export and restore). A new `Stop` hook (Claude Code, Codex)
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checks every `◉ memory:` receipt in the agent's reply against it; a receipt
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for a memory brain never surfaced is logged as a `citation_violation` audit
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event and reported to the agent on its next prompt. Advisory: the reply is
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never blocked.
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- **Low-trust occupancy cap.** `recall_low_trust_max` (default `1`) bounds how
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many `tool-output` / `external` memories a recall result or session-start
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payload may hold, approved or not; the rest are skipped for the next trusted
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match and reported as `low_trust_suppressed`.
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- **`brain port`** moves memories between brain and other memory systems:
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`export --format claude-memory|markdown|agentcore` writes what recall could
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show (memories pending verification, hidden or expired are left out and
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counted); `import --from …` sends memories through `brain memorize` as
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`external`, so they wait for review unless `--trust` marks them as yours.
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Covers Claude Code's memory files, a pasteable dated list (Claude.ai's
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import format), and AgentCore `BatchCreateMemoryRecords` bodies. What
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survives a round trip is documented per format.
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- **Poisoned LongMemEval benchmark** (`benchmark/harness/longmemeval-poison.js`):
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free, deterministic, retrieval-only. With a planted wrong-answer session per
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question, exclusion keeps clean-haystack retrieval (R@1 0.551, R@5 0.909, the
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poison never in the top 5); trust weighting alone lets the poison rank first
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for 90% of questions. Results in `benchmark/results/REPORT.md`.
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- **Plugin eval suite** (`evals/`) for `claude plugin eval`: eight cases that
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seed a throwaway brain and check pinned conventions, past decisions,
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poisoned-memory exclusion, no invented receipts, permissions not treated as
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consent, memorize-on-request, and a fat-vs-thin AGENTS.md cost pair. A
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manual-dispatch workflow runs it in CI.
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- **Messages API integration** (`integrations/api/`): `withBrainTurn()`
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recalls on each user message and appends the matches as a turn-scoped
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system message (`clear_at: "next_user_message"`) under a token cap.
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- **Git review template** (`integrations/git-review/`): a GitHub Actions check
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for a brain git-sync repository that runs `brain audit` on every push.
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- `docs/security/asi06.md`: Brain's controls mapped onto OWASP ASI06, every
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CLI command and connector tool classified by effect, the threats not
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covered, and the benchmark evidence.
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- Session start reports `recall_usage_7d`: how many surfaced memories the agent
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went on to use (`brain reinforce`).
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- **`brain verify requeue <id>`**, an undo for a mistaken approve. It puts the
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memory back into pending verification, clears `vetted` (which also withdraws
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per-item consent for a sensitive memory), rebuilds the reasons approval
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dropped, and logs a `verify_requeue` audit event. A pinned memory is refused
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rather than silently unpinned.
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- **Install without a terminal.** `brain --claude --global` (installer flags
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with no subcommand) runs the installer, so an agent or a CI job can install
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brain by itself. With nothing to ask on, the installer initializes `~/.brain/`
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if it does not exist and never overwrites one; `--yes` skips that question on
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a terminal too.
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- The installer warns when brain is installed under nvm, fnm, asdf, mise or
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nodenv: the command exists for that Node version only, so it disappears when
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the default version moves and agent hooks never see it.
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- Website: a Self-Hosting a Store page, and documentation for token login and
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refused pushes.
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### Changed
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- **Quarantine excludes by default.** `quarantine_mode` now defaults to
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`enforce`: memories pending verification are left out of recall and session
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start until approved, instead of being returned with a `⊘ unverified` mark.
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Down-weighting a poisoned memory does not keep it out of the context window
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when it is the best match; exclusion does. They are still counted in
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`pending_verification`. Set `"quarantine_mode": "flag"` in
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`~/.brain/config.json` to keep the previous behavior. An unrecognized value
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now falls back to `enforce`, never to `off`.
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- A write that lands pending verification is no longer born pinned; the output
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reports `pin_dropped`.
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- The agent prompts say to approve only the exact ids the user reviewed, never
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a fresh listing, because other sessions write concurrently.
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### Fixed
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- The `secret_exfil` lint no longer quarantines ordinary engineering notes
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("the password-reset email", a code literal such as `upload`) as injections.
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- `test/harvest.test.js` no longer depends on the `~/.codex` of whoever runs it.
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- The Compose environment template is `store/deploy/env.example`; as
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`.env.example` it was ignored by git and npm and never shipped.
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## [0.4.0] - 2026-09-18
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Opens up sync. The HTTP interface between a Brain client and a remote store is
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package/README.md
CHANGED
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brain --all --global # All runtimes, global
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```
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These run without a terminal, so an agent or a CI job can install brain itself. With no terminal to ask on, the installer initializes `~/.brain/` if it doesn't exist yet (it never overwrites an existing brain) — add `--yes` to skip that question outright. Leave out the runtime and it stops with an error rather than guessing.
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For the deepest Copilot CLI integration — deterministic session-start context injection via its `sessionStart` hook — install the [Copilot plugin](integrations/copilot/) from the brain marketplace:
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```bash
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> **Why not `npx`?** `npx` runs the setup wizard in a temporary directory that is discarded after execution. The `brain` CLI (`brain recall`, `brain memorize`, `brain reinforce`) won't be available in your PATH, which means agents will fall back to less reliable manual file operations. Always use `npm install -g` to ensure everything works correctly.
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> **Using nvm, fnm, asdf, mise or nodenv?** `npm install -g` puts `brain` inside whichever Node version is active, and only there. The command then disappears when your default version moves — a `22` alias drifting to a newer 22.x is enough — and shells that never load the version manager (agent hooks, GUI-launched agents, non-interactive shells) can't see it at all. Nothing errors: agents quietly fall back to editing memory files by hand, and it looks like brain works "sometimes". Install brain-memory with a system Node instead (Homebrew, apt, the nodejs.org installer) so `brain` lives in one stable place. npm takes its global prefix from the `node` that runs it, so put the system Node first on `PATH` for that one command — on macOS with Homebrew: `PATH="/opt/homebrew/bin:$PATH" npm install -g brain-memory`. Check with `which -a brain`; it should print exactly one path, outside your version manager's directory. The installer warns when it detects this. Volta is fine as-is — it keeps global packages available across versions.
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### Uninstall
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```bash
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package/SECURITY.md
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- **Provenance ceilings.** Every memory records an `origin`; non-`user` origins
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are confidence-capped, decay faster, and **cannot pin or entrench** (refused at
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write, not silently capped).
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- **Trust-weighted recall.** Origin trust multiplies the
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spreading-activation sources, so a co-tagged clique of
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self-amplify past a genuine memory
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- **Trust-weighted recall and an occupancy cap.** Origin trust multiplies the
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recall score and damps spreading-activation sources, so a co-tagged clique of
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planted writes can't self-amplify past a genuine memory; and one result set
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holds at most `recall_low_trust_max` (default 1) low-trust memories.
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- **Content lint.** Instruction-shaped writes (e.g. "ignore previous
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instructions", pipe-to-shell, secret exfiltration) are flagged regardless of
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the claimed origin.
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- **Quarantine + verification.** Low-trust
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verification (`brain verify`)
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until approved.
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- **Quarantine + verification.** Low-trust, lint-flagged and permission-granting
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writes land pending verification (`brain verify`) and, by default (`enforce`),
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are excluded from recall until approved.
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- **Permissions need the user's words.** A memory that grants the agent a
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permission is quarantined unless it is user-origin and carries the user's own
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words, and is never treated as consent for the action at hand.
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- **Citation lock.** Under Claude Code and Codex a Stop hook checks every
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receipt in a reply against what brain surfaced, and logs any other as a
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`citation_violation`.
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- **Anomaly detection.** `brain audit` flags write bursts, low-trust cliques, and
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quietly-reinforced unverified memories (runs as `brain sleep` Phase 0).
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- **Forensics + rollback.** An append-only `~/.brain/audit.log` (carried forward
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through restores) records every write, archival, and verification; `brain
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restore` rolls the whole brain back to a pre-attack snapshot.
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The control map, a classification of every tool by effect, the threats not
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covered, and poisoning-benchmark numbers are in
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[docs/security/asi06.md](docs/security/asi06.md).
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`origin` is asserted by the writing agent, so this does not defend against a
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fully hostile agent lying about provenance — but it holds for the dominant case
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(an honest agent relaying poisoned content), and the entrenchment refusal and
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package/bin/brain.js
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* Usage:
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* brain Interactive installer (also: brain install)
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* brain install|update|uninstall [flags]
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* brain --claude --global Installer flags alone also install (non-interactive)
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* brain recall "<query>" [--project P] [--task T] [--top N] [--context] [--reindex]
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* brain memorize [--sync] Store memories from a JSON payload on stdin
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* brain reinforce <id> [<id>...] Spaced reinforcement + Hebbian co-retrieval
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restore: 'restore.js',
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audit: 'audit.js',
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port: 'port.js',
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};
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// install.js finds its positional subcommand from process.argv itself, so it is
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// `npx brain-memory` via npm's single-bin fallback.
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const INSTALLER = new Set(['install', 'update', 'uninstall']);
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// The documented non-interactive form has no subcommand at all —
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// `brain --claude --global` — a holdover from the old `brain-memory` binary that
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// install.js's own arg parser still accepts. An explicit list rather than "any
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// --flag", so a typo like `--verison` still gets the unknown-command help.
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const INSTALLER_FLAGS = new Set([
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'--claude', '--codex', '--openai', '--opencode', '--antigravity', '--copilot', '--kilo', '--all',
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'--global', '--local', '--update', '--uninstall', '--yes', '--y',
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]);
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const HELP = `◉ brain — Brain Memory CLI
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Usage: brain <command> [options]
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Budget-bounded startup payload (agent-invoked)
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Trust
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verify <list|show|approve|reject>
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verify <list|show|approve|reject|requeue>
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Quarantine workflow for unverified writes
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audit [--window 24h|7d] [--apply]
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Anomalous-write scan over audit.log
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import --mark <id> [<id>...]
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Record sessions as imported (incremental cursor)
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Portability
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port export --format <claude-memory|markdown|agentcore> [--out PATH]
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Export what recall could show, for another memory system
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port import --from <claude-memory|markdown|agentcore> <PATH> [--trust] [--dry-run]
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Import through memorize (external → pending review)
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Sync
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cloud <login|logout|push|pull|status>
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restore --list [--from git|cloud]
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Setup
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install Interactive installer (default when no command)
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install --claude --global [--yes]
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Non-interactive: name the runtime(s) and scope
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(--codex --opencode --copilot --kilo --antigravity --all;
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\`install\` may be omitted)
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update Update an existing installation
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uninstall [--delete-data] Remove the installation
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}
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// Bare `brain
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if (sub === undefined || INSTALLER.has(sub)) {
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// Bare `brain`, an installer subcommand, or installer flags alone → run the installer.
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if (sub === undefined || INSTALLER.has(sub) || INSTALLER_FLAGS.has(sub)) {
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require(path.join(__dirname, 'install.js'));
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|
112
133
|
return;
|
|
113
134
|
}
|
package/bin/install.js
CHANGED
|
@@ -10,17 +10,61 @@ const {
|
|
|
10
10
|
initializeBrain,
|
|
11
11
|
detectInstallations,
|
|
12
12
|
uninstallForRuntime,
|
|
13
|
+
detectVersionManager,
|
|
13
14
|
} = require('../src/installer');
|
|
14
15
|
|
|
16
|
+
// Interfaces whose stdin has ended. Tracked here because question() on a
|
|
17
|
+
// closed interface throws on some Node versions and silently never calls back
|
|
18
|
+
// on others.
|
|
19
|
+
const ended = new WeakSet();
|
|
20
|
+
|
|
15
21
|
function createRL() {
|
|
16
|
-
|
|
22
|
+
const rl = readline.createInterface({
|
|
17
23
|
input: process.stdin,
|
|
18
24
|
output: process.stdout,
|
|
19
25
|
});
|
|
26
|
+
rl.once('close', () => ended.add(rl));
|
|
27
|
+
return rl;
|
|
20
28
|
}
|
|
21
29
|
|
|
30
|
+
// Resolves null when stdin ends before an answer arrives — closed stdin, or a
|
|
31
|
+
// pipe that ran dry. Agents and CI run this installer without a terminal; a
|
|
32
|
+
// question that never resolves lets the event loop drain, and the process exits
|
|
33
|
+
// 0 having installed nothing. Callers must handle null (take the default, or
|
|
34
|
+
// fail loudly) rather than treat it as an answer.
|
|
22
35
|
function ask(rl, question) {
|
|
23
|
-
return new Promise((resolve) =>
|
|
36
|
+
return new Promise((resolve) => {
|
|
37
|
+
if (ended.has(rl)) {
|
|
38
|
+
console.log(question);
|
|
39
|
+
return resolve(null);
|
|
40
|
+
}
|
|
41
|
+
const onClose = () => {
|
|
42
|
+
console.log('');
|
|
43
|
+
resolve(null);
|
|
44
|
+
};
|
|
45
|
+
rl.once('close', onClose);
|
|
46
|
+
rl.question(question, (answer) => {
|
|
47
|
+
rl.removeListener('close', onClose);
|
|
48
|
+
resolve(answer);
|
|
49
|
+
});
|
|
50
|
+
});
|
|
51
|
+
}
|
|
52
|
+
|
|
53
|
+
function assumeYes(flags) {
|
|
54
|
+
return flags.has('yes') || flags.has('y');
|
|
55
|
+
}
|
|
56
|
+
|
|
57
|
+
function warnIfVersionManaged() {
|
|
58
|
+
const vm = detectVersionManager();
|
|
59
|
+
if (!vm) return;
|
|
60
|
+
console.log(`
|
|
61
|
+
⚠ brain is installed under ${vm.manager} (Node ${vm.version}).
|
|
62
|
+
The \`brain\` command exists for that Node version only. It disappears when your
|
|
63
|
+
default version changes, and shells that don't load ${vm.manager} — agent hooks,
|
|
64
|
+
GUI-launched agents, non-interactive shells — never see it. When agents can't find
|
|
65
|
+
\`brain\` they fall back to editing memory files by hand, with no error.
|
|
66
|
+
Install brain-memory with a system Node instead (Homebrew, apt, the nodejs.org
|
|
67
|
+
installer), then run \`brain update\`.`);
|
|
24
68
|
}
|
|
25
69
|
|
|
26
70
|
function parseArgs(argv) {
|
|
@@ -112,6 +156,11 @@ async function runInstall(flags) {
|
|
|
112
156
|
console.log('');
|
|
113
157
|
|
|
114
158
|
const choice = await ask(rl, ' Select (1/2/3/4/5/6/7): ');
|
|
159
|
+
if (choice === null) {
|
|
160
|
+
throw new Error(
|
|
161
|
+
'no runtime selected and no terminal to ask on. Name one, e.g. `brain install --claude --global`.'
|
|
162
|
+
);
|
|
163
|
+
}
|
|
115
164
|
switch (choice.trim()) {
|
|
116
165
|
case '1':
|
|
117
166
|
runtimes = ['claude'];
|
|
@@ -148,15 +197,17 @@ async function runInstall(flags) {
|
|
|
148
197
|
console.log('');
|
|
149
198
|
|
|
150
199
|
const choice = await ask(rl, ' Select (1/2): ');
|
|
151
|
-
scope = choice.trim() === '2' ? 'local' : 'global';
|
|
200
|
+
scope = choice !== null && choice.trim() === '2' ? 'local' : 'global';
|
|
152
201
|
}
|
|
153
202
|
|
|
154
|
-
// Initialize .brain structure?
|
|
155
|
-
|
|
156
|
-
|
|
157
|
-
|
|
158
|
-
'
|
|
159
|
-
|
|
203
|
+
// Initialize .brain structure? No answer takes the prompt's own default
|
|
204
|
+
// (yes) — initializeBrain() never overwrites an existing brain.
|
|
205
|
+
let initBrain = 'y';
|
|
206
|
+
if (!assumeYes(flags)) {
|
|
207
|
+
console.log('');
|
|
208
|
+
const answer = await ask(rl, ' Initialize ~/.brain/ directory? (Y/n): ');
|
|
209
|
+
if (answer !== null) initBrain = answer;
|
|
210
|
+
}
|
|
160
211
|
|
|
161
212
|
// Perform installation
|
|
162
213
|
console.log('\n Installing...');
|
|
@@ -196,6 +247,7 @@ async function runInstall(flags) {
|
|
|
196
247
|
Your brain is ready — recall and memorize happen automatically. Just start working,
|
|
197
248
|
or run /brain:status to see an overview.
|
|
198
249
|
`);
|
|
250
|
+
warnIfVersionManaged();
|
|
199
251
|
} finally {
|
|
200
252
|
rl.close();
|
|
201
253
|
}
|
|
@@ -226,7 +278,7 @@ async function runUpdate(flags) {
|
|
|
226
278
|
|
|
227
279
|
if (detections.length === 0) {
|
|
228
280
|
console.log(' No existing brain-memory installations found.\n');
|
|
229
|
-
console.log(' To install, run: npm install -g brain-memory
|
|
281
|
+
console.log(' To install, run: npm install -g brain-memory && brain install');
|
|
230
282
|
if (filterRuntimes.length > 0) {
|
|
231
283
|
console.log(` (Searched for: ${filterRuntimes.join(', ')})`);
|
|
232
284
|
}
|
|
@@ -251,6 +303,7 @@ async function runUpdate(flags) {
|
|
|
251
303
|
}
|
|
252
304
|
|
|
253
305
|
console.log(`\n ✓ Updated to v${version}\n`);
|
|
306
|
+
warnIfVersionManaged();
|
|
254
307
|
}
|
|
255
308
|
|
|
256
309
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
@@ -285,12 +338,17 @@ async function runUninstall(flags) {
|
|
|
285
338
|
console.log(` ${d.runtimeName} (${d.scope}) — ${parts.join(' + ')}`);
|
|
286
339
|
}
|
|
287
340
|
|
|
288
|
-
// Confirm unless --yes
|
|
289
|
-
|
|
341
|
+
// Confirm unless --yes. No answer (no terminal) is a no: removal is never
|
|
342
|
+
// something to default into.
|
|
343
|
+
if (!assumeYes(flags)) {
|
|
290
344
|
const rl = createRL();
|
|
291
345
|
try {
|
|
292
346
|
console.log('');
|
|
293
347
|
const answer = await ask(rl, ' Proceed? (y/N): ');
|
|
348
|
+
if (answer === null) {
|
|
349
|
+
console.log(' Cancelled — no terminal to confirm on. Pass --yes to uninstall non-interactively.\n');
|
|
350
|
+
return;
|
|
351
|
+
}
|
|
294
352
|
if (answer.trim().toLowerCase() !== 'y') {
|
|
295
353
|
console.log('\n Cancelled.\n');
|
|
296
354
|
return;
|
|
@@ -313,7 +371,7 @@ async function runUninstall(flags) {
|
|
|
313
371
|
if (flags.has('delete-data')) {
|
|
314
372
|
fs.rmSync(brainDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
|
|
315
373
|
console.log('\n Deleted ~/.brain/ directory.');
|
|
316
|
-
} else if (!
|
|
374
|
+
} else if (!assumeYes(flags)) {
|
|
317
375
|
const rl = createRL();
|
|
318
376
|
try {
|
|
319
377
|
console.log('');
|
|
@@ -321,7 +379,7 @@ async function runUninstall(flags) {
|
|
|
321
379
|
rl,
|
|
322
380
|
' Delete ~/.brain/ data directory? This removes all memories. (y/N): '
|
|
323
381
|
);
|
|
324
|
-
if (answer.trim().toLowerCase() === 'y') {
|
|
382
|
+
if (answer !== null && answer.trim().toLowerCase() === 'y') {
|
|
325
383
|
fs.rmSync(brainDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
|
|
326
384
|
console.log(' Deleted ~/.brain/ directory.');
|
|
327
385
|
} else {
|
package/bin/memorize.js
CHANGED
|
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ const { appendAudit } = require('../src/audit');
|
|
|
40
40
|
const { lintMemoryContent } = require('../src/content-lint');
|
|
41
41
|
const { contentHash } = require('../src/integrity');
|
|
42
42
|
const { proposeSupersessions } = require('../src/contradiction');
|
|
43
|
-
const { quarantineDecision } = require('../src/quarantine');
|
|
43
|
+
const { quarantineDecision, isAuthorizationClaim } = require('../src/quarantine');
|
|
44
44
|
const {
|
|
45
45
|
validateValidity,
|
|
46
46
|
supersessionInstant,
|
|
@@ -216,6 +216,13 @@ function buildMemoryFileContent(mem, id, now, origin, originDecayMultiplier, qua
|
|
|
216
216
|
fmLines.push(`quarantine_reasons: [${quarantine.reasons.map((r) => `"${r}"`).join(', ')}]`);
|
|
217
217
|
fmLines.push(`quarantine_flagged: "${now}"`);
|
|
218
218
|
}
|
|
219
|
+
// Authorization claim (src/content-lint.js): the memory says the agent may
|
|
220
|
+
// act without asking. Marked so recall and pinning can treat it apart, with
|
|
221
|
+
// the user's own words alongside when the caller supplied them.
|
|
222
|
+
if (mem.authorization) {
|
|
223
|
+
fmLines.push('authorization: true');
|
|
224
|
+
if (mem.authorized_by) fmLines.push(`authorized_by: ${JSON.stringify(JSON.stringify(mem.authorized_by))}`);
|
|
225
|
+
}
|
|
219
226
|
// Temporal invalidation: record which memories this one replaces. The
|
|
220
227
|
// reciprocal `superseded_by` is stamped on those targets in main().
|
|
221
228
|
if (mem.supersedes && mem.supersedes.length) {
|
|
@@ -245,6 +252,24 @@ function buildMemoryFileContent(mem, id, now, origin, originDecayMultiplier, qua
|
|
|
245
252
|
return { fileContent: frontmatter + mem.content + '\n', strength, decay_rate };
|
|
246
253
|
}
|
|
247
254
|
|
|
255
|
+
/**
|
|
256
|
+
* Validate the optional `authorized_by` backing for an authorization claim:
|
|
257
|
+
* `{ quote, session_id? }`, where `quote` is the user's own words granting the
|
|
258
|
+
* permission. Bounded so a memory cannot smuggle a transcript in through it.
|
|
259
|
+
*/
|
|
260
|
+
function normalizeAuthorizedBy(value) {
|
|
261
|
+
if (value == null) return null;
|
|
262
|
+
if (typeof value !== 'object' || Array.isArray(value)) {
|
|
263
|
+
return { error: 'authorized_by must be an object: { quote, session_id? }' };
|
|
264
|
+
}
|
|
265
|
+
const quote = typeof value.quote === 'string' ? value.quote.trim() : '';
|
|
266
|
+
if (!quote) return { error: 'authorized_by.quote must be the user\'s own words, non-empty' };
|
|
267
|
+
if (quote.length > 500) return { error: 'authorized_by.quote is longer than 500 characters' };
|
|
268
|
+
const out = { quote };
|
|
269
|
+
if (typeof value.session_id === 'string' && value.session_id.trim()) out.session_id = value.session_id.trim().slice(0, 120);
|
|
270
|
+
return out;
|
|
271
|
+
}
|
|
272
|
+
|
|
248
273
|
function buildIndexEntry(mem, id, strength, decayRate, now, origin, quarantine) {
|
|
249
274
|
const entry = {
|
|
250
275
|
title: mem.title,
|
|
@@ -279,6 +304,10 @@ function buildIndexEntry(mem, id, strength, decayRate, now, origin, quarantine)
|
|
|
279
304
|
entry.quarantine_reasons = quarantine.reasons;
|
|
280
305
|
entry.quarantine_flagged = now;
|
|
281
306
|
}
|
|
307
|
+
if (mem.authorization) {
|
|
308
|
+
entry.authorization = true;
|
|
309
|
+
if (mem.authorized_by) entry.authorized_by = mem.authorized_by;
|
|
310
|
+
}
|
|
282
311
|
if (mem.supersedes && mem.supersedes.length) entry.supersedes = mem.supersedes;
|
|
283
312
|
if (mem.valid_from) entry.valid_from = mem.valid_from;
|
|
284
313
|
if (mem.valid_until) entry.valid_until = mem.valid_until;
|
|
@@ -387,10 +416,11 @@ async function main() {
|
|
|
387
416
|
process.exit(1);
|
|
388
417
|
}
|
|
389
418
|
|
|
390
|
-
// Read
|
|
391
|
-
//
|
|
392
|
-
//
|
|
393
|
-
|
|
419
|
+
// Read stdin as a stream. The '/dev/stdin' path fails with ENXIO on Linux CI
|
|
420
|
+
// and doesn't exist on Windows; readFileSync(0) throws EAGAIN on macOS when
|
|
421
|
+
// the parent hands over a non-blocking pipe. The stream handles both.
|
|
422
|
+
process.stdin.setEncoding('utf-8');
|
|
423
|
+
for await (const chunk of process.stdin) inputData += chunk;
|
|
394
424
|
|
|
395
425
|
let input;
|
|
396
426
|
try {
|
|
@@ -490,7 +520,14 @@ async function main() {
|
|
|
490
520
|
// (cheap, and the flags feed forensics even when nothing is quarantined);
|
|
491
521
|
// the decision flags low-trust origins and injection-shaped content.
|
|
492
522
|
const lint = lintMemoryContent(mem);
|
|
493
|
-
const
|
|
523
|
+
const authorizedBy = normalizeAuthorizedBy(mem.authorized_by);
|
|
524
|
+
if (authorizedBy && authorizedBy.error) {
|
|
525
|
+
console.error(JSON.stringify({ error: `${authorizedBy.error} — memory: ${JSON.stringify(rawMem.title)}` }));
|
|
526
|
+
process.exit(1);
|
|
527
|
+
}
|
|
528
|
+
const quarantine = quarantineDecision({ origin, lintResult: lint, config, authorizedBy });
|
|
529
|
+
mem.authorization = isAuthorizationClaim(lint);
|
|
530
|
+
mem.authorized_by = mem.authorization ? authorizedBy : undefined;
|
|
494
531
|
|
|
495
532
|
// Sensitive-topic consent (src/sensitivity.js). `blocked` content is
|
|
496
533
|
// refused outright; `sensitive` content is stored only after the user
|
|
@@ -516,6 +553,11 @@ async function main() {
|
|
|
516
553
|
quarantine.reasons = [...quarantine.reasons, SENSITIVE_OPT_OUT_REASON];
|
|
517
554
|
}
|
|
518
555
|
mem.sensitivity = sensitivity.level;
|
|
556
|
+
// A write that lands pending verification cannot be born pinned: the pin
|
|
557
|
+
// would load an unreviewed memory into every session. Dropped, not
|
|
558
|
+
// refused, so the memory itself is kept — the result says why.
|
|
559
|
+
const pinDropped = Boolean(mem.pinned && quarantine.quarantined);
|
|
560
|
+
if (pinDropped) mem.pinned = false;
|
|
519
561
|
|
|
520
562
|
// Generate ID
|
|
521
563
|
const id = generateId();
|
|
@@ -665,6 +707,8 @@ async function main() {
|
|
|
665
707
|
// until the user opts in (config) or approves it (`brain verify approve`).
|
|
666
708
|
...(mem.sensitivity !== 'standard' ? { sensitivity: mem.sensitivity } : {}),
|
|
667
709
|
...(sensitivity.action === 'quarantine' ? { sensitive_opt_out: true } : {}),
|
|
710
|
+
...(mem.authorization ? { authorization_claim: true } : {}),
|
|
711
|
+
...(pinDropped ? { pin_dropped: 'pending verification — pin it after `brain verify approve`' } : {}),
|
|
668
712
|
...(supersededNow.length ? { superseded: supersededNow } : {}),
|
|
669
713
|
// Held back until verification — surfaced so the agent can tell the user
|
|
670
714
|
// the replacement it asked for has not taken effect yet.
|