brain-memory 0.1.0 → 0.3.0

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Files changed (46) hide show
  1. package/CHANGELOG.md +216 -0
  2. package/README.md +34 -5
  3. package/bin/audit.js +18 -1
  4. package/bin/brain +4 -0
  5. package/bin/forget.js +10 -1
  6. package/bin/import.js +1 -1
  7. package/bin/install.js +10 -0
  8. package/bin/memorize.js +99 -21
  9. package/bin/recall.js +64 -13
  10. package/bin/reinforce.js +34 -1
  11. package/bin/session-start.js +32 -4
  12. package/bin/skill.js +8 -2
  13. package/bin/verify.js +35 -3
  14. package/commands/brain/import.md +1 -1
  15. package/commands/brain/memorize.md +45 -4
  16. package/commands/brain/remember.md +10 -1
  17. package/commands/brain/skills.md +29 -0
  18. package/commands/brain/sleep.md +1 -1
  19. package/commands/brain/verify.md +6 -0
  20. package/hooks/hooks.json +39 -0
  21. package/hooks/lib.mjs +117 -0
  22. package/hooks/prompt-recall.mjs +123 -0
  23. package/hooks/session-end.md +54 -0
  24. package/hooks/session-end.mjs +63 -0
  25. package/hooks/session-start.md +58 -0
  26. package/hooks/session-start.mjs +82 -0
  27. package/integrations/agentskills/brain-memory/SKILL.md +5 -0
  28. package/package.json +5 -3
  29. package/prompts/antigravity.md +26 -2
  30. package/prompts/claude.md +26 -2
  31. package/prompts/copilot.md +26 -2
  32. package/prompts/kilo.md +26 -2
  33. package/prompts/openai.md +26 -2
  34. package/prompts/opencode.md +26 -2
  35. package/src/anomaly.js +7 -0
  36. package/src/contradiction.js +106 -0
  37. package/src/harvest.js +174 -2
  38. package/src/index-manager.js +8 -0
  39. package/src/installer.js +126 -3
  40. package/src/integrity.js +155 -0
  41. package/src/receipt.js +14 -4
  42. package/src/scorer.js +75 -7
  43. package/src/sensitivity.js +134 -0
  44. package/src/skill-verify.js +191 -0
  45. package/src/skills.js +63 -0
  46. package/src/temporal.js +228 -0
package/src/receipt.js CHANGED
@@ -13,8 +13,10 @@
13
13
  * trailing warning segment so a poisoned-source memory is visibly marked
14
14
  * wherever its receipt appears: ◉ memory: "<title>" (<type>, <age>, ⚠ external)
15
15
  * Memories pending verification (quarantined — see src/quarantine.js) carry a
16
- * further "⊘ unverified" segment. User/agent-inferred, vetted receipts are
17
- * byte-identical to the base format.
16
+ * further "⊘ unverified" segment, and memories whose validity window has closed
17
+ * (see src/temporal.js) a "⌛ expired" one, and sensitive-topic memories (see
18
+ * src/sensitivity.js) a "⚠ sensitive" one. User/agent-inferred, vetted, current,
19
+ * standard receipts are byte-identical to the base format.
18
20
  *
19
21
  * Age is derived from the memory's `created` timestamp (falling back to
20
22
  * `last_accessed`; omitted entirely when neither parses):
@@ -25,6 +27,7 @@
25
27
  */
26
28
 
27
29
  const { isLowTrust } = require('./provenance');
30
+ const { temporalState } = require('./temporal');
28
31
 
29
32
  const MS_PER_DAY = 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
30
33
  const DAYS_PER_MONTH = 30.44; // mean Gregorian month
@@ -72,10 +75,17 @@ function receiptFor(memoryLike, nowFn) {
72
75
  // Pending verification (quarantine flag mode): the receipt is the visible
73
76
  // channel, so an unverified memory is marked wherever it fires.
74
77
  const pending = mem.quarantined ? ', ⊘ unverified' : '';
78
+ // Bitemporal: the fact's validity window has closed. A stale memory can
79
+ // still be the right answer ("that was true until March") — but it must
80
+ // never look current, so the marker rides along with the receipt.
81
+ const expired = temporalState(mem, now.getTime()) === 'expired' ? ', ⌛ expired' : '';
82
+ // Consent: a sensitive-topic memory stays visibly marked even after the user
83
+ // opted in or approved it, so the agent knows to handle it with care.
84
+ const sensitive = mem.sensitivity === 'sensitive' ? ', ⚠ sensitive' : '';
75
85
 
76
86
  return age
77
- ? `◉ memory: "${title}" (${type}, ${age}${trust}${pending})`
78
- : `◉ memory: "${title}" (${type}${trust}${pending})`;
87
+ ? `◉ memory: "${title}" (${type}, ${age}${trust}${pending}${expired}${sensitive})`
88
+ : `◉ memory: "${title}" (${type}${trust}${pending}${expired}${sensitive})`;
79
89
  }
80
90
 
81
91
  module.exports = { receiptFor, ageLabel };
package/src/scorer.js CHANGED
@@ -8,6 +8,12 @@
8
8
  */
9
9
 
10
10
  const { trustFactor } = require('./provenance');
11
+ const {
12
+ EXPIRED_PENALTY,
13
+ parseInstant,
14
+ temporalState,
15
+ validityOf,
16
+ } = require('./temporal');
11
17
 
12
18
  // Temporal invalidation: multiplier applied to a memory that a newer one has
13
19
  // explicitly superseded. Low enough that the successor reliably outranks it,
@@ -378,6 +384,36 @@ function computeSpreadingActivationBatch(scoredMemories, associations, maxDepth
378
384
  * recall of low-relevance neighbors is a feature, not noise).
379
385
  * @returns {Object[]} Scored and sorted memories (highest first)
380
386
  */
387
+ /**
388
+ * Recall multiplier for a memory's temporal standing (1 = current).
389
+ *
390
+ * Default mode demotes anything a successor replaced or whose validity window
391
+ * has elapsed. In valid-time travel (`asOf`) the question changes: a memory
392
+ * still inside its window *was* current at that instant, so the supersession
393
+ * demotion is lifted — the fact that it was later replaced is exactly what the
394
+ * query is looking past.
395
+ *
396
+ * The one case that keeps its demotion under asOf is a memory superseded
397
+ * before validity windows existed (`superseded_by` with no `valid_until`):
398
+ * nothing records when it stopped being true, so assuming it was still current
399
+ * would be a guess. Legacy data stays conservative.
400
+ *
401
+ * @param {Object} mem - Memory or index entry
402
+ * @param {Object} ctx - { asOf: number|null, evaluatedAt: number }
403
+ * @returns {number} Multiplier in (0, 1]
404
+ */
405
+ function temporalPenaltyFor(mem, { asOf = null, evaluatedAt = Date.now() } = {}) {
406
+ if (asOf != null) {
407
+ const supersededWithoutWindow = mem.superseded_by && validityOf(mem).until == null;
408
+ return supersededWithoutWindow ? SUPERSEDED_PENALTY : 1;
409
+ }
410
+
411
+ let penalty = 1;
412
+ if (mem.superseded_by) penalty = SUPERSEDED_PENALTY;
413
+ if (temporalState(mem, evaluatedAt) === 'expired') penalty = Math.min(penalty, EXPIRED_PENALTY);
414
+ return penalty;
415
+ }
416
+
381
417
  function rankMemories(memories, relevanceFn, options = {}) {
382
418
  // Guard every term against NaN (e.g. a missing/invalid last_accessed or
383
419
  // strength) — a single NaN score sorts non-deterministically and can outrank
@@ -447,10 +483,35 @@ function rankMemories(memories, relevanceFn, options = {}) {
447
483
  // Relevance floor: gate BEFORE final scoring so strength/salience can't
448
484
  // carry an unrelated memory into the results (uses raw, unrounded terms).
449
485
  const floor = options.relevanceFloor;
450
- const gated = floor != null
486
+ const relevanceGated = floor != null
451
487
  ? scored.filter((mem) => mem.relevance >= floor || mem.spreading_bonus >= floor)
452
488
  : scored;
453
489
 
490
+ // Bitemporal gates. Both are point-in-time *filters*, not demotions: an
491
+ // as-of query asks what the world looked like at an instant, and a memory
492
+ // outside that instant is not a weaker answer — it is not an answer.
493
+ // asOf (valid time) — the fact was true then
494
+ // asKnownOf (record time) — the brain had recorded it by then
495
+ // Passing both reconstructs what the brain believed, and when.
496
+ const asOf = parseInstant(options.asOf);
497
+ const asKnownOf = parseInstant(options.asKnownOf);
498
+ let gated = relevanceGated;
499
+ if (asOf != null) {
500
+ gated = gated.filter((mem) => temporalState(mem, asOf) === 'current');
501
+ }
502
+ if (asKnownOf != null) {
503
+ gated = gated.filter((mem) => {
504
+ const recorded = parseInstant(mem.created);
505
+ // A memory with no parseable record time can't be proven to post-date
506
+ // the cutoff, so it stays — dropping it would silently lose legacy data.
507
+ return recorded == null || recorded <= asKnownOf;
508
+ });
509
+ }
510
+
511
+ // The instant "current" is judged against: the as-of instant in valid-time
512
+ // travel, otherwise now.
513
+ const evaluatedAt = asOf != null ? asOf : Date.now();
514
+
454
515
  // Final score
455
516
  return gated
456
517
  .map((mem) => {
@@ -463,21 +524,25 @@ function rankMemories(memories, relevanceFn, options = {}) {
463
524
  // volume, not relevance — a clearly more relevant low-trust memory can
464
525
  // still win, but it can't win on bulk. Missing origin weighs as the
465
526
  // memorize default, so legacy memories keep their relative order.
466
- // Temporal invalidation: a memory explicitly superseded by a newer one
467
- // (via `superseded_by`) is strongly demoted — not excluded, so an agent
468
- // can still surface "this was true until X" — but it must never outrank
469
- // the memory that replaced it. Demote, don't drop; the successor wins.
470
- const supersededPenalty = mem.superseded_by ? SUPERSEDED_PENALTY : 1;
527
+ // Temporal invalidation. Two signals say "no longer current": an explicit
528
+ // successor (`superseded_by`) and an elapsed validity window
529
+ // (`valid_until`). Take the strongest single penalty, never the product —
530
+ // a memory carrying both is one stale fact, not two. Demote, don't drop:
531
+ // the successor wins, but "this was true until X" stays answerable.
532
+ const temporalPenalty = temporalPenaltyFor(mem, { asOf, evaluatedAt });
471
533
 
472
534
  const score = fin(computeRecallScore(
473
535
  mem.relevance,
474
536
  mem.decayed_strength,
475
537
  mem.recency_bonus,
476
538
  extras
477
- )) * trustFactor(mem.origin) * supersededPenalty;
539
+ )) * trustFactor(mem.origin) * temporalPenalty;
478
540
 
479
541
  return {
480
542
  ...mem,
543
+ // Standing at the instant this ranking was judged against, so callers
544
+ // can flag a stale fact without re-deriving the window.
545
+ temporal_state: temporalState(mem, evaluatedAt),
481
546
  decayed_strength: Math.round(mem.decayed_strength * 1000) / 1000,
482
547
  recency_bonus: Math.round(mem.recency_bonus * 1000) / 1000,
483
548
  relevance: Math.round(mem.relevance * 1000) / 1000,
@@ -506,4 +571,7 @@ module.exports = {
506
571
  computeContextMatch,
507
572
  computeSpacedBoost,
508
573
  improveDecayRate,
574
+ // Bitemporal validity (see src/temporal.js)
575
+ temporalPenaltyFor,
576
+ SUPERSEDED_PENALTY,
509
577
  };
@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
1
+ /**
2
+ * Brain Memory — Sensitive-topic consent (per-fragment)
3
+ *
4
+ * Three tiers, deliberately matching the vocabulary of the largest deployed
5
+ * consent model for assistant memory (Anthropic's, Aug 2026) so a brain is
6
+ * interoperable with it rather than inventing a bespoke schema:
7
+ *
8
+ * standard Stored normally. The default.
9
+ * sensitive Health, race, ethnicity, religious beliefs, politics, gender
10
+ * identity and similar. Excluded from storage unless the user has
11
+ * opted in (`sensitive_topics: true` in ~/.brain/config.json) —
12
+ * until then the write lands quarantined (`sensitive_opt_out`) and
13
+ * is hidden from recall and session-start. `brain verify approve`
14
+ * is per-item consent and lifts the exclusion for that memory.
15
+ * Never retroactive: opting in never rewrites what was refused.
16
+ * blocked Government / national ID numbers, criminal history, immigration
17
+ * status. Refused at write time whatever the toggle says.
18
+ *
19
+ * The agent classifies (it read the conversation); the patterns here are a
20
+ * backstop for the two tiers that must never depend on a caller's honesty.
21
+ * They are narrow on purpose: a false "blocked" refuses a write the user asked
22
+ * for, so only unambiguous identifiers and phrases qualify, and the sensitive
23
+ * backstop flags rather than blocks. Nothing here is PII detection.
24
+ */
25
+
26
+ const SENSITIVITY_LEVELS = ['standard', 'sensitive', 'blocked'];
27
+ const DEFAULT_SENSITIVITY = 'standard';
28
+ const SENSITIVE_OPT_OUT_REASON = 'sensitive_opt_out';
29
+
30
+ /** Category → description, as published. Kept as data so docs and prompts can cite it. */
31
+ const SENSITIVE_CATEGORIES = {
32
+ health: 'physical or mental health, conditions, medication, treatment',
33
+ race: 'race',
34
+ ethnicity: 'ethnicity or national origin',
35
+ religion: 'religious or philosophical beliefs',
36
+ politics: 'political opinions or affiliation',
37
+ gender_identity: 'gender identity or sexual orientation',
38
+ };
39
+
40
+ const BLOCKED_CATEGORIES = {
41
+ government_id: 'social-security, passport, national-ID, tax or similar identification numbers',
42
+ criminal_history: 'criminal history, charges, convictions',
43
+ immigration_status: 'immigration or visa status',
44
+ };
45
+
46
+ // --- Backstop patterns ---
47
+
48
+ const BLOCKED_RULES = [
49
+ // Structured identifiers: a US SSN, or an ID-word within a few tokens of a
50
+ // 6-12 digit run (passport/national/tax IDs vary by country; the word makes
51
+ // the digits unambiguous).
52
+ { category: 'government_id', re: /\b\d{3}-\d{2}-\d{4}\b/ },
53
+ {
54
+ category: 'government_id',
55
+ re: /\b(?:ssn|social\s+security|passport|national\s+id|tax\s+id|citizen\s+service|bsn|nino|sin)\b(?:\s+(?:number|no\.?|#))?[^\n\d]{0,20}\d(?:[\s-]?\d){5,11}\b/i,
56
+ },
57
+ { category: 'criminal_history', re: /\b(?:criminal\s+(?:record|history|charges?)|convicted\s+of|felony\s+conviction|misdemeanou?r\s+conviction|was\s+arrested\s+for|serv(?:ed|ing)\s+(?:time|a\s+sentence))\b/i },
58
+ { category: 'immigration_status', re: /\b(?:immigration\s+status|visa\s+status|undocumented\s+immigrant|asylum\s+(?:seeker|claim|status)|deportation\s+order|green\s+card\s+(?:status|application)|overstayed\s+(?:a|the|my|their)\s+visa)\b/i },
59
+ ];
60
+
61
+ const SENSITIVE_RULES = [
62
+ { category: 'health', re: /\b(?:diagnos(?:ed|is)\s+with|my\s+(?:therapist|psychiatrist|oncologist|medication|diagnosis)|(?:takes?|taking|prescribed)\s+(?:antidepressants?|insulin|chemotherapy|adhd\s+medication)|mental\s+health\s+(?:condition|history|diagnosis)|(?:has|have|had)\s+(?:cancer|diabetes|epilepsy|hiv|depression|bipolar|schizophrenia|ptsd|anorexia|bulimia))\b/i },
63
+ { category: 'race', re: /\b(?:racial\s+(?:identity|background)|(?:identif(?:y|ies)\s+as|is|am)\s+(?:black|white|asian|latino|latina|latinx|hispanic|indigenous|native\s+american|mixed[- ]race))\b/i },
64
+ { category: 'ethnicity', re: /\b(?:ethnic(?:ity|\s+background)|(?:is|am|are)\s+(?:of\s+)?(?:kurdish|turkish|arab|jewish|romani|han\s+chinese|tamil|uyghur|persian|armenian|pashtun)\s*(?:descent|origin|heritage)?)\b/i },
65
+ { category: 'religion', re: /\b(?:religious\s+(?:beliefs?|affiliation|background)|(?:is|am|are)\s+(?:a\s+)?(?:practi[sc]ing\s+)?(?:muslim|christian|catholic|protestant|jewish|hindu|buddhist|sikh|atheist|agnostic)\b|converted\s+to\s+(?:islam|christianity|judaism|buddhism|hinduism)|attends?\s+(?:church|mosque|synagogue|temple)\s+(?:every|weekly|regularly))/i },
66
+ { category: 'politics', re: /\b(?:political\s+(?:views?|affiliation|opinions?|party)|vot(?:ed|es|ing)\s+(?:for|against)\s+(?:the\s+)?[A-Z][\w-]+|(?:is|am|are)\s+(?:a\s+)?(?:registered\s+)?(?:democrat|republican|conservative|liberal|socialist|libertarian|green\s+party\s+member)|member\s+of\s+(?:the\s+)?\w+\s+party)\b/i },
67
+ { category: 'gender_identity', re: /\b(?:gender\s+identity|(?:is|am|are|identif(?:y|ies)\s+as)\s+(?:transgender|trans|non-?binary|genderfluid|genderqueer|gay|lesbian|bisexual|queer|asexual|pansexual)|sexual\s+orientation|came\s+out\s+as)\b/i },
68
+ ];
69
+
70
+ function textOf(mem) {
71
+ return `${(mem && mem.title) || ''}\n${(mem && mem.content) || ''}`;
72
+ }
73
+
74
+ /**
75
+ * Backstop classification of a memory's text.
76
+ *
77
+ * @param {Object} mem - { title, content }
78
+ * @returns {{ level: string, categories: string[] }}
79
+ */
80
+ function classifySensitivity(mem) {
81
+ const text = textOf(mem);
82
+ const blocked = BLOCKED_RULES.filter((r) => r.re.test(text)).map((r) => r.category);
83
+ if (blocked.length > 0) return { level: 'blocked', categories: [...new Set(blocked)] };
84
+ const sensitive = SENSITIVE_RULES.filter((r) => r.re.test(text)).map((r) => r.category);
85
+ if (sensitive.length > 0) return { level: 'sensitive', categories: [...new Set(sensitive)] };
86
+ return { level: 'standard', categories: [] };
87
+ }
88
+
89
+ /**
90
+ * Resolve the final sensitivity of a write and what to do with it.
91
+ *
92
+ * The caller's label can only raise the level (an agent may not call a match
93
+ * for "criminal record" `standard`), and the backstop can only raise it too.
94
+ *
95
+ * @param {Object} mem - { title, content, sensitivity? }
96
+ * @param {Object} config - brain config (sensitive_topics)
97
+ * @returns {{ level, categories, action: 'store'|'quarantine'|'refuse', requested, error? }}
98
+ */
99
+ function sensitivityDecision(mem, config) {
100
+ const requested = mem && mem.sensitivity != null ? String(mem.sensitivity) : null;
101
+ if (requested != null && !SENSITIVITY_LEVELS.includes(requested)) {
102
+ return { error: `Unknown sensitivity "${requested}" (expected one of: ${SENSITIVITY_LEVELS.join(', ')})` };
103
+ }
104
+ const detected = classifySensitivity(mem);
105
+ const rank = (l) => SENSITIVITY_LEVELS.indexOf(l);
106
+ const level = rank(detected.level) > rank(requested || DEFAULT_SENSITIVITY) ? detected.level : (requested || DEFAULT_SENSITIVITY);
107
+
108
+ let action = 'store';
109
+ if (level === 'blocked') action = 'refuse';
110
+ else if (level === 'sensitive' && !(config && config.sensitive_topics === true)) action = 'quarantine';
111
+
112
+ return { level, categories: detected.categories, action, requested };
113
+ }
114
+
115
+ /**
116
+ * Read-side gate: a sensitive memory is hidden from recall and session-start
117
+ * unless the user opted in globally or approved this one (`vetted`).
118
+ */
119
+ function isSensitiveHidden(entry, config) {
120
+ if (!entry || entry.sensitivity !== 'sensitive') return false;
121
+ if (config && config.sensitive_topics === true) return false;
122
+ return !entry.vetted;
123
+ }
124
+
125
+ module.exports = {
126
+ SENSITIVITY_LEVELS,
127
+ DEFAULT_SENSITIVITY,
128
+ SENSITIVE_OPT_OUT_REASON,
129
+ SENSITIVE_CATEGORIES,
130
+ BLOCKED_CATEGORIES,
131
+ classifySensitivity,
132
+ sensitivityDecision,
133
+ isSensitiveHidden,
134
+ };
@@ -0,0 +1,191 @@
1
+ /**
2
+ * Brain Memory — Skill Verification (Skill-DisCo, arXiv:2606.26669)
3
+ *
4
+ * A crystallized skill is a claim: "this is how this repo does migrations."
5
+ * Today that claim is only ever tested by *using* it — `brain skill use
6
+ * --failed` demotes one that misfires, so a bad skill decays out of the L0
7
+ * index eventually. Eventually is the problem: the skill is advertised to
8
+ * every session until enough failures accumulate, and the first few failures
9
+ * are paid by the user.
10
+ *
11
+ * The Skill-DisCo result is that procedural memory should compile to something
12
+ * **checkable offline** — verifiable without running the agent. This module is
13
+ * that check: a skill may declare preconditions, and `brain skill verify`
14
+ * answers whether they still hold in the current working directory.
15
+ *
16
+ * The value is drift detection. A skill distilled six months ago against a repo
17
+ * whose `migrations/` folder has since been renamed is not weakly-supported —
18
+ * it is *wrong*, and it will confidently misdirect the next session that
19
+ * matches its triggers. A precondition check catches that in milliseconds.
20
+ *
21
+ * ── Why declarative checks and not a shell command ───────────────────────
22
+ * The obvious design is `verify: npm run migrate:check`. It is also a loaded
23
+ * gun pointed at the rest of this codebase.
24
+ *
25
+ * Skills are crystallized automatically from experience (sleep Phase 4b), they
26
+ * sync between machines, and they can be imported from other people. A `verify`
27
+ * field holding arbitrary shell would mean a memory file that executes code —
28
+ * turning every one of Brain's poisoning defenses into theatre, because the
29
+ * payload would no longer need to persuade the agent of anything. It would just
30
+ * need to be run. `curl … | bash` in a synced skill is precisely the OWASP
31
+ * ASI06 scenario with the hard part removed.
32
+ *
33
+ * So checks are DECLARATIVE and READ-ONLY. Every check type below inspects
34
+ * state; none of them execute anything, and there is deliberately no escape
35
+ * hatch. A skill can ask "does `migrations/` exist?" It cannot ask the machine
36
+ * to run something and trust the exit code.
37
+ *
38
+ * ── Check types ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
39
+ * { file_exists: "migrations/" }
40
+ * { file_absent: "config/legacy.yml" }
41
+ * { file_contains: { path: "package.json", text: "\"migrate\"" } }
42
+ * { command_available: "psql" } — PATH lookup only, never executed
43
+ * { env_set: "DATABASE_URL" } — presence only, value never read
44
+ */
45
+
46
+ const fs = require('fs');
47
+ const path = require('path');
48
+
49
+ // A contains-check reads a file into memory; cap it so a skill pointed at a
50
+ // multi-gigabyte artifact degrades to a failed check instead of an OOM.
51
+ const MAX_CONTAINS_BYTES = 2 * 1024 * 1024;
52
+
53
+ const CHECK_TYPES = ['file_exists', 'file_absent', 'file_contains', 'command_available', 'env_set'];
54
+
55
+ /**
56
+ * Resolve a skill-declared path inside the working directory.
57
+ *
58
+ * Skills sync between machines and can be imported from other people, so a
59
+ * declared path is untrusted input. Anything that escapes the working
60
+ * directory — `../`, an absolute path, a symlink pointing out — resolves to
61
+ * null and fails the check, so a skill can never be used to probe for files
62
+ * elsewhere on the disk.
63
+ *
64
+ * @param {string} cwd - Directory the checks run against
65
+ * @param {string} rel - Skill-declared path
66
+ * @returns {string|null} Absolute path, or null when it escapes `cwd`
67
+ */
68
+ function resolveInside(cwd, rel) {
69
+ if (typeof rel !== 'string' || rel.length === 0) return null;
70
+ if (path.isAbsolute(rel)) return null;
71
+ const base = fs.realpathSync.native ? path.resolve(cwd) : path.resolve(cwd);
72
+ const target = path.resolve(base, rel);
73
+ const withSep = base.endsWith(path.sep) ? base : base + path.sep;
74
+ if (target !== base && !target.startsWith(withSep)) return null;
75
+ return target;
76
+ }
77
+
78
+ /** Is `name` an executable on PATH? Resolves only — never runs it. */
79
+ function onPath(name) {
80
+ if (typeof name !== 'string' || !/^[A-Za-z0-9._-]+$/.test(name)) return false;
81
+ const dirs = (process.env.PATH || '').split(path.delimiter).filter(Boolean);
82
+ // Windows resolves commands through PATHEXT (`node` on PATH is node.exe);
83
+ // POSIX has no equivalent, so the bare name is the only candidate there.
84
+ const exts = process.platform === 'win32'
85
+ ? ['', ...(process.env.PATHEXT || '.COM;.EXE;.BAT;.CMD').split(';').filter(Boolean)]
86
+ : [''];
87
+ for (const dir of dirs) {
88
+ for (const ext of exts) {
89
+ try {
90
+ fs.accessSync(path.join(dir, name + ext), fs.constants.X_OK);
91
+ return true;
92
+ } catch { /* keep looking */ }
93
+ }
94
+ }
95
+ return false;
96
+ }
97
+
98
+ /**
99
+ * Evaluate one declarative check.
100
+ *
101
+ * @param {Object} check - Single-key object, e.g. { file_exists: "migrations/" }
102
+ * @param {string} cwd
103
+ * @returns {{ check: string, target: string, ok: boolean, detail?: string }}
104
+ */
105
+ function runCheck(check, cwd) {
106
+ if (!check || typeof check !== 'object') {
107
+ return { check: 'malformed', target: '', ok: false, detail: 'check is not an object' };
108
+ }
109
+ const kind = Object.keys(check).find((k) => CHECK_TYPES.includes(k));
110
+ if (!kind) {
111
+ return {
112
+ check: 'unknown',
113
+ target: String(Object.keys(check)[0] || ''),
114
+ ok: false,
115
+ detail: `unsupported check; expected one of ${CHECK_TYPES.join(', ')}`,
116
+ };
117
+ }
118
+
119
+ const value = check[kind];
120
+
121
+ if (kind === 'env_set') {
122
+ const ok = typeof value === 'string' && Boolean(process.env[value]);
123
+ // Presence only. The value is never read, so a check can't exfiltrate a
124
+ // secret into a result payload that later gets synced.
125
+ return { check: kind, target: String(value), ok };
126
+ }
127
+
128
+ if (kind === 'command_available') {
129
+ return { check: kind, target: String(value), ok: onPath(value) };
130
+ }
131
+
132
+ if (kind === 'file_exists' || kind === 'file_absent') {
133
+ const abs = resolveInside(cwd, value);
134
+ if (abs === null) {
135
+ return { check: kind, target: String(value), ok: false, detail: 'path escapes the working directory' };
136
+ }
137
+ const exists = fs.existsSync(abs);
138
+ return { check: kind, target: String(value), ok: kind === 'file_exists' ? exists : !exists };
139
+ }
140
+
141
+ // file_contains
142
+ const spec = value && typeof value === 'object' ? value : {};
143
+ const abs = resolveInside(cwd, spec.path);
144
+ if (abs === null) {
145
+ return { check: kind, target: String(spec.path || ''), ok: false, detail: 'path escapes the working directory' };
146
+ }
147
+ if (typeof spec.text !== 'string' || spec.text.length === 0) {
148
+ return { check: kind, target: String(spec.path || ''), ok: false, detail: 'missing `text`' };
149
+ }
150
+ try {
151
+ const stat = fs.statSync(abs);
152
+ if (stat.size > MAX_CONTAINS_BYTES) {
153
+ return { check: kind, target: spec.path, ok: false, detail: 'file too large to scan' };
154
+ }
155
+ return { check: kind, target: spec.path, ok: fs.readFileSync(abs, 'utf-8').includes(spec.text) };
156
+ } catch {
157
+ return { check: kind, target: String(spec.path || ''), ok: false, detail: 'unreadable' };
158
+ }
159
+ }
160
+
161
+ /**
162
+ * Run every check a skill declares.
163
+ *
164
+ * A skill with no `verify` block is `unverifiable` — not passing and not
165
+ * failing. Most skills are prose and always will be; treating an absent block
166
+ * as failure would demote the whole library on the first verification sweep.
167
+ *
168
+ * @param {Object} skill - Skill record (needs `verify` array)
169
+ * @param {Object} [opts]
170
+ * @param {string} [opts.cwd=process.cwd()]
171
+ * @returns {{ status: 'passed'|'failed'|'unverifiable', checks: Object[], passed: number, total: number }}
172
+ */
173
+ function verifySkill(skill, opts = {}) {
174
+ const cwd = opts.cwd || process.cwd();
175
+ const declared = (skill && skill.verify) || null;
176
+
177
+ if (!Array.isArray(declared) || declared.length === 0) {
178
+ return { status: 'unverifiable', checks: [], passed: 0, total: 0 };
179
+ }
180
+
181
+ const checks = declared.map((c) => runCheck(c, cwd));
182
+ const passed = checks.filter((c) => c.ok).length;
183
+ return {
184
+ status: passed === checks.length ? 'passed' : 'failed',
185
+ checks,
186
+ passed,
187
+ total: checks.length,
188
+ };
189
+ }
190
+
191
+ module.exports = { verifySkill, runCheck, resolveInside, onPath, CHECK_TYPES, MAX_CONTAINS_BYTES };
package/src/skills.js CHANGED
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ const {
22
22
  atomicWriteSync,
23
23
  } = require('./index-manager');
24
24
  const { setFrontmatterFields } = require('./pinning');
25
+ const { verifySkill } = require('./skill-verify');
25
26
 
26
27
  const SKILLS_DIR = '_skills';
27
28
  const DEFAULT_STRENGTH = 0.6;
@@ -83,6 +84,10 @@ function addSkill(projectRoot, skill) {
83
84
  use_count: 0,
84
85
  fail_count: 0,
85
86
  last_used: null,
87
+ // Declarative, read-only preconditions (src/skill-verify.js). Only set when
88
+ // present, so prose-only skills stay lean and are reported `unverifiable`
89
+ // rather than failing a check they never claimed to support.
90
+ ...(Array.isArray(skill.verify) && skill.verify.length ? { verify: skill.verify } : {}),
86
91
  };
87
92
  atomicWriteSync(path.join(dir, 'SKILL.md'), buildSkillFile({ ...record, body: skill.body }));
88
93
 
@@ -116,6 +121,63 @@ function showSkill(projectRoot, name) {
116
121
  }
117
122
  }
118
123
 
124
+ /**
125
+ * Check a skill's declared preconditions against the current working directory.
126
+ *
127
+ * Answers "does this skill still describe reality?" without running the agent
128
+ * — the offline-checkable half of procedural memory (Skill-DisCo,
129
+ * arXiv:2606.26669). A skill distilled against a repo layout that has since
130
+ * changed is not weakly-supported, it is wrong, and it will keep being
131
+ * advertised to every matching session until enough real failures accumulate.
132
+ *
133
+ * A failed verification demotes exactly like a failed use, because the user
134
+ * pays the same price either way. A *passing* verification does NOT strengthen:
135
+ * preconditions holding says the skill is still applicable, not that following
136
+ * it produced a good outcome, and inflating strength on a cheap automatic check
137
+ * would let a skill climb the index without ever having worked.
138
+ *
139
+ * Skills with no `verify` block return `unverifiable` and are left untouched.
140
+ *
141
+ * @param {string} projectRoot
142
+ * @param {string} name
143
+ * @param {Object} [opts] - { cwd }
144
+ * @returns {Object} { name, status, passed, total, checks, strength? }
145
+ */
146
+ function verifySkillByName(projectRoot, name, opts = {}) {
147
+ const idx = readSkillsIndex(projectRoot);
148
+ const s = idx.skills.find((x) => x.name === slug(name));
149
+ if (!s) return { error: `Skill not found: ${name}` };
150
+
151
+ const result = verifySkill(s, { cwd: opts.cwd || process.cwd() });
152
+ if (result.status === 'unverifiable') {
153
+ return { name: s.name, ...result };
154
+ }
155
+
156
+ const now = new Date().toISOString();
157
+ s.last_verified = now;
158
+ s.verify_status = result.status;
159
+ if (result.status === 'failed') {
160
+ s.fail_count = (s.fail_count || 0) + 1;
161
+ s.strength = Math.max(0, (s.strength ?? DEFAULT_STRENGTH) - 0.10);
162
+ }
163
+ writeSkillsIndex(idx, projectRoot);
164
+
165
+ setFrontmatterFields(getBrainDir(projectRoot), skillPath(name), {
166
+ last_verified: now,
167
+ verify_status: result.status,
168
+ ...(result.status === 'failed'
169
+ ? { strength: Math.round(s.strength * 1000) / 1000, fail_count: s.fail_count }
170
+ : {}),
171
+ });
172
+
173
+ return {
174
+ name: s.name,
175
+ ...result,
176
+ strength: Math.round((s.strength ?? DEFAULT_STRENGTH) * 1000) / 1000,
177
+ advertised: isAdvertised(s),
178
+ };
179
+ }
180
+
119
181
  /**
120
182
  * Record a use. Success strengthens; failure weakens and counts toward demotion.
121
183
  * @param {Object} [opts] - { failed: boolean }
@@ -202,6 +264,7 @@ module.exports = {
202
264
  advertisedSummaries,
203
265
  showSkill,
204
266
  useSkill,
267
+ verifySkillByName,
205
268
  removeSkill,
206
269
  exportSkill,
207
270
  DEMOTE_FAIL_RATIO,