botmux 3.4.3 → 3.5.2

package/dist/adapters/cli/read-isolation.d.ts

@@ -60,42 +60,15 @@ export declare function buildCliExecutableReadCarveOuts(input: {
     cliId: string;
     resolvedBin: string;
 }): string[];
-export interface V2IsolationContext {
-    /** The bot user's home directory. */
-    homeDir: string;
-    /** BOTMUX_HOME root (e.g. `~/.botmux`). NOT denied wholesale — the botmux CLI the
-     *  agent runs (`botmux send`/`list`/`status`) needs broad read access to it (config,
-     *  daemon registry, pm2, session store). Only its cross-bot-SENSITIVE parts are denied. */
-    botmuxHome: string;
-    /** Canonical fixed `~/.botmux` root when it differs from botmuxHome (custom
-     * SESSION_DATA_DIR or a symlinked default root). */
-    defaultBotmuxHome?: string;
-    /** botmux session data root (SESSION_DATA_DIR, e.g. `~/.botmux/data`). */
-    sessionDataDir: string;
-    /** This bot's Feishu app id. All carve-outs are keyed on it (immutable, never the
-     *  user-controllable cwd) — sibling data needs NO enumeration: per-bot dirs are
-     *  denied WHOLESALE and per-bot session files by a filename-pattern regex. */
-    currentAppId: string;
-    /** Current botmux session. Used only to carve back the exact rotating IPC
-     * capability file from the otherwise denied read-isolation runtime dir. */
-    currentSessionId: string;
-    /** Per-bot extra deny paths (BotConfig.readDenyExtraPaths). */
-    extraDenyPaths?: string[];
-}
-/** Root-level host authority files retained for machine binding/back-compat.
- * They live outside every per-bot BOT_HOME, so no chat-driven CLI may read or
- * rotate them. New device secrets live below DEVICE_AUTHORITY_DIRECTORY and
- * are masked by directory, so future filenames/atomic sidecars need no policy
- * update. */
+/** Host device-authority files must never be visible to a chat-driven CLI.
+ * New credentials live below DEVICE_AUTHORITY_DIRECTORY; the exact legacy
+ * files remain covered for upgrades from older layouts. */
 export declare const HOST_DEVICE_CREDENTIAL_FILES: readonly ["platform.json", "device.json", "device-enroll-pending.json"];
 export declare const DEVICE_CREDENTIAL_ISOLATION_MARKER_BASENAME = ".device-credential-isolation";
-/** Fixed authority marker. It deliberately ignores SESSION_DATA_DIR and every
- * child-controlled env value: enrollment writes this under the real user home
- * before credentials exist, then workers treat it as a one-way security gate. */
+/** Fixed host marker; deliberately independent of SESSION_DATA_DIR and child env. */
 export declare function deviceCredentialIsolationMarkerPath(homeDir: string): string;
-/** A root entry hidden by credential-only isolation. Prefix matching lets the
- * worker include current atomic-write sidecars and legacy backups; arbitrary
- * future device files are covered wholesale by DEVICE_AUTHORITY_DIRECTORY. */
+/** Match current atomic-write sidecars and legacy backups as well as the
+ * dedicated authority directory. */
 export declare function isCredentialIsolationReservedBasename(name: string): boolean;
 export declare function credentialIsolationRequired(input: {
     markerExists: boolean;
@@ -118,19 +91,14 @@ export type CredentialOnlyIsolationGate = {
     mode: 'blocked';
     failClosedReason: string;
 };
-/**
- * Resolve the mandatory credential boundary independently of optional/full
- * read isolation. There is intentionally no adapter capability or bot sandbox
- * toggle input: once the marker/device exists, every locally spawned CLI must
- * be covered even when `supportsReadIsolation=false` and `sandbox=false`.
- */
+/** Mandatory device-credential isolation is independent of the optional bot
+ * sandbox toggle: once enrolled, every local child must be confined. */
 export declare function evaluateCredentialOnlyIsolationGate(input: {
     markerExists: boolean;
     deviceCredentialExists: boolean;
     remoteBackend: boolean;
     platform: string;
     mechanismAvailable: boolean;
-    /** An already-selected Seatbelt/full-bwrap profile will include this policy. */
     fullIsolationCoversCredentials: boolean;
 }): CredentialOnlyIsolationGate;
 export interface CredentialIsolationContext {
@@ -138,6 +106,8 @@ export interface CredentialIsolationContext {
     botmuxHome: string;
     defaultBotmuxHome?: string;
 }
+/** Legacy credential-only Seatbelt/bwrap rule shape. Full fs-policy sessions
+ * consume the same authority paths through buildFsPolicy instead. */
 export declare function buildCredentialIsolationRules(ctx: CredentialIsolationContext): {
     roots: string[];
     denyPaths: string[];
@@ -146,146 +116,6 @@ export declare function buildCredentialIsolationRules(ctx: CredentialIsolationCo
     denyWriteRegexes: string[];
     denyWriteLiterals: string[];
 };
-/** v2 DENY set (HYBRID). The F1 fix is a WHOLE-deny of the CLI data dirs `~/.claude`
- *  (+ `~/.claude.json`) and `~/.codex`: this bot's OWN CLI data is redirected into its
- *  BOT_HOME (readable) via CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR/CODEX_HOME, so whole-denying the globals
- *  blocks the admin/other/pre-migration data + kills the per-cwd carve-out + /cd hole,
- *  while own resume/memory keep working from BOT_HOME. `~/.botmux` is NOT whole-denied
- *  (the agent's botmux CLI needs its config/registry/pm2/data structure) — instead its
- *  cross-bot-SENSITIVE parts are denied surgically: bots.json, logs, other bots' lark
- *  configs / session files / send-creds / BOT_HOMEs, and the shared conversation-content
- *  dirs (frozen-cards, queues, attachments, whiteboards, …). Own BOT_HOME + own
- *  session/cred + own attachments bucket + config/registry stay readable by default.
- *  Plus the system-credential stores. Everything else (code/repos/runtime) stays open.
- *
- *  NOTE: per-bot session stores (`sessions-<appId>.json`) are denied by PATTERN — see
- *  {@link buildV2DenyRegexes} — so no sibling-appId enumeration is needed anywhere. */
-export declare function buildV2DenyPaths(ctx: V2IsolationContext): string[];
-/** v2 PATTERN denies — Seatbelt `regex` filters that deny a whole FILENAME CLASS
- *  instead of enumerating sibling app ids. Covers:
- *   - per-bot session stores (`<sd>/sessions-<appId>.json`, routing metadata): a
- *     newly-added bot's store is denied WITHOUT cold-restarting the ones already
- *     running, and no caller needs to know the sibling app ids. The bot's OWN store
- *     is re-allowed by carve-out (Seatbelt last-match).
- *   - EVERY `bots.json.*` sidecar (`.bak` written by setup/migration, `.tmp`, ad-hoc
- *     `.bak.<suffix>` copies): the exact `bots.json` is subpath-denied in
- *     {@link buildV2DenyPaths}, but its backups carry the SAME plaintext
- *     larkAppSecret for every bot under a DIFFERENT basename, which `subpath` does
- *     not match — so without this an isolated bot could `cat bots.json.bak` and
- *     recover all siblings' credentials, defeating the whole isolation. */
-export declare function buildV2DenyRegexes(ctx: V2IsolationContext): string[];
-/** Host-owned authority files that a read-isolated child must not mutate.
- * Read isolation otherwise keeps normal write access for backwards
- * compatibility, so these rules are emitted after every other write allow. */
-export declare function buildReadIsolationProtectedWriteRules(ctx: V2IsolationContext, extraRoots?: {
-    dashboardRoots?: string[];
-    sessionDataDirs?: string[];
-}): {
-    denyWritePaths: string[];
-    denyWriteRegexes: string[];
-    denyWriteLiterals: string[];
-};
-/** The v2 Seatbelt carve-outs that accompany {@link buildV2DenyPaths} +
- *  {@link buildV2DenyRegexes}. They re-open the bot's OWN slice of each denied class:
- *   - allowPaths: the own BOT_HOME subpath (redirected CLI data + creds + send-cred),
- *     the own lark-cli config dir, and the own session store file.
- *   - traverseDirs: `bots/` etc., as file-read-metadata ONLY — lets the CLI realpath()
- *     its config dir THROUGH the denied parent WITHOUT allowing `ls bots/` (enumeration).
- *   - finalDenyPaths: admin `readDenyExtraPaths`, emitted AFTER the allows so an admin
- *     deny UNDER the own BOT_HOME still wins (Seatbelt last-match). */
-export declare function buildV2CarveOuts(ctx: V2IsolationContext): {
-    allowPaths: string[];
-    traverseDirs: string[];
-    finalDenyPaths: string[];
-};
-export interface WriteSandboxContext {
-    /** The bot user's home directory. */
-    homeDir: string;
-    /** BOTMUX_HOME root (e.g. `~/.botmux`). */
-    botmuxHome: string;
-    /** Canonical fixed `~/.botmux` root when it differs from botmuxHome. */
-    defaultBotmuxHome?: string;
-    /** botmux session data root (SESSION_DATA_DIR, e.g. `~/.botmux/data`). */
-    sessionDataDir: string;
-    /** The session's project working dir — writes here PERSIST (the point of the sandbox). */
-    workingDir: string;
-    /** This bot's Feishu app id (keys its own BOT_HOME carve-out). */
-    currentAppId: string;
-    /** Extra writable roots the worker resolves at spawn time (realpath'd TMPDIR,
-     *  extra worktrees, admin-configured writable paths). */
-    extraWritePaths?: string[];
-}
-/**
- * Write-isolation rules for the macOS file sandbox — the FUNCTIONAL twin of the
- * Linux bwrap overlay (which lets the agent read the whole real FS but confines
- * WRITES). Seatbelt has no copy-on-write overlay, so we approximate the same
- * guarantee with a deny-all-writes + allow-list: the agent can write its project
- * and the ephemeral scratch/cache the CLI needs, but CANNOT tamper the rest of
- * your real disk (home dotfiles, other projects, other bots' data, system dirs).
- * Reads stay wide open (like Linux) — this is orthogonal to read isolation, which
- * layers its own read-deny set into the SAME profile when also enabled.
- *
- * `allowWritePaths` re-open the writable zones AFTER the profile's `(deny
- * file-write* (subpath "/"))`; `denyWritePaths` are crown jewels re-denied AFTER
- * the allows (Seatbelt last-match), so they stay protected even if the project or
- * an allowed zone nests them. The allow-list is intentionally generous toward
- * CLI scratch/cache — the exact set is empirically tuned on real macOS (a missing
- * cache path makes the CLI fail, an over-broad one weakens the sandbox). Pure: the
- * worker realpath's every path (symlink-safe) before emitting.
- */
-export declare function buildWriteSandboxRules(ctx: WriteSandboxContext): {
-    allowWritePaths: string[];
-    allowWriteRegexes: string[];
-    denyWritePaths: string[];
-    denyWriteRegexes: string[];
-};
-export interface LinuxReadIsolationInput {
-    ctx: V2IsolationContext;
-    /** Every OTHER bot's appId — the worker enumerates these from the registry.
-     *  bwrap has NO regex (unlike the macOS Seatbelt profile), so each sibling's
-     *  per-bot paths are masked INDIVIDUALLY. Consequence: the mask set is
-     *  spawn-time-static — a bot added AFTER this session spawned isn't covered
-     *  until a cold restart (the macOS regex covers new bots without one). */
-    siblingAppIds: string[];
-    /** Existing `bots.json.*` sidecars (backups/tmp) globbed by the worker at spawn
-     *  — each carries every bot's plaintext secret under a dynamic name that no
-     *  wholesale rule matches, so they're masked individually. */
-    botsJsonSidecars?: string[];
-}
-/**
- * The bwrap MASK set for Linux read isolation — the functional twin of the macOS
- * Seatbelt read-deny profile ({@link buildV2DenyPaths} + regexes + carve-outs),
- * expressed for bwrap (which blanks paths with tmpfs/empty-binds and has no regex).
- *
- * SAME cross-bot-sensitive set as macOS, but the per-bot classes (other bots'
- * BOT_HOMEs / lark configs / session stores / identities / send-creds / attachment
- * buckets) are enumerated PER SIBLING instead of wholesale-denied + regex-matched.
- * The read-isolation-specific set does not mask the bot's OWN slice. The file
- * sandbox still masks BOTMUX_HOME wholesale as its mandatory credential
- * boundary, so `ownReadWritePaths` re-opens only this bot's BOT_HOME after that
- * parent mask; the worker separately re-masks send-cred.json.
- *
- * Pure: the worker resolves the impure inputs (sibling list, sidecar glob, realpath).
- * NOTE: keep the `shared` set in lock-step with {@link buildV2DenyPaths} — the
- * `read-isolation.test.ts` parity test fails if a sensitive path is added to one
- * platform but not the other.
- */
-export declare function buildLinuxReadIsolationMasks(input: LinuxReadIsolationInput): {
-    /** Paths to blank inside bwrap (prepareSandbox stat-classifies: dir→tmpfs,
-     *  file→empty ro-bind; a missing ancestor of another mask is treated as a
-     *  directory so nested mounts remain valid). Feed as prepareSandbox.hidePaths. */
-    hidePaths: string[];
-    /** The bot's OWN BOT_HOME — bound REAL + writable (feed as
-     *  prepareSandbox.trustedWritablePaths) so the
-     *  redirected CLI data (CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR/CODEX_HOME) persists and escapes the
-     *  write overlay after the mandatory BOTMUX_HOME mask. */
-    ownReadWritePaths: string[];
-    /** The bot's OWN slices that sit UNDER a wholesale-masked parent and must be
-     *  re-exposed read-only AFTER the masks (feed as readonlyRoots — bound after the
-     *  tmpfs masks). Currently the own attachments bucket, under the wholesale
-     *  `data/attachments` mask. Read-only is enough (the agent only READS uploads). */
-    ownReadOnlyPaths: string[];
-};
 /**
  * Decide whether read isolation is enabled for a session, or fail-closed.
  * Pure: the caller resolves the impure inputs. This is the SINGLE decision
@@ -311,36 +141,20 @@ export declare function evaluateReadIsolationGate(opts: {
     enabled: boolean;
     failClosedReason?: string;
 };
-/**
- * macOS Seatbelt (sandbox-exec) profile for the whole-process isolation wrapper.
- * Blocklist: allow everything, deny reads of the sensitive paths/patterns, THEN
- * re-allow the carve-outs — `subpath` covers a file or a whole subtree. Rule ORDER
- * matters: Seatbelt applies the LAST matching rule, so an allow listed AFTER a
- * broader deny re-opens that subpath, and the final denies win over the allows.
- * Verified: reads of denied paths fail EPERM; carved-out subpaths read normally; the
- * wrapped CLI (which bypasses its OWN sandbox — nested Seatbelt would hang) runs fine.
- */
-export declare function buildSeatbeltProfile(denyPaths: string[], allowPaths?: string[], finalDenyPaths?: string[], traverseDirs?: string[], denyRegexes?: string[], 
-/** When set, layer the macOS file-sandbox WRITE isolation (Linux-bwrap twin) into
- *  the SAME profile: deny all writes, re-allow the writable zones, then final-deny
- *  the crown jewels. Reads are unaffected. Omit for read-isolation-only sessions. */
-writeSandbox?: {
+/** Legacy allow-default profile retained only for mandatory credential-only
+ * confinement when the full fs-policy sandbox is disabled. */
+export declare function buildSeatbeltProfile(denyPaths: string[], allowPaths?: string[], finalDenyPaths?: string[], traverseDirs?: string[], denyRegexes?: string[], writeSandbox?: {
     allowWritePaths: string[];
     allowWriteRegexes?: string[];
     denyWritePaths: string[];
     denyWriteRegexes?: string[];
-}, 
-/** Host-owned files that must remain immutable even for legacy read-only
- * isolation (where writes are otherwise unrestricted). Emitted last so they
- * also win over a broad write-sandbox allow. */
-protectedWrites?: {
+}, protectedWrites?: {
     denyWritePaths: string[];
     denyWriteRegexes?: string[];
     denyWriteLiterals?: string[];
 }): string;
 export declare const ISOLATION_PANE_MARKER_VERSION = 7;
 export type IsolationCapability = 'credential' | 'read' | 'write';
-/** Versioned marker written beside a freshly spawned persistent sandbox. */
 export declare function isolationPaneMarkerContent(bootId: string, capabilities: readonly IsolationCapability[]): string;
 /**
  * Decide whether a live persistent pane (tmux/zellij/herdr) may be reattached for

package/dist/adapters/cli/read-isolation.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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