botmux 3.14.0 → 3.16.0

package/dist/core/mojo-containment.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,575 @@
+import type { TurnQuiescence } from '../adapters/backend/mojo-process-tree.js';
+export interface StrongContainmentHandle {
+    kind: 'cgroup';
+    sessionId: string;
+    /** Worker generation that acquired it; kept for operator-facing logs only. */
+    generation: number;
+    /** Absolute cgroup v2 directory owning the turn subtree. */
+    cgroupPath: string;
+    /** Env nonce injected into the tree, so a degraded scan can still corroborate. */
+    nonce: string;
+    /**
+     * Boot id at mint time. A reboot provably kills the whole tree — including the
+     * same-UID sibling/parent migrant that cgroup emptiness cannot see — so a
+     * changed boot id is the ONE thing that lets a cgroup handle release (it is
+     * the same unforgeable fact a weak handle uses). Optional so a handle written
+     * by an older daemon (no bootId) still parses; such a legacy handle simply
+     * never gets the reboot proof and waits for an operator revoke.
+     */
+    bootId?: string;
+}
+export interface WeakContainmentHandle {
+    kind: 'tree-identity';
+    sessionId: string;
+    generation: number;
+    rootPid: number;
+    /** Boot identity, so a pid from a previous boot is never re-signalled. */
+    bootId: string;
+    /** `/proc/<pid>/stat` field 22, which makes pid reuse detectable. */
+    startTime: number;
+    nonce: string;
+}
+/**
+ * A tree we can neither contain nor describe.
+ *
+ * Reached when the host offers NO usable mechanism: no cgroup v2 delegation, and
+ * no readable boot id / starttime (a non-Linux host, or a locked-down /proc). The
+ * turn still spawned a credentialed child, so the honest record is not "nothing to
+ * track" — it is "something exists here that this host can never prove gone".
+ *
+ * Why this exists rather than returning null
+ * -----------------------------------------
+ * `acquireContainmentHandle` used to return null in this case, which meant the
+ * caller recorded NOTHING and `hasUnprovenContainment()` answered false — so the
+ * device-isolation blocker was not retained on exactly the platform that cannot
+ * prove anything. That inverted the intended fail-closed direction, and it did so
+ * silently, because "no handle" is indistinguishable from "no turn ever ran".
+ *
+ * An unprovable handle is deliberately a DEAD END: `proveContainmentQuiescent`
+ * can never return `proven: true` for it, so the type-level guard on
+ * `releaseContainmentHandle` makes it impossible to release. The session's blocker
+ * therefore stays for the lifetime of the record, which is the correct answer when
+ * a credentialed subtree existed and the host cannot ever demonstrate its death.
+ *
+ * The platform is recorded so an operator can tell "macOS, no cgroups" apart from
+ * "Linux with /proc unreadable" without re-deriving it.
+ */
+export interface UnprovableContainmentHandle {
+    kind: 'unprovable';
+    sessionId: string;
+    generation: number;
+    nonce: string;
+    /** `process.platform` at acquisition time. */
+    platform: string;
+    /** Why nothing stronger could be minted, for operator-facing logs. */
+    reason: string;
+}
+export type ContainmentHandle = StrongContainmentHandle | WeakContainmentHandle | UnprovableContainmentHandle;
+/**
+ * Result of asking "is everything this handle owns gone?".
+ *
+ * `proven: false` deliberately carries no "probably fine" variant: every
+ * non-proof (alive, unreadable, unsupported, timed out) is the same verdict to a
+ * caller, because all of them must keep the blocker.
+ */
+export type QuiescenceVerdict = {
+    proven: true;
+    handle: ContainmentHandle;
+    reason?: string;
+    evidence?: QuiescenceEvidence;
+} | {
+    proven: false;
+    handle: ContainmentHandle;
+    reason: string;
+    residualPids?: number[];
+};
+/**
+ * WHICH fact settled a `proven: true` verdict. The distinction is the entire
+ * safety argument of this module, so it is carried in the data instead of being
+ * re-derived by every caller:
+ *
+ *   - `boot-id-changed`: the recorded tree cannot have survived the reboot that
+ *     changed the kernel boot id, and a same-user child cannot fake a boot id ->
+ *     THE boundary proof (the only one). Applies to a weak handle and, once its
+ *     bootId is stamped, to a cgroup handle too.
+ *   - `cgroup-empty` / `cgroup-zombie-only`: kernel membership shows the leaf
+ *     subtree empty. DIAGNOSTIC ONLY, NOT a boundary proof: mojo runs at the
+ *     daemon's UID and cgroup v2 lets a same-UID process migrate ITSELF out of
+ *     the leaf (to the parent slice or a sibling), invisible to the leaf-down
+ *     read. Good for stopping signals + killing (cgroup.kill), never for dropping
+ *     device isolation.
+ *   - `scan-clean`: a /proc subtree scan came back empty. DIAGNOSTIC ONLY: a
+ *     descendant that calls setsid(), scrubs its own environ and reparents to
+ *     init evades enumeration entirely, so this can never authorise dropping
+ *     device isolation.
+ *
+ * An absent field is read as "the strongest thing this handle KIND could prove",
+ * for compatibility with hand-built verdicts; it can never be read as stronger
+ * than the handle kind allows.
+ */
+export type QuiescenceEvidence = 'cgroup-empty' | 'cgroup-zombie-only' | 'boot-id-changed' | 'scan-clean';
+/** What stays isolated after a close that could not prove its boundary. */
+export interface ContainmentResidual {
+    /** True keeps the device-isolation blocker even though the session may close. */
+    deviceIsolation: boolean;
+    /** Pids the evidence named, when it named any. */
+    pids?: number[];
+    /** Operator-facing explanation of what is still unproven. */
+    reason?: string;
+}
+/**
+ * The single authority on "may this handle be forgotten, and may the blocker go?".
+ *
+ * `boundaryProof` is the only field that answer may consult, and unlike the
+ * previous revision that statement now has a real production consumer:
+ * `releaseContainmentHandle` branches on `releaseAuthorised` below, so a clean
+ * weak scan cannot reach the removal path at all.
+ */
+export interface ContainmentReleaseDecision {
+    /** Unforgeable boundary evidence. The gate. */
+    boundaryProof: boolean;
+    /** `verdict.proven && boundaryProof` - the only state that removes a handle. */
+    releaseAuthorised: boolean;
+    /** Which fact was available, or `not-proven` when quiescence itself failed. */
+    evidence: QuiescenceEvidence | 'not-proven';
+    /** Non-null whenever the handle stays behind; null only on a real release. */
+    residual: ContainmentResidual | null;
+    /** May the caller stop re-signalling? True once quiescence itself is proven. */
+    signalsStopped: boolean;
+}
+/** Thrown instead of degrading to an empty (fail-open) handle store. */
+export declare class MojoContainmentUnavailableError extends Error {
+    readonly cause?: unknown | undefined;
+    constructor(message: string, cause?: unknown | undefined);
+}
+/**
+ * Boot identity of the running kernel.
+ *
+ * Returns null when it cannot be read (non-Linux, or a locked-down /proc).
+ * Callers must treat null as "cannot mint a trustworthy weak handle", NOT as a
+ * blank value to store: a handle whose bootId is empty would compare equal
+ * across reboots and across hosts, resurrecting exactly the pid-reuse confusion
+ * the field exists to prevent.
+ */
+export declare function readBootId(opts?: {
+    procRoot?: string;
+}): string | null;
+/**
+ * `/proc/<pid>/stat` field 22 (starttime, in clock ticks since boot).
+ *
+ * null means the pid is not currently live (or is unreadable), which is why the
+ * caller may never read null as "the tree is gone": the ROOT exiting says
+ * nothing about a descendant that called setsid().
+ *
+ * Field indexing has the same comm hazard as the scanner: field 2 is
+ * parenthesised and may contain spaces or ')', so the split starts after the LAST
+ * ')'. From there, index 0 is state (field 3), hence starttime (field 22) sits at
+ * index 19.
+ */
+export declare function readProcStartTime(pid: number, opts?: {
+    procRoot?: string;
+}): number | null;
+/**
+ * Is a usable cgroup v2 hierarchy mounted?
+ *
+ * `cgroup.controllers` exists only on the v2 unified hierarchy, so its presence
+ * is the cheap discriminator against a v1-only host (where per-session
+ * containment via this module is not available).
+ */
+export declare function cgroupV2Available(opts?: {
+    cgroupRoot?: string;
+}): boolean;
+/**
+ * Process state from `/proc/<pid>/stat` field 3, for zombie classification.
+ *
+ *   'zombie'     — state Z: the process has exited and is only waiting to be
+ *                  reaped. It executes no instructions and cannot use a
+ *                  credential, but it REMAINS a member of its cgroup until the
+ *                  parent reaps it (and `rmdir` keeps failing while it does).
+ *   'running'    — any other state. Treated as executing.
+ *   'gone'       — ENOENT: the pid vanished between listing and reading, i.e.
+ *                  genuinely not a member any more (same race rule the scanner
+ *                  applies).
+ *   'unreadable' — anything else. Deliberately NOT merged into 'zombie': a state
+ *                  we cannot read must count as executing, or an EACCES becomes
+ *                  a free pass.
+ *
+ * DUPLICATED RULE — read before changing any of the three cases
+ * ------------------------------------------------------------
+ * The same zombie rule has to hold in TWO places that deliberately do not share
+ * code: here, for cgroup members read out of `cgroup.procs`, and in the /proc
+ * subtree scanner (mojo-process-tree), for members found by enumeration. They stay
+ * separate because they start from different inputs, but they must agree, and
+ * nothing enforces that agreement automatically.
+ *
+ * Why the agreement matters more than the rule itself: if one side discounts a
+ * zombie and the other does not, the SAME tree gets two verdicts. That is not a
+ * cosmetic inconsistency — ProcTree hit it for real while wiring 7-A. A SIGKILLed
+ * child sat in state Z awaiting reap; the in-memory ladder discounted it and
+ * reported clean, while the pid list handed to `proveContainmentQuiescent` still
+ * carried it, so this module judged the tree alive. The close was then refused
+ * forever and the handle could never be discharged: a permanent wedge produced
+ * purely by two definitions of "running".
+ *
+ * So: change one side and you MUST change the other. The rule is exactly
+ *   - state 'Z'        -> discounted (a zombie executes nothing, holds no credential)
+ *   - ENOENT           -> gone, skipped (raced away; not a member)
+ *   - anything else     -> EXECUTING, including any state we cannot read
+ * The last case is the one that must never be relaxed on either side: turning an
+ * unreadable state into "harmless" is a fail-open, and it is reachable by the very
+ * process being policed.
+ */
+export type ProcLiveness = 'zombie' | 'running' | 'gone' | 'unreadable';
+export declare function readProcLiveness(pid: number, opts?: {
+    procRoot?: string;
+}): ProcLiveness;
+export interface AcquireContainmentInput {
+    sessionId: string;
+    generation: number;
+    /** Root pid of the turn (the direct child this backend spawned). */
+    rootPid: number;
+    /** The env nonce already injected into that tree. */
+    nonce: string;
+}
+/**
+ * A cgroup boundary created BEFORE the turn child is spawned.
+ *
+ * The strong handle used to be minted post-spawn by migrating the root pid into
+ * a fresh cgroup. That left a spawn→enrolment window: cgroup v2 migration does
+ * not retroactively move a process's already-forked descendants
+ * (admin-guide/cgroup-v2: "Migration of a process doesn't affect already
+ * existing descendant processes"), so a descendant forked (and setsid'd) inside
+ * the window was outside the cgroup while `cgroup.procs` — the whole strong
+ * proof — read empty after the root exited. The proof went false-green and the
+ * device-isolation blocker was cleared with a credentialed escapee still alive.
+ *
+ * The boundary is therefore prepared first, and the child enrols ITSELF into it
+ * before exec'ing the target binary (see MOJO_CGROUP_ENROLL_SHIM in
+ * mojo-backend). Between fork and enrolment the process runs only our trusted
+ * shim, which forks nothing, so every descendant of the target binary is born
+ * inside the cgroup — that is the precondition the strong proof relies on.
+ */
+export interface PreparedContainmentBoundary {
+    sessionId: string;
+    generation: number;
+    cgroupPath: string;
+    nonce: string;
+}
+/**
+ * Create the cgroup directory for a turn about to be spawned.
+ *
+ * Returns null when the host cannot support a strong boundary (no cgroup v2, or
+ * the slice is not writable) — the caller falls back to the weak post-spawn
+ * handle, which never claims boundary proof.
+ */
+export declare function prepareContainmentBoundary(input: {
+    sessionId: string;
+    generation: number;
+    nonce: string;
+}, opts?: {
+    cgroupRoot?: string;
+    procRoot?: string;
+}): PreparedContainmentBoundary | null;
+/** Mint the strong handle for a boundary the child has enrolled itself into. */
+export declare function strongHandleFromPreparedBoundary(prepared: PreparedContainmentBoundary, opts?: {
+    procRoot?: string;
+}): ContainmentHandle;
+/**
+ * Kill every process currently enrolled in a prepared boundary (cgroup.kill),
+ * then remove the directory if that emptied it.
+ *
+ * For the caller who spawned a child through the enrolment shim and then FAILED
+ * to record the handle durably: the subtree must not be left running behind a
+ * blocker nobody recorded. Returns true only when the boundary is provably
+ * empty (or already gone) afterwards — false means the caller must keep its
+ * own fence up.
+ */
+export declare function killPreparedBoundary(prepared: PreparedContainmentBoundary): Promise<boolean>;
+/**
+ * Mint the strongest POST-SPAWN handle this host can describe a turn with.
+ *
+ * Deliberately NEVER a cgroup handle: migrating an already-running root into a
+ * cgroup does not capture descendants it forked before the write, so a strong
+ * handle minted here would claim a boundary that provably has a hole (the P0
+ * this module was rewritten for). Strong handles exist only via
+ * prepareContainmentBoundary + the pre-exec enrolment shim. This function is
+ * the fallback for hosts (or spawn paths) where that was not possible, and the
+ * handles it mints never carry boundary proof.
+ */
+export declare function acquireContainmentHandle(input: AcquireContainmentInput, opts?: {
+    cgroupRoot?: string;
+    procRoot?: string;
+    platform?: string;
+}): ContainmentHandle;
+/**
+ * Outcome of a degraded, /proc-based enumeration, supplied by the caller.
+ *
+ * Deliberately a callback rather than a direct import of `scanMojoTree`: the
+ * scanner is owned by mojo-process-tree.ts and this module must stay a leaf that
+ * a unit test can drive with a synthetic world. `scanned: false` is the scanner's
+ * fail-closed signal and MUST NOT be collapsed into an empty pid list by the
+ * caller.
+ */
+export interface TreeScanEvidence {
+    scanned: boolean;
+    pids: readonly number[];
+    reason?: string;
+}
+export interface ProveContainmentOpts {
+    procRoot?: string;
+    /** Required to prove a WEAK handle; ignored for a strong one. */
+    scan?: (handle: WeakContainmentHandle) => TreeScanEvidence;
+}
+/**
+ * Can we prove that nothing this handle owns is still executing?
+ *
+ * STRONG handle: `cgroup.procs` is authoritative. An absent directory also counts
+ * as proof, because the kernel refuses `rmdir` on a non-empty cgroup and this
+ * module only removes one after a proven verdict — so "gone" can only mean
+ * "was empty when it went". Any OTHER read error is a non-proof.
+ *
+ * WEAK handle:
+ *   - a bootId mismatch is genuine, cheap proof: the recorded tree cannot have
+ *     survived the reboot that changed the id;
+ *   - otherwise the only available evidence is a /proc scan, which the caller
+ *     must supply. No scan, or a failed scan, or any surviving pid → not proven.
+ *   - the root pid being gone is explicitly NOT accepted on its own: a descendant
+ *     that called setsid() outlives its parent, which is the whole reason the
+ *     scanner unions three signals.
+ *
+ * A clean weak verdict is the best this host can do, not an unforgeable
+ * boundary — see the trust-domain note in mojo-process-tree. Callers that need
+ * certainty need a strong handle.
+ */
+export declare function proveContainmentQuiescent(handle: ContainmentHandle, opts?: ProveContainmentOpts): QuiescenceVerdict;
+/**
+ * Is the recorded root pid still the ORIGINAL process?
+ *
+ * Used before signalling: a weak handle names a pid, and pids are reused. Sending
+ * SIGKILL to a recycled pid would kill an unrelated process, so a caller must
+ * confirm identity first. False therefore means "do not signal this pid", NOT
+ * "the tree is gone".
+ */
+export declare function weakHandleRootStillOriginal(handle: WeakContainmentHandle, opts?: {
+    procRoot?: string;
+}): boolean;
+/** Stable identity of a handle, so union/removal cannot double-count or mis-hit. */
+export declare function containmentHandleKey(handle: ContainmentHandle): string;
+/**
+ * Record a handle as OWNED AND UNPROVEN.
+ *
+ * Call this at spawn time, before the child can do anything: a crash between
+ * spawn and record is exactly the window that used to lose the tree entirely.
+ * Monotonic union by handle identity, so re-recording is idempotent and a later
+ * call can never retract an earlier one.
+ *
+ * THROWS on any read/write failure — the caller must not proceed believing the
+ * tree was recorded.
+ */
+export declare function recordContainmentHandle(handle: ContainmentHandle, dataDir?: string): void;
+/**
+ * Handles this session still owns. Empty ONLY when nothing is outstanding.
+ *
+ * THROWS when the store cannot be read, so isolation callers fail closed instead
+ * of reading an error as "clean".
+ */
+export declare function containmentHandles(sessionId: string, dataDir?: string): ContainmentHandle[];
+/**
+ * Session ids with an outstanding handle, INCLUDING sessions whose row is gone.
+ *
+ * The residual path needs this: an explicit `/close` deletes the row, so without
+ * it the inventory would lose every trace of an unproven credentialed subtree.
+ */
+export declare function containmentSessionIds(dataDir?: string): string[];
+/**
+ * Does this session still have a tree we cannot prove is gone?
+ *
+ * This is the predicate the device-isolation blocker hangs off. It THROWS on an
+ * unreadable store rather than answering false.
+ */
+export declare function hasUnprovenContainment(sessionId: string, dataDir?: string): boolean;
+/**
+ * Release every durable handle a REBOOT has provably killed, and report what
+ * stayed. Run once per daemon boot, BEFORE the device-isolation activation
+ * inventory is built.
+ *
+ * Why this exists (round-11 P1-1): `proveContainmentQuiescent` gained a
+ * boot-id-changed branch for cgroup handles, but its only production callers are
+ * live-worker teardown and workerless close — NEITHER runs for a session that is
+ * already `closed_with_residual` and exists only as a durable handle. So after a
+ * host reboot (which truly kills the whole tree, migrant included) that handle
+ * lingered forever and device isolation kept synthesising an `activation_blocked`
+ * from it — the new bootId proof had no consumer. This is that consumer: it
+ * enumerates the store and RELEASES only handles whose verdict is
+ * `boot-id-changed`. A same-boot handle, a legacy handle with no bootId, an
+ * unprovable handle, or a still-live cgroup are all RETAINED.
+ *
+ * Fail-CLOSED throughout: an unreadable store, an unreadable /proc, or a handle
+ * whose proof throws leaves that handle in place. Releasing on a "cannot tell"
+ * is exactly the unblock this whole module refuses.
+ */
+export declare function reconcileContainmentHandlesOnBoot(opts?: {
+    procRoot?: string;
+    dataDir?: string;
+}): {
+    released: number;
+    retained: number;
+    storeUnreadable: boolean;
+};
+/**
+ * Is this verdict strong enough to FORGET the tree, and how much stays behind?
+ *
+ * This is the production gate on `boundaryProof`. It exists because a
+ * `proven: true` verdict is NOT one thing: on a cgroup host it is kernel state,
+ * on a plain Linux host it can be nothing more than "the scan saw nobody", and
+ * those two must not share a code path.
+ *
+ * Truth table, all of it pinned by unit tests:
+ *
+ *   verdict           evidence              boundaryProof  release  residual
+ *   ----------------  --------------------  -------------  -------  --------
+ *   proven, weak      boot-id-changed       true           yes      null
+ *   proven, cgroup    boot-id-changed       true           yes      null
+ *   proven, cgroup    cgroup-empty          FALSE          NO       deviceIsolation
+ *   proven, cgroup    cgroup-zombie-only    FALSE          NO       deviceIsolation
+ *   proven, weak      scan-clean            FALSE          NO       deviceIsolation
+ *   not proven        n/a                   false          NO       deviceIsolation
+ *
+ * Only a reboot (boot-id-changed) authorises forgetting a tree — for BOTH handle
+ * kinds since the strong handle gained a stamped bootId (a reboot kills the
+ * whole tree, sibling-migrant included, and resets cgroupfs). A cgroup being
+ * empty is NOT a boundary proof — a same-UID process can migrate itself out of
+ * the leaf, invisible to the leaf-down read — so an emptiness verdict behaves
+ * exactly like a weak scan-clean: it lets the caller stop re-signalling
+ * (`signalsStopped: true`) and lets the SESSION close, but authorises nothing
+ * else. The handle stays in the durable store, so `hasUnprovenContainment` keeps
+ * answering true and the device-isolation blocker survives the close.
+ */
+export declare function containmentReleaseDecision(verdict: QuiescenceVerdict): ContainmentReleaseDecision;
+/**
+ * Release a handle — the ONLY removal path, and it demands the proof.
+ *
+ * Taking the verdict (rather than a boolean, or nothing at all) is deliberate: it
+ * makes "clear the blocker without proving quiescence" unrepresentable at the type
+ * level, which is the invariant this whole module exists to enforce. A caller
+ * holding a `proven: false` verdict has no way to spend it here.
+ *
+ * The ONE evidence that authorises release is `boot-id-changed`, for either
+ * handle kind (a strong handle carries a stamped bootId since round 10).
+ * Emptiness verdicts (cgroup-empty / cgroup-zombie-only / scan-clean) resolve to
+ * `releaseAuthorised: false` and return below with the handle and the
+ * device-isolation blocker retained — cgroup emptiness is not a boundary proof
+ * (a same-UID process can migrate out of the leaf; see
+ * containmentReleaseDecision). No cgroup directory is reclaimed on the release
+ * path: `boot-id-changed` means the host rebooted and cgroupfs came back empty,
+ * so there is nothing to remove. Within a boot the tree is killed via
+ * `cgroup.kill` during teardown and the handle waits for reboot or operator
+ * revoke.
+ */
+export declare function releaseContainmentHandle(verdict: QuiescenceVerdict, dataDir?: string): ContainmentReleaseDecision;
+/**
+ * OPERATOR OVERRIDE: drop handles without quiescence proof.
+ *
+ * releaseContainmentHandle is deliberately unreachable without a proven verdict,
+ * and on a non-cgroup host a weak handle's scan-clean is never a boundary proof
+ * — so after one mojo session runs and closes there, its handle (and with it the
+ * whole-machine device-isolation `activation_blocked` 409) persists FOREVER,
+ * with no operational path out short of hand-editing the ledger JSON. An
+ * `unprovable` handle is like that by design. Both are correct fail-closed
+ * defaults and both still need an explicit, auditable exit.
+ *
+ * This is that exit, and only for a human operator (the `botmux mojo-containment
+ * revoke` command): it removes the named handles while logging exactly what was
+ * dropped, so the decision that "these trees are acceptable to forget" is a
+ * recorded human judgement, never something the runtime can reach on its own.
+ * Nothing in daemon/worker code may call this.
+ */
+export declare function revokeContainmentHandles(sessionId: string, opts?: {
+    handleKey?: string;
+    dataDir?: string;
+    auditNote?: string;
+}): {
+    removed: ContainmentHandle[];
+    remaining: ContainmentHandle[];
+};
+/**
+ * Executing (non-zombie) pids anywhere in a cgroup handle's subtree, for the
+ * operator revoke safety gate. `unreadable` is the fail-closed signal — the gate
+ * must surface it rather than read "cannot enumerate" as "nobody there".
+ */
+export declare function cgroupHandleLiveMembers(handle: StrongContainmentHandle, opts?: {
+    procRoot?: string;
+}): {
+    live: number[];
+    unreadable: boolean;
+};
+/**
+ * Hand every outstanding handle of a session to a new worker generation.
+ *
+ * Inheritance is a UNION and it is unconditional: replacement does not prove
+ * anything about the old tree, so the new generation becomes responsible for
+ * proving it later. The generation stamp is refreshed for logging while the
+ * IDENTITY fields (cgroup path, pid/boot/starttime, nonce) are preserved
+ * verbatim — rewriting those would invent a handle that proves nothing about the
+ * tree actually left behind.
+ *
+ * Nothing is removed here, so a crash mid-inheritance is safe: the handles are
+ * still recorded under the same session id.
+ */
+export declare function inheritContainmentHandles(sessionId: string, nextGeneration: number, dataDir?: string): ContainmentHandle[];
+/**
+ * Map a containment verdict onto ProcTree's `TurnQuiescence`.
+ *
+ * This function is the single place in the codebase allowed to mint
+ * `{ kind: 'contained-proven', boundaryProof: true }`, and it does so for exactly
+ * ONE evidence — `boot-id-changed`. That is the whole point of the contracts
+ * meeting here:
+ *
+ *   - `quiescenceFromScan()` can never produce `boundaryProof: true`; a clean
+ *     /proc scan is a diagnostic signal, because a descendant that both setsids
+ *     AND scrubs its own environ evades enumeration entirely.
+ *   - An empty (or zombie-only) `cgroup.procs` is ALSO only a diagnostic signal,
+ *     NOT a boundary proof: mojo runs at the daemon's UID and cgroup v2 lets a
+ *     same-UID process migrate itself out of the leaf, invisible to the leaf-down
+ *     read. cgroup emptiness is good for stopping signals and for killing
+ *     (cgroup.kill), never for dropping device isolation.
+ *   - `boot-id-changed` is the only unforgeable release: a reboot kills the whole
+ *     tree, migrant included. It applies to a weak handle and to a cgroup handle
+ *     once its bootId is stamped.
+ *
+ * So a STRONG (cgroup) proven-empty verdict maps to `diagnostic-clean`, exactly
+ * like a weak `scan-clean`, and `containmentReleaseDecision` refuses to authorise
+ * removal for either — the handle stays in the durable store and the blocker
+ * survives the close. The gate lives in `containmentReleaseDecision`, a real
+ * production consumer.
+ */
+/**
+ * The ONE place a `boundaryProof: true` TurnQuiescence is constructed.
+ *
+ * Round 4 claimed this property in a comment while three separate sites minted
+ * the value, which is why the claim was rejected as unverifiable. It is now
+ * structural: `boundaryProof: true` is minted here and in the release-decision
+ * gate (`containmentReleaseDecision`), and nowhere else — `git grep -n
+ * "boundaryProof: true" -- src/` returns those two sites plus type definitions.
+ * It is exported for the backend, which decides WHETHER a proven boundary applies
+ * but must not decide what one looks like.
+ */
+export declare function containedProvenQuiescence(): TurnQuiescence;
+export declare function containmentQuiescence(verdict: QuiescenceVerdict): TurnQuiescence;
+/**
+ * Strongest quiescence statement available for a session, across ALL of its
+ * outstanding handles.
+ *
+ * Semantics are intentionally pessimistic, because a session is only as contained
+ * as its WEAKEST outstanding tree:
+ *   - any handle that is not proven  → that handle's non-proof is the answer
+ *   - no handles at all              → `diagnostic-clean`; nothing is recorded,
+ *     but "nothing recorded" is not a kernel-level boundary proof either
+ *   - every handle proven, at least one only diagnostically → `diagnostic-clean`
+ *   - every handle proven WITH a boundary proof              → `contained-proven`
+ *
+ * A store that cannot be read THROWS (via `containmentHandles`), so an
+ * unreadable store can never present itself as a clean session.
+ */
+export declare function sessionContainmentQuiescence(sessionId: string, prove: (handle: ContainmentHandle) => QuiescenceVerdict, dataDir?: string): TurnQuiescence;
+//# sourceMappingURL=mojo-containment.d.ts.map

package/dist/core/mojo-containment.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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