bmad-plus 0.7.4 → 0.8.0

package/src/bmad-plus/packs/pack-shield/references/tsa-compliance/tsa-incident-reporting.md

@@ -1,187 +1,187 @@
-# TSA Cybersecurity Incident Reporting — Procedures and Requirements
-
-Source: TSA Security Directives; CISA guidance; Federal Register notices
-
----
-
-## 24-Hour Reporting Obligation
-
-All covered entities under any TSA cybersecurity Security Directive are required to report cybersecurity incidents to **CISA within 24 hours** of identifying an incident. This is a **hard deadline** — the clock starts when the entity identifies the incident, not when the investigation is complete.
-
-**Key principle**: Report early with limited information. TSA and CISA do not expect a complete investigation before the initial report. Updates are provided as the investigation progresses.
-
----
-
-## What Qualifies as a Reportable Incident
-
-A cybersecurity incident is reportable if it results in — or is reasonably likely to result in — operational disruption, safety impact, or unauthorised access involving a Critical Cyber System (CCS).
-
-**Definite reportable incidents:**
-- Ransomware infection confirmed on IT or OT systems
-- Unauthorised access confirmed to any CCS
-- Malware detected on CCS (even if contained)
-- Denial of service that impacts operational capability
-- Confirmed phishing attack with resultant system access
-- Insider threat with confirmed access to CCS
-- Physical security breach resulting in suspected cyber access
-- Loss or suspected loss of operational control of OT systems
-- Detection of reconnaissance activity specifically targeting CCS
-
-**Potentially reportable (apply judgement; when in doubt, report):**
-- Phishing with credential theft (no confirmed CCS access yet)
-- Suspicious login attempts with partial success indicators
-- Discovery of unknown devices on OT network segments
-- Evidence of lateral movement in IT with potential path to OT
-- Vendor notification of a breach affecting systems they manage for you
-
-**Not reportable (generally):**
-- Spam email with no credential compromise
-- Blocked phishing attempt (no access)
-- Routine vulnerability scan activity from authorised ASV/pen test firm
-- Failed brute-force with no account compromise
-
----
-
-## How to Report to CISA
-
-### CISA Reporting Channels (24/7)
-
-| Channel | Contact |
-|---------|---------|
-| **Phone** | 1-888-282-0870 (CISA 24/7 Operations Center) |
-| **Email** | CISAgov@mail.dhs.gov |
-| **Online** | https://myservices.cisa.gov/report (CISA Reporting Portal) |
-
-### TSA Notification
-In addition to CISA, notify TSA via the TSA Operations Center:
-- **TSA Operations Center**: 1-866-289-9673
-
-### Internal Notification Sequence
-Before or concurrent with CISA reporting:
-1. Cybersecurity Coordinator notified immediately upon incident identification
-2. Cybersecurity Coordinator notifies Accountable Executive
-3. Legal counsel notified (regulatory reporting obligations)
-4. OT operations team notified if OT systems involved
-5. CISA report made within 24 hours
-6. TSA notification made per directive requirements
-
----
-
-## Initial Report — Minimum Required Information
-
-The initial 24-hour report should include as much of the following as available. Missing information can be provided in follow-up reports.
-
-**Required fields for initial report:**
-- Organisation name and sector (pipeline, freight rail, transit, etc.)
-- Contact name and phone number (Cybersecurity Coordinator)
-- Date and approximate time incident was identified
-- Brief description of what was observed
-- Systems affected (IT, OT, or both — be as specific as safe to share)
-- Operational impact (disruption to operations? estimated scope)
-- Containment actions taken so far
-- Whether law enforcement has been notified (FBI, etc.)
-
-**Sample initial report language:**
-> "[Organisation Name], a [natural gas pipeline / freight railroad / transit agency] operator, is reporting a cybersecurity incident identified on [date/time]. We detected [ransomware/unauthorised access/malware] on [IT systems / OT control systems / both]. At this time, [describe operational impact]. We have taken [initial containment actions]. Our Cybersecurity Coordinator is [Name] and can be reached at [phone]. We will provide updates as our investigation progresses."
-
----
-
-## Follow-Up Reporting
-
-After the initial 24-hour report, maintain regular communication with CISA and TSA as the investigation develops:
-
-**Follow-up report triggers:**
-- Identification of root cause
-- Significant change in scope (more systems affected than initially reported)
-- Significant operational impact change
-- Recovery milestones reached
-- Incident closure
-
-**Incident closure report should include:**
-- Timeline from detection to containment to eradication to recovery
-- Root cause analysis
-- Systems affected (final scope)
-- Data involved (any cardholder data, PII, operational data)
-- Actions taken (containment, eradication, recovery)
-- Lessons learned
-- Corrective actions planned or implemented to prevent recurrence
-
----
-
-## CIRB (Cyber Incident Response Board) and External Assistance
-
-If the incident is significant, CISA may:
-- Dispatch a CISA Rapid Response Team (CISA has dedicated ICS/OT responders)
-- Coordinate with FBI Cyber Division if criminal activity suspected
-- Share sanitised threat intelligence with other critical infrastructure operators via ISACs
-
-**Free CISA services available to covered entities:**
-- Incident response support (CIRP assistance, forensics support)
-- Cybersecurity advisory services
-- Vulnerability scanning (CISA CSET — Cybersecurity Evaluation Tool)
-- Exercises (tabletop exercise facilitation)
-- Threat intelligence (CISA advisories, ICS-CERT alerts)
-
----
-
-## Sector-Specific ISACs
-
-Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs) provide sector-specific threat intelligence and incident coordination:
-
-| Sector | ISAC | Website |
-|--------|------|---------|
-| Pipeline / Energy | E-ISAC (Energy ISAC) | https://www.eisac.com |
-| Oil and Natural Gas | ONG-ISAC | https://www.ongisac.org |
-| Rail / Surface Transportation | Surface Transportation ISAC (ST-ISAC) | https://www.surfacetransportationisac.org |
-| Public Transit | PT-ISAC | https://www.pt-isac.org |
-| Multi-sector | MS-ISAC (focused on SLTT) | https://www.cisecurity.org/ms-isac |
-
-ISAC membership is strongly encouraged by TSA and CISA. Incidents can be reported to ISACs for anonymised sharing with sector peers.
-
----
-
-## Post-Incident IRP Testing Requirement
-
-Following a significant cybersecurity incident, covered entities should:
-1. Conduct an after-action review (AAR) within 30 days of incident closure
-2. Document lessons learned
-3. Update the IRP to reflect lessons learned
-4. Update the CIP if architectural or procedural changes are required
-5. Consider whether the incident warrants unscheduled IRP testing (e.g., drill on the specific scenario that occurred)
-6. Track corrective actions to closure
-
-The annual IRP testing requirement (test two objectives) does not reset due to a real incident — a real incident response may count as a test if properly documented.
-
----
-
-## Cyber Incident Notification Log
-
-Maintain a log of all regulatory notifications made for each incident. Recommended fields:
-
-| Field | Example |
-|-------|---------|
-| Incident ID | INC-2026-001 |
-| Date/time identified | 2026-03-10 14:32 UTC |
-| Date/time CISA notified | 2026-03-11 09:15 UTC (within 24h ✅) |
-| CISA ticket/case number | CISA-2026-XXXXX |
-| Date/time TSA notified | 2026-03-11 09:30 UTC |
-| TSA case reference | TSA-XXXX |
-| Date/time law enforcement notified | N/A or 2026-03-11 |
-| Internal legal counsel notified | 2026-03-10 15:00 UTC |
-| Accountable Executive notified | 2026-03-10 14:45 UTC |
-| Follow-up reports submitted | 2026-03-15, 2026-03-22 |
-| Incident closure date | 2026-03-25 |
-| Closure report submitted to CISA | 2026-03-30 |
-
----
-
-## CIRPA — Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act
-
-In addition to TSA-specific reporting, large-scale incidents may also trigger reporting obligations under **CIRCIA (Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act of 2022)**:
-
-- CIRCIA requires covered entities to report significant cyber incidents to CISA within **72 hours** (broader trigger than TSA's 24-hour requirement)
-- Ransom payments must be reported within **24 hours** under CIRCIA
-- TSA's 24-hour requirement is more stringent — complying with TSA also satisfies CIRCIA timelines
-- CIRCIA final rules were under development as of 2025/2026; interim guidance from CISA applies
-
-**Practical guidance**: When in doubt, report to CISA as early as possible. TSA's 24-hour requirement is the most demanding — use it as your reporting trigger.
+# TSA Cybersecurity Incident Reporting — Procedures and Requirements
+
+Source: TSA Security Directives; CISA guidance; Federal Register notices
+
+---
+
+## 24-Hour Reporting Obligation
+
+All covered entities under any TSA cybersecurity Security Directive are required to report cybersecurity incidents to **CISA within 24 hours** of identifying an incident. This is a **hard deadline** — the clock starts when the entity identifies the incident, not when the investigation is complete.
+
+**Key principle**: Report early with limited information. TSA and CISA do not expect a complete investigation before the initial report. Updates are provided as the investigation progresses.
+
+---
+
+## What Qualifies as a Reportable Incident
+
+A cybersecurity incident is reportable if it results in — or is reasonably likely to result in — operational disruption, safety impact, or unauthorised access involving a Critical Cyber System (CCS).
+
+**Definite reportable incidents:**
+- Ransomware infection confirmed on IT or OT systems
+- Unauthorised access confirmed to any CCS
+- Malware detected on CCS (even if contained)
+- Denial of service that impacts operational capability
+- Confirmed phishing attack with resultant system access
+- Insider threat with confirmed access to CCS
+- Physical security breach resulting in suspected cyber access
+- Loss or suspected loss of operational control of OT systems
+- Detection of reconnaissance activity specifically targeting CCS
+
+**Potentially reportable (apply judgement; when in doubt, report):**
+- Phishing with credential theft (no confirmed CCS access yet)
+- Suspicious login attempts with partial success indicators
+- Discovery of unknown devices on OT network segments
+- Evidence of lateral movement in IT with potential path to OT
+- Vendor notification of a breach affecting systems they manage for you
+
+**Not reportable (generally):**
+- Spam email with no credential compromise
+- Blocked phishing attempt (no access)
+- Routine vulnerability scan activity from authorised ASV/pen test firm
+- Failed brute-force with no account compromise
+
+---
+
+## How to Report to CISA
+
+### CISA Reporting Channels (24/7)
+
+| Channel | Contact |
+|---------|---------|
+| **Phone** | 1-888-282-0870 (CISA 24/7 Operations Center) |
+| **Email** | CISAgov@mail.dhs.gov |
+| **Online** | https://myservices.cisa.gov/report (CISA Reporting Portal) |
+
+### TSA Notification
+In addition to CISA, notify TSA via the TSA Operations Center:
+- **TSA Operations Center**: 1-866-289-9673
+
+### Internal Notification Sequence
+Before or concurrent with CISA reporting:
+1. Cybersecurity Coordinator notified immediately upon incident identification
+2. Cybersecurity Coordinator notifies Accountable Executive
+3. Legal counsel notified (regulatory reporting obligations)
+4. OT operations team notified if OT systems involved
+5. CISA report made within 24 hours
+6. TSA notification made per directive requirements
+
+---
+
+## Initial Report — Minimum Required Information
+
+The initial 24-hour report should include as much of the following as available. Missing information can be provided in follow-up reports.
+
+**Required fields for initial report:**
+- Organisation name and sector (pipeline, freight rail, transit, etc.)
+- Contact name and phone number (Cybersecurity Coordinator)
+- Date and approximate time incident was identified
+- Brief description of what was observed
+- Systems affected (IT, OT, or both — be as specific as safe to share)
+- Operational impact (disruption to operations? estimated scope)
+- Containment actions taken so far
+- Whether law enforcement has been notified (FBI, etc.)
+
+**Sample initial report language:**
+> "[Organisation Name], a [natural gas pipeline / freight railroad / transit agency] operator, is reporting a cybersecurity incident identified on [date/time]. We detected [ransomware/unauthorised access/malware] on [IT systems / OT control systems / both]. At this time, [describe operational impact]. We have taken [initial containment actions]. Our Cybersecurity Coordinator is [Name] and can be reached at [phone]. We will provide updates as our investigation progresses."
+
+---
+
+## Follow-Up Reporting
+
+After the initial 24-hour report, maintain regular communication with CISA and TSA as the investigation develops:
+
+**Follow-up report triggers:**
+- Identification of root cause
+- Significant change in scope (more systems affected than initially reported)
+- Significant operational impact change
+- Recovery milestones reached
+- Incident closure
+
+**Incident closure report should include:**
+- Timeline from detection to containment to eradication to recovery
+- Root cause analysis
+- Systems affected (final scope)
+- Data involved (any cardholder data, PII, operational data)
+- Actions taken (containment, eradication, recovery)
+- Lessons learned
+- Corrective actions planned or implemented to prevent recurrence
+
+---
+
+## CIRB (Cyber Incident Response Board) and External Assistance
+
+If the incident is significant, CISA may:
+- Dispatch a CISA Rapid Response Team (CISA has dedicated ICS/OT responders)
+- Coordinate with FBI Cyber Division if criminal activity suspected
+- Share sanitised threat intelligence with other critical infrastructure operators via ISACs
+
+**Free CISA services available to covered entities:**
+- Incident response support (CIRP assistance, forensics support)
+- Cybersecurity advisory services
+- Vulnerability scanning (CISA CSET — Cybersecurity Evaluation Tool)
+- Exercises (tabletop exercise facilitation)
+- Threat intelligence (CISA advisories, ICS-CERT alerts)
+
+---
+
+## Sector-Specific ISACs
+
+Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs) provide sector-specific threat intelligence and incident coordination:
+
+| Sector | ISAC | Website |
+|--------|------|---------|
+| Pipeline / Energy | E-ISAC (Energy ISAC) | https://www.eisac.com |
+| Oil and Natural Gas | ONG-ISAC | https://www.ongisac.org |
+| Rail / Surface Transportation | Surface Transportation ISAC (ST-ISAC) | https://www.surfacetransportationisac.org |
+| Public Transit | PT-ISAC | https://www.pt-isac.org |
+| Multi-sector | MS-ISAC (focused on SLTT) | https://www.cisecurity.org/ms-isac |
+
+ISAC membership is strongly encouraged by TSA and CISA. Incidents can be reported to ISACs for anonymised sharing with sector peers.
+
+---
+
+## Post-Incident IRP Testing Requirement
+
+Following a significant cybersecurity incident, covered entities should:
+1. Conduct an after-action review (AAR) within 30 days of incident closure
+2. Document lessons learned
+3. Update the IRP to reflect lessons learned
+4. Update the CIP if architectural or procedural changes are required
+5. Consider whether the incident warrants unscheduled IRP testing (e.g., drill on the specific scenario that occurred)
+6. Track corrective actions to closure
+
+The annual IRP testing requirement (test two objectives) does not reset due to a real incident — a real incident response may count as a test if properly documented.
+
+---
+
+## Cyber Incident Notification Log
+
+Maintain a log of all regulatory notifications made for each incident. Recommended fields:
+
+| Field | Example |
+|-------|---------|
+| Incident ID | INC-2026-001 |
+| Date/time identified | 2026-03-10 14:32 UTC |
+| Date/time CISA notified | 2026-03-11 09:15 UTC (within 24h ✅) |
+| CISA ticket/case number | CISA-2026-XXXXX |
+| Date/time TSA notified | 2026-03-11 09:30 UTC |
+| TSA case reference | TSA-XXXX |
+| Date/time law enforcement notified | N/A or 2026-03-11 |
+| Internal legal counsel notified | 2026-03-10 15:00 UTC |
+| Accountable Executive notified | 2026-03-10 14:45 UTC |
+| Follow-up reports submitted | 2026-03-15, 2026-03-22 |
+| Incident closure date | 2026-03-25 |
+| Closure report submitted to CISA | 2026-03-30 |
+
+---
+
+## CIRPA — Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act
+
+In addition to TSA-specific reporting, large-scale incidents may also trigger reporting obligations under **CIRCIA (Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act of 2022)**:
+
+- CIRCIA requires covered entities to report significant cyber incidents to CISA within **72 hours** (broader trigger than TSA's 24-hour requirement)
+- Ransom payments must be reported within **24 hours** under CIRCIA
+- TSA's 24-hour requirement is more stringent — complying with TSA also satisfies CIRCIA timelines
+- CIRCIA final rules were under development as of 2025/2026; interim guidance from CISA applies
+
+**Practical guidance**: When in doubt, report to CISA as early as possible. TSA's 24-hour requirement is the most demanding — use it as your reporting trigger.