blitzstrike 2.4.95 → 2.4.97

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -5,6 +5,36 @@ All notable changes to Blitz Strike are documented here.
 The format follows [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.0.0/),
 and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/).
 
+## [2.4.97] — 2026-09-17
+
+### Added — bugbounty-lab101 knowledge extraction (watchlist upgrade + dedup doctrine)
+
+- Upgraded `watchlist()` CVE data from a generic 9-CVE list to the 18
+  Hacktivity-ranked CVEs with EPSS, report counts, and per-CVE fingerprint
+  hints (Confluence OGNL RCE, Next.js middleware/RSC auth-bypass/RCE, Kibana
+  SSRF/authz, Langflow RCE, PAN-OS GlobalProtect, Grafana, Keycloak, Jira).
+  `watchlist()` now emits a "fingerprint-first" recommendation: if the target
+  stack matches a watchlist product, test that specific CVE instead of relying
+  on generic scanning.
+- Added a `dedup_before_report` doctrine rule — search Hacktivity (and prior
+  public reports) for the same endpoint/tech/vuln class before writing the
+  report; the #1 cause of "Duplicate"/"N/A" rejections is not searching first.
+
+## [2.4.96] — 2026-09-17
+
+### Security — self-audit (command injection + path traversal fixed)
+
+- `resolve_check(host)` interpolated the user-controlled host into a `curl` shell
+  string (`execSync`), allowing command injection (`host = "x.com; id"`). Now
+  validates the host against a strict hostname regex BEFORE any subprocess/DNS and
+  calls curl via `execFileSync` (array argv, no shell) — defense in depth.
+- `foundry_run(contract_name=...)` used the name as a filename under the temp
+  project without validation, allowing path traversal (`"../../evil"`). Now
+  sanitizes to a valid Solidity identifier (`[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*`), defaulting
+  to `Vulnerable` otherwise.
+- Added regression checks: `isValidHostname` rejects shell metacharacters
+  (`;`, backticks, `$()`, `|`, `../`, newlines); the identifier regex is shared.
+
 ## [2.4.95] — 2026-09-17
 
 ### Fixed — full interconnection audit (unreachable template + 2 ungrounded classes)

package/README.md

@@ -52,6 +52,13 @@ source analysis, and validation — into three tool tiers executed server-side.
 Reconnaissance → analysis → validation. Nothing is reported until STRIKE
 confirms it.
 
+Beyond the three tiers, Blitz Strike also ships **Web3 audit** (deterministic
+Solidity + executable Foundry proof), a **live logic-bug prober** (sibling
+enumeration + differential IDOR), **hunting intel** (CWE/CVE watchlist + DNS
+sinkhole detection), and **out-of-band proof** — so IDOR/auth logic bugs, blind
+injection, and smart-contract findings are all caught and proven, not just
+pattern-matched.
+
 ---
 
 ## Autonomous, LLM-driven
@@ -220,7 +227,7 @@ MCP servers. With no client detected, it prints the snippet for manual paste.
 | `dedup_findings(findings)` | Collapse findings that share a root cause (sink × source × CWE) into one group per root cause. |
 | `generate_report(findings, format)` | Emit a reproducible markdown/JSON report with summary + SHA-256 integrity hash. |
 | `run_enterprise_benchmark()` | Run the labelled enterprise corpus and report detection rate, false-positive rate, and precision. |
-| `coverage_matrix()` | Enumerate language × sink-class coverage (4 languages × 15 sink classes) + coverage ratio. |
+| `coverage_matrix()` | Enumerate language × sink-class coverage (5 languages) + coverage ratio. |
 
 ### EAGLE-EYE — taint + data-flow
 
@@ -263,6 +270,26 @@ decoration — they are wired into the flow:
 - `tool_lookup(name)` auto-attaches the tool's full manual.
 - `run_engagement()` attaches the relevant manual per matched chain's `tools` field.
 
+### WEB3 — smart-contract audit + proof
+
+| Tool | Purpose |
+|---|---|
+| `web3_audit(code, path)` | Deterministic Solidity audit — 13 bug classes (reentrancy incl. ERC721/ERC1155 callbacks, unchecked return/arithmetic, tx.origin auth, signature replay, selfdestruct, delegatecall, missing access control, timestamp dependence, spot-price oracle, unbounded loop, encodePacked collision, missing address(0) check) with CWE + severity + line refs. |
+| `foundry_poc(class, contract)` | Generate an executable Foundry test that PROVES a Web3 finding. |
+| `foundry_run(contract_code, poc_code, class_)` | Actually run the Foundry PoC (`forge test`) — a PASSING test = exploit reproduced (deterministic: forge's own verdict). |
+
+### HUNTING — doctrine + live logic-bug prober + intel
+
+| Tool | Purpose |
+|---|---|
+| `hunting_doctrine()` | High-ROI heuristics — sibling rule, A→B signal, two-account IDOR, PoC escalation, follow-the-money + the always-rejected kill-list. |
+| `kill_list(type)` | Deterministic always-rejected check — missing headers, self-XSS, open-redirect-alone, SSRF-DNS-only, GraphQL-introspection-alone are N/A standalone. |
+| `sibling_scan(base_url, endpoint, token_a, token_b)` | Deterministic LIVE logic-bug prober — sibling enumeration + differential IDOR + auth matrix + mass assignment + rate limit (closes the static-analysis gap on IDOR/auth logic bugs). |
+| `auto_poc(type, base_url, endpoint, param)` | Turn a finding into a copy-paste-ready reproduction recipe (marker + negative control + expected differential + Patchstack-style title). |
+| `watchlist()` | Ranked CWE frequency + high-value CVE watchlist with payout + saturated flag — "what to hunt next". |
+| `resolve_check(host)` | Detect an ISP/country DNS sinkhole (blocking page) before auditing a sensitive-niche domain. |
+| `oob_start()` / `oob_poll(id)` / `oob_stop(id)` | Out-of-band proof — interactsh listener for blind SSRF/XXE/SQLi/command-injection (the canary must actually arrive). |
+
 ### MEMORY — long-term knowledge (self-growing)
 
 | Tool | Purpose |
@@ -325,7 +352,7 @@ See `ATTRIBUTION.md` for full license/copyright notices.
 
 ## Escalation Chains (chains.json)
 
-57 data-driven escalation chains, each with ordered steps carrying:
+58 data-driven escalation chains, each with ordered steps carrying:
 
 - `tool_hint` — which Blitz Strike tool to use
 - `success_criteria` — binary observable for the step
@@ -361,7 +388,7 @@ All other tools need no credentials.
 bun install          # deps
 bun run typecheck    # tsc --noEmit
 bun run build        # ESM bundle → dist/index.js
-bun run test         # regression + benchmark suite (183 checks)
+bun run test         # regression + benchmark suite (453 checks)
 bun run compile      # single static binary → dist/blitzstrike
 ```
 
@@ -375,14 +402,14 @@ number you can re-run, not a claim.
 - **Benchmark** (`run_enterprise_benchmark`) — a labelled corpus of vulnerable +
   safe fixtures across PHP, JavaScript, Python, and Java. Current result:
   detection rate **1.0**, false-positive rate **0**, precision **1.0**.
-- **Coverage matrix** (`coverage_matrix`) — 4 languages × 15 sink classes =
-  56/60 pairs covered. The four uncovered pairs are legitimately absent from
-  the language (e.g. Java has no `eval`, Python/Java no PHP-style file
-  inclusion, JS no deserialization sink).
+- **Coverage matrix** (`coverage_matrix`) — 5 languages × sink classes = 84%
+  coverage (php, javascript, python, java, rust). Uncovered pairs are
+  legitimately absent from the language (e.g. Java has no `eval`, Python/Java no
+  PHP-style file inclusion, JS no deserialization sink).
 - **Attack-vector taxonomy** (`list_attack_vectors` / `attack_vectors`) — a
   master reference of 34 attack-vector categories (588 vectors) so a driving
   agent can map the *entire* attack surface, not just the obvious sinks.
-- **Regression suite** — `bun run test` runs 183 checks covering finding
+- **Regression suite** — `bun run test` runs 453 checks covering finding
   lifecycle, evidence integrity, CVSS math, taint tracing, dedup, report
   integrity, and benchmark invariants. CI runs it on every push.
 

package/dist/index.js

@@ -17499,7 +17499,7 @@ var init_update = __esm(() => {
 import { readFileSync as readFileSync29, existsSync as existsSync16 } from "node:fs";
 import { join as join27 } from "node:path";
 import { fileURLToPath as fileURLToPath14 } from "node:url";
-import { execSync as execSync5 } from "node:child_process";
+import { execSync as execSync4 } from "node:child_process";
 function validateRelease() {
   const checks = [];
   checks.push({ name: "package.json version", ok: true, detail: VERSION });
@@ -17516,13 +17516,13 @@ function validateRelease() {
     checks.push({ name: "CHANGELOG version", ok: false, detail: "CHANGELOG.md not found" });
   }
   try {
-    const tag = execSync5("git describe --tags --abbrev=0", { cwd: ROOT8, encoding: "utf8", stdio: ["ignore", "pipe", "ignore"] }).trim();
+    const tag = execSync4("git describe --tags --abbrev=0", { cwd: ROOT8, encoding: "utf8", stdio: ["ignore", "pipe", "ignore"] }).trim();
     checks.push({ name: "Git tag", ok: tag === `v${VERSION}`, detail: tag, soft: true });
   } catch {
     checks.push({ name: "Git tag", ok: true, detail: "unavailable (no git/tags)", soft: true });
   }
   try {
-    const published = execSync5("npm view blitzstrike version", { encoding: "utf8", timeout: 8000, stdio: ["ignore", "pipe", "ignore"] }).trim();
+    const published = execSync4("npm view blitzstrike version", { encoding: "utf8", timeout: 8000, stdio: ["ignore", "pipe", "ignore"] }).trim();
     checks.push({ name: "npm registry version", ok: published === VERSION, detail: published, soft: true });
   } catch {
     checks.push({ name: "npm registry version", ok: true, detail: "unavailable (offline)", soft: true });
@@ -60943,6 +60943,11 @@ var HUNTING_DOCTRINE = [
     id: "rotation",
     title: "20-Minute Rotation",
     rule: "Every 20 minutes ask 'am I making progress?'. No → rotate to the next endpoint / subdomain / class. Fresh context finds more bugs than brute force."
+  },
+  {
+    id: "dedup_before_report",
+    title: "Search for Duplicates Before Reporting",
+    rule: "The #1 cause of 'Duplicate'/'N/A' rejections is not searching first. Before writing the report, search Hacktivity (and the program's prior public reports) for the same endpoint/tech/vuln class; an already-reported open S3 bucket, CORS misconfig, or XSS param is not worth a second report. Only submit what is genuinely new."
   }
 ];
 function huntingDoctrine() {
@@ -61408,7 +61413,8 @@ function parseTestResults(out) {
 }
 async function foundryRun(input) {
   const forge = findForge();
-  const name = input.contract_name ?? "Vulnerable";
+  const rawName = input.contract_name ?? "Vulnerable";
+  const name = /^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]{0,63}$/.test(rawName) ? rawName : "Vulnerable";
   if (!forge) {
     return {
       forge: null,
@@ -61459,11 +61465,15 @@ solc = "0.8.20"
 }
 
 // src/hunting-intel.ts
-import { execSync as execSync4 } from "node:child_process";
+import { execFileSync as execFileSync5 } from "node:child_process";
 import { resolve4 as resolve42, Resolver } from "node:dns/promises";
 import { readFileSync as readFileSync25 } from "node:fs";
 import { join as join24 } from "node:path";
 var BLOCKING_KEYWORDS = /internet positif|kominfo|\.go\.id\b|pemblokiran|ditutup|dilarang|akses dibatasi|blocked|restricted|illegal|advertencia|coljuegos|regulat|forbidden|this (site|website) has been (blocked|banned)/i;
+var HOSTNAME_RE = /^[a-z0-9]([a-z0-9-]{0,61}[a-z0-9])?(\.[a-z0-9]([a-z0-9-]{0,61}[a-z0-9])?)*$/i;
+function isValidHostname(host) {
+  return host.length <= 253 && HOSTNAME_RE.test(host);
+}
 async function localResolve(host) {
   try {
     return await resolve42(host);
@@ -61484,7 +61494,7 @@ function probeBlockingPage(host, ip, timeoutMs = 8000) {
   for (const port of ["443", "80"]) {
     const scheme = port === "443" ? "https" : "http";
     try {
-      const out = execSync4(`curl -sk -m 6 --resolve ${host}:${port}:${ip} ${scheme}://${host}/ 2>/dev/null`, { encoding: "utf8", timeout: timeoutMs, stdio: ["ignore", "pipe", "ignore"] });
+      const out = execFileSync5("curl", ["-sk", "-m", "6", "--resolve", `${host}:${port}:${ip}`, `${scheme}://${host}/`], { encoding: "utf8", timeout: timeoutMs, stdio: ["ignore", "pipe", "ignore"] });
       const preview = out.replace(/\s+/g, " ").trim().slice(0, 300);
       if (!preview)
         continue;
@@ -61495,6 +61505,9 @@ function probeBlockingPage(host, ip, timeoutMs = 8000) {
 }
 async function resolveCheck(host) {
   const clean = host.replace(/^https?:\/\//, "").split("/")[0];
+  if (!isValidHostname(clean)) {
+    return { host: clean, local_ips: [], public_ips: [], sinkhole: false, verdict: "invalid", evidence: "not a valid hostname — rejected before DNS/subprocess" };
+  }
   const local = await localResolve(clean);
   const pub = await publicResolve(clean);
   if (local.length === 0 && pub.length === 0) {
@@ -61559,7 +61572,8 @@ function watchlist() {
     };
   }).sort((a, b) => a.rank - b.rank);
   const unsaturated = entries.filter((e) => !e.saturated);
-  const recommendation = `Prioritize the ${unsaturated.length} non-saturated classes (top: ${unsaturated.slice(0, 3).map((e) => e.cwe).join(", ")}) — high frequency + high payout + not yet saturated. Skip saturated/low-value classes (XSS/CSRF/open-redirect standalone) unless they chain into account takeover.`;
+  const topCve = cve_watchlist.filter((c) => (c.epss ?? 0) >= 0.8 || (c.reports ?? 0) >= 100).slice(0, 4).map((c) => c.cve).join(", ");
+  const recommendation = `Prioritize the ${unsaturated.length} non-saturated classes (top: ${unsaturated.slice(0, 3).map((e) => e.cwe).join(", ")}) — high frequency + high payout + not yet saturated. Skip saturated/low-value classes (XSS/CSRF/open-redirect standalone) unless they chain into account takeover. FINGERPRINT FIRST: if the target stack matches a watchlist product (Next.js, Kibana, Langflow, Confluence/Jira, PAN-OS, Grafana), test that specific CVE — top EPSS/report CVEs: ${topCve}.`;
   return { cwe_frequency: entries, cve_watchlist, recommendation };
 }
 

package/intelligence/watchlist.json

@@ -1,33 +1,339 @@
 {
-  "_comment": "Bug-bounty disclosure frequency + payout watchlist. Derived from public disclosure statistics (HackerOne Hacktivity / CWE Top 25) and typical bounty ranges — a 'what to hunt next' signal, not a vulnerability database. Each CWE entry links to a Blitz Strike detector pattern when one exists (grounding via pattern_lookup).",
+  "_comment": "Bug-bounty disclosure frequency + payout watchlist. Derived from public disclosure statistics (HackerOne Hacktivity / CWE Top 25) and typical bounty ranges \u2014 a 'what to hunt next' signal, not a vulnerability database. Each CWE entry links to a Blitz Strike detector pattern when one exists (grounding via pattern_lookup).",
   "cwe_frequency": [
-    { "cwe": "CWE-79", "name": "Cross-site Scripting (XSS)", "rank": 1, "saturated": true, "pattern": "xss", "payout_min": 100, "payout_max": 2500, "notes": "Most-reported class; heavily automated and low-paying — hunt only for high-impact variants (stored/account-takeover)." },
-    { "cwe": "CWE-862", "name": "Missing Authorization / IDOR", "rank": 2, "saturated": false, "pattern": "missing_authz", "payout_min": 1000, "payout_max": 10000, "notes": "~30% of paid access-control bugs; sibling rule + two-account test are the highest-ROI moves." },
-    { "cwe": "CWE-284", "name": "Improper Access Control (priv-esc)", "rank": 3, "saturated": false, "pattern": "priv_esc", "payout_min": 1000, "payout_max": 15000, "notes": "Role/privilege escalation; mass assignment + forced membership are under-hunted." },
-    { "cwe": "CWE-89", "name": "SQL Injection", "rank": 4, "saturated": false, "pattern": "sql_injection", "payout_min": 1000, "payout_max": 15000, "notes": "Still high-value where it reaches a real query; WAF bypass + second-order matter." },
-    { "cwe": "CWE-918", "name": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)", "rank": 5, "saturated": false, "pattern": "ssrf", "payout_min": 1000, "payout_max": 15000, "notes": "P1 when it hits cloud metadata; proof = internal response or OOB callback." },
-    { "cwe": "CWE-78", "name": "OS Command Injection", "rank": 6, "saturated": false, "pattern": "command_injection", "payout_min": 1000, "payout_max": 15000, "notes": "Critical class; less common than XSS/SQLi but very high impact." },
-    { "cwe": "CWE-502", "name": "Insecure Deserialization", "rank": 7, "saturated": false, "pattern": "deserialization", "payout_min": 5000, "payout_max": 30000, "notes": "Highest per-finding payout; needs a gadget chain but very rewarded." },
-    { "cwe": "CWE-94", "name": "Code Injection / eval", "rank": 8, "saturated": false, "pattern": "command_injection", "payout_min": 1000, "payout_max": 15000, "notes": "eval/exec with user input; folds into RCE umbrella." },
-    { "cwe": "CWE-434", "name": "Unrestricted File Upload", "rank": 9, "saturated": false, "pattern": "file_upload", "payout_min": 1000, "payout_max": 10000, "notes": "Upload → RCE chains pay well; confirm the file actually executes." },
-    { "cwe": "CWE-611", "name": "XML External Entity (XXE)", "rank": 10, "saturated": false, "pattern": "xxe", "payout_min": 1000, "payout_max": 10000, "notes": "Less common post-2020 but still found in SOAP/XML upload flows." },
-    { "cwe": "CWE-287", "name": "Authentication Bypass", "rank": 11, "saturated": false, "pattern": "type_juggling", "payout_min": 1000, "payout_max": 15000, "notes": "Loose comparison / JWT confusion / OAuth misconfig — account takeover class." },
-    { "cwe": "CWE-798", "name": "Hardcoded Credentials", "rank": 12, "saturated": false, "pattern": "hardcoded_secret", "payout_min": 500, "payout_max": 10000, "notes": "Committed keys are common in JS bundles + .git history; prove the key is ACTIVE." },
-    { "cwe": "CWE-22", "name": "Path Traversal / LFI", "rank": 13, "saturated": true, "pattern": "path_confusion", "payout_min": 500, "payout_max": 5000, "notes": "Saturated; value only when it chains to RCE (log poisoning, session files)." },
-    { "cwe": "CWE-601", "name": "Open Redirect", "rank": 14, "saturated": true, "pattern": "oauth_misconfig", "payout_min": 100, "payout_max": 1500, "notes": "Standalone is usually N/A; value only chained into OAuth/token theft." },
-    { "cwe": "CWE-352", "name": "Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)", "rank": 15, "saturated": true, "pattern": "missing_nonce", "payout_min": 100, "payout_max": 2000, "notes": "Saturated + low; only for high-impact state changes (password/email/transfer)." },
-    { "cwe": "CWE-200", "name": "Information Exposure", "rank": 16, "saturated": true, "pattern": "hardcoded_secret", "payout_min": 100, "payout_max": 2000, "notes": "Excessive data exposure / verbose errors; usually a chain enabler, not a standalone bounty." },
-    { "cwe": "CWE-400", "name": "Denial of Service / rate-limit", "rank": 17, "saturated": true, "pattern": null, "payout_min": 100, "payout_max": 1000, "notes": "Usually out of scope standalone; relevant only for business-critical flows." }
+    {
+      "cwe": "CWE-79",
+      "name": "Cross-site Scripting (XSS)",
+      "rank": 1,
+      "saturated": true,
+      "pattern": "xss",
+      "payout_min": 100,
+      "payout_max": 2500,
+      "notes": "Most-reported class; heavily automated and low-paying \u2014 hunt only for high-impact variants (stored/account-takeover)."
+    },
+    {
+      "cwe": "CWE-862",
+      "name": "Missing Authorization / IDOR",
+      "rank": 2,
+      "saturated": false,
+      "pattern": "missing_authz",
+      "payout_min": 1000,
+      "payout_max": 10000,
+      "notes": "~30% of paid access-control bugs; sibling rule + two-account test are the highest-ROI moves."
+    },
+    {
+      "cwe": "CWE-284",
+      "name": "Improper Access Control (priv-esc)",
+      "rank": 3,
+      "saturated": false,
+      "pattern": "priv_esc",
+      "payout_min": 1000,
+      "payout_max": 15000,
+      "notes": "Role/privilege escalation; mass assignment + forced membership are under-hunted."
+    },
+    {
+      "cwe": "CWE-89",
+      "name": "SQL Injection",
+      "rank": 4,
+      "saturated": false,
+      "pattern": "sql_injection",
+      "payout_min": 1000,
+      "payout_max": 15000,
+      "notes": "Still high-value where it reaches a real query; WAF bypass + second-order matter."
+    },
+    {
+      "cwe": "CWE-918",
+      "name": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)",
+      "rank": 5,
+      "saturated": false,
+      "pattern": "ssrf",
+      "payout_min": 1000,
+      "payout_max": 15000,
+      "notes": "P1 when it hits cloud metadata; proof = internal response or OOB callback."
+    },
+    {
+      "cwe": "CWE-78",
+      "name": "OS Command Injection",
+      "rank": 6,
+      "saturated": false,
+      "pattern": "command_injection",
+      "payout_min": 1000,
+      "payout_max": 15000,
+      "notes": "Critical class; less common than XSS/SQLi but very high impact."
+    },
+    {
+      "cwe": "CWE-502",
+      "name": "Insecure Deserialization",
+      "rank": 7,
+      "saturated": false,
+      "pattern": "deserialization",
+      "payout_min": 5000,
+      "payout_max": 30000,
+      "notes": "Highest per-finding payout; needs a gadget chain but very rewarded."
+    },
+    {
+      "cwe": "CWE-94",
+      "name": "Code Injection / eval",
+      "rank": 8,
+      "saturated": false,
+      "pattern": "command_injection",
+      "payout_min": 1000,
+      "payout_max": 15000,
+      "notes": "eval/exec with user input; folds into RCE umbrella."
+    },
+    {
+      "cwe": "CWE-434",
+      "name": "Unrestricted File Upload",
+      "rank": 9,
+      "saturated": false,
+      "pattern": "file_upload",
+      "payout_min": 1000,
+      "payout_max": 10000,
+      "notes": "Upload \u2192 RCE chains pay well; confirm the file actually executes."
+    },
+    {
+      "cwe": "CWE-611",
+      "name": "XML External Entity (XXE)",
+      "rank": 10,
+      "saturated": false,
+      "pattern": "xxe",
+      "payout_min": 1000,
+      "payout_max": 10000,
+      "notes": "Less common post-2020 but still found in SOAP/XML upload flows."
+    },
+    {
+      "cwe": "CWE-287",
+      "name": "Authentication Bypass",
+      "rank": 11,
+      "saturated": false,
+      "pattern": "type_juggling",
+      "payout_min": 1000,
+      "payout_max": 15000,
+      "notes": "Loose comparison / JWT confusion / OAuth misconfig \u2014 account takeover class."
+    },
+    {
+      "cwe": "CWE-798",
+      "name": "Hardcoded Credentials",
+      "rank": 12,
+      "saturated": false,
+      "pattern": "hardcoded_secret",
+      "payout_min": 500,
+      "payout_max": 10000,
+      "notes": "Committed keys are common in JS bundles + .git history; prove the key is ACTIVE."
+    },
+    {
+      "cwe": "CWE-22",
+      "name": "Path Traversal / LFI",
+      "rank": 13,
+      "saturated": true,
+      "pattern": "path_confusion",
+      "payout_min": 500,
+      "payout_max": 5000,
+      "notes": "Saturated; value only when it chains to RCE (log poisoning, session files)."
+    },
+    {
+      "cwe": "CWE-601",
+      "name": "Open Redirect",
+      "rank": 14,
+      "saturated": true,
+      "pattern": "oauth_misconfig",
+      "payout_min": 100,
+      "payout_max": 1500,
+      "notes": "Standalone is usually N/A; value only chained into OAuth/token theft."
+    },
+    {
+      "cwe": "CWE-352",
+      "name": "Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)",
+      "rank": 15,
+      "saturated": true,
+      "pattern": "missing_nonce",
+      "payout_min": 100,
+      "payout_max": 2000,
+      "notes": "Saturated + low; only for high-impact state changes (password/email/transfer)."
+    },
+    {
+      "cwe": "CWE-200",
+      "name": "Information Exposure",
+      "rank": 16,
+      "saturated": true,
+      "pattern": "hardcoded_secret",
+      "payout_min": 100,
+      "payout_max": 2000,
+      "notes": "Excessive data exposure / verbose errors; usually a chain enabler, not a standalone bounty."
+    },
+    {
+      "cwe": "CWE-400",
+      "name": "Denial of Service / rate-limit",
+      "rank": 17,
+      "saturated": true,
+      "pattern": null,
+      "payout_min": 100,
+      "payout_max": 1000,
+      "notes": "Usually out of scope standalone; relevant only for business-critical flows."
+    }
   ],
   "cve_watchlist": [
-    { "cve": "CVE-2021-44228", "name": "Log4Shell", "product": "Apache Log4j 2", "class": "RCE", "payout_hint": "critical" },
-    { "cve": "CVE-2022-22965", "name": "Spring4Shell", "product": "Spring Framework", "class": "RCE", "payout_hint": "critical" },
-    { "cve": "CVE-2021-41773", "name": "Apache path traversal", "product": "Apache httpd 2.4.49", "class": "Path traversal / RCE", "payout_hint": "high" },
-    { "cve": "CVE-2023-22518", "name": "Confluence auth bypass", "product": "Atlassian Confluence", "class": "Auth bypass", "payout_hint": "high" },
-    { "cve": "CVE-2024-27198", "name": "TeamCity auth bypass", "product": "JetBrains TeamCity", "class": "Auth bypass / RCE", "payout_hint": "high" },
-    { "cve": "CVE-2023-34362", "name": "MOVEit SQLi", "product": "Progress MOVEit", "class": "SQL injection", "payout_hint": "critical" },
-    { "cve": "CVE-2022-42475", "name": "Fortinet SSL-VPN", "product": "FortiOS", "class": "RCE", "payout_hint": "critical" },
-    { "cve": "CVE-2023-27997", "name": "Fortinet SSL-VPN pre-auth", "product": "FortiOS", "class": "RCE", "payout_hint": "critical" },
-    { "cve": "CVE-2024-6387", "name": "regreSSHion", "product": "OpenSSH", "class": "RCE (race)", "payout_hint": "critical" }
+    {
+      "cve": "CVE-2021-26084",
+      "name": "Confluence OGNL injection RCE",
+      "product": "Atlassian Confluence",
+      "class": "rce",
+      "epss": 1.0,
+      "reports": 2669,
+      "fingerprint": "Confluence (Server/Data Center) \u2014 /login.action, confluence headers"
+    },
+    {
+      "cve": "CVE-2025-29927",
+      "name": "Next.js middleware auth bypass",
+      "product": "Next.js",
+      "class": "auth_bypass",
+      "epss": 0.9962,
+      "reports": 132,
+      "fingerprint": "_next/static/chunks/ bundles; x-middleware-subrequest header"
+    },
+    {
+      "cve": "CVE-2025-55182",
+      "name": "Next.js RSC pre-auth RCE (deserialization)",
+      "product": "Next.js / React Server Components",
+      "class": "rce",
+      "epss": 0.9956,
+      "reports": 415,
+      "fingerprint": "_next/ + Server Function / flight endpoints"
+    },
+    {
+      "cve": "CVE-2025-3248",
+      "name": "Langflow unauth code injection",
+      "product": "Langflow",
+      "class": "rce",
+      "epss": 0.9997,
+      "reports": 29,
+      "fingerprint": "/api/v1/validate/code \u2014 AI/agent tooling"
+    },
+    {
+      "cve": "CVE-2024-34351",
+      "name": "Next.js Server Actions SSRF",
+      "product": "Next.js",
+      "class": "ssrf",
+      "epss": 0.0545,
+      "reports": 50,
+      "fingerprint": "Next.js Server Actions (Host header + relative redirect)"
+    },
+    {
+      "cve": "CVE-2025-0133",
+      "name": "PAN-OS GlobalProtect portal XSS",
+      "product": "Palo Alto PAN-OS",
+      "class": "xss",
+      "epss": 0.4352,
+      "reports": 1990,
+      "fingerprint": "GlobalProtect captive portal"
+    },
+    {
+      "cve": "CVE-2026-0257",
+      "name": "PAN-OS GlobalProtect auth bypass",
+      "product": "Palo Alto PAN-OS / Prisma",
+      "class": "auth_bypass",
+      "epss": 0.8668,
+      "reports": 27,
+      "fingerprint": "GlobalProtect portal/gateway"
+    },
+    {
+      "cve": "CVE-2025-4123",
+      "name": "Grafana XSS \u2192 SSRF chain",
+      "product": "Grafana",
+      "class": "xss",
+      "epss": 0.9781,
+      "reports": 220,
+      "fingerprint": "Grafana path traversal + open redirect (Image Renderer)"
+    },
+    {
+      "cve": "CVE-2021-20323",
+      "name": "Keycloak reflected XSS (POST)",
+      "product": "Keycloak (Red Hat)",
+      "class": "xss",
+      "epss": 0.3725,
+      "reports": 107,
+      "fingerprint": "Keycloak auth flows"
+    },
+    {
+      "cve": "CVE-2018-5230",
+      "name": "Jira issue collector XSS",
+      "product": "Atlassian Jira",
+      "class": "xss",
+      "epss": 0.3761,
+      "reports": 4694,
+      "fingerprint": "Jira /issuecollector custom fields"
+    },
+    {
+      "cve": "CVE-2026-33461",
+      "name": "Kibana Fleet endpoint authz (key/token leak)",
+      "product": "Elastic Kibana",
+      "class": "auth_bypass",
+      "epss": 0.0028,
+      "reports": 8,
+      "fingerprint": "Kibana internal Fleet endpoints"
+    },
+    {
+      "cve": "CVE-2026-49093",
+      "name": "Kibana egress connector SSRF",
+      "product": "Elastic Kibana",
+      "class": "ssrf",
+      "epss": 0.002,
+      "reports": 5,
+      "fingerprint": "Kibana connectors / allowlist bypass"
+    },
+    {
+      "cve": "CVE-2026-26938",
+      "name": "Kibana Workflows template injection \u2192 file read/SSRF",
+      "product": "Elastic Kibana",
+      "class": "ssti",
+      "epss": 0.0025,
+      "reports": 5,
+      "fingerprint": "Kibana Workflows"
+    },
+    {
+      "cve": "CVE-2026-33068",
+      "name": "Claude Code bypassPermissions via .claude/settings.json",
+      "product": "Claude Code",
+      "class": "priv_esc",
+      "epss": 0.0034,
+      "reports": 5,
+      "fingerprint": "repo .claude/settings.json"
+    },
+    {
+      "cve": "CVE-2025-25297",
+      "name": "Label Studio S3 endpoint SSRF",
+      "product": "Label Studio",
+      "class": "ssrf",
+      "epss": 0.0062,
+      "reports": 2,
+      "fingerprint": "Label Studio S3 integration"
+    },
+    {
+      "cve": "CVE-2026-33309",
+      "name": "Langflow arbitrary file write \u2192 RCE",
+      "product": "Langflow",
+      "class": "file_upload",
+      "epss": 0.0142,
+      "reports": 6,
+      "fingerprint": "Langflow multipart upload filename"
+    },
+    {
+      "cve": "CVE-2026-45543",
+      "name": "Nextcloud Forms collaborator read retention",
+      "product": "Nextcloud Forms",
+      "class": "missing_authz",
+      "epss": 0.0027,
+      "reports": 5,
+      "fingerprint": "Nextcloud Forms collaborator removal"
+    },
+    {
+      "cve": "CVE-2017-15277",
+      "name": "ImageMagick GIF palette memory leak",
+      "product": "ImageMagick / GraphicsMagick",
+      "class": "infoleak",
+      "epss": 0.1919,
+      "reports": 5914,
+      "fingerprint": "image processing (GIF upload)"
+    }
   ]
-}
+}

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "blitzstrike",
-  "version": "2.4.95",
+  "version": "2.4.97",
   "description": "Blitz Strike — a universal MCP security-audit toolbelt. BLITZ sweeps the attack surface, EAGLE-EYE traces source-to-sink, STRIKE verifies live. 57 attack chains, 130-tool catalog, intelligence data layer. One server, every agent.",
   "type": "module",
   "bin": {