blitzstrike 2.4.91 → 2.4.93

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -5,6 +5,35 @@ All notable changes to Blitz Strike are documented here.
 The format follows [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.0.0/),
 and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/).
 
+## [2.4.93] — 2026-09-17
+
+### Fixed — reproducible verify harness (flaky wordlist test)
+
+- The `crack: wordlist autoload` check depended on rockyou.txt/seclists being
+  installed at `/usr/share/wordlists/` (absent on minimal hosts), so `blitzstrike
+  verify` was not reproducible. Now uses a bundled `test/fixtures/wordlist.txt` via
+  the `opts.wordlist` argument — deterministic, no external wordlist required.
+
+## [2.4.92] — 2026-09-17
+
+### Fixed — interconnection audit (grounding gaps + reversed PoC semantics)
+
+- `command_injection` was UNGROUNDED: emitted by the taint engine + used in auto-poc
+  and attack_plan, but had no pattern/CWE/severity/alias. Added the full pattern
+  (CWE-78, chain `command_injection_os_cmd`, payout $1K–$15K, bypass + crown-jewels),
+  a severity VRT entry (P1/critical), and synonyms (command injection / os command
+  injection / command execution / cmd injection / rce / code execution / code
+  injection / eval injection).
+- Foundry PoC templates now use consistent POSITIVE semantics (a passing PoC = the
+  bug is PRESENT): `missing_access_control` asserted the secure outcome (backwards) —
+  now `assertGt(balanceOf(attacker), 0)`; `address_zero_check` now asserts the zero
+  address IS accepted; `signature_replay` / `delegatecall_user_input` /
+  `unchecked_arithmetic` / `timestamp_dependence` flipped from `vm.expectRevert()`
+  (secure-behavior) to asserting the exploit outcome.
+- verify.ts: pattern-grounding check changed from exact count equality (patterns ==
+  detector types) to a subset invariant (every detector type grounded), so extra
+  classes like command_injection don't fail it.
+
 ## [2.4.91] — 2026-09-17
 
 ### Added — Foundry runner (execute Web3 PoC to PROVE a finding)

package/dist/index.js

@@ -34453,6 +34453,16 @@ var ALIASES = {
   ssti: "ssti",
   "template injection": "ssti",
   "server side template injection": "ssti",
+  "command injection": "command_injection",
+  "os command injection": "command_injection",
+  "command execution": "command_injection",
+  "cmd injection": "command_injection",
+  rce: "command_injection",
+  "remote code execution": "command_injection",
+  "code execution": "command_injection",
+  "code injection": "command_injection",
+  "eval injection": "command_injection",
+  "arbitrary code execution": "command_injection",
   xxe: "xxe",
   "xml external entity": "xxe",
   "xxe injection": "xxe",
@@ -59026,6 +59036,7 @@ function hackbotArenaCoverage() {
 var VRT_MAP = {
   sql_injection: { vrt: "injection > sql_injection", priority: "P1", severity: "critical", rationale: "SQL injection reaches sensitive data or enables admin takeover." },
   ssti: { vrt: "injection > server_side_template_injection", priority: "P1", severity: "critical", rationale: "SSTI evaluates expressions server-side → code execution." },
+  command_injection: { vrt: "injection > os_command_injection", priority: "P1", severity: "critical", rationale: "User input reaches a shell (system/exec/popen) → arbitrary command execution, full host takeover." },
   deserialization: { vrt: "injection > insecure_deserialization", priority: "P1", severity: "critical", rationale: "Deserialization escalated via a gadget chain → code execution." },
   xxe: { vrt: "injection > xml_external_entity", priority: "P1", severity: "critical", rationale: "XXE reads local files or reaches internal services." },
   file_upload: { vrt: "insecure_design > unrestricted_file_upload", priority: "P1", severity: "critical", rationale: "A web-reachable uploaded file of an executable type → code execution." },
@@ -60748,9 +60759,11 @@ contract ReentrantAttacker {
         assertFalse(ok, "call should fail");
     }`,
     unchecked_arithmetic: `    function testUncheckedArithmetic() public {
+        uint256 before = target.counter();
         // trigger the wrap that the unchecked block allowed
-        vm.expectRevert(); // replace with a concrete overflow/underflow assertion
         target.triggerOverflow();
+        // the bug is PRESENT when the value wrapped (became smaller):
+        assertLt(target.counter(), before, "unchecked arithmetic wrapped");
     }`,
     tx_origin_auth: `    function testTxOriginAuth() public {
         // a malicious intermediary makes the victim (tx.origin) call the target
@@ -60769,13 +60782,13 @@ contract Phisher {
         // replay the same signature on a second chain / a second time
         (uint8 v, bytes32 r, bytes32 s) = vm.sign(attackerPk, digest);
         target.claim(attacker, 1 ether, deadline, v, r, s);
-        // replay it — should revert if nonce/chainId bound
-        vm.expectRevert();
+        // the bug is PRESENT when the SAME signature replays (no nonce/chainId binding):
         target.claim(attacker, 1 ether, deadline, v, r, s);
+        assertGt(target.balanceOf(attacker), 1 ether, "signature replayed");
     }`,
     unprotected_selfdestruct: `    function testUnprotectedSelfdestruct() public {
         vm.prank(attacker);
-        target.kill(); // should revert — only owner may selfdestruct
+        target.kill(); // the bug is PRESENT when a non-owner can destroy it
         assertEq(address(target).code.length, 0, "contract destroyed by non-owner");
     }`,
     delegatecall_user_input: `    function testDelegatecallUserInput() public {
@@ -60783,8 +60796,9 @@ contract Phisher {
         Evil impl = new Evil();
         vm.prank(attacker);
         target.setImplementation(address(impl));
-        vm.expectRevert();
+        // the bug is PRESENT when the attacker-supplied implementation actually ran:
         target.exec();
+        assertEq(address(target).code.length, 0, "attacker implementation executed");
     }
 }
 
@@ -60793,13 +60807,16 @@ contract Evil {
 }`,
     missing_access_control: `    function testMissingAccessControl() public {
         vm.prank(attacker);
-        target.mint(attacker, 1_000_000 ether); // should require owner
-        assertEq(target.balanceOf(attacker), 0, "attacker minted without auth");
+        target.mint(attacker, 1_000_000 ether); // no owner check
+        // the bug is PRESENT when the attacker's mint actually lands:
+        assertGt(target.balanceOf(attacker), 0, "attacker minted without auth");
     }`,
     timestamp_dependence: `    function testTimestampDependence() public {
         // warp the timestamp to a favorable value and observe the payout/randomness
         vm.warp(block.timestamp + 1000);
         target.resolve();
+        // the bug is PRESENT when the timestamp change altered the outcome:
+        assertTrue(/* favorable outcome observed */, "timestamp dependence exploited");
     }`,
     oracle_manipulation: `    function testOracleManipulation() public {
         // swap a large amount to move the spot price, then exploit the target
@@ -60820,10 +60837,9 @@ contract Evil {
         assertEq(a, b, "abi.encodePacked collision");
     }`,
     address_zero_check: `    function testAddressZeroCheck() public {
-        // assign the zero address as owner — should revert
-        vm.expectRevert();
+        // the bug is PRESENT when the zero address is accepted as owner:
         target.setOwner(address(0));
-        assertTrue(target.owner() != address(0), "zero address became owner");
+        assertEq(target.owner(), address(0), "zero address became owner");
     }`
   };
   return base + (exploit[cls] ?? exploit.missing_access_control) + `

package/intelligence/patterns.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "$schema": "blitzstrike-patterns-v1",
   "version": "1.1.0",
-  "_comment": "Empirical grounding layer. Every detector type is traced to its real-world bug class (CWE), its real-world signature, the chains it composes into (cross-ref chains.json), citable references, per-class bypass techniques, and the high-value assets (crown jewels) that class typically hits. Detection is derived from this data, never hardcoded. References are public standards (CWE/OWASP) and disclosed-report classes — no vendor/product framing.",
+  "_comment": "Empirical grounding layer. Every detector type is traced to its real-world bug class (CWE), its real-world signature, the chains it composes into (cross-ref chains.json), citable references, per-class bypass techniques, and the high-value assets (crown jewels) that class typically hits. Detection is derived from this data, never hardcoded. References are public standards (CWE/OWASP) and disclosed-report classes \u2014 no vendor/product framing.",
   "patterns": [
     {
       "id": "sql_injection",
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@
       ],
       "payout_min": 1000,
       "payout_max": 15000,
-      "typical_payout": "$1K–$15K"
+      "typical_payout": "$1K\u2013$15K"
     },
     {
       "id": "ssrf",
@@ -73,13 +73,13 @@
       ],
       "payout_min": 1000,
       "payout_max": 15000,
-      "typical_payout": "$1K–$15K"
+      "typical_payout": "$1K\u2013$15K"
     },
     {
       "id": "ssti",
       "name": "Server-Side Template Injection",
       "cwe": "CWE-1336",
-      "real_world": "User input reaches a template engine (Jinja2, Twig, Freemarker, ERB, …) that evaluates expressions, yielding code execution via template syntax like {{7*7}}.",
+      "real_world": "User input reaches a template engine (Jinja2, Twig, Freemarker, ERB, \u2026) that evaluates expressions, yielding code execution via template syntax like {{7*7}}.",
       "detection_signatures": [
         "template render of request input",
         "expression evaluation in a template engine"
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@
         "sandbox escape via attribute/object introspection",
         "unicode/alternate delimiter to dodge input filters",
         "chaining globals/locals to reach builtins",
-        "engine-specific escapes (Jinja2 → Python, Twig → PHP)"
+        "engine-specific escapes (Jinja2 \u2192 Python, Twig \u2192 PHP)"
       ],
       "crown_jewels": [
         "direct RCE",
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@
       ],
       "payout_min": 2000,
       "payout_max": 10000,
-      "typical_payout": "$2K–$10K"
+      "typical_payout": "$2K\u2013$10K"
     },
     {
       "id": "xxe",
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@
       ],
       "payout_min": 1000,
       "payout_max": 10000,
-      "typical_payout": "$1K–$10K"
+      "typical_payout": "$1K\u2013$10K"
     },
     {
       "id": "deserialization",
@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@
       ],
       "payout_min": 5000,
       "payout_max": 30000,
-      "typical_payout": "$5K–$30K"
+      "typical_payout": "$5K\u2013$30K"
     },
     {
       "id": "type_juggling",
@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@
         "OWASP A07:2021 Identification and Authentication Failures"
       ],
       "bypass_techniques": [
-        "0e magic hashes (0e1234… == 0e5678…)",
+        "0e magic hashes (0e1234\u2026 == 0e5678\u2026)",
         "numeric-string coercion (\"1admin\" == 1)",
         "array comparison (array() == false)",
         "null/empty-string coercion"
@@ -200,7 +200,7 @@
       ],
       "payout_min": 500,
       "payout_max": 5000,
-      "typical_payout": "$500–$5K"
+      "typical_payout": "$500\u2013$5K"
     },
     {
       "id": "mass_assignment",
@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@
       ],
       "payout_min": 500,
       "payout_max": 5000,
-      "typical_payout": "$500–$5K"
+      "typical_payout": "$500\u2013$5K"
     },
     {
       "id": "prototype_pollution",
@@ -262,7 +262,7 @@
       ],
       "payout_min": 1000,
       "payout_max": 10000,
-      "typical_payout": "$1K–$10K"
+      "typical_payout": "$1K\u2013$10K"
     },
     {
       "id": "crlf_injection",
@@ -286,13 +286,13 @@
         "header smuggling via folded headers"
       ],
       "crown_jewels": [
-        "Set-Cookie injection → session fixation",
-        "response splitting → XSS",
-        "cache poisoning → stored XSS"
+        "Set-Cookie injection \u2192 session fixation",
+        "response splitting \u2192 XSS",
+        "cache poisoning \u2192 stored XSS"
       ],
       "payout_min": 300,
       "payout_max": 3000,
-      "typical_payout": "$300–$3K"
+      "typical_payout": "$300\u2013$3K"
     },
     {
       "id": "path_confusion",
@@ -327,7 +327,7 @@
       ],
       "payout_min": 1000,
       "payout_max": 10000,
-      "typical_payout": "$1K–$10K"
+      "typical_payout": "$1K\u2013$10K"
     },
     {
       "id": "wrong_sanitizer",
@@ -355,7 +355,7 @@
       ],
       "payout_min": 300,
       "payout_max": 3000,
-      "typical_payout": "$300–$3K"
+      "typical_payout": "$300\u2013$3K"
     },
     {
       "id": "missing_authz",
@@ -388,7 +388,7 @@
       ],
       "payout_min": 1000,
       "payout_max": 10000,
-      "typical_payout": "$1K–$10K",
+      "typical_payout": "$1K\u2013$10K",
       "validation": [
         "Two-account test: attacker account A reads victim account B's object (A's token + B's id -> B's data). A single self-account test does not prove IDOR."
       ]
@@ -421,7 +421,7 @@
       ],
       "payout_min": 300,
       "payout_max": 3000,
-      "typical_payout": "$300–$3K"
+      "typical_payout": "$300\u2013$3K"
     },
     {
       "id": "file_upload",
@@ -455,7 +455,7 @@
       ],
       "payout_min": 500,
       "payout_max": 10000,
-      "typical_payout": "$500–$10K"
+      "typical_payout": "$500\u2013$10K"
     },
     {
       "id": "priv_esc",
@@ -487,7 +487,7 @@
       ],
       "payout_min": 1000,
       "payout_max": 10000,
-      "typical_payout": "$1K–$10K"
+      "typical_payout": "$1K\u2013$10K"
     },
     {
       "id": "hardcoded_secret",
@@ -496,7 +496,7 @@
       "real_world": "A secret (API key, database password, access token, private key) is committed in source, exposing it to anyone with repo access. Real disclosures regularly turn a leaked key into account takeover or cloud compromise.",
       "detection_signatures": [
         "secret field assigned a literal",
-        "known secret format (JWT/AWS/GitHub/Slack/…) in source",
+        "known secret format (JWT/AWS/GitHub/Slack/\u2026) in source",
         "high-entropy token under a non-obvious name"
       ],
       "chain_templates": [
@@ -522,7 +522,7 @@
       ],
       "payout_min": 500,
       "payout_max": 10000,
-      "typical_payout": "$500–$10K"
+      "typical_payout": "$500\u2013$10K"
     },
     {
       "id": "llm_injection",
@@ -551,13 +551,13 @@
         "privileged actions (email/send/pay) gated on model output"
       ],
       "validation": [
-        "RUN-TWICE RULE — the extraction/injection must reproduce token-for-token across two fresh sessions (filter out model confabulation)",
-        "NON-GUESSABLE ANCHOR — it must leak an actual verifiable internal key, endpoint URL, or cross-tenant data, not a plausible guess",
-        "OOB PROOF — tool-use or markdown exfiltration must produce a verifiable callback log on your listener"
+        "RUN-TWICE RULE \u2014 the extraction/injection must reproduce token-for-token across two fresh sessions (filter out model confabulation)",
+        "NON-GUESSABLE ANCHOR \u2014 it must leak an actual verifiable internal key, endpoint URL, or cross-tenant data, not a plausible guess",
+        "OOB PROOF \u2014 tool-use or markdown exfiltration must produce a verifiable callback log on your listener"
       ],
       "payout_min": 500,
       "payout_max": 10000,
-      "typical_payout": "$500–$10K"
+      "typical_payout": "$500\u2013$10K"
     },
     {
       "id": "graphql_exposure",
@@ -587,7 +587,7 @@
       ],
       "payout_min": 500,
       "payout_max": 5000,
-      "typical_payout": "$500–$5K"
+      "typical_payout": "$500\u2013$5K"
     },
     {
       "id": "oauth_misconfig",
@@ -619,7 +619,7 @@
       ],
       "payout_min": 500,
       "payout_max": 5000,
-      "typical_payout": "$500–$5K"
+      "typical_payout": "$500\u2013$5K"
     },
     {
       "id": "grpc_reflection",
@@ -645,7 +645,7 @@
       ],
       "payout_min": 200,
       "payout_max": 2000,
-      "typical_payout": "$200–$2K"
+      "typical_payout": "$200\u2013$2K"
     },
     {
       "id": "dependency_confusion",
@@ -674,12 +674,12 @@
       ],
       "payout_min": 1000,
       "payout_max": 20000,
-      "typical_payout": "$1K–$20K"
+      "typical_payout": "$1K\u2013$20K"
     },
     {
       "id": "ml_supply_chain",
       "cwe": "CWE-502",
-      "real_world": "A poisoned model file (pickle) hosted at a URL or uploaded by a user is loaded via torch.load/joblib.load without the safe flag → arbitrary code execution on load.",
+      "real_world": "A poisoned model file (pickle) hosted at a URL or uploaded by a user is loaded via torch.load/joblib.load without the safe flag \u2192 arbitrary code execution on load.",
       "detection_signatures": [
         "torch.load(...) without weights_only=True",
         "joblib.load(...) / keras.models.load_model(...) / np.load(...allow_pickle=True) on an untrusted path/URL"
@@ -702,7 +702,7 @@
       ],
       "payout_min": 1000,
       "payout_max": 20000,
-      "typical_payout": "$1K–$20K"
+      "typical_payout": "$1K\u2013$20K"
     },
     {
       "id": "rust_unsafe",
@@ -720,7 +720,7 @@
         "CWE-119",
         "CWE-787",
         "CWE-416",
-        "Rust Foundation — Unsafe Rust in the Wild",
+        "Rust Foundation \u2014 Unsafe Rust in the Wild",
         "guardsarm/rust-memory-safety-examples",
         "doc.rust-lang.org/rustc/exploit-mitigations.html"
       ],
@@ -737,12 +737,12 @@
       ],
       "payout_min": 500,
       "payout_max": 10000,
-      "typical_payout": "$500–$10K"
+      "typical_payout": "$500\u2013$10K"
     },
     {
       "id": "rust_format_string",
       "cwe": "CWE-134",
-      "real_world": "A server logs or prints a user-supplied string as the format argument — println!(user_input) — so the attacker's format specifiers (positional args, width/precision) read or corrupt memory.",
+      "real_world": "A server logs or prints a user-supplied string as the format argument \u2014 println!(user_input) \u2014 so the attacker's format specifiers (positional args, width/precision) read or corrupt memory.",
       "detection_signatures": [
         "format!(var) / println!(var) / print!(var) / eprintln!(var) with a VARIABLE as the format string (not a literal)"
       ],
@@ -751,7 +751,7 @@
         "CWE-134",
         "OWASP WSTG-INPV-13 Format String Injection",
         "yevh/rust-security-handbook (injection attack prevention)",
-        "StackHawk — Rust command injection examples"
+        "StackHawk \u2014 Rust command injection examples"
       ],
       "bypass_techniques": [
         "width/precision specifiers to read past the intended argument",
@@ -765,7 +765,7 @@
       ],
       "payout_min": 500,
       "payout_max": 5000,
-      "typical_payout": "$500–$5K"
+      "typical_payout": "$500\u2013$5K"
     },
     {
       "id": "jwt_alg_confusion",
@@ -802,7 +802,7 @@
       ],
       "payout_min": 1000,
       "payout_max": 10000,
-      "typical_payout": "$1K–$10K"
+      "typical_payout": "$1K\u2013$10K"
     },
     {
       "id": "cache_deception",
@@ -815,7 +815,7 @@
       ],
       "references": [
         "CWE-525",
-        "Omer Gil — Web Cache Deception Attack",
+        "Omer Gil \u2014 Web Cache Deception Attack",
         "OWASP WSTG-ATHN-03"
       ],
       "real_world": "A reverse proxy caches static-extension URLs (.css/.js/.png) with a cache key that omits the session cookie, while a backend route (often a greedy regex like /account(/.*)?) serves per-session private data for those URLs. An attacker submits a victim-visited URL, the bot's private response is cached, then re-fetched anonymously.",
@@ -839,7 +839,7 @@
       ],
       "payout_min": 1000,
       "payout_max": 10000,
-      "typical_payout": "$1K–$10K"
+      "typical_payout": "$1K\u2013$10K"
     },
     {
       "id": "cors_misconfiguration",
@@ -854,7 +854,7 @@
       "references": [
         "CWE-942",
         "OWASP WSTG-CLNT-01",
-        "PortSwigger — CORS vulnerability with basic origin reflection"
+        "PortSwigger \u2014 CORS vulnerability with basic origin reflection"
       ],
       "real_world": "A server echoes the request Origin header into Access-Control-Allow-Origin while also sending Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true. Any website the victim visits can then make credentialed requests and read the victim's authenticated responses cross-origin (session theft, account data exfil).",
       "detection_signatures": [
@@ -878,7 +878,7 @@
       ],
       "payout_min": 500,
       "payout_max": 5000,
-      "typical_payout": "$500–$5K"
+      "typical_payout": "$500\u2013$5K"
     },
     {
       "id": "xss",
@@ -892,7 +892,7 @@
       "references": [
         "CWE-79",
         "OWASP WSTG-INPV-02",
-        "PortSwigger — DOM-based XSS"
+        "PortSwigger \u2014 DOM-based XSS"
       ],
       "real_world": "A DOM sink (innerHTML, document.write, dangerouslySetInnerHTML, jQuery .html(), eval) is fed user-controlled input without sanitization/encoding. The injected script runs in the victim's origin, stealing cookies, hijacking the session, or exfiltrating data.",
       "detection_signatures": [
@@ -915,14 +915,14 @@
       ],
       "payout_min": 500,
       "payout_max": 5000,
-      "typical_payout": "$500–$5K"
+      "typical_payout": "$500\u2013$5K"
     },
     {
       "id": "subdomain_takeover",
       "name": "Subdomain Takeover",
       "cwe": "CWE-404",
       "severity": "high",
-      "signature": "a DNS CNAME/AliasTarget points at a service that can be claimed by an attacker (GitHub Pages/S3/Heroku/…)",
+      "signature": "a DNS CNAME/AliasTarget points at a service that can be claimed by an attacker (GitHub Pages/S3/Heroku/\u2026)",
       "chains": [
         "subdomain_takeover",
         "subdomain_takeover_to_cookie_theft"
@@ -932,9 +932,9 @@
         "OWASP WSTG-CONFIG-10",
         "Can I Take Over XYZ (EdOverflow)"
       ],
-      "real_world": "A dangling DNS record (CNAME/AliasTarget) points to a service the org no longer owns (e.g. a deleted GitHub Pages repo, S3 bucket, or Heroku app). An attacker re-registers that name and serves arbitrary content from the victim's subdomain — phishing, cookie theft via a parent-domain cookie, and same-origin attacks.",
+      "real_world": "A dangling DNS record (CNAME/AliasTarget) points to a service the org no longer owns (e.g. a deleted GitHub Pages repo, S3 bucket, or Heroku app). An attacker re-registers that name and serves arbitrary content from the victim's subdomain \u2014 phishing, cookie theft via a parent-domain cookie, and same-origin attacks.",
       "detection_signatures": [
-        "CNAME/AliasTarget/DNSName -> *.github.io / *.herokuapp.com / *.amazonaws.com / …",
+        "CNAME/AliasTarget/DNSName -> *.github.io / *.herokuapp.com / *.amazonaws.com / \u2026",
         "aws_route53_record type=CNAME with an unclaimed service target"
       ],
       "chain_templates": [
@@ -952,7 +952,42 @@
       ],
       "payout_min": 500,
       "payout_max": 5000,
-      "typical_payout": "$500–$5K"
+      "typical_payout": "$500\u2013$5K"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "command_injection",
+      "name": "OS Command Injection",
+      "cwe": "CWE-78",
+      "real_world": "User input is interpolated into a shell command (system/exec/popen/subprocess) without argument escaping. Attackers append ; | && $(...) to run arbitrary commands, from id/whoami probes to full reverse shells.",
+      "detection_signatures": [
+        "raw input concatenated into a shell/exec sink",
+        "no escapeshellarg / argument-array / shlex.quote",
+        "user-controlled parameter into os.system / subprocess / exec"
+      ],
+      "chain_templates": [
+        "command_injection_os_cmd"
+      ],
+      "references": [
+        "CWE-78",
+        "OWASP A03:2021 Injection"
+      ],
+      "bypass_techniques": [
+        "command separators ; | && || for chained commands",
+        "$(...) and backtick substitution to bypass keyword filters",
+        "newline / IFS-based argument splitting",
+        "URL + hex encoding of payloads",
+        "base64-encode the payload, then decode + execute"
+      ],
+      "crown_jewels": [
+        "shell access (reverse shell / bind shell)",
+        "credential files (config, .env, id_rsa)",
+        "database dumps",
+        "internal network pivoting"
+      ],
+      "severity": "critical",
+      "payout_min": 1000,
+      "payout_max": 15000,
+      "typical_payout": "$1K\u2013$15K"
     }
   ]
 }

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "blitzstrike",
-  "version": "2.4.91",
+  "version": "2.4.93",
   "description": "Blitz Strike — a universal MCP security-audit toolbelt. BLITZ sweeps the attack surface, EAGLE-EYE traces source-to-sink, STRIKE verifies live. 57 attack chains, 130-tool catalog, intelligence data layer. One server, every agent.",
   "type": "module",
   "bin": {