blitzstrike 2.4.81 → 2.4.82

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -5,6 +5,20 @@ All notable changes to Blitz Strike are documented here.
 The format follows [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.0.0/),
 and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/).
 
+## [2.4.82] — 2026-09-17
+
+### Added — out-of-band (OOB) listener for blind vuln proof
+
+- New `oob_start` / `oob_poll` / `oob_stop` / `oob_list` tools give deterministic
+  proof for BLIND SSRF/XXE/SQLi/command-injection that never reflect in the HTTP
+  response. `oob_start` prefers the installed `interactsh-client` (unique *.oast.*
+  domain streaming DNS/HTTP interactions — the standard for public targets) and
+  falls back to a local HTTP listener for local labs. `oob_poll(id)` reports a hit
+  ONLY when an interaction for the session's unique id actually arrives. Handles
+  interactsh's ANSI-colored `[INF]` banner + JSONL interaction parsing.
+
+Competitive analysis source: Awarexone/Agentic-Bug-Hunter (interactsh OOB).
+
 ## [2.4.81] — 2026-09-17
 
 ### Added — impact-first prioritization via typical bounty payout

package/dist/index.js

@@ -17358,10 +17358,10 @@ var init_update = __esm(() => {
 });
 
 // src/release.ts
-import { readFileSync as readFileSync28, existsSync as existsSync14 } from "node:fs";
+import { readFileSync as readFileSync28, existsSync as existsSync15 } from "node:fs";
 import { join as join25 } from "node:path";
 import { fileURLToPath as fileURLToPath14 } from "node:url";
-import { execSync as execSync2 } from "node:child_process";
+import { execSync as execSync3 } from "node:child_process";
 function validateRelease() {
   const checks = [];
   checks.push({ name: "package.json version", ok: true, detail: VERSION });
@@ -17378,13 +17378,13 @@ function validateRelease() {
     checks.push({ name: "CHANGELOG version", ok: false, detail: "CHANGELOG.md not found" });
   }
   try {
-    const tag = execSync2("git describe --tags --abbrev=0", { cwd: ROOT8, encoding: "utf8", stdio: ["ignore", "pipe", "ignore"] }).trim();
+    const tag = execSync3("git describe --tags --abbrev=0", { cwd: ROOT8, encoding: "utf8", stdio: ["ignore", "pipe", "ignore"] }).trim();
     checks.push({ name: "Git tag", ok: tag === `v${VERSION}`, detail: tag, soft: true });
   } catch {
     checks.push({ name: "Git tag", ok: true, detail: "unavailable (no git/tags)", soft: true });
   }
   try {
-    const published = execSync2("npm view blitzstrike version", { encoding: "utf8", timeout: 8000, stdio: ["ignore", "pipe", "ignore"] }).trim();
+    const published = execSync3("npm view blitzstrike version", { encoding: "utf8", timeout: 8000, stdio: ["ignore", "pipe", "ignore"] }).trim();
     checks.push({ name: "npm registry version", ok: published === VERSION, detail: published, soft: true });
   } catch {
     checks.push({ name: "npm registry version", ok: true, detail: "unavailable (offline)", soft: true });
@@ -17398,7 +17398,7 @@ function validateRelease() {
   return { version: VERSION, checks, consistent: checks.filter((c) => !c.soft).every((c) => c.ok) };
 }
 function lockfilePresent() {
-  return existsSync14(join25(ROOT8, "package-lock.json")) || existsSync14(join25(ROOT8, "bun.lock")) || existsSync14(join25(ROOT8, "bun.lockb"));
+  return existsSync15(join25(ROOT8, "package-lock.json")) || existsSync15(join25(ROOT8, "bun.lock")) || existsSync15(join25(ROOT8, "bun.lockb"));
 }
 var ROOT8;
 var init_release = __esm(() => {
@@ -17440,7 +17440,7 @@ var init_dependency = __esm(() => {
 });
 
 // src/cli.ts
-import { readFileSync as readFileSync30, existsSync as existsSync15, writeFileSync as writeFileSync9, mkdirSync as mkdirSync10 } from "node:fs";
+import { readFileSync as readFileSync30, existsSync as existsSync16, writeFileSync as writeFileSync9, mkdirSync as mkdirSync10 } from "node:fs";
 import { join as join27, dirname as dirname6 } from "node:path";
 import { homedir as homedir11 } from "node:os";
 import { fileURLToPath as fileURLToPath16 } from "node:url";
@@ -17486,7 +17486,7 @@ async function runDoctor() {
     detail: h1 ? `X-HackerOne-Research: ${h1}` : "H1_USERNAME not set",
     fix: h1 ? undefined : "export H1_USERNAME=<your-hackerone-username> (adds X-HackerOne-Research to outbound requests)"
   });
-  const dataOk = existsSync15(join27(ROOT10, "chains.json")) && existsSync15(join27(ROOT10, "tools-catalog.json"));
+  const dataOk = existsSync16(join27(ROOT10, "chains.json")) && existsSync16(join27(ROOT10, "tools-catalog.json"));
   issues.push({
     name: "Data layers (chains + tools-catalog)",
     status: dataOk ? "ok" : "fail",
@@ -17538,14 +17538,14 @@ function resolveCommand() {
   if (which("blitzstrike"))
     return { command: "blitzstrike", args: ["serve", "--mcp"] };
   const src = join27(ROOT10, "src", "index.ts");
-  if (which("bun") && existsSync15(src))
+  if (which("bun") && existsSync16(src))
     return { command: "bun", args: ["run", src, "serve", "--mcp"] };
   if (which("npx"))
     return { command: "npx", args: ["-y", "blitzstrike", "serve", "--mcp"] };
   if (which("bunx"))
     return { command: "bunx", args: ["blitzstrike", "serve", "--mcp"] };
   const dist = join27(ROOT10, "dist", "index.js");
-  if (existsSync15(dist))
+  if (existsSync16(dist))
     return { command: "bun", args: [dist, "serve", "--mcp"] };
   return { command: "npx", args: ["-y", "blitzstrike", "serve", "--mcp"] };
 }
@@ -17559,7 +17559,7 @@ function readJson(p) {
 function jsonMcpServersWrite(p) {
   return (command, args) => {
     const dir = dirname6(p);
-    if (!existsSync15(dir))
+    if (!existsSync16(dir))
       mkdirSync10(dir, { recursive: true });
     const existing = readJson(p) ?? {};
     existing.mcpServers = {
@@ -17572,7 +17572,7 @@ function jsonMcpServersWrite(p) {
 function opencodeWrite(p) {
   return (command, args) => {
     const dir = dirname6(p);
-    if (!existsSync15(dir))
+    if (!existsSync16(dir))
       mkdirSync10(dir, { recursive: true });
     const existing = readJson(p) ?? {};
     existing.mcp = {
@@ -17586,14 +17586,14 @@ function opencodeWrite(p) {
 function copyOpenCodeAgents() {
   const srcDir = join27(ROOT10, "opencode-agents");
   const dstDir = join27(homedir11(), ".config", "opencode", "agents");
-  if (!existsSync15(srcDir))
+  if (!existsSync16(srcDir))
     return;
-  if (!existsSync15(dstDir))
+  if (!existsSync16(dstDir))
     mkdirSync10(dstDir, { recursive: true });
   for (const f of ["Blitz Strike.md", "Blitz.md", "Eagle Eye.md", "Strike.md"]) {
     const src = join27(srcDir, f);
     const dst = join27(dstDir, f);
-    if (existsSync15(src)) {
+    if (existsSync16(src)) {
       writeFileSync9(dst, readFileSync30(src, "utf8"));
     }
   }
@@ -17601,9 +17601,9 @@ function copyOpenCodeAgents() {
 function codexWrite(p) {
   return (command, args) => {
     const dir = dirname6(p);
-    if (!existsSync15(dir))
+    if (!existsSync16(dir))
       mkdirSync10(dir, { recursive: true });
-    let existing = existsSync15(p) ? readFileSync30(p, "utf8") : "";
+    let existing = existsSync16(p) ? readFileSync30(p, "utf8") : "";
     if (!existing.trimEnd().endsWith(`
 `))
       existing += `
@@ -17620,9 +17620,9 @@ args = ${JSON.stringify(args)}
 function hermesWrite(p) {
   return (command, args) => {
     const dir = dirname6(p);
-    if (!existsSync15(dir))
+    if (!existsSync16(dir))
       mkdirSync10(dir, { recursive: true });
-    let existing = existsSync15(p) ? readFileSync30(p, "utf8") : "";
+    let existing = existsSync16(p) ? readFileSync30(p, "utf8") : "";
     existing = existing.replace(/^  blitzstrike:\n(?:    .*\n?)*/m, "");
     if (!existing.trimEnd().endsWith(`
 `))
@@ -17653,70 +17653,70 @@ function detectAgents() {
   agents.push({
     name: "Claude Code",
     detectPath: claudeJson,
-    installed: () => existsSync15(claudeJson) || which("claude"),
+    installed: () => existsSync16(claudeJson) || which("claude"),
     write: jsonMcpServersWrite(claudeJson)
   });
   const claudeDesktop = join27(home, ".config", "Claude", "claude_desktop_config.json");
   agents.push({
     name: "Claude Desktop",
     detectPath: claudeDesktop,
-    installed: () => existsSync15(claudeDesktop),
+    installed: () => existsSync16(claudeDesktop),
     write: jsonMcpServersWrite(claudeDesktop)
   });
   const cursor = join27(home, ".cursor", "mcp.json");
   agents.push({
     name: "Cursor",
     detectPath: cursor,
-    installed: () => existsSync15(join27(home, ".cursor")) || which("cursor"),
+    installed: () => existsSync16(join27(home, ".cursor")) || which("cursor"),
     write: jsonMcpServersWrite(cursor)
   });
   const opencode = join27(home, ".config", "opencode", "opencode.jsonc");
   agents.push({
     name: "OpenCode",
     detectPath: opencode,
-    installed: () => existsSync15(join27(home, ".config", "opencode")) || which("opencode"),
+    installed: () => existsSync16(join27(home, ".config", "opencode")) || which("opencode"),
     write: opencodeWrite(opencode)
   });
   const codex = join27(home, ".codex", "config.toml");
   agents.push({
     name: "Codex",
     detectPath: codex,
-    installed: () => existsSync15(join27(home, ".codex")) || which("codex"),
+    installed: () => existsSync16(join27(home, ".codex")) || which("codex"),
     write: codexWrite(codex)
   });
   const hermes = join27(home, ".hermes", "config.yaml");
   agents.push({
     name: "Hermes",
     detectPath: hermes,
-    installed: () => existsSync15(join27(home, ".hermes")) || which("hermes"),
+    installed: () => existsSync16(join27(home, ".hermes")) || which("hermes"),
     write: hermesWrite(hermes)
   });
   const gemini = join27(home, ".gemini", "settings.json");
   agents.push({
     name: "Gemini CLI",
     detectPath: gemini,
-    installed: () => existsSync15(join27(home, ".gemini")) || which("gemini"),
+    installed: () => existsSync16(join27(home, ".gemini")) || which("gemini"),
     write: jsonMcpServersWrite(gemini)
   });
   const windsurf = join27(home, ".codeium", "windsurf", "mcp_config.json");
   agents.push({
     name: "Windsurf",
     detectPath: windsurf,
-    installed: () => existsSync15(join27(home, ".codeium")) || which("windsurf"),
+    installed: () => existsSync16(join27(home, ".codeium")) || which("windsurf"),
     write: jsonMcpServersWrite(windsurf)
   });
   const copilot = join27(home, ".copilot", "mcp.json");
   agents.push({
     name: "Copilot",
     detectPath: copilot,
-    installed: () => existsSync15(join27(home, ".copilot")),
+    installed: () => existsSync16(join27(home, ".copilot")),
     write: jsonMcpServersWrite(copilot)
   });
   const cline = join27(home, ".cline", "mcp_settings.json");
   agents.push({
     name: "Cline",
     detectPath: cline,
-    installed: () => existsSync15(join27(home, ".cline")),
+    installed: () => existsSync16(join27(home, ".cline")),
     write: jsonMcpServersWrite(cline)
   });
   return agents;
@@ -60177,8 +60177,174 @@ function analyzeJwt(token, opts = {}) {
   };
 }
 
+// src/oob.ts
+import { spawn as spawn3, execSync as execSync2 } from "node:child_process";
+import { createServer } from "node:http";
+import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto";
+import { networkInterfaces } from "node:os";
+import { existsSync as existsSync13 } from "node:fs";
+var sessions = new Map;
+function sleep(ms) {
+  return new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, ms));
+}
+function findInteractsh() {
+  try {
+    const p = execSync2("which interactsh-client 2>/dev/null", { encoding: "utf8", timeout: 3000 }).trim();
+    if (p)
+      return p;
+  } catch {}
+  const home = process.env.HOME ?? "/root";
+  const candidates = [`${home}/go/bin/interactsh-client`, "/usr/local/bin/interactsh-client", "/usr/bin/interactsh-client"];
+  for (const c of candidates)
+    if (existsSync13(c))
+      return c;
+  return null;
+}
+function stripAnsi(s) {
+  return s.replace(/\u001b\[[0-9;]*m/g, "");
+}
+function extractDomain(buffer) {
+  const m = stripAnsi(buffer).match(/\[INF\]\s+([a-z0-9]{20,}\.[a-z0-9.-]+)/i);
+  return m ? m[1] : null;
+}
+function parseInteractions(buffer) {
+  const out = [];
+  for (const raw of stripAnsi(buffer).split(`
+`)) {
+    const line = raw.trim();
+    if (!line.startsWith("{"))
+      continue;
+    try {
+      const j = JSON.parse(line);
+      if (j && j.protocol && j.timestamp) {
+        const req = typeof j["raw-request"] === "string" ? j["raw-request"].split(/\r?\n/)[0] : null;
+        out.push({
+          protocol: j.protocol,
+          remote_address: j["remote-address"] ?? null,
+          request_line: req,
+          timestamp: j.timestamp,
+          unique_id: j["unique-id"] ?? null
+        });
+      }
+    } catch {}
+  }
+  return out;
+}
+function localIP() {
+  const ifaces = networkInterfaces();
+  for (const name of Object.keys(ifaces)) {
+    for (const iface of ifaces[name] ?? []) {
+      if (iface.family === "IPv4" && !iface.internal)
+        return iface.address;
+    }
+  }
+  return "127.0.0.1";
+}
+function result(s, extra = {}) {
+  return {
+    id: s.id,
+    mode: s.mode,
+    domain: s.domain ?? null,
+    url: s.url ?? null,
+    payload_url: s.url ? `\${oob_url}` : null,
+    payload_dns: s.domain ? `\${oob_dns}` : null,
+    templates: s.domain ? {
+      dns: `\${oob_dns}`,
+      http: `http://\${oob_dns}`,
+      ssrf_xxe: `http://\${oob_dns}/<marker>`,
+      sql_blind: `http://\${oob_dns}/<marker>`
+    } : { http: `http://${s.url}/<marker>` },
+    ...extra
+  };
+}
+async function oobStart() {
+  const bin = findInteractsh();
+  if (bin) {
+    const id = randomUUID().slice(0, 8);
+    const session = { id, mode: "interactsh", buffer: "", hits: [], startedAt: Date.now() };
+    session.proc = spawn3(bin, ["-json"], { stdio: ["ignore", "pipe", "pipe"] });
+    session.proc.stdout?.on("data", (d) => session.buffer += d.toString());
+    session.proc.stderr?.on("data", (d) => session.buffer += d.toString());
+    sessions.set(id, session);
+    const deadline = Date.now() + 25000;
+    while (Date.now() < deadline) {
+      const domain = extractDomain(session.buffer);
+      if (domain) {
+        session.domain = domain;
+        session.url = `http://${domain}`;
+        return result(session, { status: "listening" });
+      }
+      await sleep(300);
+    }
+    return result(session, { status: "timeout", note: "interactsh-client did not register a domain within 15s — check network / oast server reachability" });
+  }
+  return startSelfHost();
+}
+function startSelfHost() {
+  const id = randomUUID().slice(0, 8);
+  const session = { id, mode: "selfhost", buffer: "", hits: [], startedAt: Date.now() };
+  const server = createServer((req, res) => {
+    let body = "";
+    req.on("data", (c) => body += c);
+    req.on("end", () => {
+      session.hits.push({
+        protocol: "http",
+        method: req.method,
+        path: req.url,
+        remote_address: req.socket.remoteAddress,
+        headers: req.headers,
+        body: body.slice(0, 2000),
+        timestamp: new Date().toISOString()
+      });
+      res.writeHead(200, { "Content-Type": "text/plain" });
+      res.end("oob-ok");
+    });
+  });
+  server.listen(0, "0.0.0.0");
+  const port = server.address().port;
+  session.server = server;
+  session.port = port;
+  session.url = `http://${localIP()}:${port}`;
+  sessions.set(id, session);
+  return result(session, {
+    status: "listening",
+    note: "local listener (target must reach this host); for a remote target, expose it via a tunnel (e.g. pinggy) and re-point the payload"
+  });
+}
+function oobPoll(id) {
+  const s = sessions.get(id);
+  if (!s)
+    return { error: "unknown session id (was it stopped or did the server restart?)" };
+  if (s.mode === "selfhost") {
+    const fresh = s.hits.slice(0);
+    s.hits.length = 0;
+    return { id, mode: s.mode, url: s.url, found: fresh.length > 0, hits: fresh, total_hits_seen: fresh.length };
+  }
+  const interactions = parseInteractions(s.buffer);
+  const known = new Set(s.hits.map((h) => `${h.timestamp}|${h.protocol}|${h.request_line ?? ""}`));
+  const fresh = interactions.filter((i) => !known.has(`${i.timestamp}|${i.protocol}|${i.request_line ?? ""}`));
+  s.hits.push(...fresh);
+  return { id, mode: s.mode, domain: s.domain, url: s.url, found: fresh.length > 0, hits: fresh, total_hits_seen: s.hits.length };
+}
+function oobStop(id) {
+  const s = sessions.get(id);
+  if (!s)
+    return { error: "unknown session id" };
+  try {
+    s.proc?.kill("SIGTERM");
+  } catch {}
+  try {
+    s.server?.close();
+  } catch {}
+  sessions.delete(id);
+  return { id, stopped: true, total_hits_seen: s.hits.length };
+}
+function oobList() {
+  return { active: [...sessions.values()].map((s) => ({ id: s.id, mode: s.mode, domain: s.domain, url: s.url, age_sec: Math.round((Date.now() - s.startedAt) / 1000) })) };
+}
+
 // src/enterprise-benchmark.ts
-import { existsSync as existsSync13, readFileSync as readFileSync25, readdirSync as readdirSync6, statSync as statSync3 } from "node:fs";
+import { existsSync as existsSync14, readFileSync as readFileSync25, readdirSync as readdirSync6, statSync as statSync3 } from "node:fs";
 import { join as join23, resolve } from "node:path";
 init_complex_bugs();
 var ROOT6 = resolve(process.cwd(), "bench", "enterprise");
@@ -60239,7 +60405,7 @@ function detectFixture(dir) {
 function runEnterpriseBenchmark() {
   const fixtures = [];
   for (const fx of ENTERPRISE_FIXTURES) {
-    if (!existsSync13(fx.dir)) {
+    if (!existsSync14(fx.dir)) {
       fixtures.push({ id: fx.id, available: false, detected: 0, expected: fx.expected_vulns, recall: 0 });
       continue;
     }
@@ -60421,7 +60587,7 @@ function coverageMatrix() {
 // src/server.ts
 init_update();
 init_version();
-function createServer() {
+function createServer2() {
   const server = new McpServer({
     name: "blitzstrike",
     version: VERSION
@@ -60434,7 +60600,7 @@ function createServer() {
 ` + `- A hard block (Cloudflare/WAF/IP-block/captcha) is NOT the end: mark the finding blocked + note the required vantage (residential / authorized / correct-SNI / --resolve direct-to-origin), then CONTINUE to the next lead (origin bypass, non-prod cluster, mobile APK, subdomain).
 ` + `- Keep trying every lead AND every chain step until each is verified/executed or blocked, THEN generate_report. Never deliver a bare surface map, and never stop at 'found X' when X enables more.
 
-` + "TWO PATHS:\\n" + "- Source path on disk -> blitz_scan / taint_file / eagle_eye2 (static).\\n" + "- Live URL -> live_recon / active_scan / strike_verify (web-hunting).\\n\\n" + "DEEPEN A FINDING: attack_plan(target, tech, params) to get the prioritized vector plan (decide what to test next with data); list_chains (escalation), chain_links (compose), technique_lookup(cls), payload_lookup, bypass_lookup (blocked). Ground any detector hit empirically with pattern_lookup(id) — it returns the class's CWE, real-world signature, escalation chains, citable references, per-class bypass techniques, and the high-value assets (crown jewels) that class hits, so a raw hit becomes a class-aware finding. Resolve free-form terminology first with synonym_lookup(term) (IDOR/BOLA/SQLi/prompt-injection → canonical id). For an llm_injection hit, its pattern carries a validation discipline — the RUN-TWICE RULE (reproduce token-for-token across two fresh sessions), NON-GUESSABLE ANCHOR (must leak a real key/URL, not a plausible guess), and OOB PROOF (a verifiable callback log) — apply all three before reporting. BEFORE generating a report, run submission_gate(...) and only ship a finding that passes all 7 questions (reproducible, in-scope, real-impact, no-privileged-assumption, verified-live, evidence-redacted, severity-derived); one false = kill it. Calibrate severity with severity_calibrate(type, cvss) to get a P1–P5 tier + VRT-style category. Start each engagement with engagement_scaffold(target, scope) for the folder + scope.md structure, and check data_refresh() to confirm the data layers are consistent. Phase doctrine: read_skill(bs-orchestrate-engagement | bs-web-hunting | bs-source-audit | bs-verify-finding). Campaign plan: read_playbook(target-type). On any failure call retry_guidance(signal) / model_fallback(signal) before giving up.\n" + "KNOWLEDGE BASE (discover, don't guess): skillLookup(topic) / listSkills for the 40 attack-path + hunting skills (ap-*, hp-*, bs-*); list_attack_vectors / attack_vectors(cat) for the 34-category vector taxonomy; taxonomy(kind) for OWASP/CWE/ASVS/API-top-10; read_playbook(type) for the 17 campaign playbooks; list_manuals / read_tool_manual for 317 tool references; list_tools / run_catalog_tool for the 141-tool catalog. Every tool, skill, and data layer is reachable from these. CROSS-TARGET INTELLIGENCE: strike_resolve auto-records confirmed/false_positive verdicts into the empirical ledger; query it with intelligence(action=hit_rates/top_vectors/recall) so a new target on a known tech inherits historical hit-rates (attack_plan already blends them into success_probability). intelligence(action=recall, tech, target) is the per-engagement pattern recall — it returns which patterns historically CONFIRMED on that tech (prioritize them) versus which only ever produced false positives (avoid them), so a new engagement starts from the empirical playbook of past ones. LIVE PENTEST + TARGETING (black-box, WAF-safe): cache_gap(base_url, endpoint) fuzzes path-normalization + static-extension variants for cache deception/poisoning; blind_oracle(base_url, param, value) detects which SINK a param reaches (sql/ssti/xss) via benign arithmetic (id=1+0, test${7*7}) WITHOUT a malicious payload; param_precedence(base_url, param, A, B) maps duplicate-parameter precedence (first/last-wins) for WAF-bypass. SOURCE TARGETING: action_surface(code) maps every wp_ajax_* action to its vuln class + DERIVED priority (what to look for WHERE); security_state(sanitizers, sink) gives a wrong-context sanitization verdict; framework_knowledge(framework) returns auth/nonce primitives for 9 frameworks; variant_scan(root, signature) mass-sweeps an install base for ONE bug family; patch_analyze(old, new) REVERSES a security patch into the 0-day, and its mine_signature feeds variant_scan to sweep unpatched copies. All of these are DETECTION HINTS — verify each live (strike_verify / browser_validate) before it enters the report. NEWEST DETECTORS — understand AND try them: variant_scan also emits priv_esc (privilege escalation — a role/capability/user change fed by request input, traced cross-file via reverse call-graph, e.g. set_role($id, sanitize_key($_POST['um-role'])) or update_user_meta(...,'wp_capabilities', $_POST[...])) and flags uploadAllow=>array('all') unrestricted-upload configs as file_upload (the file-manager/connector shape). TO TRY a priv_esc hit: submit the role field with 'administrator' (or send wp_capabilities meta) and confirm the account actually gains admin. TO TRY an unrestricted-upload hit: POST a .php/.phtml and confirm it lands web-reachable + executes. variant_scan also emits hardcoded_secret (CWE-798) in three tiers: a secret field (api_key/db_password/access_token/aws_*) assigned a literal (HIGH), a known secret FORMAT (JWT eyJ…/AWS AKIA…/GitHub ghp_…/Slack xoxb-…/…) regardless of name (HIGH), or a high-entropy suspect token (MEDIUM — verify before reporting). Verify a frontend/JS secret live via drive_devtools (inspect the JS bundle / network response and confirm the key is actually exposed), and for a backend secret confirm it is reachable/valid. A static hit is a HYPOTHESIS until verified live — never report unverified. For a repo, also scan_git_history(root) — secrets DELETED from HEAD still live in .git history (the removed-later-is-not-fixed trap), and it feeds every recovered pre-deletion blob through the same secret detector. Once you recover a credential, prove it is still ACTIVE with validate_leaked_key(apiBase, endpoints, key|blobUrl) — a READ-ONLY differential test (401-without-key vs 200-with-key = auth bypass PROVEN). Two supply-chain detectors: dependency_confusion (a manifest/build file resolving a package from a public registry — pypi.org/npmjs.org --extra-index-url, or a scoped @company/pkg with no private registry) and ml_supply_chain (torch.load without weights_only=True / joblib.load / np.load(allow_pickle=True) / keras load_model on an untrusted model → pickle RCE). Rust is supported end-to-end: the taint engine (blitz_scan / taint_file) maps Rust sinks (std::process::Command, sqlx/diesel, reqwest/hyper, std::fs, serde/bincode) to the classic classes, plus two Rust-specific detectors — rust_unsafe (transmute / assume_init / from_raw_parts / ptr::* — memory-unsafety surface, CWE-119) and rust_format_string (println!/format! with a variable as the format string — CWE-134). The sqlx query! compile-time macro is treated as safe (suppressed). Two more web-class detectors: jwt_alg_confusion (a JWT verifier that dispatches on the token's alg header and accepts BOTH RS256 and HS256, with the HS256 HMAC secret derived from public/shared key material — CWE-347; the attacker sets alg=HS256 and signs with the public key to forge admin tokens) and cache_deception (a reverse proxy caching static-extension URLs with a cache key that omits the session cookie, over a session-authenticated backend — CWE-525; the victim's cached private response is re-fetched anonymously). TO TRY a jwt_alg_confusion hit: fetch the public key (/.well-known/jwks.json), forge an HS256 token signed with that public key, and confirm admin access. TO TRY a cache_deception hit: request an authenticated path with a static extension appended (.css/.js) and re-fetch it anonymously.\n" + `PRECISION ANALYSIS — chrome-devtools MCP is MANDATORY, not optional:
+` + "TWO PATHS:\\n" + "- Source path on disk -> blitz_scan / taint_file / eagle_eye2 (static).\\n" + "- Live URL -> live_recon / active_scan / strike_verify (web-hunting).\\n\\n" + "DEEPEN A FINDING: attack_plan(target, tech, params) to get the prioritized vector plan (decide what to test next with data); list_chains (escalation), chain_links (compose), technique_lookup(cls), payload_lookup, bypass_lookup (blocked). Ground any detector hit empirically with pattern_lookup(id) — it returns the class's CWE, real-world signature, escalation chains, citable references, per-class bypass techniques, and the high-value assets (crown jewels) that class hits, so a raw hit becomes a class-aware finding. Resolve free-form terminology first with synonym_lookup(term) (IDOR/BOLA/SQLi/prompt-injection → canonical id). For an llm_injection hit, its pattern carries a validation discipline — the RUN-TWICE RULE (reproduce token-for-token across two fresh sessions), NON-GUESSABLE ANCHOR (must leak a real key/URL, not a plausible guess), and OOB PROOF (a verifiable callback log) — apply all three before reporting. BEFORE generating a report, run submission_gate(...) and only ship a finding that passes all 7 questions (reproducible, in-scope, real-impact, no-privileged-assumption, verified-live, evidence-redacted, severity-derived); one false = kill it. Calibrate severity with severity_calibrate(type, cvss) to get a P1–P5 tier + VRT-style category. Start each engagement with engagement_scaffold(target, scope) for the folder + scope.md structure, and check data_refresh() to confirm the data layers are consistent. Phase doctrine: read_skill(bs-orchestrate-engagement | bs-web-hunting | bs-source-audit | bs-verify-finding). Campaign plan: read_playbook(target-type). On any failure call retry_guidance(signal) / model_fallback(signal) before giving up.\n" + "KNOWLEDGE BASE (discover, don't guess): skillLookup(topic) / listSkills for the 40 attack-path + hunting skills (ap-*, hp-*, bs-*); list_attack_vectors / attack_vectors(cat) for the 34-category vector taxonomy; taxonomy(kind) for OWASP/CWE/ASVS/API-top-10; read_playbook(type) for the 17 campaign playbooks; list_manuals / read_tool_manual for 317 tool references; list_tools / run_catalog_tool for the 141-tool catalog. Every tool, skill, and data layer is reachable from these. CROSS-TARGET INTELLIGENCE: strike_resolve auto-records confirmed/false_positive verdicts into the empirical ledger; query it with intelligence(action=hit_rates/top_vectors/recall) so a new target on a known tech inherits historical hit-rates (attack_plan already blends them into success_probability). intelligence(action=recall, tech, target) is the per-engagement pattern recall — it returns which patterns historically CONFIRMED on that tech (prioritize them) versus which only ever produced false positives (avoid them), so a new engagement starts from the empirical playbook of past ones. LIVE PENTEST + TARGETING (black-box, WAF-safe): cache_gap(base_url, endpoint) fuzzes path-normalization + static-extension variants for cache deception/poisoning; blind_oracle(base_url, param, value) detects which SINK a param reaches (sql/ssti/xss) via benign arithmetic (id=1+0, test${7*7}) WITHOUT a malicious payload; param_precedence(base_url, param, A, B) maps duplicate-parameter precedence (first/last-wins) for WAF-bypass. OOB (out-of-band) PROOF for BLIND vulns: oob_start() spins an interactsh listener (unique *.oast.* domain, streams DNS/HTTP interactions — the standard for public targets) or a local HTTP listener for local labs; inject the canary, then oob_poll(id) until the hit arrives; oob_stop(id) to clean up. A blind SSRF/XXE/SQLi/command-injection is CONFIRMED only when the canary actually arrives — never from a guess. SOURCE TARGETING: action_surface(code) maps every wp_ajax_* action to its vuln class + DERIVED priority (what to look for WHERE); security_state(sanitizers, sink) gives a wrong-context sanitization verdict; framework_knowledge(framework) returns auth/nonce primitives for 9 frameworks; variant_scan(root, signature) mass-sweeps an install base for ONE bug family; patch_analyze(old, new) REVERSES a security patch into the 0-day, and its mine_signature feeds variant_scan to sweep unpatched copies. All of these are DETECTION HINTS — verify each live (strike_verify / browser_validate) before it enters the report. NEWEST DETECTORS — understand AND try them: variant_scan also emits priv_esc (privilege escalation — a role/capability/user change fed by request input, traced cross-file via reverse call-graph, e.g. set_role($id, sanitize_key($_POST['um-role'])) or update_user_meta(...,'wp_capabilities', $_POST[...])) and flags uploadAllow=>array('all') unrestricted-upload configs as file_upload (the file-manager/connector shape). TO TRY a priv_esc hit: submit the role field with 'administrator' (or send wp_capabilities meta) and confirm the account actually gains admin. TO TRY an unrestricted-upload hit: POST a .php/.phtml and confirm it lands web-reachable + executes. variant_scan also emits hardcoded_secret (CWE-798) in three tiers: a secret field (api_key/db_password/access_token/aws_*) assigned a literal (HIGH), a known secret FORMAT (JWT eyJ…/AWS AKIA…/GitHub ghp_…/Slack xoxb-…/…) regardless of name (HIGH), or a high-entropy suspect token (MEDIUM — verify before reporting). Verify a frontend/JS secret live via drive_devtools (inspect the JS bundle / network response and confirm the key is actually exposed), and for a backend secret confirm it is reachable/valid. A static hit is a HYPOTHESIS until verified live — never report unverified. For a repo, also scan_git_history(root) — secrets DELETED from HEAD still live in .git history (the removed-later-is-not-fixed trap), and it feeds every recovered pre-deletion blob through the same secret detector. Once you recover a credential, prove it is still ACTIVE with validate_leaked_key(apiBase, endpoints, key|blobUrl) — a READ-ONLY differential test (401-without-key vs 200-with-key = auth bypass PROVEN). Two supply-chain detectors: dependency_confusion (a manifest/build file resolving a package from a public registry — pypi.org/npmjs.org --extra-index-url, or a scoped @company/pkg with no private registry) and ml_supply_chain (torch.load without weights_only=True / joblib.load / np.load(allow_pickle=True) / keras load_model on an untrusted model → pickle RCE). Rust is supported end-to-end: the taint engine (blitz_scan / taint_file) maps Rust sinks (std::process::Command, sqlx/diesel, reqwest/hyper, std::fs, serde/bincode) to the classic classes, plus two Rust-specific detectors — rust_unsafe (transmute / assume_init / from_raw_parts / ptr::* — memory-unsafety surface, CWE-119) and rust_format_string (println!/format! with a variable as the format string — CWE-134). The sqlx query! compile-time macro is treated as safe (suppressed). Two more web-class detectors: jwt_alg_confusion (a JWT verifier that dispatches on the token's alg header and accepts BOTH RS256 and HS256, with the HS256 HMAC secret derived from public/shared key material — CWE-347; the attacker sets alg=HS256 and signs with the public key to forge admin tokens) and cache_deception (a reverse proxy caching static-extension URLs with a cache key that omits the session cookie, over a session-authenticated backend — CWE-525; the victim's cached private response is re-fetched anonymously). TO TRY a jwt_alg_confusion hit: fetch the public key (/.well-known/jwks.json), forge an HS256 token signed with that public key, and confirm admin access. TO TRY a cache_deception hit: request an authenticated path with a static extension appended (.css/.js) and re-fetch it anonymously.\n" + `PRECISION ANALYSIS — chrome-devtools MCP is MANDATORY, not optional:
 ` + `- When a lead needs DOM/JS precision — DOM-XSS sink execution, AJAX endpoint + payload interception, JS runtime errors, redirect chains, SSO/token flow, or anything a static HTML glance cannot prove — call drive_devtools(target). It spawns chrome-devtools-mcp and drives a REAL headless browser (navigate -> list_network_requests -> list_console_messages -> evaluate_script), giving reproducible evidence instead of a guess.
 ` + `- Before calling it, check_mcp() to confirm the browser MCP is available; if not, blitzstrike install-tools or npm i -g chrome-devtools-mcp. Never substitute eyeballing minified JS or a static sink guess when a live browser can PROVE it. This is the precision + consistency layer.
 ` + "EXTERNAL MCP SERVERS (verified, connect them — NOT one-shot CLIs): chrome-devtools-mcp (29 tools: list_network_requests/get_network_request for raw HTTP interception, list_console_messages for JS errors + DOM-XSS, evaluate_script to run JS, take_screenshot) -> stdio chrome-devtools-mcp --headless --chromeArg=--no-sandbox --chromeArg=--disable-gpu (as root/container this is MANDATORY or the browser crashes; add --proxyServer http://127.0.0.1:8080 to route through Burp, --acceptInsecureCerts for bad TLS). burp-suite-mcp (proxy history + active scan + repeater) -> NOT npm: build the JAR (git clone https://github.com/PortSwigger/mcp-server.git && cd mcp-server && ./gradlew embedProxyJar), load it in Burp Extensions, then connect the client to http://127.0.0.1:9876 (SSE) or the stdio proxy java -jar mcp-proxy-all.jar --sse-url http://127.0.0.1:9876."
@@ -61353,6 +61519,38 @@ ${statusLine}` : statusLine },
     }
     return { content: [{ type: "text", text: JSON.stringify(await blindOracle(base_url, param, value, { sinks: s })) }] };
   });
+  server.registerTool("oob_start", {
+    title: "Out-of-band callback listener (blind SSRF/XXE/SQLi/RCE proof)",
+    description: "Start a deterministic out-of-band (OOB) listener to PROVE a blind vuln (SSRF/XXE/SQLi/command injection) that does not reflect in the HTTP response. Uses interactsh-client when installed (unique *.oast.* domain, streams DNS/HTTP interactions) — the standard for public targets; falls back to a local HTTP listener for local labs. Returns the callback URL/domain + payload templates. Pair oob_start -> inject the canary -> oob_poll(id) until the hit arrives -> oob_stop(id). A hit is reported ONLY when an interaction actually arrives for the session's unique id — never a guess.",
+    inputSchema: {}
+  }, async () => {
+    return { content: [{ type: "text", text: JSON.stringify(await oobStart()) }] };
+  });
+  server.registerTool("oob_poll", {
+    title: "Poll an OOB listener for incoming interactions",
+    description: "Check a live OOB session (from oob_start) for incoming DNS/HTTP interactions. Returns found:true + the hits (protocol, remote address, request line, timestamp) when the canary was actually fetched. Poll repeatedly (e.g. every 2-3s) for up to ~60s after injecting the payload; a blind vuln is CONFIRMED only when your marker arrives.",
+    inputSchema: {
+      id: string2().describe("Session id returned by oob_start")
+    }
+  }, async ({ id }) => {
+    return { content: [{ type: "text", text: JSON.stringify(oobPoll(id)) }] };
+  });
+  server.registerTool("oob_stop", {
+    title: "Stop an OOB listener",
+    description: "Stop an OOB session and free its resources (kill the interactsh child / close the listener). Returns the total hits seen.",
+    inputSchema: {
+      id: string2().describe("Session id returned by oob_start")
+    }
+  }, async ({ id }) => {
+    return { content: [{ type: "text", text: JSON.stringify(oobStop(id)) }] };
+  });
+  server.registerTool("oob_list", {
+    title: "List active OOB listeners",
+    description: "List active OOB sessions (id, mode, domain/url, age) for introspection.",
+    inputSchema: {}
+  }, async () => {
+    return { content: [{ type: "text", text: JSON.stringify(oobList()) }] };
+  });
   server.registerTool("param_precedence", {
     title: "Duplicate parameter precedence fuzzer (WAF-bypass oracle)",
     description: "LIVE (black-box): determine how the app resolves duplicate parameters + alternate delimiters (; , %26 %3b | [] %00 + #). Reveals the WAF-bypass vector — if the WAF validates one value and the app binds another, inject via the disagreement. Deterministic: baseline A/B + differential per variant.",
@@ -62275,21 +62473,21 @@ ${out}${gate}` }] };
   return server;
 }
 async function serve() {
-  const server = createServer();
+  const server = createServer2();
   const transport = new StdioServerTransport;
   await server.connect(transport);
 }
 
 // src/index.ts
 init_cli();
-import { readFileSync as readFileSync31, existsSync as existsSync16 } from "node:fs";
+import { readFileSync as readFileSync31, existsSync as existsSync17 } from "node:fs";
 import { join as join28 } from "node:path";
 import { fileURLToPath as fileURLToPath17 } from "node:url";
 var ROOT11 = join28(fileURLToPath17(new URL(".", import.meta.url)), "..");
 function readVersion() {
   try {
     const p = join28(ROOT11, "package.json");
-    if (existsSync16(p))
+    if (existsSync17(p))
       return JSON.parse(readFileSync31(p, "utf8")).version ?? "1.0.0";
   } catch {}
   return "1.0.0";

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "blitzstrike",
-  "version": "2.4.81",
+  "version": "2.4.82",
   "description": "Blitz Strike — a universal MCP security-audit toolbelt. BLITZ sweeps the attack surface, EAGLE-EYE traces source-to-sink, STRIKE verifies live. 57 attack chains, 130-tool catalog, intelligence data layer. One server, every agent.",
   "type": "module",
   "bin": {