blitzstrike 2.4.79 → 2.4.81

package/dist/index.js

@@ -32555,9 +32555,9 @@ async function nvdLookup(cveId) {
 
 // src/orchestrator.ts
 init_scanner();
-import { readFileSync as readFileSync9, existsSync as existsSync8, statSync as statSync2 } from "node:fs";
-import { join as join11 } from "node:path";
-import { fileURLToPath as fileURLToPath5 } from "node:url";
+import { readFileSync as readFileSync10, existsSync as existsSync8, statSync as statSync2 } from "node:fs";
+import { join as join12 } from "node:path";
+import { fileURLToPath as fileURLToPath6 } from "node:url";
 
 // src/memory.ts
 import { readFileSync as readFileSync2, appendFileSync, mkdirSync, existsSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs";
@@ -34109,9 +34109,9 @@ function uniqueFindings(findings) {
 }
 
 // src/intel.ts
-import { readFileSync as readFileSync8, existsSync as existsSync7 } from "node:fs";
-import { join as join9 } from "node:path";
-import { fileURLToPath as fileURLToPath4 } from "node:url";
+import { readFileSync as readFileSync9, existsSync as existsSync7 } from "node:fs";
+import { join as join10 } from "node:path";
+import { fileURLToPath as fileURLToPath5 } from "node:url";
 
 // src/intelligence.ts
 import { readFileSync as readFileSync7, appendFileSync as appendFileSync3, mkdirSync as mkdirSync4, existsSync as existsSync6 } from "node:fs";
@@ -34292,17 +34292,196 @@ function queryIntel(filter = {}) {
   };
 }
 
+// src/patterns.ts
+import { readFileSync as readFileSync8 } from "node:fs";
+import { join as join9, dirname as dirname2 } from "node:path";
+import { fileURLToPath as fileURLToPath4 } from "node:url";
+
+// src/synonyms.ts
+var ALIASES = {
+  idor: "missing_authz",
+  bola: "missing_authz",
+  "broken object level authorization": "missing_authz",
+  "insecure direct object reference": "missing_authz",
+  "broken access control": "missing_authz",
+  authorization: "missing_authz",
+  csrf: "missing_nonce",
+  xsrf: "missing_nonce",
+  "cross site request forgery": "missing_nonce",
+  "cross-site request forgery": "missing_nonce",
+  sqli: "sql_injection",
+  "sql injection": "sql_injection",
+  "sql-injection": "sql_injection",
+  ssti: "ssti",
+  "template injection": "ssti",
+  "server side template injection": "ssti",
+  xxe: "xxe",
+  "xml external entity": "xxe",
+  "xxe injection": "xxe",
+  bpla: "mass_assignment",
+  "broken property level authorization": "mass_assignment",
+  "mass assignment": "mass_assignment",
+  lfi: "path_confusion",
+  rfi: "path_confusion",
+  "path traversal": "path_confusion",
+  "directory traversal": "path_confusion",
+  "local file inclusion": "path_confusion",
+  "remote file inclusion": "path_confusion",
+  ssrf: "ssrf",
+  "server side request forgery": "ssrf",
+  "server-side request forgery": "ssrf",
+  "prompt injection": "llm_injection",
+  llm: "llm_injection",
+  llm01: "llm_injection",
+  "llm prompt injection": "llm_injection",
+  graphql: "graphql_exposure",
+  oauth: "oauth_misconfig",
+  "open redirect": "oauth_misconfig",
+  grpc: "grpc_reflection",
+  "hardcoded credential": "hardcoded_secret",
+  "hardcoded secret": "hardcoded_secret",
+  "credential leak": "hardcoded_secret",
+  "hard coded credentials": "hardcoded_secret",
+  "priv esc": "priv_esc",
+  privesc: "priv_esc",
+  "privilege escalation": "priv_esc",
+  "file upload": "file_upload",
+  "unrestricted upload": "file_upload",
+  "unrestricted file upload": "file_upload",
+  deserialization: "deserialization",
+  "insecure deserialization": "deserialization",
+  unserialize: "deserialization",
+  "type juggling": "type_juggling",
+  "php type juggling": "type_juggling",
+  "prototype pollution": "prototype_pollution",
+  crlf: "crlf_injection",
+  "header injection": "crlf_injection",
+  "http response splitting": "crlf_injection",
+  "wrong sanitizer": "wrong_sanitizer",
+  "wrong context sanitization": "wrong_sanitizer",
+  "dependency confusion": "dependency_confusion",
+  "dep confusion": "dependency_confusion",
+  "supply chain": "dependency_confusion",
+  "supply chain attack": "dependency_confusion",
+  "ml supply chain": "ml_supply_chain",
+  "ai supply chain": "ml_supply_chain",
+  "model poisoning": "ml_supply_chain",
+  "ml security": "ml_supply_chain",
+  "ai ml security": "ml_supply_chain",
+  "rust unsafe": "rust_unsafe",
+  "unsafe rust": "rust_unsafe",
+  "rust memory safety": "rust_unsafe",
+  transmute: "rust_unsafe",
+  "rust format string": "rust_format_string",
+  "format string": "rust_format_string",
+  "format string injection": "rust_format_string",
+  "jwt algorithm confusion": "jwt_alg_confusion",
+  "jwt alg confusion": "jwt_alg_confusion",
+  "alg confusion": "jwt_alg_confusion",
+  "rs256 hs256": "jwt_alg_confusion",
+  "web cache deception": "cache_deception",
+  "cache deception": "cache_deception",
+  "cache poisoning": "cache_deception",
+  "cache key injection": "cache_deception"
+};
+function normalize(term) {
+  return term.trim().toLowerCase().replace(/[_-]+/g, " ").replace(/\s+/g, " ").trim();
+}
+function canonicalId(term) {
+  const key = normalize(term);
+  if (ALIASES[key])
+    return ALIASES[key];
+  return key.replace(/ /g, "_");
+}
+function synonymsFor(term) {
+  const canonical = canonicalId(term);
+  const aliases = Object.entries(ALIASES).filter(([, v]) => v === canonical).map(([k]) => k);
+  return { canonical, aliases };
+}
+function listAliases() {
+  return Object.entries(ALIASES).map(([alias, canonical]) => ({ alias, canonical }));
+}
+
+// src/patterns.ts
+var __dirname2 = dirname2(fileURLToPath4(import.meta.url));
+var _doc = null;
+function load() {
+  if (_doc)
+    return _doc;
+  try {
+    _doc = JSON.parse(readFileSync8(join9(__dirname2, "..", "intelligence", "patterns.json"), "utf8"));
+  } catch {
+    _doc = { patterns: [] };
+  }
+  return _doc;
+}
+function patternLookup(id) {
+  const canonical = canonicalId(id);
+  const p = load().patterns.find((x) => x.id === canonical);
+  return p ?? null;
+}
+function listPatterns() {
+  return load().patterns;
+}
+function submissionGate(input) {
+  const questions = [
+    {
+      q: "Reproducible — a copy-paste-ready request or step list triggers it?",
+      pass: input.reproducible === true,
+      reason: "Without an exact reproduction the finding is a hypothesis, not a result."
+    },
+    {
+      q: "In scope — the vulnerable asset is in the engagement scope?",
+      pass: input.in_scope === true,
+      reason: "Out-of-scope assets must not be submitted."
+    },
+    {
+      q: "Real impact — maps to an accepted-impact class, not informational?",
+      pass: input.real_impact === true,
+      reason: "Informational-only findings dilute the validity ratio."
+    },
+    {
+      q: "No privileged assumption — works without unrealistic attacker prerequisites?",
+      pass: input.no_privileged_assumption === true,
+      reason: "'Admin can do X' is a centralization risk, not a vulnerability."
+    },
+    {
+      q: "Verified live — confirmed with a marker + negative control, not just a static hint?",
+      pass: input.verified_live === true,
+      reason: "A static hit is a hypothesis until verified live (strike_verify / browser_validate)."
+    },
+    {
+      q: "Evidence attached AND redacted — secrets/PII stripped, integrity-tagged?",
+      pass: input.evidence_redacted === true,
+      reason: "Evidence must carry SHA-256-tagged, redacted records — no leaked secrets or victim PII."
+    },
+    {
+      q: "Severity derived — CVSS/confidence computed, not guessed?",
+      pass: input.severity_derived === true,
+      reason: "Severity is not confidence; derive it, don't assert it."
+    }
+  ];
+  const failed = questions.find((q) => !q.pass);
+  return {
+    verdict: failed ? "fail" : "pass",
+    passed: questions.filter((q) => q.pass).length,
+    total: questions.length,
+    questions,
+    ...failed ? { blocker: failed.q } : {}
+  };
+}
+
 // src/intel.ts
 import { readdirSync as readdirSync4 } from "node:fs";
 import { homedir as homedir6 } from "node:os";
-var ROOT3 = join9(fileURLToPath4(new URL(".", import.meta.url)), "..");
-var INTEL = join9(ROOT3, "intelligence");
+var ROOT3 = join10(fileURLToPath5(new URL(".", import.meta.url)), "..");
+var INTEL = join10(ROOT3, "intelligence");
 function loadJson(name) {
-  const p = join9(INTEL, `${name}.json`);
+  const p = join10(INTEL, `${name}.json`);
   if (!existsSync7(p))
     return null;
   try {
-    return JSON.parse(readFileSync8(p, "utf8"));
+    return JSON.parse(readFileSync9(p, "utf8"));
   } catch {
     return null;
   }
@@ -34534,6 +34713,38 @@ function successProbability(priority, vector, tech) {
 function estimateTime(vector) {
   return VECTOR_TIME[vector] ?? DEFAULT_VECTOR_TIME;
 }
+var PAYOUT_FALLBACK = {
+  xss: [500, 5000],
+  command_injection: [1000, 1e4],
+  open_redirect: [300, 3000],
+  cors_misconfiguration: [300, 3000],
+  business_logic: [500, 1e4],
+  lfi: [1000, 1e4],
+  nosql_injection: [1000, 15000],
+  pickle_deserialization: [5000, 30000],
+  upload_rce: [500, 1e4],
+  auth_bypass: [1000, 1e4],
+  idor: [500, 5000],
+  wp_plugin_audit: [500, 1e4],
+  xmlrpc: [300, 3000],
+  rest_api_auth: [500, 5000],
+  debug_mode: [200, 2000],
+  actuator_exposure: [500, 5000],
+  viewstate: [1000, 5000]
+};
+function fmtUsd(v) {
+  return v >= 1000 ? `$${v / 1000}K` : `$${v}`;
+}
+function payoutFor(vector) {
+  const pat = patternLookup(canonicalId(vector));
+  if (pat && pat.payout_min != null && pat.payout_max != null) {
+    return { min: pat.payout_min, max: pat.payout_max, display: pat.typical_payout ?? `${fmtUsd(pat.payout_min)}–${fmtUsd(pat.payout_max)}` };
+  }
+  const fb = PAYOUT_FALLBACK[vector];
+  if (fb)
+    return { min: fb[0], max: fb[1], display: `${fmtUsd(fb[0])}–${fmtUsd(fb[1])}` };
+  return null;
+}
 function attackPlan(target, tech = [], params = [], mode = "full") {
   const data = loadJson("attack_vectors");
   const totalCategories = data?.categories.length ?? 0;
@@ -34569,31 +34780,37 @@ function attackPlan(target, tech = [], params = [], mode = "full") {
     target,
     mode,
     taxonomy: { total_categories: totalCategories, total_vectors_here: sorted.length },
-    plan: sorted.map((p, i) => ({
-      order: i + 1,
-      vector: p.vector,
-      priority: p.priority,
-      success_probability: successProbability(p.priority, p.vector, techKey),
-      estimated_time_sec: estimateTime(p.vector),
-      reason: p.reason,
-      tool: p.tool,
-      source: p.source
-    })),
+    plan: sorted.map((p, i) => {
+      const sp = successProbability(p.priority, p.vector, techKey);
+      const payout = payoutFor(p.vector);
+      return {
+        order: i + 1,
+        vector: p.vector,
+        priority: p.priority,
+        success_probability: sp,
+        typical_payout: payout?.display ?? null,
+        expected_value_usd: payout ? Math.round(sp * (payout.min + payout.max) / 2) : null,
+        estimated_time_sec: estimateTime(p.vector),
+        reason: p.reason,
+        tool: p.tool,
+        source: p.source
+      };
+    }),
     total_estimated_time_sec: totalTime
   };
 }
-var PACKAGE_PAYLOADS = join9(ROOT3, "payloads");
-var PACKAGE_TEMPLATES = join9(ROOT3, "templates");
-var DATA_ROOT = process.env.BLITZSTRIKE_DATA ?? join9(homedir6(), ".blitzstrike", "data");
+var PACKAGE_PAYLOADS = join10(ROOT3, "payloads");
+var PACKAGE_TEMPLATES = join10(ROOT3, "templates");
+var DATA_ROOT = process.env.BLITZSTRIKE_DATA ?? join10(homedir6(), ".blitzstrike", "data");
 function payloadsDir() {
   if (existsSync7(PACKAGE_PAYLOADS))
     return PACKAGE_PAYLOADS;
-  return join9(DATA_ROOT, "payloads");
+  return join10(DATA_ROOT, "payloads");
 }
 function templatesDir() {
   if (existsSync7(PACKAGE_TEMPLATES))
     return PACKAGE_TEMPLATES;
-  return join9(DATA_ROOT, "templates");
+  return join10(DATA_ROOT, "templates");
 }
 var PAYLOADS = payloadsDir();
 var TEMPLATES = templatesDir();
@@ -34629,7 +34846,7 @@ function payloadLookup(topic) {
   const normalized = ALIASES[key] ?? key;
   const exact = cats.find((c) => c.toLowerCase() === normalized);
   if (exact) {
-    return { found: true, category: exact, files: listFiles(join9(PAYLOADS, exact)) };
+    return { found: true, category: exact, files: listFiles(join10(PAYLOADS, exact)) };
   }
   const keyTokens = normalized.split(/[^a-z0-9]+/).filter((t) => t.length >= 3);
   const matches = cats.filter((c) => {
@@ -34639,7 +34856,7 @@ function payloadLookup(topic) {
     return keyTokens.some((tok) => new RegExp(`(^|[^a-z0-9])${tok}`).test(cl));
   });
   if (matches.length > 0) {
-    return { found: true, category: matches[0], files: listFiles(join9(PAYLOADS, matches[0])), alternatives: matches.slice(0, 10) };
+    return { found: true, category: matches[0], files: listFiles(join10(PAYLOADS, matches[0])), alternatives: matches.slice(0, 10) };
   }
   return { found: false, topic, suggestions: cats.slice(0, 20) };
 }
@@ -34648,19 +34865,19 @@ function readPayload(category, file) {
   const exact = cats.find((c) => c.toLowerCase() === category.toLowerCase());
   if (!exact)
     return { found: false, category, suggestions: cats.slice(0, 20) };
-  const dir = join9(PAYLOADS, exact);
+  const dir = join10(PAYLOADS, exact);
   const files = listFiles(dir);
   if (!file) {
     const readme = files.find((f) => f.toLowerCase() === "readme.md");
     if (readme) {
-      return { found: true, category: exact, file: readme, content: readFileSync8(join9(dir, readme), "utf8").slice(0, 20000) };
+      return { found: true, category: exact, file: readme, content: readFileSync9(join10(dir, readme), "utf8").slice(0, 20000) };
     }
     return { found: true, category: exact, files };
   }
   const f = files.find((x) => x.toLowerCase() === file.toLowerCase());
   if (!f)
     return { found: false, category: exact, file, suggestions: files };
-  return { found: true, category: exact, file: f, content: readFileSync8(join9(dir, f), "utf8").slice(0, 20000) };
+  return { found: true, category: exact, file: f, content: readFileSync9(join10(dir, f), "utf8").slice(0, 20000) };
 }
 function listFiles(dir) {
   try {
@@ -34675,7 +34892,7 @@ function countTemplates() {
     const walk = (dir) => {
       for (const e of readdirSync4(dir, { withFileTypes: true })) {
         if (e.isDirectory())
-          walk(join9(dir, e.name));
+          walk(join10(dir, e.name));
         else if (e.name.endsWith(".yaml"))
           n++;
       }
@@ -34700,14 +34917,14 @@ function templateLookup(topic, limit = 10) {
     }
     for (const e of entries) {
       if (e.isDirectory())
-        walk(join9(dir, e.name), depth + 1);
+        walk(join10(dir, e.name), depth + 1);
       else if (e.name.endsWith(".yaml")) {
         const name = e.name.toLowerCase();
         if (name.includes(key)) {
-          const full = join9(dir, e.name);
+          const full = join10(dir, e.name);
           let id = "";
           try {
-            const content = readFileSync8(full, "utf8");
+            const content = readFileSync9(full, "utf8");
             const m = content.match(/^\s*id:\s*(.+)$/m);
             if (m)
               id = m[1].trim();
@@ -35253,7 +35470,7 @@ function complianceSummary(cwes) {
 
 // src/report.ts
 import { writeFileSync as writeFileSync2, mkdirSync as mkdirSync5 } from "node:fs";
-import { join as join10 } from "node:path";
+import { join as join11 } from "node:path";
 import { homedir as homedir7 } from "node:os";
 var SEVERITY_METRICS = {
   critical: { AV: "N", AC: "L", PR: "N", UI: "N", S: "U", C: "H", I: "H", A: "H" },
@@ -35484,7 +35701,7 @@ function reportJson(findings, opts = {}) {
   };
   return JSON.stringify(payload, null, 2);
 }
-var REPORT_DIR = process.env.BLITZSTRIKE_REPORT_DIR ?? join10(homedir7(), ".blitzstrike", "reports");
+var REPORT_DIR = process.env.BLITZSTRIKE_REPORT_DIR ?? join11(homedir7(), ".blitzstrike", "reports");
 function slugify2(s) {
   const slug = s.toLowerCase().replace(/^https?:\/\//, "").replace(/[^a-z0-9.-]+/g, "-").replace(/^-+|-+$/g, "").replace(/\./g, "_").slice(0, 60);
   return slug || "engagement";
@@ -35495,7 +35712,7 @@ function saveReport(content, opts = {}) {
   const ts = new Date().toISOString().replace(/[:.]/g, "-").slice(0, 19);
   const ext = opts.format === "json" ? "json" : "md";
   const filename = `${slug}-${ts}.${ext}`;
-  const path = join10(REPORT_DIR, filename);
+  const path = join11(REPORT_DIR, filename);
   writeFileSync2(path, content, "utf8");
   return { path, dir: REPORT_DIR, filename };
 }
@@ -35564,14 +35781,14 @@ function findingReport(f) {
 }
 function perFindingReports(findings, opts = {}) {
   const slug = slugify2(opts.scope ?? opts.title ?? "engagement");
-  const dir = join10(REPORT_DIR, slug);
-  const findingsDir = join10(dir, "findings");
+  const dir = join11(REPORT_DIR, slug);
+  const findingsDir = join11(dir, "findings");
   mkdirSync5(findingsDir, { recursive: true });
   const files = [];
   for (const f of findings) {
     const sev = f.classification?.severity ?? "informational";
     const filename = `${sev}_${findingSlug(f.title)}.md`;
-    const path = join10(findingsDir, filename);
+    const path = join11(findingsDir, filename);
     writeFileSync2(path, findingReport(f), "utf8");
     files.push({ path, filename, severity: sev, title: f.title });
   }
@@ -35599,7 +35816,7 @@ function perFindingReports(findings, opts = {}) {
     summaryLines.push(`| ${i + 1} | ${fl.title} | ${fl.severity} | [${fl.filename}](findings/${fl.filename}) |`);
   });
   summaryLines.push("");
-  const summaryPath = join10(dir, "SUMMARY.md");
+  const summaryPath = join11(dir, "SUMMARY.md");
   writeFileSync2(summaryPath, summaryLines.join(`
 `), "utf8");
   const meta = {
@@ -35608,9 +35825,9 @@ function perFindingReports(findings, opts = {}) {
     version: opts.version ?? null,
     total_findings: findings.length,
     by_severity: bySeverity,
-    findings: files.map((fl) => ({ title: fl.title, severity: fl.severity, file: join10("findings", fl.filename) }))
+    findings: files.map((fl) => ({ title: fl.title, severity: fl.severity, file: join11("findings", fl.filename) }))
   };
-  const metadataPath = join10(dir, "metadata.json");
+  const metadataPath = join11(dir, "metadata.json");
   writeFileSync2(metadataPath, JSON.stringify(meta, null, 2) + `
 `, "utf8");
   return {
@@ -36247,9 +36464,9 @@ function loadChains() {
   if (_chainsCache)
     return _chainsCache;
   try {
-    const dir = join11(fileURLToPath5(new URL(".", import.meta.url)), "..");
-    const path = join11(dir, "chains.json");
-    const raw = JSON.parse(readFileSync9(path, "utf8"));
+    const dir = join12(fileURLToPath6(new URL(".", import.meta.url)), "..");
+    const path = join12(dir, "chains.json");
+    const raw = JSON.parse(readFileSync10(path, "utf8"));
     _chainsCache = raw.chains ?? [];
     return _chainsCache;
   } catch {
@@ -37019,6 +37236,9 @@ var CHAIN_ID_TO_ESCALATION = {
   xxe: "xxe_to_ssrf_and_file_read",
   deserialization: "deserialization_to_rce",
   jwt: "jwt_alg_confusion_forgery",
+  jwt_alg_confusion: "jwt_alg_confusion_forgery",
+  cache_deception: "cache_deception",
+  cache_poisoning: "cache_poisoning_xss",
   nosql_injection: "nosql_injection_to_data_theft",
   mass_assignment: "mass_assignment_to_admin_takeover",
   prototype_pollution: "prototype_pollution_to_rce",
@@ -37027,8 +37247,8 @@ var CHAIN_ID_TO_ESCALATION = {
 };
 function loadChainLinks() {
   try {
-    const dir = join11(fileURLToPath5(new URL(".", import.meta.url)), "..");
-    const data = JSON.parse(readFileSync9(join11(dir, "intelligence", "chain_links.json"), "utf8"));
+    const dir = join12(fileURLToPath6(new URL(".", import.meta.url)), "..");
+    const data = JSON.parse(readFileSync10(join12(dir, "intelligence", "chain_links.json"), "utf8"));
     return data.links ?? [];
   } catch {
     return [];
@@ -37184,18 +37404,18 @@ function compactState(phase, findings) {
 }
 
 // src/tasks.ts
-import { mkdirSync as mkdirSync6, readFileSync as readFileSync10, writeFileSync as writeFileSync3 } from "node:fs";
-import { join as join12 } from "node:path";
-import { fileURLToPath as fileURLToPath6 } from "node:url";
+import { mkdirSync as mkdirSync6, readFileSync as readFileSync11, writeFileSync as writeFileSync3 } from "node:fs";
+import { join as join13 } from "node:path";
+import { fileURLToPath as fileURLToPath7 } from "node:url";
 function tasksDir() {
-  return join12(fileURLToPath6(new URL(".", import.meta.url)), "..", ".blitzstrike", "tasks");
+  return join13(fileURLToPath7(new URL(".", import.meta.url)), "..", ".blitzstrike", "tasks");
 }
 function taskPath(id) {
-  return join12(tasksDir(), `${id}.json`);
+  return join13(tasksDir(), `${id}.json`);
 }
-function load(id) {
+function load2(id) {
   try {
-    return JSON.parse(readFileSync10(taskPath(id), "utf8"));
+    return JSON.parse(readFileSync11(taskPath(id), "utf8"));
   } catch {
     return null;
   }
@@ -37220,7 +37440,7 @@ function taskStart(id, objective, plan) {
   return { ...t, progress: `0/${plan.length}`, next: t.current_step };
 }
 function taskCheckpoint(id, step, status, note, outputHash) {
-  const t = load(id);
+  const t = load2(id);
   if (!t)
     return { ok: false, error: `task '${id}' not found — call task_start first` };
   t.checkpoints.push({ step, status, output_hash: outputHash, note, ts: Date.now() });
@@ -37246,7 +37466,7 @@ function taskCheckpoint(id, step, status, note, outputHash) {
   };
 }
 function taskStatus(id) {
-  const t = load(id);
+  const t = load2(id);
   if (!t)
     return { found: false, error: `task '${id}' not found` };
   const done = t.checkpoints.filter((c) => c.status === "done").length;
@@ -37262,7 +37482,7 @@ function taskStatus(id) {
   };
 }
 function taskResume(id) {
-  const t = load(id);
+  const t = load2(id);
   if (!t)
     return { found: false, error: `task '${id}' not found` };
   const doneSteps = t.checkpoints.filter((c) => c.status === "done").map((c) => c.step);
@@ -37535,16 +37755,16 @@ function scaffoldEngagement(target, scope = [], out_of_scope = []) {
 // src/incremental.ts
 import { execFileSync as execFileSync2 } from "node:child_process";
 import { writeFileSync as writeFileSync4, mkdtempSync, rmSync } from "node:fs";
-import { join as join13 } from "node:path";
+import { join as join14 } from "node:path";
 import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
 
 // src/eagle2.ts
 var import_php_parser2 = __toESM(require_src(), 1);
-import { readFileSync as readFileSync13 } from "node:fs";
+import { readFileSync as readFileSync14 } from "node:fs";
 
 // src/dataflow.ts
 init_scanner();
-import { readFileSync as readFileSync11 } from "node:fs";
+import { readFileSync as readFileSync12 } from "node:fs";
 var SOURCES = {
   $_GET: { id: "http_get", label: "HTTP GET parameter", attacker_controlled: true },
   $_POST: { id: "http_post", label: "HTTP POST body", attacker_controlled: true },
@@ -37629,7 +37849,7 @@ function traceDataFlow(path) {
     return result;
   let text;
   try {
-    text = readFileSync11(path, "utf8");
+    text = readFileSync12(path, "utf8");
   } catch {
     return result;
   }
@@ -37710,7 +37930,7 @@ init_scanner();
 
 // src/callgraph.ts
 var import_php_parser = __toESM(require_src(), 1);
-import { readFileSync as readFileSync12 } from "node:fs";
+import { readFileSync as readFileSync13 } from "node:fs";
 var parser = new import_php_parser.Engine({
   parser: { extractDoc: false, php7: true },
   ast: { withPositions: true, withSource: false }
@@ -37771,7 +37991,7 @@ function buildCallGraph(path) {
   const g = { nodes: new Map, edges: [] };
   let code;
   try {
-    code = readFileSync12(path, "utf8");
+    code = readFileSync13(path, "utf8");
   } catch {
     return g;
   }
@@ -38433,7 +38653,7 @@ function resolveFuncId(name, summaries) {
 function analyzeDataFlow2(path) {
   let cacheCode = "";
   try {
-    cacheCode = readFileSync13(path, "utf8");
+    cacheCode = readFileSync14(path, "utf8");
   } catch {}
   if (cacheCode) {
     const cached = getCache("eagle2", cacheCode);
@@ -38455,7 +38675,7 @@ function analyzeDataFlow2(path) {
   };
   let code;
   try {
-    code = cacheCode || readFileSync13(path, "utf8");
+    code = cacheCode || readFileSync14(path, "utf8");
   } catch {
     return result;
   }
@@ -57141,8 +57361,8 @@ function analyzeChangedFiles(repo, base = "HEAD~1", head = "HEAD") {
       continue;
     const lang = detectLanguage(file)?.language;
     if (lang === "php") {
-      const dir = mkdtempSync(join13(tmpdir(), "blitz-incr-"));
-      const tmp = join13(dir, "changed.php");
+      const dir = mkdtempSync(join14(tmpdir(), "blitz-incr-"));
+      const tmp = join14(dir, "changed.php");
       writeFileSync4(tmp, code);
       try {
         const r = analyzeDataFlow2(tmp);
@@ -57163,7 +57383,7 @@ function analyzeChangedFiles(repo, base = "HEAD~1", head = "HEAD") {
 // src/taint.ts
 init_scanner();
 var import_php_parser4 = __toESM(require_src(), 1);
-import { readFileSync as readFileSync14 } from "node:fs";
+import { readFileSync as readFileSync15 } from "node:fs";
 var parser4 = new import_php_parser4.Engine({
   parser: { extractDoc: false, php7: true },
   ast: { withPositions: true, withSource: false }
@@ -57461,7 +57681,7 @@ function analyzeTaint(path) {
   const result = { file: path, findings: [], suppressed: 0 };
   let code;
   try {
-    code = readFileSync14(path, "utf8");
+    code = readFileSync15(path, "utf8");
   } catch {
     return result;
   }
@@ -57555,15 +57775,15 @@ function taintTree(root, maxFiles = 2000) {
 }
 
 // src/differential.ts
-import { writeFileSync as writeFileSync5, rmSync as rmSync2, mkdtempSync as mkdtempSync2, readFileSync as readFileSync15 } from "node:fs";
-import { join as join14 } from "node:path";
+import { writeFileSync as writeFileSync5, rmSync as rmSync2, mkdtempSync as mkdtempSync2, readFileSync as readFileSync16 } from "node:fs";
+import { join as join15 } from "node:path";
 import { tmpdir as tmpdir2 } from "node:os";
 import { execFileSync as execFileSync3 } from "node:child_process";
 init_scanner();
 function runEngine(code, language, file) {
   if (language === "php") {
-    const dir = mkdtempSync2(join14(tmpdir2(), "blitz-diff-"));
-    const tmp = join14(dir, "old.php");
+    const dir = mkdtempSync2(join15(tmpdir2(), "blitz-diff-"));
+    const tmp = join15(dir, "old.php");
     writeFileSync5(tmp, code);
     try {
       const r = analyzeDataFlow2(tmp);
@@ -57717,8 +57937,8 @@ function languageOf(file) {
   return adapter?.language ?? "php";
 }
 function analyzeDifferentialFiles(oldPath, newPath, language) {
-  const oldCode = readFileSync15(oldPath, "utf8");
-  const newCode = readFileSync15(newPath, "utf8");
+  const oldCode = readFileSync16(oldPath, "utf8");
+  const newCode = readFileSync16(newPath, "utf8");
   const lang = language ?? languageOf(newPath);
   return analyzeDifferential(oldCode, newCode, lang, newPath);
 }
@@ -57845,46 +58065,46 @@ function analyzePatch(oldCode, newCode, language = "php") {
   };
 }
 function analyzePatchFiles(oldPath, newPath, language) {
-  const oldCode = readFileSync15(oldPath, "utf8");
-  const newCode = readFileSync15(newPath, "utf8");
+  const oldCode = readFileSync16(oldPath, "utf8");
+  const newCode = readFileSync16(newPath, "utf8");
   const lang = language ?? languageOf(newPath);
   return analyzePatch(oldCode, newCode, lang);
 }
 
 // src/frameworks.ts
-import { readFileSync as readFileSync16, existsSync as existsSync9 } from "node:fs";
-import { join as join15 } from "node:path";
-import { fileURLToPath as fileURLToPath7 } from "node:url";
-var ROOT4 = join15(fileURLToPath7(new URL(".", import.meta.url)), "..");
-var INTEL2 = join15(ROOT4, "intelligence");
+import { readFileSync as readFileSync17, existsSync as existsSync9 } from "node:fs";
+import { join as join16 } from "node:path";
+import { fileURLToPath as fileURLToPath8 } from "node:url";
+var ROOT4 = join16(fileURLToPath8(new URL(".", import.meta.url)), "..");
+var INTEL2 = join16(ROOT4, "intelligence");
 var cache = null;
-function load2() {
+function load3() {
   if (cache)
     return cache;
-  const p = join15(INTEL2, "frameworks.json");
+  const p = join16(INTEL2, "frameworks.json");
   if (!existsSync9(p))
     return null;
   try {
-    cache = JSON.parse(readFileSync16(p, "utf8"));
+    cache = JSON.parse(readFileSync17(p, "utf8"));
     return cache;
   } catch {
     return null;
   }
 }
 function listFrameworks() {
-  const data = load2();
+  const data = load3();
   if (!data)
     return [];
   return data.frameworks.map((f) => ({ id: f.id, name: f.name, language: f.language }));
 }
 function frameworkProfile(id) {
-  const data = load2();
+  const data = load3();
   if (!data)
     return null;
   return data.frameworks.find((f) => f.id === id) ?? null;
 }
 function detectFramework(code, language) {
-  const data = load2();
+  const data = load3();
   const hay = code.toLowerCase();
   const candidates = [];
   if (data) {
@@ -58373,185 +58593,6 @@ function nextSteps(ctx) {
   return steps;
 }
 
-// src/patterns.ts
-import { readFileSync as readFileSync17 } from "node:fs";
-import { join as join16, dirname as dirname2 } from "node:path";
-import { fileURLToPath as fileURLToPath8 } from "node:url";
-
-// src/synonyms.ts
-var ALIASES = {
-  idor: "missing_authz",
-  bola: "missing_authz",
-  "broken object level authorization": "missing_authz",
-  "insecure direct object reference": "missing_authz",
-  "broken access control": "missing_authz",
-  authorization: "missing_authz",
-  csrf: "missing_nonce",
-  xsrf: "missing_nonce",
-  "cross site request forgery": "missing_nonce",
-  "cross-site request forgery": "missing_nonce",
-  sqli: "sql_injection",
-  "sql injection": "sql_injection",
-  "sql-injection": "sql_injection",
-  ssti: "ssti",
-  "template injection": "ssti",
-  "server side template injection": "ssti",
-  xxe: "xxe",
-  "xml external entity": "xxe",
-  "xxe injection": "xxe",
-  bpla: "mass_assignment",
-  "broken property level authorization": "mass_assignment",
-  "mass assignment": "mass_assignment",
-  lfi: "path_confusion",
-  rfi: "path_confusion",
-  "path traversal": "path_confusion",
-  "directory traversal": "path_confusion",
-  "local file inclusion": "path_confusion",
-  "remote file inclusion": "path_confusion",
-  ssrf: "ssrf",
-  "server side request forgery": "ssrf",
-  "server-side request forgery": "ssrf",
-  "prompt injection": "llm_injection",
-  llm: "llm_injection",
-  llm01: "llm_injection",
-  "llm prompt injection": "llm_injection",
-  graphql: "graphql_exposure",
-  oauth: "oauth_misconfig",
-  "open redirect": "oauth_misconfig",
-  grpc: "grpc_reflection",
-  "hardcoded credential": "hardcoded_secret",
-  "hardcoded secret": "hardcoded_secret",
-  "credential leak": "hardcoded_secret",
-  "hard coded credentials": "hardcoded_secret",
-  "priv esc": "priv_esc",
-  privesc: "priv_esc",
-  "privilege escalation": "priv_esc",
-  "file upload": "file_upload",
-  "unrestricted upload": "file_upload",
-  "unrestricted file upload": "file_upload",
-  deserialization: "deserialization",
-  "insecure deserialization": "deserialization",
-  unserialize: "deserialization",
-  "type juggling": "type_juggling",
-  "php type juggling": "type_juggling",
-  "prototype pollution": "prototype_pollution",
-  crlf: "crlf_injection",
-  "header injection": "crlf_injection",
-  "http response splitting": "crlf_injection",
-  "wrong sanitizer": "wrong_sanitizer",
-  "wrong context sanitization": "wrong_sanitizer",
-  "dependency confusion": "dependency_confusion",
-  "dep confusion": "dependency_confusion",
-  "supply chain": "dependency_confusion",
-  "supply chain attack": "dependency_confusion",
-  "ml supply chain": "ml_supply_chain",
-  "ai supply chain": "ml_supply_chain",
-  "model poisoning": "ml_supply_chain",
-  "ml security": "ml_supply_chain",
-  "ai ml security": "ml_supply_chain",
-  "rust unsafe": "rust_unsafe",
-  "unsafe rust": "rust_unsafe",
-  "rust memory safety": "rust_unsafe",
-  transmute: "rust_unsafe",
-  "rust format string": "rust_format_string",
-  "format string": "rust_format_string",
-  "format string injection": "rust_format_string",
-  "jwt algorithm confusion": "jwt_alg_confusion",
-  "jwt alg confusion": "jwt_alg_confusion",
-  "alg confusion": "jwt_alg_confusion",
-  "rs256 hs256": "jwt_alg_confusion",
-  "web cache deception": "cache_deception",
-  "cache deception": "cache_deception",
-  "cache poisoning": "cache_deception",
-  "cache key injection": "cache_deception"
-};
-function normalize(term) {
-  return term.trim().toLowerCase().replace(/[_-]+/g, " ").replace(/\s+/g, " ").trim();
-}
-function canonicalId(term) {
-  const key = normalize(term);
-  if (ALIASES[key])
-    return ALIASES[key];
-  return key.replace(/ /g, "_");
-}
-function synonymsFor(term) {
-  const canonical = canonicalId(term);
-  const aliases = Object.entries(ALIASES).filter(([, v]) => v === canonical).map(([k]) => k);
-  return { canonical, aliases };
-}
-function listAliases() {
-  return Object.entries(ALIASES).map(([alias, canonical]) => ({ alias, canonical }));
-}
-
-// src/patterns.ts
-var __dirname2 = dirname2(fileURLToPath8(import.meta.url));
-var _doc = null;
-function load3() {
-  if (_doc)
-    return _doc;
-  try {
-    _doc = JSON.parse(readFileSync17(join16(__dirname2, "..", "intelligence", "patterns.json"), "utf8"));
-  } catch {
-    _doc = { patterns: [] };
-  }
-  return _doc;
-}
-function patternLookup(id) {
-  const canonical = canonicalId(id);
-  const p = load3().patterns.find((x) => x.id === canonical);
-  return p ?? null;
-}
-function listPatterns() {
-  return load3().patterns;
-}
-function submissionGate(input) {
-  const questions = [
-    {
-      q: "Reproducible — a copy-paste-ready request or step list triggers it?",
-      pass: input.reproducible === true,
-      reason: "Without an exact reproduction the finding is a hypothesis, not a result."
-    },
-    {
-      q: "In scope — the vulnerable asset is in the engagement scope?",
-      pass: input.in_scope === true,
-      reason: "Out-of-scope assets must not be submitted."
-    },
-    {
-      q: "Real impact — maps to an accepted-impact class, not informational?",
-      pass: input.real_impact === true,
-      reason: "Informational-only findings dilute the validity ratio."
-    },
-    {
-      q: "No privileged assumption — works without unrealistic attacker prerequisites?",
-      pass: input.no_privileged_assumption === true,
-      reason: "'Admin can do X' is a centralization risk, not a vulnerability."
-    },
-    {
-      q: "Verified live — confirmed with a marker + negative control, not just a static hint?",
-      pass: input.verified_live === true,
-      reason: "A static hit is a hypothesis until verified live (strike_verify / browser_validate)."
-    },
-    {
-      q: "Evidence attached AND redacted — secrets/PII stripped, integrity-tagged?",
-      pass: input.evidence_redacted === true,
-      reason: "Evidence must carry SHA-256-tagged, redacted records — no leaked secrets or victim PII."
-    },
-    {
-      q: "Severity derived — CVSS/confidence computed, not guessed?",
-      pass: input.severity_derived === true,
-      reason: "Severity is not confidence; derive it, don't assert it."
-    }
-  ];
-  const failed = questions.find((q) => !q.pass);
-  return {
-    verdict: failed ? "fail" : "pass",
-    passed: questions.filter((q) => q.pass).length,
-    total: questions.length,
-    questions,
-    ...failed ? { blocker: failed.q } : {}
-  };
-}
-
 // src/git-history.ts
 init_complex_bugs();
 import { execFileSync as execFileSync4 } from "node:child_process";
@@ -60393,7 +60434,7 @@ function createServer() {
 ` + `- A hard block (Cloudflare/WAF/IP-block/captcha) is NOT the end: mark the finding blocked + note the required vantage (residential / authorized / correct-SNI / --resolve direct-to-origin), then CONTINUE to the next lead (origin bypass, non-prod cluster, mobile APK, subdomain).
 ` + `- Keep trying every lead AND every chain step until each is verified/executed or blocked, THEN generate_report. Never deliver a bare surface map, and never stop at 'found X' when X enables more.
 
-` + "TWO PATHS:\\n" + "- Source path on disk -> blitz_scan / taint_file / eagle_eye2 (static).\\n" + "- Live URL -> live_recon / active_scan / strike_verify (web-hunting).\\n\\n" + "DEEPEN A FINDING: attack_plan(target, tech, params) to get the prioritized vector plan (decide what to test next with data); list_chains (escalation), chain_links (compose), technique_lookup(cls), payload_lookup, bypass_lookup (blocked). Ground any detector hit empirically with pattern_lookup(id) — it returns the class's CWE, real-world signature, escalation chains, citable references, per-class bypass techniques, and the high-value assets (crown jewels) that class hits, so a raw hit becomes a class-aware finding. Resolve free-form terminology first with synonym_lookup(term) (IDOR/BOLA/SQLi/prompt-injection → canonical id). For an llm_injection hit, its pattern carries a validation discipline — the RUN-TWICE RULE (reproduce token-for-token across two fresh sessions), NON-GUESSABLE ANCHOR (must leak a real key/URL, not a plausible guess), and OOB PROOF (a verifiable callback log) — apply all three before reporting. BEFORE generating a report, run submission_gate(...) and only ship a finding that passes all 7 questions (reproducible, in-scope, real-impact, no-privileged-assumption, verified-live, evidence-redacted, severity-derived); one false = kill it. Calibrate severity with severity_calibrate(type, cvss) to get a P1–P5 tier + VRT-style category. Start each engagement with engagement_scaffold(target, scope) for the folder + scope.md structure, and check data_refresh() to confirm the data layers are consistent. Phase doctrine: read_skill(bs-orchestrate-engagement | bs-web-hunting | bs-source-audit | bs-verify-finding). Campaign plan: read_playbook(target-type). On any failure call retry_guidance(signal) / model_fallback(signal) before giving up.\n" + "KNOWLEDGE BASE (discover, don't guess): skillLookup(topic) / listSkills for the 40 attack-path + hunting skills (ap-*, hp-*, bs-*); list_attack_vectors / attack_vectors(cat) for the 34-category vector taxonomy; taxonomy(kind) for OWASP/CWE/ASVS/API-top-10; read_playbook(type) for the 17 campaign playbooks; list_manuals / read_tool_manual for 317 tool references; list_tools / run_catalog_tool for the 141-tool catalog. Every tool, skill, and data layer is reachable from these. CROSS-TARGET INTELLIGENCE: strike_resolve auto-records confirmed/false_positive verdicts into the empirical ledger; query it with intelligence(action=hit_rates/top_vectors/recall) so a new target on a known tech inherits historical hit-rates (attack_plan already blends them into success_probability). intelligence(action=recall, tech, target) is the per-engagement pattern recall — it returns which patterns historically CONFIRMED on that tech (prioritize them) versus which only ever produced false positives (avoid them), so a new engagement starts from the empirical playbook of past ones. LIVE PENTEST + TARGETING (black-box, WAF-safe): cache_gap(base_url, endpoint) fuzzes path-normalization + static-extension variants for cache deception/poisoning; blind_oracle(base_url, param, value) detects which SINK a param reaches (sql/ssti/xss) via benign arithmetic (id=1+0, test${7*7}) WITHOUT a malicious payload; param_precedence(base_url, param, A, B) maps duplicate-parameter precedence (first/last-wins) for WAF-bypass. SOURCE TARGETING: action_surface(code) maps every wp_ajax_* action to its vuln class + DERIVED priority (what to look for WHERE); security_state(sanitizers, sink) gives a wrong-context sanitization verdict; framework_knowledge(framework) returns auth/nonce primitives for 9 frameworks; variant_scan(root, signature) mass-sweeps an install base for ONE bug family; patch_analyze(old, new) REVERSES a security patch into the 0-day, and its mine_signature feeds variant_scan to sweep unpatched copies. All of these are DETECTION HINTS — verify each live (strike_verify / browser_validate) before it enters the report. NEWEST DETECTORS — understand AND try them: variant_scan also emits priv_esc (privilege escalation — a role/capability/user change fed by request input, traced cross-file via reverse call-graph, e.g. set_role($id, sanitize_key($_POST['um-role'])) or update_user_meta(...,'wp_capabilities', $_POST[...])) and flags uploadAllow=>array('all') unrestricted-upload configs as file_upload (the file-manager/connector shape). TO TRY a priv_esc hit: submit the role field with 'administrator' (or send wp_capabilities meta) and confirm the account actually gains admin. TO TRY an unrestricted-upload hit: POST a .php/.phtml and confirm it lands web-reachable + executes. variant_scan also emits hardcoded_secret (CWE-798) in three tiers: a secret field (api_key/db_password/access_token/aws_*) assigned a literal (HIGH), a known secret FORMAT (JWT eyJ…/AWS AKIA…/GitHub ghp_…/Slack xoxb-…/…) regardless of name (HIGH), or a high-entropy suspect token (MEDIUM — verify before reporting). Verify a frontend/JS secret live via drive_devtools (inspect the JS bundle / network response and confirm the key is actually exposed), and for a backend secret confirm it is reachable/valid. A static hit is a HYPOTHESIS until verified live — never report unverified. For a repo, also scan_git_history(root) — secrets DELETED from HEAD still live in .git history (the removed-later-is-not-fixed trap), and it feeds every recovered pre-deletion blob through the same secret detector. Once you recover a credential, prove it is still ACTIVE with validate_leaked_key(apiBase, endpoints, key|blobUrl) — a READ-ONLY differential test (401-without-key vs 200-with-key = auth bypass PROVEN). Two supply-chain detectors: dependency_confusion (a manifest/build file resolving a package from a public registry — pypi.org/npmjs.org --extra-index-url, or a scoped @company/pkg with no private registry) and ml_supply_chain (torch.load without weights_only=True / joblib.load / np.load(allow_pickle=True) / keras load_model on an untrusted model → pickle RCE). Rust is supported end-to-end: the taint engine (blitz_scan / taint_file) maps Rust sinks (std::process::Command, sqlx/diesel, reqwest/hyper, std::fs, serde/bincode) to the classic classes, plus two Rust-specific detectors — rust_unsafe (transmute / assume_init / from_raw_parts / ptr::* — memory-unsafety surface, CWE-119) and rust_format_string (println!/format! with a variable as the format string — CWE-134). The sqlx query! compile-time macro is treated as safe (suppressed).\n" + `PRECISION ANALYSIS — chrome-devtools MCP is MANDATORY, not optional:
+` + "TWO PATHS:\\n" + "- Source path on disk -> blitz_scan / taint_file / eagle_eye2 (static).\\n" + "- Live URL -> live_recon / active_scan / strike_verify (web-hunting).\\n\\n" + "DEEPEN A FINDING: attack_plan(target, tech, params) to get the prioritized vector plan (decide what to test next with data); list_chains (escalation), chain_links (compose), technique_lookup(cls), payload_lookup, bypass_lookup (blocked). Ground any detector hit empirically with pattern_lookup(id) — it returns the class's CWE, real-world signature, escalation chains, citable references, per-class bypass techniques, and the high-value assets (crown jewels) that class hits, so a raw hit becomes a class-aware finding. Resolve free-form terminology first with synonym_lookup(term) (IDOR/BOLA/SQLi/prompt-injection → canonical id). For an llm_injection hit, its pattern carries a validation discipline — the RUN-TWICE RULE (reproduce token-for-token across two fresh sessions), NON-GUESSABLE ANCHOR (must leak a real key/URL, not a plausible guess), and OOB PROOF (a verifiable callback log) — apply all three before reporting. BEFORE generating a report, run submission_gate(...) and only ship a finding that passes all 7 questions (reproducible, in-scope, real-impact, no-privileged-assumption, verified-live, evidence-redacted, severity-derived); one false = kill it. Calibrate severity with severity_calibrate(type, cvss) to get a P1–P5 tier + VRT-style category. Start each engagement with engagement_scaffold(target, scope) for the folder + scope.md structure, and check data_refresh() to confirm the data layers are consistent. Phase doctrine: read_skill(bs-orchestrate-engagement | bs-web-hunting | bs-source-audit | bs-verify-finding). Campaign plan: read_playbook(target-type). On any failure call retry_guidance(signal) / model_fallback(signal) before giving up.\n" + "KNOWLEDGE BASE (discover, don't guess): skillLookup(topic) / listSkills for the 40 attack-path + hunting skills (ap-*, hp-*, bs-*); list_attack_vectors / attack_vectors(cat) for the 34-category vector taxonomy; taxonomy(kind) for OWASP/CWE/ASVS/API-top-10; read_playbook(type) for the 17 campaign playbooks; list_manuals / read_tool_manual for 317 tool references; list_tools / run_catalog_tool for the 141-tool catalog. Every tool, skill, and data layer is reachable from these. CROSS-TARGET INTELLIGENCE: strike_resolve auto-records confirmed/false_positive verdicts into the empirical ledger; query it with intelligence(action=hit_rates/top_vectors/recall) so a new target on a known tech inherits historical hit-rates (attack_plan already blends them into success_probability). intelligence(action=recall, tech, target) is the per-engagement pattern recall — it returns which patterns historically CONFIRMED on that tech (prioritize them) versus which only ever produced false positives (avoid them), so a new engagement starts from the empirical playbook of past ones. LIVE PENTEST + TARGETING (black-box, WAF-safe): cache_gap(base_url, endpoint) fuzzes path-normalization + static-extension variants for cache deception/poisoning; blind_oracle(base_url, param, value) detects which SINK a param reaches (sql/ssti/xss) via benign arithmetic (id=1+0, test${7*7}) WITHOUT a malicious payload; param_precedence(base_url, param, A, B) maps duplicate-parameter precedence (first/last-wins) for WAF-bypass. SOURCE TARGETING: action_surface(code) maps every wp_ajax_* action to its vuln class + DERIVED priority (what to look for WHERE); security_state(sanitizers, sink) gives a wrong-context sanitization verdict; framework_knowledge(framework) returns auth/nonce primitives for 9 frameworks; variant_scan(root, signature) mass-sweeps an install base for ONE bug family; patch_analyze(old, new) REVERSES a security patch into the 0-day, and its mine_signature feeds variant_scan to sweep unpatched copies. All of these are DETECTION HINTS — verify each live (strike_verify / browser_validate) before it enters the report. NEWEST DETECTORS — understand AND try them: variant_scan also emits priv_esc (privilege escalation — a role/capability/user change fed by request input, traced cross-file via reverse call-graph, e.g. set_role($id, sanitize_key($_POST['um-role'])) or update_user_meta(...,'wp_capabilities', $_POST[...])) and flags uploadAllow=>array('all') unrestricted-upload configs as file_upload (the file-manager/connector shape). TO TRY a priv_esc hit: submit the role field with 'administrator' (or send wp_capabilities meta) and confirm the account actually gains admin. TO TRY an unrestricted-upload hit: POST a .php/.phtml and confirm it lands web-reachable + executes. variant_scan also emits hardcoded_secret (CWE-798) in three tiers: a secret field (api_key/db_password/access_token/aws_*) assigned a literal (HIGH), a known secret FORMAT (JWT eyJ…/AWS AKIA…/GitHub ghp_…/Slack xoxb-…/…) regardless of name (HIGH), or a high-entropy suspect token (MEDIUM — verify before reporting). Verify a frontend/JS secret live via drive_devtools (inspect the JS bundle / network response and confirm the key is actually exposed), and for a backend secret confirm it is reachable/valid. A static hit is a HYPOTHESIS until verified live — never report unverified. For a repo, also scan_git_history(root) — secrets DELETED from HEAD still live in .git history (the removed-later-is-not-fixed trap), and it feeds every recovered pre-deletion blob through the same secret detector. Once you recover a credential, prove it is still ACTIVE with validate_leaked_key(apiBase, endpoints, key|blobUrl) — a READ-ONLY differential test (401-without-key vs 200-with-key = auth bypass PROVEN). Two supply-chain detectors: dependency_confusion (a manifest/build file resolving a package from a public registry — pypi.org/npmjs.org --extra-index-url, or a scoped @company/pkg with no private registry) and ml_supply_chain (torch.load without weights_only=True / joblib.load / np.load(allow_pickle=True) / keras load_model on an untrusted model → pickle RCE). Rust is supported end-to-end: the taint engine (blitz_scan / taint_file) maps Rust sinks (std::process::Command, sqlx/diesel, reqwest/hyper, std::fs, serde/bincode) to the classic classes, plus two Rust-specific detectors — rust_unsafe (transmute / assume_init / from_raw_parts / ptr::* — memory-unsafety surface, CWE-119) and rust_format_string (println!/format! with a variable as the format string — CWE-134). The sqlx query! compile-time macro is treated as safe (suppressed). Two more web-class detectors: jwt_alg_confusion (a JWT verifier that dispatches on the token's alg header and accepts BOTH RS256 and HS256, with the HS256 HMAC secret derived from public/shared key material — CWE-347; the attacker sets alg=HS256 and signs with the public key to forge admin tokens) and cache_deception (a reverse proxy caching static-extension URLs with a cache key that omits the session cookie, over a session-authenticated backend — CWE-525; the victim's cached private response is re-fetched anonymously). TO TRY a jwt_alg_confusion hit: fetch the public key (/.well-known/jwks.json), forge an HS256 token signed with that public key, and confirm admin access. TO TRY a cache_deception hit: request an authenticated path with a static extension appended (.css/.js) and re-fetch it anonymously.\n" + `PRECISION ANALYSIS — chrome-devtools MCP is MANDATORY, not optional:
 ` + `- When a lead needs DOM/JS precision — DOM-XSS sink execution, AJAX endpoint + payload interception, JS runtime errors, redirect chains, SSO/token flow, or anything a static HTML glance cannot prove — call drive_devtools(target). It spawns chrome-devtools-mcp and drives a REAL headless browser (navigate -> list_network_requests -> list_console_messages -> evaluate_script), giving reproducible evidence instead of a guess.
 ` + `- Before calling it, check_mcp() to confirm the browser MCP is available; if not, blitzstrike install-tools or npm i -g chrome-devtools-mcp. Never substitute eyeballing minified JS or a static sink guess when a live browser can PROVE it. This is the precision + consistency layer.
 ` + "EXTERNAL MCP SERVERS (verified, connect them — NOT one-shot CLIs): chrome-devtools-mcp (29 tools: list_network_requests/get_network_request for raw HTTP interception, list_console_messages for JS errors + DOM-XSS, evaluate_script to run JS, take_screenshot) -> stdio chrome-devtools-mcp --headless --chromeArg=--no-sandbox --chromeArg=--disable-gpu (as root/container this is MANDATORY or the browser crashes; add --proxyServer http://127.0.0.1:8080 to route through Burp, --acceptInsecureCerts for bad TLS). burp-suite-mcp (proxy history + active scan + repeater) -> NOT npm: build the JAR (git clone https://github.com/PortSwigger/mcp-server.git && cd mcp-server && ./gradlew embedProxyJar), load it in Burp Extensions, then connect the client to http://127.0.0.1:9876 (SSE) or the stdio proxy java -jar mcp-proxy-all.jar --sse-url http://127.0.0.1:9876."
@@ -60753,7 +60794,7 @@ ${statusLine}` : statusLine },
   });
   server.registerTool("pattern_lookup", {
     title: "Empirical pattern lookup",
-    description: "GROUNDING: return the empirical grounding for a detector type / vuln class — its CWE, its real-world signature, the escalation chains it composes into (cross-ref chains.json), and citable references. Use to turn a raw detector hit into a grounded, class-aware finding. Pass 'list' to enumerate all grounded classes.",
+    description: "GROUNDING: return the empirical grounding for a detector type / vuln class — its CWE, its real-world signature, the escalation chains it composes into (cross-ref chains.json), citable references, and its typical bug-bounty payout range (typical_payout / payout_min / payout_max) for impact-first prioritization. Use to turn a raw detector hit into a grounded, class-aware finding. Pass 'list' to enumerate all grounded classes.",
     inputSchema: {
       id: string2().describe("Detector/vuln class id (sql_injection, ssrf, idor-like missing_authz, …), or 'list'")
     }