blitzstrike 2.4.61 → 2.4.63

package/intelligence/patterns.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "$schema": "blitzstrike-patterns-v1",
-  "version": "1.0.0",
-  "_comment": "Empirical grounding layer. Every detector type is traced to its real-world bug class (CWE), its real-world signature, the chains it composes into (cross-ref chains.json), and a citable reference. Detection is derived from this data, never hardcoded. References are public standards (CWE/OWASP) and disclosed-report classes — no vendor/product framing.",
+  "version": "1.1.0",
+  "_comment": "Empirical grounding layer. Every detector type is traced to its real-world bug class (CWE), its real-world signature, the chains it composes into (cross-ref chains.json), citable references, per-class bypass techniques, and the high-value assets (crown jewels) that class typically hits. Detection is derived from this data, never hardcoded. References are public standards (CWE/OWASP) and disclosed-report classes — no vendor/product framing.",
   "patterns": [
     {
       "id": "sql_injection",
@@ -10,7 +10,9 @@
       "real_world": "User input is interpolated into a SQL query by string concatenation instead of parameterization. The single most-reported web class; real disclosures range from boolean/UNION extraction to stacked queries for admin takeover.",
       "detection_signatures": ["raw string-interpolated query into a SQL sink", "no prepare()/parameterization", "cross-file: concatenated variable with no visible source"],
       "chain_templates": ["sqli_to_rce", "sqli_to_hash_dump_and_crack", "sql_injection_to_rce", "second_order_sqli"],
-      "references": ["CWE-89", "OWASP A03:2021 Injection"]
+      "references": ["CWE-89", "OWASP A03:2021 Injection"],
+      "bypass_techniques": ["comment/whitespace obfuscation to slip past keyword filters", "hex + double-URL encoding of payloads", "second-order: store payload, trigger on a later read", "time-based blind when output is suppressed", "chunked/case-mangled keywords"],
+      "crown_jewels": ["credential + session tables", "admin/role tables", "PII and financial records", "password-hash dumps for offline cracking"]
     },
     {
       "id": "ssrf",
@@ -19,7 +21,9 @@
       "real_world": "A server fetches an attacker-supplied URL with no host allowlist, letting it reach cloud metadata endpoints, internal services, or the loopback interface.",
       "detection_signatures": ["server-side fetch of a request-controlled URL", "no host/allowlist validation"],
       "chain_templates": ["ssrf_cloud_metadata", "ssrf_to_redis_rce", "blind_ssrf_to_oob_exfil"],
-      "references": ["CWE-918", "OWASP A10:2021 SSRF"]
+      "references": ["CWE-918", "OWASP A10:2021 SSRF"],
+      "bypass_techniques": ["DNS rebinding to pass host checks", "decimal/octal/hex + IPv6 IP encodings", "redirect chains to a blocklisted host", "gopher/dict/file URL schemes", "localhost aliases (0, 127.1, ::1)"],
+      "crown_jewels": ["cloud metadata (169.254.169.254) for instance credentials", "internal admin panels + APIs", "internal Redis/DB/Elasticsearch", "cloud IAM / STS AssumeRole endpoints"]
     },
     {
       "id": "ssti",
@@ -28,7 +32,9 @@
       "real_world": "User input reaches a template engine (Jinja2, Twig, Freemarker, ERB, …) that evaluates expressions, yielding code execution via template syntax like {{7*7}}.",
       "detection_signatures": ["template render of request input", "expression evaluation in a template engine"],
       "chain_templates": ["ssti_template_injection_rce", "ssti_to_full_rce"],
-      "references": ["CWE-1336", "OWASP A03:2021 Injection"]
+      "references": ["CWE-1336", "OWASP A03:2021 Injection"],
+      "bypass_techniques": ["sandbox escape via attribute/object introspection", "unicode/alternate delimiter to dodge input filters", "chaining globals/locals to reach builtins", "engine-specific escapes (Jinja2 → Python, Twig → PHP)"],
+      "crown_jewels": ["direct RCE", "config files + secrets", "template/partials with injected backdoors"]
     },
     {
       "id": "xxe",
@@ -37,7 +43,9 @@
       "real_world": "An XML parser resolves external entities, letting an attacker read local files or hit internal URLs via DOCTYPE entity definitions.",
       "detection_signatures": ["XML parse without disabling external entities", "DOCTYPE/ENTITY processing"],
       "chain_templates": ["xxe_to_ssrf_and_file_read"],
-      "references": ["CWE-611", "OWASP A03:2021 Injection"]
+      "references": ["CWE-611", "OWASP A03:2021 Injection"],
+      "bypass_techniques": ["parameter entities + external DTD for blind exfiltration", "OOB (out-of-band) via FTP/HTTP entity callbacks", "UTF-7/UTF-16 encodings to dodge ASCII filters", "XInclude when DOCTYPE is blocked"],
+      "crown_jewels": ["local files (/etc/passwd, app keys, .env)", "internal SSRF via entity", "cloud metadata via file:// + SSRF chain"]
     },
     {
       "id": "deserialization",
@@ -46,7 +54,9 @@
       "real_world": "Attacker-controlled serialized data is deserialized and escalated through a magic-method gadget chain (__destruct/__wakeup/__toString) into code execution or object injection.",
       "detection_signatures": ["unserialize()/pickle.loads/yaml.load of request data", "a magic-method gadget in scope"],
       "chain_templates": ["deserialization_pop_chain", "deserialization_to_rce", "appkey_leak_deserialization_rce"],
-      "references": ["CWE-502", "OWASP A08:2021 Software and Data Integrity Failures"]
+      "references": ["CWE-502", "OWASP A08:2021 Software and Data Integrity Failures"],
+      "bypass_techniques": ["custom gadget chains for the app's own classes", "phar:// stream wrappers to trigger unserialize", "wrapper formats (pickle, yaml, jsonpickle)", "encrypted-session forgery once a secret leaks"],
+      "crown_jewels": ["RCE via gadget chain", "session/cookie forgery", "admin object injection"]
     },
     {
       "id": "type_juggling",
@@ -55,7 +65,9 @@
       "real_world": "A loose comparison (==) between user input and a hash/secret collapses via the 0e magic-hash or numeric-string coercion, bypassing authentication.",
       "detection_signatures": ["loose comparison == of user input against a secret/hash", "0e-prefixed or numeric-string coercion"],
       "chain_templates": ["php_type_juggling_auth_bypass"],
-      "references": ["CWE-697", "OWASP A07:2021 Identification and Authentication Failures"]
+      "references": ["CWE-697", "OWASP A07:2021 Identification and Authentication Failures"],
+      "bypass_techniques": ["0e magic hashes (0e1234… == 0e5678…)", "numeric-string coercion (\"1admin\" == 1)", "array comparison (array() == false)", "null/empty-string coercion"],
+      "crown_jewels": ["authentication bypass", "session/cookie validation bypass", "API token check bypass"]
     },
     {
       "id": "mass_assignment",
@@ -64,7 +76,9 @@
       "real_world": "Request data is bound to model fields without an allowlist (extract()/parse_str/framework mass-assign), letting an attacker set privileged fields like role or is_admin.",
       "detection_signatures": ["extract()/parse_str of request data without a safe flag", "model binding without an allowlist"],
       "chain_templates": ["mass_assignment_to_admin_takeover", "extract_variable_injection_lfi"],
-      "references": ["CWE-915", "OWASP API6:2023 Unrestricted Access to Sensitive Business Flows"]
+      "references": ["CWE-915", "OWASP API6:2023 Unrestricted Access to Sensitive Business Flows"],
+      "bypass_techniques": ["nested/array parameters to reach guarded fields", "JSON body field injection", "adding is_admin/role/verified fields to a request", "framework default mass-assign without allowlist"],
+      "crown_jewels": ["role / is_admin / is_verified flags", "subscription tier + pricing fields", "account ownership / org membership"]
     },
     {
       "id": "prototype_pollution",
@@ -73,7 +87,9 @@
       "real_world": "A deep merge of request data into an object pollutes Object.prototype, corrupting logic and escalating to code execution in gadget-heavy runtimes.",
       "detection_signatures": ["deep merge/extend of request data into objects", "__proto__ / constructor.prototype assignment"],
       "chain_templates": ["prototype_pollution_to_rce"],
-      "references": ["CWE-1321"]
+      "references": ["CWE-1321"],
+      "bypass_techniques": ["__proto__ via constructor.prototype aliases", "array-key pollution to reach the merge", "gadget chaining to RCE", "property injection to bypass auth/ACL"],
+      "crown_jewels": ["RCE gadgets (child_process, template engines)", "authentication/ACL bypass", "XSS or property-injection escalation"]
     },
     {
       "id": "crlf_injection",
@@ -82,7 +98,9 @@
       "real_world": "Request-controlled newlines are written into an HTTP header, enabling response splitting, cookie injection, or cache poisoning.",
       "detection_signatures": ["request input reaches a header without CR/LF stripping"],
       "chain_templates": ["cache_poisoning_xss", "cache_poison_to_stored_xss"],
-      "references": ["CWE-93", "OWASP A03:2021 Injection"]
+      "references": ["CWE-93", "OWASP A03:2021 Injection"],
+      "bypass_techniques": ["double-URL-encoded %0d%0a", "unicode line separators (U+2028/U+2029)", "header smuggling via folded headers"],
+      "crown_jewels": ["Set-Cookie injection → session fixation", "response splitting → XSS", "cache poisoning → stored XSS"]
     },
     {
       "id": "path_confusion",
@@ -91,7 +109,9 @@
       "real_world": "A request-controlled path is normalized or resolved without confinement (../, %2e%2e, absolute paths), reading or writing files outside the intended directory.",
       "detection_signatures": ["request input reaches a file path without confinement"],
       "chain_templates": ["path_traversal_file_write", "path_traversal_to_credential_theft", "lfi_log_poison_rce", "lfi_to_rce_via_log_poisoning"],
-      "references": ["CWE-22", "OWASP A01:2021 Broken Access Control"]
+      "references": ["CWE-22", "OWASP A01:2021 Broken Access Control"],
+      "bypass_techniques": ["null-byte truncation (legacy PHP)", "double encoding %252e%252e%252f", "unicode + absolute-path variants", "symlink / wildcard resolution", "log-poisoning to turn LFI into RCE"],
+      "crown_jewels": ["config files + .env + private keys", "/etc/passwd and shadow", "source code for further audit", "writable dirs for a shell drop"]
     },
     {
       "id": "wrong_sanitizer",
@@ -100,7 +120,9 @@
       "real_world": "A value is sanitized for one context (e.g. HTML) but reaches a sink that needs a different context (e.g. SQL), so the sanitizer provides no real protection.",
       "detection_signatures": ["a sanitizer/validator for context X feeding a sink that requires context Y"],
       "chain_templates": ["second_order_sqli"],
-      "references": ["CWE-20", "OWASP A03:2021 Injection"]
+      "references": ["CWE-20", "OWASP A03:2021 Injection"],
+      "bypass_techniques": ["context mismatch (HTML-escape then SQL, or vice-versa)", "double encoding to survive a single decode", "sanitizer that misses alternate encodings"],
+      "crown_jewels": ["downstream injection (SQLi/XSS/RCE)", "stored data that re-enters a different sink"]
     },
     {
       "id": "missing_authz",
@@ -109,7 +131,9 @@
       "real_world": "A state-changing handler lacks a capability/ownership check, letting an unauthenticated or low-privilege caller perform an admin action.",
       "detection_signatures": ["state-changing operation with no current_user_can/is_user_logged_in check"],
       "chain_templates": ["idor_to_admin_takeover", "mass_assignment_to_admin_takeover", "idor_object_reference"],
-      "references": ["CWE-862", "OWASP A01:2021 Broken Access Control"]
+      "references": ["CWE-862", "OWASP A01:2021 Broken Access Control"],
+      "bypass_techniques": ["HTTP verb tampering (GET vs POST vs PUT)", "sequential/UUID/guessable object-ID enumeration", "cross-tenant / cross-org ID swapping", "header-based authz spoofing"],
+      "crown_jewels": ["cross-tenant data + employee PII", "admin/moderator endpoints", "financial documents + billing APIs", "org/account management actions"]
     },
     {
       "id": "missing_nonce",
@@ -118,7 +142,9 @@
       "real_world": "A state-changing action lacks an anti-CSRF token, letting a victim's browser perform the action on their behalf via a forged request.",
       "detection_signatures": ["state-changing operation with no nonce/referer verification"],
       "chain_templates": ["nonce_harvest_auth_bypass"],
-      "references": ["CWE-352", "OWASP A01:2021 Broken Access Control"]
+      "references": ["CWE-352", "OWASP A01:2021 Broken Access Control"],
+      "bypass_techniques": ["empty/null token accepted", "predictable or reusable tokens", "verb switching to skip the check", "referer/Origin header spoofing or absence"],
+      "crown_jewels": ["password/email change", "money transfer / payment actions", "admin config changes"]
     },
     {
       "id": "file_upload",
@@ -127,7 +153,9 @@
       "real_world": "A file is uploaded with an attacker-controlled name/extension and no server-side filetype whitelist, landing web-reachable for code execution.",
       "detection_signatures": ["move_uploaded_file/wp_upload_bits with attacker-controlled name", "no extension/mime whitelist", "uploadAllow=all connector config"],
       "chain_templates": ["upload_polyglot_rce", "file_upload_to_rce", "split_controller_upload_bypass"],
-      "references": ["CWE-434", "OWASP A04:2021 Insecure Design"]
+      "references": ["CWE-434", "OWASP A04:2021 Insecure Design"],
+      "bypass_techniques": ["double extension (.php.jpg, .jpg.php)", "null-byte + alternate extensions (.pht, .php5, .phtml)", "content-type/mime spoofing", "polyglot files (valid image + payload)"],
+      "crown_jewels": ["web-reachable upload directory", "avatar/profile/document uploads", "document converters (PDF/Office) with a known chain"]
     },
     {
       "id": "priv_esc",
@@ -136,7 +164,9 @@
       "real_world": "A role/capability/user change is fed by request input and reachable from a public entry point with no capability check, letting a user self-assign admin.",
       "detection_signatures": ["set_role/add_role/add_cap of request input", "cross-file: sink reachable from public hook with no capability check"],
       "chain_templates": ["mass_assignment_to_admin_takeover", "idor_to_admin_takeover"],
-      "references": ["CWE-269", "OWASP A01:2021 Broken Access Control"]
+      "references": ["CWE-269", "OWASP A01:2021 Broken Access Control"],
+      "bypass_techniques": ["role parameter injection in registration/profile", "missing capability check on a public hook", "default-role override", "wp_capabilities/user-meta injection"],
+      "crown_jewels": ["administrator / superuser role", "tenant-admin role", "org-owner / root capabilities"]
     },
     {
       "id": "hardcoded_secret",
@@ -145,7 +175,9 @@
       "real_world": "A secret (API key, database password, access token, private key) is committed in source, exposing it to anyone with repo access. Real disclosures regularly turn a leaked key into account takeover or cloud compromise.",
       "detection_signatures": ["secret field assigned a literal", "known secret format (JWT/AWS/GitHub/Slack/…) in source", "high-entropy token under a non-obvious name"],
       "chain_templates": ["api_key_leak_to_account_takeover", "appkey_leak_deserialization_rce", "default_creds_to_internal_pivot"],
-      "references": ["CWE-798", "OWASP A02:2021 Cryptographic Failures"]
+      "references": ["CWE-798", "OWASP A02:2021 Cryptographic Failures"],
+      "bypass_techniques": ["base64/hex-encoded secrets that evade naive regex", "secrets split across concatenation", "env-masquerading (default value committed)", "minified/bundled assets hiding keys"],
+      "crown_jewels": ["cloud credentials (AWS/GCP/Azure)", "database credentials", "JWT signing keys", "payment/provider API tokens"]
     },
     {
       "id": "llm_injection",
@@ -154,7 +186,9 @@
       "real_world": "Untrusted text reaches an LLM call (chat/completion/invoke) without a prompt-injection boundary, letting the input override instructions, leak the system prompt, or steer the model into a privileged action.",
       "detection_signatures": ["an LLM provider call (openai/anthropic/langchain/llm) with request input in scope", "no visible system-prompt boundary or output filtering"],
       "chain_templates": [],
-      "references": ["CWE-77", "OWASP LLM01:2025 Prompt Injection"]
+      "references": ["CWE-77", "OWASP LLM01:2025 Prompt Injection"],
+      "bypass_techniques": ["delimiter/role confusion to escape the system prompt", "translation/encoding attacks to hide instructions", "context overflow to displace earlier constraints", "indirect injection via fetched documents (RAG)"],
+      "crown_jewels": ["the system prompt itself", "tool/function-calling surfaces", "RAG-retrieved data", "privileged actions (email/send/pay) gated on model output"]
     },
     {
       "id": "graphql_exposure",
@@ -163,7 +197,9 @@
       "real_world": "GraphQL introspection or a playground is left enabled in production, exposing the full schema (every query/mutation/field) and enabling interactive querying for recon.",
       "detection_signatures": ["introspection/playground/graphiql set true in a production-reachable config"],
       "chain_templates": ["graphql_idor_to_data_theft", "graphql_batching_to_credential_stuffing"],
-      "references": ["CWE-200", "OWASP API2:2023 Broken Authentication"]
+      "references": ["CWE-200", "OWASP API2:2023 Broken Authentication"],
+      "bypass_techniques": ["alternate introspection queries when the standard one is blocked", "field suggestion / error messages leaking the schema", "aliasing + batching to brute endpoints"],
+      "crown_jewels": ["the full schema (every query/mutation/field)", "hidden/admin-only fields", "mutation endpoints for destructive actions"]
     },
     {
       "id": "oauth_misconfig",
@@ -172,7 +208,9 @@
       "real_world": "An OAuth redirect_uri/callback is fed by request input with no static allowlist, letting an attacker redirect the authorization code or token to an attacker-controlled endpoint.",
       "detection_signatures": ["redirect_uri/callback fed by request input", "no allowlist/whitelist validation nearby"],
       "chain_templates": ["oauth_redirect_bypass", "open_redirect_to_oauth_theft"],
-      "references": ["CWE-601", "OWASP A07:2021 Identification and Authentication Failures"]
+      "references": ["CWE-601", "OWASP A07:2021 Identification and Authentication Failures"],
+      "bypass_techniques": ["path/subdomain confusion on the allowlist", "missing or weak state parameter", "authorization-code replay", "OAuth mix-up between IdP and client"],
+      "crown_jewels": ["the authorization code", "access/refresh tokens", "account-linking flows"]
     },
     {
       "id": "grpc_reflection",
@@ -181,7 +219,9 @@
       "real_world": "gRPC server reflection is enabled, enumerating every service and method to any caller and leaking the API contract.",
       "detection_signatures": ["enable_server_reflection / RegisterReflectionService in production code"],
       "chain_templates": [],
-      "references": ["CWE-200"]
+      "references": ["CWE-200"],
+      "bypass_techniques": ["grpcurl / reflection API enumeration", "proto extraction to reconstruct the contract", "unauthenticated method invocation once enumerated"],
+      "crown_jewels": ["the full API contract (every service/method)", "hidden/internal methods", "input schemas for fuzzing"]
     }
   ]
 }

package/intelligence/variants.json

@@ -0,0 +1,352 @@
+{
+  "$schema": "blitzstrike-variants-v1",
+  "version": "1.0.0",
+  "_comment": "Variant corpus \u2014 concrete real-world code shapes per detector class. Each variant is a shape that MUST fire its class's detector. The verification harness sweeps every variant and reports per-class coverage, so a detector that misses a shape surfaces as a false negative. Shapes are generic (language-idiomatic), with no vendor/product framing.",
+  "variants": [
+    {
+      "class": "sql_injection",
+      "code": "$wpdb->query(\"DELETE FROM t WHERE id=\" . $row['id']);",
+      "note": "raw string concat into query"
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "sql_injection",
+      "code": "$r = $db->query(\"SELECT * FROM users WHERE name='\" . $name . \"'\");",
+      "note": "interpolated SELECT"
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "sql_injection",
+      "code": "mysqli_query($c, \"UPDATE t SET x='\" . $x . \"' WHERE id=\" . $id);",
+      "note": "mysqli raw concat"
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "sql_injection",
+      "code": "knex('users').whereRaw('id = ' + userId)",
+      "note": "ORM raw clause"
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "ssrf",
+      "code": "$ch = curl_init($_GET['url']); curl_exec($ch);",
+      "note": "curl to request URL"
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "ssrf",
+      "code": "$r = file_get_contents($_POST['target']);",
+      "note": "file_get_contents request URL"
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "ssrf",
+      "code": "requests.get(request.args.get('url'))",
+      "note": "python requests request URL"
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "ssrf",
+      "code": "axios.get(req.body.url)",
+      "note": "node axios request URL"
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "ssti",
+      "code": "return jinja2.from_string($_GET['tpl']).render()",
+      "note": "jinja from_string request input"
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "ssti",
+      "code": "$twig->render($_GET['tpl']);",
+      "note": "twig render request input"
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "ssti",
+      "code": "return render_template_string(request.args['tpl'])",
+      "note": "flask render_template_string request input"
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "ssti",
+      "code": "new Template($_GET['template'])",
+      "note": "freemarker template request input"
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "xxe",
+      "code": "$xml = $_POST['xml'];\n$x = simplexml_load_string($xml, 'SimpleXMLElement', LIBXML_NOENT);",
+      "note": "simplexml with entity substitution enabled"
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "xxe",
+      "code": "$xml = $_POST['xml'];\n$x = new SimpleXMLElement($xml, LIBXML_NOENT);",
+      "note": "SimpleXMLElement with NOENT"
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "xxe",
+      "code": "DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance().newDocumentBuilder().parse(request.getParameter('xml'))",
+      "note": "java DOM parse without disabling entities"
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "deserialization",
+      "code": "$o = unserialize($_COOKIE['data']);\nclass A { function __destruct() { system($this->c); } }",
+      "note": "unserialize cookie"
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "deserialization",
+      "code": "obj = pickle.loads(request.data)",
+      "note": "pickle.loads request data"
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "deserialization",
+      "code": "data = yaml.load(request.data)",
+      "note": "unsafe yaml.load"
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "deserialization",
+      "code": "new ObjectInputStream(request.getInputStream()).readObject()",
+      "note": "java readObject"
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "type_juggling",
+      "code": "if ($_POST['token'] == md5($secret)) { login(); }",
+      "note": "loose compare vs md5"
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "type_juggling",
+      "code": "if ($_GET['pwd'] != $stored_hash) { die('no'); }",
+      "note": "loose compare vs hash"
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "type_juggling",
+      "code": "if (strcmp($_POST['pwd'], $hash) == 0) { login(); }",
+      "note": "strcmp array coercion"
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "mass_assignment",
+      "code": "extract($_REQUEST);",
+      "note": "extract request"
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "mass_assignment",
+      "code": "parse_str(file_get_contents('php://input'), $data);",
+      "note": "parse_str raw body"
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "mass_assignment",
+      "code": "foreach ($_POST as $k => $v) { $this->$k = $v; }",
+      "note": "dynamic field binding"
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "mass_assignment",
+      "code": "User.create(req.body)",
+      "note": "model create without allowlist"
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "prototype_pollution",
+      "code": "_.merge(target, req.body)",
+      "note": "lodash merge request body"
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "prototype_pollution",
+      "code": "Object.assign(obj, req.body)",
+      "note": "Object.assign request body"
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "prototype_pollution",
+      "code": "$.extend(true, {}, req.body)",
+      "note": "jquery deep extend request body"
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "crlf_injection",
+      "code": "header(\"Location: \" . $_GET['url']);",
+      "note": "header location request input"
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "crlf_injection",
+      "code": "setcookie('name', $_GET['v']);",
+      "note": "setcookie request value"
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "crlf_injection",
+      "code": "res.setHeader('Location', req.query.url)",
+      "note": "node setHeader request input"
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "path_confusion",
+      "code": "include($_GET['page']);",
+      "note": "include request path"
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "path_confusion",
+      "code": "$c = file_get_contents($_GET['file']);",
+      "note": "file_get_contents request path"
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "path_confusion",
+      "code": "readFile(path.join(base, req.query.file))",
+      "note": "node readFile joined path"
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "path_confusion",
+      "code": "new File(request.getParameter('f'))",
+      "note": "java File request param"
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "wrong_sanitizer",
+      "code": "$x = htmlspecialchars($_GET['q']); $db->query(\"SELECT * FROM t WHERE c='\" . $x . \"'\");",
+      "note": "HTML sanitizer into SQL"
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "wrong_sanitizer",
+      "code": "$x = strip_tags($_GET['q']); mysqli_query($c, \"SELECT * FROM t WHERE c='\" . $x . \"'\");",
+      "note": "strip_tags into SQL"
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "wrong_sanitizer",
+      "code": "$x = esc_html($_GET['q']); $db->query(\"SELECT * FROM t WHERE c='\" . $x . \"'\");",
+      "note": "addslashes into SQL"
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "missing_authz",
+      "code": "add_action('wp_ajax_nopriv_export', 'h'); function h() { update_option('export', $_POST['x']); }",
+      "note": "nopriv handler no capability check"
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "missing_authz",
+      "code": "app.delete('/admin/user/:id', (req, res) => { User.delete(req.params.id); })",
+      "note": "admin route no auth"
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "missing_nonce",
+      "code": "add_action('wp_ajax_del_order', 'h'); function h() { wp_delete_post((int)$_POST['id']); }",
+      "note": "ajax handler state change no nonce"
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "missing_nonce",
+      "code": "add_action('wp_ajax_del', 'h'); function h() { wp_delete_post((int)$_POST['id']); }",
+      "note": "ajax no nonce check"
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "missing_nonce",
+      "code": "add_action('wp_ajax_save', 'h'); function h() { wp_update_post($_POST); }",
+      "note": "ajax handler state change no nonce"
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "missing_nonce",
+      "code": "add_action('wp_ajax_save', 'h'); function h() { update_option('x', $_POST['x']); }",
+      "note": "ajax save no nonce"
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "file_upload",
+      "code": "move_uploaded_file($_FILES['f']['tmp_name'], '/uploads/' . $_FILES['f']['name']);",
+      "note": "move_uploaded_file raw name"
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "file_upload",
+      "code": "wp_upload_bits($_FILES['f']['name'], null, file_get_contents($_FILES['f']['tmp_name']));",
+      "note": "wp_upload_bits raw name"
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "file_upload",
+      "code": "file.save(path.join(uploadDir, req.files.f.name))",
+      "note": "node multer raw name"
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "file_upload",
+      "code": "move_uploaded_file($_FILES['f']['tmp_name'], '/uploads/' . basename($_FILES['f']['name']));",
+      "note": "basename only, no ext whitelist"
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "priv_esc",
+      "code": "$u->set_role($_POST['role']);",
+      "note": "set_role request role"
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "priv_esc",
+      "code": "update_user_meta($id, 'wp_capabilities', $_POST['caps']);",
+      "note": "user meta capabilities request"
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "priv_esc",
+      "code": "$u->add_role($_GET['role']);",
+      "note": "add_role request role"
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "priv_esc",
+      "code": "db.query(\"UPDATE users SET role='\" + $_POST['role'] + \"' WHERE id=\" + $_POST['id'])",
+      "note": "raw role update"
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "hardcoded_secret",
+      "code": "$db_password = \"EXAMPLE_DB_PASSWORD_123\";",
+      "note": "db password literal"
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "hardcoded_secret",
+      "code": "const apiKey = \"EXAMPLE_API_KEY_123456789\";",
+      "note": "api key literal"
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "hardcoded_secret",
+      "code": "$aws_access_key_id = \"EXAMPLE_ACCESS_KEY_123\";",
+      "note": "aws key literal"
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "hardcoded_secret",
+      "code": "JWT_SECRET = \"EXAMPLE_JWT_SIGNING_KEY_123\";",
+      "note": "jwt secret literal"
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "llm_injection",
+      "code": "openai.chat.completions.create(messages=[{'content': req.body.text}])",
+      "note": "openai completion request input"
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "llm_injection",
+      "code": "anthropic.messages.create(prompt=req.body.prompt)",
+      "note": "anthropic prompt request input"
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "llm_injection",
+      "code": "llm.invoke(req.body.query)",
+      "note": "langchain invoke request input"
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "graphql_exposure",
+      "code": "const server = new ApolloServer({ introspection: true });",
+      "note": "apollo introspection on"
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "graphql_exposure",
+      "code": "const server = new ApolloServer({ playground: true });",
+      "note": "apollo playground on"
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "graphql_exposure",
+      "code": "graphqlHTTP({ schema, graphiql: true })",
+      "note": "express-graphql graphiql on"
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "oauth_misconfig",
+      "code": "const redirect_uri = req.query.redirect_uri;",
+      "note": "redirect_uri from query"
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "oauth_misconfig",
+      "code": "$redirect_uri = $_GET['redirect_uri'];",
+      "note": "redirect_uri from request"
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "oauth_misconfig",
+      "code": "const returnUrl = request.params.get('returnUrl');",
+      "note": "returnUrl from request"
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "grpc_reflection",
+      "code": "server.add_service(grpc_reflection_v1alpha.ServerReflectionServicer(...))",
+      "note": "grpc reflection servicer"
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "grpc_reflection",
+      "code": "reflection.enable_server_reflection()",
+      "note": "reflection enabled"
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "grpc_reflection",
+      "code": "grpc_reflection_v1.ReflectionServicer.to_server(server)",
+      "note": "reflection to server"
+    }
+  ]
+}

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "blitzstrike",
-  "version": "2.4.61",
+  "version": "2.4.63",
   "description": "Blitz Strike — a universal MCP security-audit toolbelt. BLITZ sweeps the attack surface, EAGLE-EYE traces source-to-sink, STRIKE verifies live. 57 attack chains, 130-tool catalog, intelligence data layer. One server, every agent.",
   "type": "module",
   "bin": {