blitzstrike 2.4.56 → 2.4.58

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -5,6 +5,42 @@ All notable changes to Blitz Strike are documented here.
 The format follows [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.0.0/),
 and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/).
 
+## [2.4.58] — 2026-09-14
+
+### Added — Empirical grounding v1 (pattern library + submission gate)
+
+- New `intelligence/patterns.json` — the empirical grounding layer: all 16 detector
+  types are traced to their CWE, real-world signature, the escalation chains they
+  compose into (cross-ref chains.json), and citable references (CWE/OWASP). Detection
+  is now derived from disclosed-report-class knowledge, not abstract heuristics alone.
+- New `src/patterns.ts` + `pattern_lookup` MCP tool — returns a detector hit's empirical
+  grounding (CWE, real-world signature, chains, references) to turn a raw hit into a
+  class-aware finding.
+- New `submission_gate` MCP tool — a deterministic 7-question gate (reproducible,
+  in-scope, real-impact, no-privileged-assumption, verified-live, evidence-redacted,
+  severity-derived); one false = the finding does not ship. Formally enforces
+  "never report unverified".
+- Inventory self-test extended: every detector type must be empirically grounded in
+  patterns.json AND CWE-mapped (drift fails at build time).
+
+## [2.4.57] — 2026-09-14
+
+### Added — Secret detection v2 (single taxonomy + format + entropy tiers)
+
+- New `src/secrets.ts` — the single source of truth for secret field names,
+  known-format signatures, and redaction patterns. `sinks.scanSinks`,
+  `complex-bugs.detectHardcodedSecret`, and the evidence redactor all import
+  from it (previously three divergent copies).
+- `hardcoded_secret` now detects in THREE tiers: (1) a known secret FIELD
+  assigned a literal (HIGH), (2) a known secret FORMAT — JWT/AWS/GitHub/Slack/
+  Google/Twilio/SendGrid/Mailgun/PEM — regardless of variable name (HIGH), and
+  (3) a high-entropy token (Shannon ≥ 4.5 bits/char, ≥32 chars, mixed case+digit)
+  under a non-obvious name (MEDIUM, suspect). Entropy skips minified/bundled files.
+- CWE map completed: added `type_juggling` (CWE-697), `path_confusion` (CWE-22),
+  `wrong_sanitizer` (CWE-20) — the compliance tool now maps all 16 detector types.
+- Added a detector-inventory self-test: every ComplexBugType must have a CWE
+  mapping (fails at build time if a new detector forgets its mapping).
+
 ## [2.4.56] — 2026-09-14
 
 ### Added — Hardcoded-secret detector (CWE-798)

package/dist/index.js

@@ -15490,10 +15490,10 @@ async function checkMcpServers() {
 var init_mcp_status = () => {};
 
 // src/sync.ts
-import { mkdirSync as mkdirSync9, writeFileSync as writeFileSync8, readFileSync as readFileSync22, readdirSync as readdirSync7, statSync as statSync4, rmSync as rmSync4 } from "node:fs";
-import { join as join19 } from "node:path";
+import { mkdirSync as mkdirSync9, writeFileSync as writeFileSync8, readFileSync as readFileSync23, readdirSync as readdirSync7, statSync as statSync4, rmSync as rmSync4 } from "node:fs";
+import { join as join20 } from "node:path";
 import { homedir as homedir10 } from "node:os";
-import { fileURLToPath as fileURLToPath9 } from "node:url";
+import { fileURLToPath as fileURLToPath10 } from "node:url";
 import { spawnSync as spawnSync4 } from "node:child_process";
 function dirExists(p) {
   try {
@@ -15508,7 +15508,7 @@ function countFiles(dir) {
     const walk = (d) => {
       for (const e of readdirSync7(d, { withFileTypes: true })) {
         if (e.isDirectory())
-          walk(join19(d, e.name));
+          walk(join20(d, e.name));
         else
           n++;
       }
@@ -15522,8 +15522,8 @@ function countFiles(dir) {
 function syncData() {
   if (!dirExists(DATA_ROOT2))
     mkdirSync9(DATA_ROOT2, { recursive: true });
-  const payloadsPath = join19(DATA_ROOT2, "payloads");
-  const templatesPath = join19(DATA_ROOT2, "templates");
+  const payloadsPath = join20(DATA_ROOT2, "payloads");
+  const templatesPath = join20(DATA_ROOT2, "templates");
   const hasPayloads = dirExists(payloadsPath) && countFiles(payloadsPath) > 0;
   const hasTemplates = dirExists(templatesPath) && countFiles(templatesPath) > 0;
   if (hasPayloads && hasTemplates) {
@@ -15533,8 +15533,8 @@ function syncData() {
       data_root: DATA_ROOT2
     };
   }
-  const localPayloads = join19(ROOT7, "payloads");
-  const localTemplates = join19(ROOT7, "templates");
+  const localPayloads = join20(ROOT7, "payloads");
+  const localTemplates = join20(ROOT7, "templates");
   let payloadsSynced = false;
   let templatesSynced = false;
   if (!hasPayloads && dirExists(localPayloads)) {
@@ -15547,7 +15547,7 @@ function syncData() {
   }
   const gitOk = spawnSync4("git", ["--version"]).status === 0;
   if (gitOk && (!dirExists(payloadsPath) || countFiles(payloadsPath) === 0 || !dirExists(templatesPath) || countFiles(templatesPath) === 0)) {
-    const tmp = join19(DATA_ROOT2, ".tmp-clone");
+    const tmp = join20(DATA_ROOT2, ".tmp-clone");
     if (dirExists(tmp))
       rmSync4(tmp, { recursive: true, force: true });
     const r = spawnSync4("git", ["clone", "--depth", "1", "--filter=blob:none", "--sparse", GITHUB_REPO, tmp], { timeout: 120000 });
@@ -15555,11 +15555,11 @@ function syncData() {
       const sparse = spawnSync4("git", ["-C", tmp, "sparse-checkout", "set", "payloads", "templates"], { timeout: 120000 });
       if (sparse.status === 0) {
         if (!dirExists(payloadsPath) || countFiles(payloadsPath) === 0) {
-          copyDir(join19(tmp, "payloads"), payloadsPath);
+          copyDir(join20(tmp, "payloads"), payloadsPath);
           payloadsSynced = true;
         }
         if (!dirExists(templatesPath) || countFiles(templatesPath) === 0) {
-          copyDir(join19(tmp, "templates"), templatesPath);
+          copyDir(join20(tmp, "templates"), templatesPath);
           templatesSynced = true;
         }
       }
@@ -15581,18 +15581,18 @@ function copyDir(src, dst) {
 function manualCopy(src, dst) {
   mkdirSync9(dst, { recursive: true });
   for (const e of readdirSync7(src, { withFileTypes: true })) {
-    const s = join19(src, e.name);
-    const d = join19(dst, e.name);
+    const s = join20(src, e.name);
+    const d = join20(dst, e.name);
     if (e.isDirectory())
       manualCopy(s, d);
     else
-      writeFileSync8(d, readFileSync22(s));
+      writeFileSync8(d, readFileSync23(s));
   }
 }
 var ROOT7, DATA_ROOT2, GITHUB_REPO = "https://github.com/shinthink/blitzstrike.git";
 var init_sync = __esm(() => {
-  ROOT7 = join19(fileURLToPath9(new URL(".", import.meta.url)), "..");
-  DATA_ROOT2 = process.env.BLITZSTRIKE_DATA ?? join19(homedir10(), ".blitzstrike", "data");
+  ROOT7 = join20(fileURLToPath10(new URL(".", import.meta.url)), "..");
+  DATA_ROOT2 = process.env.BLITZSTRIKE_DATA ?? join20(homedir10(), ".blitzstrike", "data");
 });
 
 // src/update.ts
@@ -15637,15 +15637,15 @@ var init_update = __esm(() => {
 });
 
 // src/release.ts
-import { readFileSync as readFileSync24, existsSync as existsSync12 } from "node:fs";
-import { join as join20 } from "node:path";
-import { fileURLToPath as fileURLToPath10 } from "node:url";
+import { readFileSync as readFileSync25, existsSync as existsSync12 } from "node:fs";
+import { join as join21 } from "node:path";
+import { fileURLToPath as fileURLToPath11 } from "node:url";
 import { execSync as execSync2 } from "node:child_process";
 function validateRelease() {
   const checks = [];
   checks.push({ name: "package.json version", ok: true, detail: VERSION });
   try {
-    const changelog = readFileSync24(join20(ROOT8, "CHANGELOG.md"), "utf8");
+    const changelog = readFileSync25(join21(ROOT8, "CHANGELOG.md"), "utf8");
     const m = changelog.match(/^##\s+\[([0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+)\]/m);
     const changelogVersion = m?.[1] ?? null;
     checks.push({
@@ -15677,22 +15677,22 @@ function validateRelease() {
   return { version: VERSION, checks, consistent: checks.filter((c) => !c.soft).every((c) => c.ok) };
 }
 function lockfilePresent() {
-  return existsSync12(join20(ROOT8, "package-lock.json")) || existsSync12(join20(ROOT8, "bun.lock")) || existsSync12(join20(ROOT8, "bun.lockb"));
+  return existsSync12(join21(ROOT8, "package-lock.json")) || existsSync12(join21(ROOT8, "bun.lock")) || existsSync12(join21(ROOT8, "bun.lockb"));
 }
 var ROOT8;
 var init_release = __esm(() => {
   init_version();
-  ROOT8 = join20(fileURLToPath10(new URL(".", import.meta.url)), "..");
+  ROOT8 = join21(fileURLToPath11(new URL(".", import.meta.url)), "..");
 });
 
 // src/dependency.ts
-import { readFileSync as readFileSync25 } from "node:fs";
-import { join as join21 } from "node:path";
-import { fileURLToPath as fileURLToPath11 } from "node:url";
+import { readFileSync as readFileSync26 } from "node:fs";
+import { join as join22 } from "node:path";
+import { fileURLToPath as fileURLToPath12 } from "node:url";
 function checkDependencies() {
   let pkg = {};
   try {
-    pkg = JSON.parse(readFileSync25(join21(ROOT9, "package.json"), "utf8"));
+    pkg = JSON.parse(readFileSync26(join22(ROOT9, "package.json"), "utf8"));
   } catch {
     return { install_scripts: [], git_dependencies: [], total_dependencies: 0, safe: false };
   }
@@ -15715,14 +15715,14 @@ function checkDependencies() {
 }
 var ROOT9;
 var init_dependency = __esm(() => {
-  ROOT9 = join21(fileURLToPath11(new URL(".", import.meta.url)), "..");
+  ROOT9 = join22(fileURLToPath12(new URL(".", import.meta.url)), "..");
 });
 
 // src/cli.ts
-import { readFileSync as readFileSync26, existsSync as existsSync13, writeFileSync as writeFileSync9, mkdirSync as mkdirSync10 } from "node:fs";
-import { join as join22, dirname as dirname2 } from "node:path";
+import { readFileSync as readFileSync27, existsSync as existsSync13, writeFileSync as writeFileSync9, mkdirSync as mkdirSync10 } from "node:fs";
+import { join as join23, dirname as dirname3 } from "node:path";
 import { homedir as homedir11 } from "node:os";
-import { fileURLToPath as fileURLToPath12 } from "node:url";
+import { fileURLToPath as fileURLToPath13 } from "node:url";
 import { spawnSync as spawnSync5 } from "node:child_process";
 function which(cmd) {
   return spawnSync5("sh", ["-c", 'command -v "$1" >/dev/null 2>&1', "sh", cmd]).status === 0;
@@ -15765,7 +15765,7 @@ async function runDoctor() {
     detail: h1 ? `X-HackerOne-Research: ${h1}` : "H1_USERNAME not set",
     fix: h1 ? undefined : "export H1_USERNAME=<your-hackerone-username> (adds X-HackerOne-Research to outbound requests)"
   });
-  const dataOk = existsSync13(join22(ROOT10, "chains.json")) && existsSync13(join22(ROOT10, "tools-catalog.json"));
+  const dataOk = existsSync13(join23(ROOT10, "chains.json")) && existsSync13(join23(ROOT10, "tools-catalog.json"));
   issues.push({
     name: "Data layers (chains + tools-catalog)",
     status: dataOk ? "ok" : "fail",
@@ -15816,28 +15816,28 @@ BlitzStrike — ${verdict}`);
 function resolveCommand() {
   if (which("blitzstrike"))
     return { command: "blitzstrike", args: ["serve", "--mcp"] };
-  const src = join22(ROOT10, "src", "index.ts");
+  const src = join23(ROOT10, "src", "index.ts");
   if (which("bun") && existsSync13(src))
     return { command: "bun", args: ["run", src, "serve", "--mcp"] };
   if (which("npx"))
     return { command: "npx", args: ["-y", "blitzstrike", "serve", "--mcp"] };
   if (which("bunx"))
     return { command: "bunx", args: ["blitzstrike", "serve", "--mcp"] };
-  const dist = join22(ROOT10, "dist", "index.js");
+  const dist = join23(ROOT10, "dist", "index.js");
   if (existsSync13(dist))
     return { command: "bun", args: [dist, "serve", "--mcp"] };
   return { command: "npx", args: ["-y", "blitzstrike", "serve", "--mcp"] };
 }
 function readJson(p) {
   try {
-    return JSON.parse(readFileSync26(p, "utf8"));
+    return JSON.parse(readFileSync27(p, "utf8"));
   } catch {
     return null;
   }
 }
 function jsonMcpServersWrite(p) {
   return (command, args) => {
-    const dir = dirname2(p);
+    const dir = dirname3(p);
     if (!existsSync13(dir))
       mkdirSync10(dir, { recursive: true });
     const existing = readJson(p) ?? {};
@@ -15850,7 +15850,7 @@ function jsonMcpServersWrite(p) {
 }
 function opencodeWrite(p) {
   return (command, args) => {
-    const dir = dirname2(p);
+    const dir = dirname3(p);
     if (!existsSync13(dir))
       mkdirSync10(dir, { recursive: true });
     const existing = readJson(p) ?? {};
@@ -15863,26 +15863,26 @@ function opencodeWrite(p) {
   };
 }
 function copyOpenCodeAgents() {
-  const srcDir = join22(ROOT10, "opencode-agents");
-  const dstDir = join22(homedir11(), ".config", "opencode", "agents");
+  const srcDir = join23(ROOT10, "opencode-agents");
+  const dstDir = join23(homedir11(), ".config", "opencode", "agents");
   if (!existsSync13(srcDir))
     return;
   if (!existsSync13(dstDir))
     mkdirSync10(dstDir, { recursive: true });
   for (const f of ["Blitz Strike.md", "Blitz.md", "Eagle Eye.md", "Strike.md"]) {
-    const src = join22(srcDir, f);
-    const dst = join22(dstDir, f);
+    const src = join23(srcDir, f);
+    const dst = join23(dstDir, f);
     if (existsSync13(src)) {
-      writeFileSync9(dst, readFileSync26(src, "utf8"));
+      writeFileSync9(dst, readFileSync27(src, "utf8"));
     }
   }
 }
 function codexWrite(p) {
   return (command, args) => {
-    const dir = dirname2(p);
+    const dir = dirname3(p);
     if (!existsSync13(dir))
       mkdirSync10(dir, { recursive: true });
-    let existing = existsSync13(p) ? readFileSync26(p, "utf8") : "";
+    let existing = existsSync13(p) ? readFileSync27(p, "utf8") : "";
     if (!existing.trimEnd().endsWith(`
 `))
       existing += `
@@ -15898,10 +15898,10 @@ args = ${JSON.stringify(args)}
 }
 function hermesWrite(p) {
   return (command, args) => {
-    const dir = dirname2(p);
+    const dir = dirname3(p);
     if (!existsSync13(dir))
       mkdirSync10(dir, { recursive: true });
-    let existing = existsSync13(p) ? readFileSync26(p, "utf8") : "";
+    let existing = existsSync13(p) ? readFileSync27(p, "utf8") : "";
     existing = existing.replace(/^  blitzstrike:\n(?:    .*\n?)*/m, "");
     if (!existing.trimEnd().endsWith(`
 `))
@@ -15928,74 +15928,74 @@ mcp_servers:
 function detectAgents() {
   const home = homedir11();
   const agents = [];
-  const claudeJson = join22(home, ".claude.json");
+  const claudeJson = join23(home, ".claude.json");
   agents.push({
     name: "Claude Code",
     detectPath: claudeJson,
     installed: () => existsSync13(claudeJson) || which("claude"),
     write: jsonMcpServersWrite(claudeJson)
   });
-  const claudeDesktop = join22(home, ".config", "Claude", "claude_desktop_config.json");
+  const claudeDesktop = join23(home, ".config", "Claude", "claude_desktop_config.json");
   agents.push({
     name: "Claude Desktop",
     detectPath: claudeDesktop,
     installed: () => existsSync13(claudeDesktop),
     write: jsonMcpServersWrite(claudeDesktop)
   });
-  const cursor = join22(home, ".cursor", "mcp.json");
+  const cursor = join23(home, ".cursor", "mcp.json");
   agents.push({
     name: "Cursor",
     detectPath: cursor,
-    installed: () => existsSync13(join22(home, ".cursor")) || which("cursor"),
+    installed: () => existsSync13(join23(home, ".cursor")) || which("cursor"),
     write: jsonMcpServersWrite(cursor)
   });
-  const opencode = join22(home, ".config", "opencode", "opencode.jsonc");
+  const opencode = join23(home, ".config", "opencode", "opencode.jsonc");
   agents.push({
     name: "OpenCode",
     detectPath: opencode,
-    installed: () => existsSync13(join22(home, ".config", "opencode")) || which("opencode"),
+    installed: () => existsSync13(join23(home, ".config", "opencode")) || which("opencode"),
     write: opencodeWrite(opencode)
   });
-  const codex = join22(home, ".codex", "config.toml");
+  const codex = join23(home, ".codex", "config.toml");
   agents.push({
     name: "Codex",
     detectPath: codex,
-    installed: () => existsSync13(join22(home, ".codex")) || which("codex"),
+    installed: () => existsSync13(join23(home, ".codex")) || which("codex"),
     write: codexWrite(codex)
   });
-  const hermes = join22(home, ".hermes", "config.yaml");
+  const hermes = join23(home, ".hermes", "config.yaml");
   agents.push({
     name: "Hermes",
     detectPath: hermes,
-    installed: () => existsSync13(join22(home, ".hermes")) || which("hermes"),
+    installed: () => existsSync13(join23(home, ".hermes")) || which("hermes"),
     write: hermesWrite(hermes)
   });
-  const gemini = join22(home, ".gemini", "settings.json");
+  const gemini = join23(home, ".gemini", "settings.json");
   agents.push({
     name: "Gemini CLI",
     detectPath: gemini,
-    installed: () => existsSync13(join22(home, ".gemini")) || which("gemini"),
+    installed: () => existsSync13(join23(home, ".gemini")) || which("gemini"),
     write: jsonMcpServersWrite(gemini)
   });
-  const windsurf = join22(home, ".codeium", "windsurf", "mcp_config.json");
+  const windsurf = join23(home, ".codeium", "windsurf", "mcp_config.json");
   agents.push({
     name: "Windsurf",
     detectPath: windsurf,
-    installed: () => existsSync13(join22(home, ".codeium")) || which("windsurf"),
+    installed: () => existsSync13(join23(home, ".codeium")) || which("windsurf"),
     write: jsonMcpServersWrite(windsurf)
   });
-  const copilot = join22(home, ".copilot", "mcp.json");
+  const copilot = join23(home, ".copilot", "mcp.json");
   agents.push({
     name: "Copilot",
     detectPath: copilot,
-    installed: () => existsSync13(join22(home, ".copilot")),
+    installed: () => existsSync13(join23(home, ".copilot")),
     write: jsonMcpServersWrite(copilot)
   });
-  const cline = join22(home, ".cline", "mcp_settings.json");
+  const cline = join23(home, ".cline", "mcp_settings.json");
   agents.push({
     name: "Cline",
     detectPath: cline,
-    installed: () => existsSync13(join22(home, ".cline")),
+    installed: () => existsSync13(join23(home, ".cline")),
     write: jsonMcpServersWrite(cline)
   });
   return agents;
@@ -16113,7 +16113,7 @@ var init_cli = __esm(() => {
   init_release();
   init_dependency();
   init_mcp_status();
-  ROOT10 = join22(fileURLToPath12(new URL(".", import.meta.url)), "..");
+  ROOT10 = join23(fileURLToPath13(new URL(".", import.meta.url)), "..");
 });
 
 // node_modules/zod/v3/helpers/util.js
@@ -30751,7 +30751,7 @@ class StdioServerTransport {
 
 // src/server.ts
 init_scanner();
-import { readFileSync as readFileSync23 } from "node:fs";
+import { readFileSync as readFileSync24 } from "node:fs";
 
 // src/recon.ts
 var TIMEOUT_MS = 25000;
@@ -31000,6 +31000,36 @@ function recordAudit(event, opts = {}) {
 // src/evidence.ts
 init_version();
 import { createHash as createHash2 } from "node:crypto";
+
+// src/secrets.ts
+var SECRET_FIELDS = "api[_-]?key|apikey|api[_-]?secret|access[_-]?key|access[_-]?token|secret[_-]?key|secret[_-]?access[_-]?key|auth[_-]?token|client[_-]?secret|consumer[_-]?secret|consumer[_-]?key|private[_-]?key|db[_-]?password|database[_-]?password|db[_-]?pass|passwd|password|jwt[_-]?secret|encryption[_-]?key|encryption[_-]?password|github[_-]?token|gitlab[_-]?token|stripe[_-]?key|sendgrid[_-]?api[_-]?key|datadog[_-]?api[_-]?key|cloudflare[_-]?api[_-]?key|slack[_-]?token|aws[_-]?access[_-]?key[_-]?id|aws[_-]?secret[_-]?access[_-]?key|aws[_-]?session[_-]?token|bot[_-]?token";
+var SECRET_FORMATS = [
+  { name: "JWT", re: /\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{4,}/g },
+  { name: "AWS access key", re: /\bAKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}\b/g },
+  { name: "GitHub PAT (classic)", re: /\bghp_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}\b/g },
+  { name: "GitHub PAT (fine-grained)", re: /\bgithub_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{20,}\b/g },
+  { name: "OpenAI/Stripe key", re: /\bsk-[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}\b/g },
+  { name: "Stripe live/test key", re: /\b(?:sk|pk|rk)_(?:live|test)_[0-9a-zA-Z]{10,}\b/g },
+  { name: "Slack token", re: /\bxox[baprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}\b/g },
+  { name: "Google API key", re: /\bAIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}\b/g },
+  { name: "Twilio account SID", re: /\bAC[0-9a-f]{32}\b/g },
+  { name: "SendGrid API key", re: /\bSG\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}\b/g },
+  { name: "Mailgun API key", re: /\bkey-[0-9a-zA-Z]{32}\b/g },
+  { name: "PEM private key", re: /-----BEGIN [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----/g }
+];
+function shannonEntropy(s) {
+  if (!s)
+    return 0;
+  const freq = new Map;
+  for (const c of s)
+    freq.set(c, (freq.get(c) ?? 0) + 1);
+  let e = 0;
+  for (const n of freq.values()) {
+    const p = n / s.length;
+    e -= p * Math.log2(p);
+  }
+  return e;
+}
 var REDACTION_PATTERNS = [
   [/(authorization\s*[:=]\s*)(bearer\s+)?[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{8,}/gi, "$1$2[REDACTED]"],
   [/(api[_-]?key\s*[:=]\s*)["']?[A-Za-z0-9._-]{16,}["']?/gi, "$1[REDACTED]"],
@@ -31011,10 +31041,17 @@ var REDACTION_PATTERNS = [
   [/(session\s*[:=]\s*)["']?[A-Za-z0-9._-]{12,}["']?/gi, "$1[REDACTED]"],
   [/(cookie\s*[:=]\s*)["']?[A-Za-z0-9._-]{12,}["']?/gi, "$1[REDACTED]"],
   [/(set-cookie\s*:\s*)[^\r\n]+/gi, "$1[REDACTED]"],
+  [/\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{4,}/g, "[REDACTED]"],
   [/AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}/g, "[REDACTED]"],
   [/ghp_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/g, "[REDACTED]"],
   [/github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{20,}/g, "[REDACTED]"],
   [/sk-[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/g, "[REDACTED]"],
+  [/\b(?:sk|pk|rk)_(?:live|test)_[0-9a-zA-Z]{10,}\b/g, "[REDACTED]"],
+  [/\bxox[baprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}\b/g, "[REDACTED]"],
+  [/\bAIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}\b/g, "[REDACTED]"],
+  [/\bAC[0-9a-f]{32}\b/g, "[REDACTED]"],
+  [/\bSG\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}\b/g, "[REDACTED]"],
+  [/\bkey-[0-9a-zA-Z]{32}\b/g, "[REDACTED]"],
   [/-----BEGIN [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----[\s\S]*?-----END [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----/g, "[REDACTED]"]
 ];
 function redactSecrets(text) {
@@ -31024,6 +31061,8 @@ function redactSecrets(text) {
   }
   return out;
 }
+
+// src/evidence.ts
 function hasSecrets(text) {
   return redactSecrets(text) !== text;
 }
@@ -31321,7 +31360,8 @@ var PATTERNS = [
   { type: "credential", label: "password assignment", regex: /(?:password|passwd|pass|pwd)\s*[:=]\s*["'][^"']{3,}["']/i },
   { type: "credential", label: "hardcoded cred", regex: /\b(?:admin|root|user(?:name)?)\s*[:=]\s*["'][^"']{3,}["']/i },
   { type: "deserialization", label: "pickle/unserialize/yaml", regex: /\b(?:pickle\.loads|unserialize\s*\(|yaml\.load\s*\(|marshal\.loads|jsonpickle)/i },
-  { type: "xxe", label: "XML parse", regex: /\b(?:etree\.(?:parse|fromstring)|lxml\.etree|xml\.(?:dom|sax)|DocumentBuilder|simplexml_load)/i }
+  { type: "xxe", label: "XML parse", regex: /\b(?:etree\.(?:parse|fromstring)|lxml\.etree|xml\.(?:dom|sax)|DocumentBuilder|simplexml_load)/i },
+  ...SECRET_FORMATS.map((f) => ({ type: "secret", label: f.name, regex: f.re }))
 ];
 function scanSinks(text) {
   if (!text || text.length < 3)
@@ -57012,12 +57052,13 @@ function detectSqlInjection(code, file, out) {
     });
   }
 }
-var SECRET_FIELDS = "api[_-]?key|apikey|api[_-]?secret|access[_-]?key|access[_-]?token|secret[_-]?key|secret[_-]?access[_-]?key|auth[_-]?token|client[_-]?secret|consumer[_-]?secret|consumer[_-]?key|private[_-]?key|db[_-]?password|database[_-]?password|db[_-]?pass|passwd|password|jwt[_-]?secret|encryption[_-]?key|encryption[_-]?password|github[_-]?token|gitlab[_-]?token|stripe[_-]?key|sendgrid[_-]?api[_-]?key|datadog[_-]?api[_-]?key|cloudflare[_-]?api[_-]?key|slack[_-]?token|aws[_-]?access[_-]?key[_-]?id|aws[_-]?secret[_-]?access[_-]?key|aws[_-]?session[_-]?token|bot[_-]?token";
 var SECRET_FIELD_RE = new RegExp(`\\b(${SECRET_FIELDS})\\s*(?:::|=>|=|:)\\s*`, "gi");
 var SECRET_PLACEHOLDER_RE = /^(null|true|false|undefined|your_|xxx+|changeme|example|placeholder|test|secret|password|token|key|api|smtp|localhost|root|admin|pass|change|me|none|na|foo|bar|dummy)$/i;
+var ENTROPY_EXCLUDE_VAR = /\b(data|payload|content|body|base64|encoded|encode|image|binary|blob|hash|digest|checksum|nonce|uuid|etag|signature|sig|cipher|iv|ciphertext|plaintext|thumb|thumbnail)\b/i;
 function detectHardcodedSecret(code, file, out) {
   const ls = lines2(code);
   const clean = stripCommentsOnly(code);
+  const flaggedLines = new Set;
   SECRET_FIELD_RE.lastIndex = 0;
   let m;
   while ((m = SECRET_FIELD_RE.exec(clean)) !== null) {
@@ -57038,6 +57079,7 @@ function detectHardcodedSecret(code, file, out) {
     if (/\$[A-Za-z_]|[{}\[\]]|process\.env|getenv|os\.environ|config\s*\(|env\s*\(/.test(valueRaw))
       continue;
     const ln = lineNo2(code, m.index);
+    flaggedLines.add(ln);
     out.push({
       file,
       line: ln,
@@ -57048,6 +57090,54 @@ function detectHardcodedSecret(code, file, out) {
       detail: `Secret field '${field}' is assigned a hardcoded value in source — the credential is exposed to anyone with code access (CWE-798 Hard-coded Credentials). Rotate it and load from the environment instead.`
     });
   }
+  for (const fmt of SECRET_FORMATS) {
+    fmt.re.lastIndex = 0;
+    let fm;
+    while ((fm = fmt.re.exec(clean)) !== null) {
+      const ln = lineNo2(code, fm.index);
+      if (flaggedLines.has(ln))
+        continue;
+      flaggedLines.add(ln);
+      out.push({
+        file,
+        line: ln,
+        type: "hardcoded_secret",
+        category: "Hardcoded secret (known format)",
+        severity: "high",
+        evidence: (ls[ln - 1] ?? "").trim(),
+        detail: `A ${fmt.name} was found hardcoded in source — the credential is exposed to anyone with code access (CWE-798). Rotate it and load from the environment instead.`
+      });
+    }
+  }
+  const isMinified = /\.min\.(js|css)$/i.test(file) || /[\\/](bundle|vendor|dist|build)[\\/]/i.test(file);
+  if (!isMinified) {
+    const entropyRe = /(\b[A-Za-z_]\w*)\s*(?:::|=>|=|:)\s*["']([A-Za-z0-9_-]{32,})["']/g;
+    entropyRe.lastIndex = 0;
+    let em;
+    while ((em = entropyRe.exec(clean)) !== null) {
+      const varName = em[1];
+      const value = em[2];
+      const ln = lineNo2(code, em.index);
+      if (flaggedLines.has(ln))
+        continue;
+      if (ENTROPY_EXCLUDE_VAR.test(varName))
+        continue;
+      if (!/[A-Z]/.test(value) || !/[a-z]/.test(value) || !/[0-9]/.test(value))
+        continue;
+      if (shannonEntropy(value) < 4.5)
+        continue;
+      flaggedLines.add(ln);
+      out.push({
+        file,
+        line: ln,
+        type: "hardcoded_secret",
+        category: "Suspected secret (high-entropy token)",
+        severity: "medium",
+        evidence: (ls[ln - 1] ?? "").trim(),
+        detail: `'${varName}' is assigned a high-entropy token (Shannon ${shannonEntropy(value).toFixed(2)} bits/char) that looks like a generated credential — verify it is not a secret key/token (CWE-798).`
+      });
+    }
+  }
 }
 
 // src/guidance.ts
@@ -57105,18 +57195,89 @@ function nextSteps(ctx) {
   return steps;
 }
 
-// src/benchmark.ts
-import { readFileSync as readFileSync17, readdirSync as readdirSync5, writeFileSync as writeFileSync6, rmSync as rmSync3, mkdirSync as mkdirSync7 } from "node:fs";
-import { join as join16 } from "node:path";
+// src/patterns.ts
+import { readFileSync as readFileSync17 } from "node:fs";
+import { join as join16, dirname as dirname2 } from "node:path";
 import { fileURLToPath as fileURLToPath8 } from "node:url";
+var __dirname2 = dirname2(fileURLToPath8(import.meta.url));
+var _doc = null;
+function load3() {
+  if (_doc)
+    return _doc;
+  try {
+    _doc = JSON.parse(readFileSync17(join16(__dirname2, "..", "intelligence", "patterns.json"), "utf8"));
+  } catch {
+    _doc = { patterns: [] };
+  }
+  return _doc;
+}
+function patternLookup(id) {
+  const p = load3().patterns.find((x) => x.id === id.toLowerCase());
+  return p ?? null;
+}
+function listPatterns() {
+  return load3().patterns;
+}
+function submissionGate(input) {
+  const questions = [
+    {
+      q: "Reproducible — a copy-paste-ready request or step list triggers it?",
+      pass: input.reproducible !== false,
+      reason: "Without an exact reproduction the finding is a hypothesis, not a result."
+    },
+    {
+      q: "In scope — the vulnerable asset is in the engagement scope?",
+      pass: input.in_scope !== false,
+      reason: "Out-of-scope assets must not be submitted."
+    },
+    {
+      q: "Real impact — maps to an accepted-impact class, not informational?",
+      pass: input.real_impact !== false,
+      reason: "Informational-only findings dilute the validity ratio."
+    },
+    {
+      q: "No privileged assumption — works without unrealistic attacker prerequisites?",
+      pass: input.no_privileged_assumption !== false,
+      reason: "'Admin can do X' is a centralization risk, not a vulnerability."
+    },
+    {
+      q: "Verified live — confirmed with a marker + negative control, not just a static hint?",
+      pass: input.verified_live !== false,
+      reason: "A static hit is a hypothesis until verified live (strike_verify / browser_validate)."
+    },
+    {
+      q: "Evidence attached AND redacted — secrets/PII stripped, integrity-tagged?",
+      pass: input.evidence_redacted !== false,
+      reason: "Evidence must carry SHA-256-tagged, redacted records — no leaked secrets or victim PII."
+    },
+    {
+      q: "Severity derived — CVSS/confidence computed, not guessed?",
+      pass: input.severity_derived !== false,
+      reason: "Severity is not confidence; derive it, don't assert it."
+    }
+  ];
+  const failed = questions.find((q) => !q.pass);
+  return {
+    verdict: failed ? "fail" : "pass",
+    passed: questions.filter((q) => q.pass).length,
+    total: questions.length,
+    questions,
+    ...failed ? { blocker: failed.q } : {}
+  };
+}
+
+// src/benchmark.ts
+import { readFileSync as readFileSync18, readdirSync as readdirSync5, writeFileSync as writeFileSync6, rmSync as rmSync3, mkdirSync as mkdirSync7 } from "node:fs";
+import { join as join17 } from "node:path";
+import { fileURLToPath as fileURLToPath9 } from "node:url";
 import { tmpdir as tmpdir3, homedir as homedir8 } from "node:os";
-var ROOT5 = join16(fileURLToPath8(new URL(".", import.meta.url)), "..");
-var CORPUS = join16(ROOT5, "bench", "corpus");
-var CAPTURED_CORPUS_DIR = process.env.BLITZSTRIKE_CORPUS_DIR ?? join16(homedir8(), ".blitzstrike", "corpus");
+var ROOT5 = join17(fileURLToPath9(new URL(".", import.meta.url)), "..");
+var CORPUS = join17(ROOT5, "bench", "corpus");
+var CAPTURED_CORPUS_DIR = process.env.BLITZSTRIKE_CORPUS_DIR ?? join17(homedir8(), ".blitzstrike", "corpus");
 function parseCorpusFile(path) {
   let text;
   try {
-    text = readFileSync17(path, "utf8");
+    text = readFileSync18(path, "utf8");
   } catch {
     return null;
   }
@@ -57172,7 +57333,7 @@ function loadDir(dir) {
     for (const f of readdirSync5(dir)) {
       if (!f.endsWith(".md"))
         continue;
-      const e = parseCorpusFile(join16(dir, f));
+      const e = parseCorpusFile(join17(dir, f));
       if (e)
         entries.push(e);
     }
@@ -57199,7 +57360,7 @@ function captureFalsePositive(input) {
     input.code,
     "```"
   ].filter((l) => l !== null);
-  const path = join16(CAPTURED_CORPUS_DIR, `${id}.md`);
+  const path = join17(CAPTURED_CORPUS_DIR, `${id}.md`);
   writeFileSync6(path, lines.join(`
 `) + `
 `, "utf8");
@@ -57221,7 +57382,7 @@ function detect(entry) {
   }
   const lang = entry.language;
   if (lang === "php") {
-    const tmp = join16(tmpdir3(), `blitzstrike-bench-${entry.id}-${process.pid}.php`);
+    const tmp = join17(tmpdir3(), `blitzstrike-bench-${entry.id}-${process.pid}.php`);
     writeFileSync6(tmp, entry.code);
     const r = analyzeDataFlow2(tmp);
     rmSync3(tmp, { force: true });
@@ -57290,12 +57451,12 @@ function runBenchmark() {
 }
 
 // src/obligations.ts
-import { readFileSync as readFileSync18, appendFileSync as appendFileSync4, mkdirSync as mkdirSync8, existsSync as existsSync10, writeFileSync as writeFileSync7 } from "node:fs";
-import { join as join17 } from "node:path";
+import { readFileSync as readFileSync19, appendFileSync as appendFileSync4, mkdirSync as mkdirSync8, existsSync as existsSync10, writeFileSync as writeFileSync7 } from "node:fs";
+import { join as join18 } from "node:path";
 import { createHash as createHash6 } from "node:crypto";
 import { homedir as homedir9 } from "node:os";
-var HOME_DIR4 = process.env.BLITZSTRIKE_HOME ?? join17(homedir9(), ".blitzstrike");
-var OBLIGATION_PATH = join17(HOME_DIR4, "obligations.jsonl");
+var HOME_DIR4 = process.env.BLITZSTRIKE_HOME ?? join18(homedir9(), ".blitzstrike");
+var OBLIGATION_PATH = join18(HOME_DIR4, "obligations.jsonl");
 function ensureDir3() {
   if (!existsSync10(HOME_DIR4))
     mkdirSync8(HOME_DIR4, { recursive: true });
@@ -57308,7 +57469,7 @@ function loadObligations() {
     return [];
   try {
     const out = [];
-    for (const line of readFileSync18(OBLIGATION_PATH, "utf8").split(`
+    for (const line of readFileSync19(OBLIGATION_PATH, "utf8").split(`
 `)) {
       const t = line.trim();
       if (!t)
@@ -57407,11 +57568,11 @@ function openCount() {
 
 // src/variant-scan.ts
 init_scanner();
-import { readFileSync as readFileSync20 } from "node:fs";
+import { readFileSync as readFileSync21 } from "node:fs";
 
 // src/cross-file.ts
 init_scanner();
-import { readFileSync as readFileSync19 } from "node:fs";
+import { readFileSync as readFileSync20 } from "node:fs";
 var PUBLIC_HOOK_RE = /(?:wp_ajax_nopriv_\w+|admin_post_nopriv_\w+|init|template_redirect|wp_loaded|parse_request|user_register|um_user_register|register_new_user|authenticate)/;
 var PRIV_SINK_RE = /\b(set_role|add_role|remove_role|set_user_role|wp_set_current_user|wp_set_auth_cookie|wp_insert_user|wp_create_user|wp_update_user)\s*\(/;
 var ROLE_META_RE = /update_user_meta\s*\(\s*[^,]+,\s*['"](wp_capabilities|role|roles|capabilities|wp_user_level)['"]/;
@@ -57463,7 +57624,7 @@ function detectCrossFilePrivesc(root) {
   for (const file of files) {
     let code;
     try {
-      code = stripComments(readFileSync19(file, "utf8"));
+      code = stripComments(readFileSync20(file, "utf8"));
     } catch {
       continue;
     }
@@ -57504,7 +57665,7 @@ function detectCrossFilePrivesc(root) {
   for (const file of files) {
     let code;
     try {
-      code = stripComments(readFileSync19(file, "utf8"));
+      code = stripComments(readFileSync20(file, "utf8"));
     } catch {
       continue;
     }
@@ -57527,7 +57688,7 @@ function detectCrossFilePrivesc(root) {
   for (const file of files) {
     let code;
     try {
-      code = stripComments(readFileSync19(file, "utf8"));
+      code = stripComments(readFileSync20(file, "utf8"));
     } catch {
       continue;
     }
@@ -57642,7 +57803,7 @@ function variantScan(root, opts = {}) {
   for (const file of files) {
     let code;
     try {
-      code = readFileSync20(file, "utf8");
+      code = readFileSync21(file, "utf8");
     } catch {
       continue;
     }
@@ -58302,16 +58463,16 @@ function analyzeJwt(token, opts = {}) {
 }
 
 // src/enterprise-benchmark.ts
-import { existsSync as existsSync11, readFileSync as readFileSync21, readdirSync as readdirSync6, statSync as statSync3 } from "node:fs";
-import { join as join18, resolve } from "node:path";
+import { existsSync as existsSync11, readFileSync as readFileSync22, readdirSync as readdirSync6, statSync as statSync3 } from "node:fs";
+import { join as join19, resolve } from "node:path";
 var ROOT6 = resolve(process.cwd(), "bench", "enterprise");
 var ENTERPRISE_FIXTURES = [
-  { id: "php-laravel", dir: join18(ROOT6, "php-laravel"), expected_vulns: 4 },
-  { id: "js-express", dir: join18(ROOT6, "js-express"), expected_vulns: 2 },
-  { id: "py-django", dir: join18(ROOT6, "py-django"), expected_vulns: 2 },
-  { id: "java-spring", dir: join18(ROOT6, "java-spring"), expected_vulns: 2 },
-  { id: "wp-batch-route", dir: join18(ROOT6, "wp-batch-route"), expected_vulns: 3 },
-  { id: "php-complex", dir: join18(ROOT6, "php-complex"), expected_vulns: 4 }
+  { id: "php-laravel", dir: join19(ROOT6, "php-laravel"), expected_vulns: 4 },
+  { id: "js-express", dir: join19(ROOT6, "js-express"), expected_vulns: 2 },
+  { id: "py-django", dir: join19(ROOT6, "py-django"), expected_vulns: 2 },
+  { id: "java-spring", dir: join19(ROOT6, "java-spring"), expected_vulns: 2 },
+  { id: "wp-batch-route", dir: join19(ROOT6, "wp-batch-route"), expected_vulns: 3 },
+  { id: "php-complex", dir: join19(ROOT6, "php-complex"), expected_vulns: 4 }
 ];
 function sourceFiles(root) {
   const out = [];
@@ -58323,7 +58484,7 @@ function sourceFiles(root) {
       return;
     }
     for (const e of entries) {
-      const p = join18(dir, e);
+      const p = join19(dir, e);
       let st;
       try {
         st = statSync3(p);
@@ -58344,7 +58505,7 @@ function detectFixture(dir) {
   for (const f of sourceFiles(dir)) {
     let code;
     try {
-      code = readFileSync21(f, "utf8");
+      code = readFileSync22(f, "utf8");
     } catch {
       continue;
     }
@@ -58539,8 +58700,8 @@ function createServer() {
 ` + `- A hard block (Cloudflare/WAF/IP-block/captcha) is NOT the end: mark the finding blocked + note the required vantage (residential / authorized / correct-SNI / --resolve direct-to-origin), then CONTINUE to the next lead (origin bypass, non-prod cluster, mobile APK, subdomain).
 ` + `- Keep trying every lead AND every chain step until each is verified/executed or blocked, THEN generate_report. Never deliver a bare surface map, and never stop at 'found X' when X enables more.
 
-` + "TWO PATHS:\\n" + "- Source path on disk -> blitz_scan / taint_file / eagle_eye2 (static).\\n" + "- Live URL -> live_recon / active_scan / strike_verify (web-hunting).\\n\\n" + `DEEPEN A FINDING: attack_plan(target, tech, params) to get the prioritized vector plan (decide what to test next with data); list_chains (escalation), chain_links (compose), technique_lookup(cls), payload_lookup, bypass_lookup (blocked). Phase doctrine: read_skill(bs-orchestrate-engagement | bs-web-hunting | bs-source-audit | bs-verify-finding). Campaign plan: read_playbook(target-type). On any failure call retry_guidance(signal) / model_fallback(signal) before giving up.
-` + "KNOWLEDGE BASE (discover, don't guess): skillLookup(topic) / listSkills for the 40 attack-path + hunting skills (ap-*, hp-*, bs-*); list_attack_vectors / attack_vectors(cat) for the 34-category vector taxonomy; taxonomy(kind) for OWASP/CWE/ASVS/API-top-10; read_playbook(type) for the 17 campaign playbooks; list_manuals / read_tool_manual for 317 tool references; list_tools / run_catalog_tool for the 141-tool catalog. Every tool, skill, and data layer is reachable from these. CROSS-TARGET INTELLIGENCE: strike_resolve auto-records confirmed/false_positive verdicts into the empirical ledger; query it with intelligence(action=hit_rates/top_vectors) so a new target on a known tech inherits historical hit-rates (attack_plan already blends them into success_probability). LIVE PENTEST + TARGETING (black-box, WAF-safe): cache_gap(base_url, endpoint) fuzzes path-normalization + static-extension variants for cache deception/poisoning; blind_oracle(base_url, param, value) detects which SINK a param reaches (sql/ssti/xss) via benign arithmetic (id=1+0, test${7*7}) WITHOUT a malicious payload; param_precedence(base_url, param, A, B) maps duplicate-parameter precedence (first/last-wins) for WAF-bypass. SOURCE TARGETING: action_surface(code) maps every wp_ajax_* action to its vuln class + DERIVED priority (what to look for WHERE); security_state(sanitizers, sink) gives a wrong-context sanitization verdict; framework_knowledge(framework) returns auth/nonce primitives for 9 frameworks; variant_scan(root, signature) mass-sweeps an install base for ONE bug family; patch_analyze(old, new) REVERSES a security patch into the 0-day, and its mine_signature feeds variant_scan to sweep unpatched copies. All of these are DETECTION HINTS — verify each live (strike_verify / browser_validate) before it enters the report. NEWEST DETECTORS — understand AND try them: variant_scan also emits priv_esc (privilege escalation — a role/capability/user change fed by request input, traced cross-file via reverse call-graph, e.g. set_role($id, sanitize_key($_POST['um-role'])) or update_user_meta(...,'wp_capabilities', $_POST[...])) and flags uploadAllow=>array('all') unrestricted-upload configs as file_upload (the file-manager/connector shape). TO TRY a priv_esc hit: submit the role field with 'administrator' (or send wp_capabilities meta) and confirm the account actually gains admin. TO TRY an unrestricted-upload hit: POST a .php/.phtml and confirm it lands web-reachable + executes. variant_scan also emits hardcoded_secret (a secret field — api_key/db_password/access_token/aws_* — assigned a literal value in source, CWE-798); verify a frontend/JS secret live via drive_devtools (inspect the JS bundle / network response and confirm the key is actually exposed), and for a backend secret confirm it is reachable/valid. A static hit is a HYPOTHESIS until verified live — never report unverified.\n" + `PRECISION ANALYSIS — chrome-devtools MCP is MANDATORY, not optional:
+` + "TWO PATHS:\\n" + "- Source path on disk -> blitz_scan / taint_file / eagle_eye2 (static).\\n" + "- Live URL -> live_recon / active_scan / strike_verify (web-hunting).\\n\\n" + `DEEPEN A FINDING: attack_plan(target, tech, params) to get the prioritized vector plan (decide what to test next with data); list_chains (escalation), chain_links (compose), technique_lookup(cls), payload_lookup, bypass_lookup (blocked). Ground any detector hit empirically with pattern_lookup(id) — it returns the class's CWE, real-world signature, escalation chains, and citable references, so a raw hit becomes a class-aware finding. BEFORE generating a report, run submission_gate(...) and only ship a finding that passes all 7 questions (reproducible, in-scope, real-impact, no-privileged-assumption, verified-live, evidence-redacted, severity-derived); one false = kill it. Phase doctrine: read_skill(bs-orchestrate-engagement | bs-web-hunting | bs-source-audit | bs-verify-finding). Campaign plan: read_playbook(target-type). On any failure call retry_guidance(signal) / model_fallback(signal) before giving up.
+` + "KNOWLEDGE BASE (discover, don't guess): skillLookup(topic) / listSkills for the 40 attack-path + hunting skills (ap-*, hp-*, bs-*); list_attack_vectors / attack_vectors(cat) for the 34-category vector taxonomy; taxonomy(kind) for OWASP/CWE/ASVS/API-top-10; read_playbook(type) for the 17 campaign playbooks; list_manuals / read_tool_manual for 317 tool references; list_tools / run_catalog_tool for the 141-tool catalog. Every tool, skill, and data layer is reachable from these. CROSS-TARGET INTELLIGENCE: strike_resolve auto-records confirmed/false_positive verdicts into the empirical ledger; query it with intelligence(action=hit_rates/top_vectors) so a new target on a known tech inherits historical hit-rates (attack_plan already blends them into success_probability). LIVE PENTEST + TARGETING (black-box, WAF-safe): cache_gap(base_url, endpoint) fuzzes path-normalization + static-extension variants for cache deception/poisoning; blind_oracle(base_url, param, value) detects which SINK a param reaches (sql/ssti/xss) via benign arithmetic (id=1+0, test${7*7}) WITHOUT a malicious payload; param_precedence(base_url, param, A, B) maps duplicate-parameter precedence (first/last-wins) for WAF-bypass. SOURCE TARGETING: action_surface(code) maps every wp_ajax_* action to its vuln class + DERIVED priority (what to look for WHERE); security_state(sanitizers, sink) gives a wrong-context sanitization verdict; framework_knowledge(framework) returns auth/nonce primitives for 9 frameworks; variant_scan(root, signature) mass-sweeps an install base for ONE bug family; patch_analyze(old, new) REVERSES a security patch into the 0-day, and its mine_signature feeds variant_scan to sweep unpatched copies. All of these are DETECTION HINTS — verify each live (strike_verify / browser_validate) before it enters the report. NEWEST DETECTORS — understand AND try them: variant_scan also emits priv_esc (privilege escalation — a role/capability/user change fed by request input, traced cross-file via reverse call-graph, e.g. set_role($id, sanitize_key($_POST['um-role'])) or update_user_meta(...,'wp_capabilities', $_POST[...])) and flags uploadAllow=>array('all') unrestricted-upload configs as file_upload (the file-manager/connector shape). TO TRY a priv_esc hit: submit the role field with 'administrator' (or send wp_capabilities meta) and confirm the account actually gains admin. TO TRY an unrestricted-upload hit: POST a .php/.phtml and confirm it lands web-reachable + executes. variant_scan also emits hardcoded_secret (CWE-798) in three tiers: a secret field (api_key/db_password/access_token/aws_*) assigned a literal (HIGH), a known secret FORMAT (JWT eyJ…/AWS AKIA…/GitHub ghp_…/Slack xoxb-…/…) regardless of name (HIGH), or a high-entropy suspect token (MEDIUM — verify before reporting). Verify a frontend/JS secret live via drive_devtools (inspect the JS bundle / network response and confirm the key is actually exposed), and for a backend secret confirm it is reachable/valid. A static hit is a HYPOTHESIS until verified live — never report unverified.\n" + `PRECISION ANALYSIS — chrome-devtools MCP is MANDATORY, not optional:
 ` + `- When a lead needs DOM/JS precision — DOM-XSS sink execution, AJAX endpoint + payload interception, JS runtime errors, redirect chains, SSO/token flow, or anything a static HTML glance cannot prove — call drive_devtools(target). It spawns chrome-devtools-mcp and drives a REAL headless browser (navigate -> list_network_requests -> list_console_messages -> evaluate_script), giving reproducible evidence instead of a guess.
 ` + `- Before calling it, check_mcp() to confirm the browser MCP is available; if not, blitzstrike install-tools or npm i -g chrome-devtools-mcp. Never substitute eyeballing minified JS or a static sink guess when a live browser can PROVE it. This is the precision + consistency layer.
 ` + "EXTERNAL MCP SERVERS (verified, connect them — NOT one-shot CLIs): chrome-devtools-mcp (29 tools: list_network_requests/get_network_request for raw HTTP interception, list_console_messages for JS errors + DOM-XSS, evaluate_script to run JS, take_screenshot) -> stdio chrome-devtools-mcp --headless --chromeArg=--no-sandbox --chromeArg=--disable-gpu (as root/container this is MANDATORY or the browser crashes; add --proxyServer http://127.0.0.1:8080 to route through Burp, --acceptInsecureCerts for bad TLS). burp-suite-mcp (proxy history + active scan + repeater) -> NOT npm: build the JAR (git clone https://github.com/PortSwigger/mcp-server.git && cd mcp-server && ./gradlew embedProxyJar), load it in Burp Extensions, then connect the client to http://127.0.0.1:9876 (SSE) or the stdio proxy java -jar mcp-proxy-all.jar --sse-url http://127.0.0.1:9876."
@@ -58895,6 +59056,37 @@ ${statusLine}` : statusLine },
       content: [{ type: "text", text: JSON.stringify(listChains()) }]
     };
   });
+  server.registerTool("pattern_lookup", {
+    title: "Empirical pattern lookup",
+    description: "GROUNDING: return the empirical grounding for a detector type / vuln class — its CWE, its real-world signature, the escalation chains it composes into (cross-ref chains.json), and citable references. Use to turn a raw detector hit into a grounded, class-aware finding. Pass 'list' to enumerate all grounded classes.",
+    inputSchema: {
+      id: string2().describe("Detector/vuln class id (sql_injection, ssrf, idor-like missing_authz, …), or 'list'")
+    }
+  }, async ({ id }) => {
+    if (id === "list")
+      return { content: [{ type: "text", text: JSON.stringify(listPatterns()) }] };
+    const p = patternLookup(id);
+    if (!p)
+      return { content: [{ type: "text", text: JSON.stringify({ error: `no pattern for '${id}'`, known: listPatterns().map((x) => x.id) }) }] };
+    return { content: [{ type: "text", text: JSON.stringify(p) }] };
+  });
+  server.registerTool("submission_gate", {
+    title: "Submission gate (7 questions)",
+    description: "GATE: run the deterministic 7-question checklist on a finding before it ships. Questions: reproducible? in-scope? real impact? no privileged assumption? verified live? evidence redacted? severity derived? One false = fail (kill the finding). Pass booleans you can honestly assert true; omit/leave false any you cannot.",
+    inputSchema: {
+      type: string2().optional().describe("Detector/vuln class id"),
+      severity: string2().optional().describe("Finding severity"),
+      reproducible: boolean2().optional().describe("Exact request/step list is copy-paste ready"),
+      in_scope: boolean2().optional().describe("Vulnerable asset is in engagement scope"),
+      real_impact: boolean2().optional().describe("Maps to an accepted-impact class"),
+      no_privileged_assumption: boolean2().optional().describe("Works without unrealistic prerequisites"),
+      verified_live: boolean2().optional().describe("Confirmed with marker + negative control"),
+      evidence_redacted: boolean2().optional().describe("Evidence attached, secrets/PII redacted"),
+      severity_derived: boolean2().optional().describe("Severity derived via CVSS/confidence")
+    }
+  }, async (args) => {
+    return { content: [{ type: "text", text: JSON.stringify(submissionGate(args)) }] };
+  });
   server.registerTool("fofa_search", {
     title: "FOFA asset search",
     description: "STRIKE: search the FOFA asset index (needs FOFA_EMAIL + FOFA_KEY).",
@@ -59279,7 +59471,7 @@ ${statusLine}` : statusLine },
     let src = code;
     if (!src && path) {
       try {
-        src = readFileSync23(path, "utf8");
+        src = readFileSync24(path, "utf8");
       } catch {
         return { content: [{ type: "text", text: JSON.stringify({ error: "unreadable path" }) }] };
       }
@@ -59897,7 +60089,7 @@ ${statusLine}` : statusLine },
     description: "Route confusion (separate class from source→sink taint): detect attacker-controlled dispatch (call_user_func/forward/dispatch), dynamic method calls ($obj->$m()), dynamic include (LFI), batch/proxy forwarding without per-route auth re-check, and route matching without path normalization.",
     inputSchema: { path: string2().describe("Source file path (PHP)") }
   }, async ({ path }) => {
-    const code = readFileSync23(path, "utf8");
+    const code = readFileSync24(path, "utf8");
     const findings = detectRouteConfusion(code, path);
     return {
       content: [{
@@ -59911,7 +60103,7 @@ ${statusLine}` : statusLine },
     description: "Complex-bug detection beyond taint: deserialization→POP gadget chain (unserialize + magic method), type juggling (loose ==/!= vs hash/secret), mass assignment (extract/parse_str without a safe flag), prototype pollution (unsafe merge of request data), CRLF/header injection (user input into a header), path confusion (user input into a file path without canonicalization), SSRF (user-controlled URL with no host allowlist), XXE (user XML parsed without disabling entities), SSTI (user input into a template render with no sandbox), wrong-context sanitization (sanitize_text_field() into a SQL query), and missing authorization/nonce on WordPress entry points (wp_ajax_* / admin_post_* / register_rest_route without current_user_can, nonce verification, or permission_callback).",
     inputSchema: { path: string2().describe("Source file path") }
   }, async ({ path }) => {
-    const code = readFileSync23(path, "utf8");
+    const code = readFileSync24(path, "utf8");
     const findings = detectComplexBugs(code, path);
     return {
       content: [{
@@ -59997,7 +60189,7 @@ ${statusLine}` : statusLine },
     let lang = language;
     if (path && !code) {
       try {
-        src = readFileSync23(path, "utf8");
+        src = readFileSync24(path, "utf8");
       } catch {
         return { content: [{ type: "text", text: JSON.stringify({ error: `cannot read ${path}` }) }] };
       }
@@ -60238,15 +60430,15 @@ async function serve() {
 
 // src/index.ts
 init_cli();
-import { readFileSync as readFileSync27, existsSync as existsSync14 } from "node:fs";
-import { join as join23 } from "node:path";
-import { fileURLToPath as fileURLToPath13 } from "node:url";
-var ROOT11 = join23(fileURLToPath13(new URL(".", import.meta.url)), "..");
+import { readFileSync as readFileSync28, existsSync as existsSync14 } from "node:fs";
+import { join as join24 } from "node:path";
+import { fileURLToPath as fileURLToPath14 } from "node:url";
+var ROOT11 = join24(fileURLToPath14(new URL(".", import.meta.url)), "..");
 function readVersion() {
   try {
-    const p = join23(ROOT11, "package.json");
+    const p = join24(ROOT11, "package.json");
     if (existsSync14(p))
-      return JSON.parse(readFileSync27(p, "utf8")).version ?? "1.0.0";
+      return JSON.parse(readFileSync28(p, "utf8")).version ?? "1.0.0";
   } catch {}
   return "1.0.0";
 }

package/intelligence/cwe_map.json

@@ -55,6 +55,9 @@
     {"id": "missing_authz", "cwe": "CWE-862", "name": "Missing Authorization"},
     {"id": "missing_nonce", "cwe": "CWE-352", "name": "Cross-Site Request Forgery (Missing Nonce)"},
     {"id": "priv_esc", "cwe": "CWE-269", "name": "Improper Privilege Management"},
-    {"id": "hardcoded_secret", "cwe": "CWE-798", "name": "Use of Hard-coded Credentials"}
+    {"id": "hardcoded_secret", "cwe": "CWE-798", "name": "Use of Hard-coded Credentials"},
+    {"id": "type_juggling", "cwe": "CWE-697", "name": "Incorrect Comparison"},
+    {"id": "path_confusion", "cwe": "CWE-22", "name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (Path Traversal)"},
+    {"id": "wrong_sanitizer", "cwe": "CWE-20", "name": "Improper Input Validation"}
   ]
 }

package/intelligence/patterns.json

@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
+{
+  "$schema": "blitzstrike-patterns-v1",
+  "version": "1.0.0",
+  "_comment": "Empirical grounding layer. Every detector type is traced to its real-world bug class (CWE), its real-world signature, the chains it composes into (cross-ref chains.json), and a citable reference. Detection is derived from this data, never hardcoded. References are public standards (CWE/OWASP) and disclosed-report classes — no vendor/product framing.",
+  "patterns": [
+    {
+      "id": "sql_injection",
+      "name": "SQL Injection",
+      "cwe": "CWE-89",
+      "real_world": "User input is interpolated into a SQL query by string concatenation instead of parameterization. The single most-reported web class; real disclosures range from boolean/UNION extraction to stacked queries for admin takeover.",
+      "detection_signatures": ["raw string-interpolated query into a SQL sink", "no prepare()/parameterization", "cross-file: concatenated variable with no visible source"],
+      "chain_templates": ["sqli_to_rce", "sqli_to_hash_dump_and_crack", "sql_injection_to_rce", "second_order_sqli"],
+      "references": ["CWE-89", "OWASP A03:2021 Injection"]
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "ssrf",
+      "name": "Server-Side Request Forgery",
+      "cwe": "CWE-918",
+      "real_world": "A server fetches an attacker-supplied URL with no host allowlist, letting it reach cloud metadata endpoints, internal services, or the loopback interface.",
+      "detection_signatures": ["server-side fetch of a request-controlled URL", "no host/allowlist validation"],
+      "chain_templates": ["ssrf_cloud_metadata", "ssrf_to_redis_rce", "blind_ssrf_to_oob_exfil"],
+      "references": ["CWE-918", "OWASP A10:2021 SSRF"]
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "ssti",
+      "name": "Server-Side Template Injection",
+      "cwe": "CWE-1336",
+      "real_world": "User input reaches a template engine (Jinja2, Twig, Freemarker, ERB, …) that evaluates expressions, yielding code execution via template syntax like {{7*7}}.",
+      "detection_signatures": ["template render of request input", "expression evaluation in a template engine"],
+      "chain_templates": ["ssti_template_injection_rce", "ssti_to_full_rce"],
+      "references": ["CWE-1336", "OWASP A03:2021 Injection"]
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "xxe",
+      "name": "XML External Entity Injection",
+      "cwe": "CWE-611",
+      "real_world": "An XML parser resolves external entities, letting an attacker read local files or hit internal URLs via DOCTYPE entity definitions.",
+      "detection_signatures": ["XML parse without disabling external entities", "DOCTYPE/ENTITY processing"],
+      "chain_templates": ["xxe_to_ssrf_and_file_read"],
+      "references": ["CWE-611", "OWASP A03:2021 Injection"]
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "deserialization",
+      "name": "Insecure Deserialization",
+      "cwe": "CWE-502",
+      "real_world": "Attacker-controlled serialized data is deserialized and escalated through a magic-method gadget chain (__destruct/__wakeup/__toString) into code execution or object injection.",
+      "detection_signatures": ["unserialize()/pickle.loads/yaml.load of request data", "a magic-method gadget in scope"],
+      "chain_templates": ["deserialization_pop_chain", "deserialization_to_rce", "appkey_leak_deserialization_rce"],
+      "references": ["CWE-502", "OWASP A08:2021 Software and Data Integrity Failures"]
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "type_juggling",
+      "name": "PHP Type Juggling (Loose Comparison)",
+      "cwe": "CWE-697",
+      "real_world": "A loose comparison (==) between user input and a hash/secret collapses via the 0e magic-hash or numeric-string coercion, bypassing authentication.",
+      "detection_signatures": ["loose comparison == of user input against a secret/hash", "0e-prefixed or numeric-string coercion"],
+      "chain_templates": ["php_type_juggling_auth_bypass"],
+      "references": ["CWE-697", "OWASP A07:2021 Identification and Authentication Failures"]
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "mass_assignment",
+      "name": "Mass Assignment",
+      "cwe": "CWE-915",
+      "real_world": "Request data is bound to model fields without an allowlist (extract()/parse_str/framework mass-assign), letting an attacker set privileged fields like role or is_admin.",
+      "detection_signatures": ["extract()/parse_str of request data without a safe flag", "model binding without an allowlist"],
+      "chain_templates": ["mass_assignment_to_admin_takeover", "extract_variable_injection_lfi"],
+      "references": ["CWE-915", "OWASP API6:2023 Unrestricted Access to Sensitive Business Flows"]
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "prototype_pollution",
+      "name": "Prototype Pollution",
+      "cwe": "CWE-1321",
+      "real_world": "A deep merge of request data into an object pollutes Object.prototype, corrupting logic and escalating to code execution in gadget-heavy runtimes.",
+      "detection_signatures": ["deep merge/extend of request data into objects", "__proto__ / constructor.prototype assignment"],
+      "chain_templates": ["prototype_pollution_to_rce"],
+      "references": ["CWE-1321"]
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "crlf_injection",
+      "name": "CRLF Injection / Header Injection",
+      "cwe": "CWE-93",
+      "real_world": "Request-controlled newlines are written into an HTTP header, enabling response splitting, cookie injection, or cache poisoning.",
+      "detection_signatures": ["request input reaches a header without CR/LF stripping"],
+      "chain_templates": ["cache_poisoning_xss", "cache_poison_to_stored_xss"],
+      "references": ["CWE-93", "OWASP A03:2021 Injection"]
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "path_confusion",
+      "name": "Path Traversal / Path Confusion",
+      "cwe": "CWE-22",
+      "real_world": "A request-controlled path is normalized or resolved without confinement (../, %2e%2e, absolute paths), reading or writing files outside the intended directory.",
+      "detection_signatures": ["request input reaches a file path without confinement"],
+      "chain_templates": ["path_traversal_file_write", "path_traversal_to_credential_theft", "lfi_log_poison_rce", "lfi_to_rce_via_log_poisoning"],
+      "references": ["CWE-22", "OWASP A01:2021 Broken Access Control"]
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "wrong_sanitizer",
+      "name": "Wrong-Context Sanitization",
+      "cwe": "CWE-20",
+      "real_world": "A value is sanitized for one context (e.g. HTML) but reaches a sink that needs a different context (e.g. SQL), so the sanitizer provides no real protection.",
+      "detection_signatures": ["a sanitizer/validator for context X feeding a sink that requires context Y"],
+      "chain_templates": ["second_order_sqli"],
+      "references": ["CWE-20", "OWASP A03:2021 Injection"]
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "missing_authz",
+      "name": "Missing Authorization (Broken Access Control)",
+      "cwe": "CWE-862",
+      "real_world": "A state-changing handler lacks a capability/ownership check, letting an unauthenticated or low-privilege caller perform an admin action.",
+      "detection_signatures": ["state-changing operation with no current_user_can/is_user_logged_in check"],
+      "chain_templates": ["idor_to_admin_takeover", "mass_assignment_to_admin_takeover", "idor_object_reference"],
+      "references": ["CWE-862", "OWASP A01:2021 Broken Access Control"]
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "missing_nonce",
+      "name": "Missing Nonce (CSRF)",
+      "cwe": "CWE-352",
+      "real_world": "A state-changing action lacks an anti-CSRF token, letting a victim's browser perform the action on their behalf via a forged request.",
+      "detection_signatures": ["state-changing operation with no nonce/referer verification"],
+      "chain_templates": ["nonce_harvest_auth_bypass"],
+      "references": ["CWE-352", "OWASP A01:2021 Broken Access Control"]
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "file_upload",
+      "name": "Unrestricted File Upload",
+      "cwe": "CWE-434",
+      "real_world": "A file is uploaded with an attacker-controlled name/extension and no server-side filetype whitelist, landing web-reachable for code execution.",
+      "detection_signatures": ["move_uploaded_file/wp_upload_bits with attacker-controlled name", "no extension/mime whitelist", "uploadAllow=all connector config"],
+      "chain_templates": ["upload_polyglot_rce", "file_upload_to_rce", "split_controller_upload_bypass"],
+      "references": ["CWE-434", "OWASP A04:2021 Insecure Design"]
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "priv_esc",
+      "name": "Privilege Escalation",
+      "cwe": "CWE-269",
+      "real_world": "A role/capability/user change is fed by request input and reachable from a public entry point with no capability check, letting a user self-assign admin.",
+      "detection_signatures": ["set_role/add_role/add_cap of request input", "cross-file: sink reachable from public hook with no capability check"],
+      "chain_templates": ["mass_assignment_to_admin_takeover", "idor_to_admin_takeover"],
+      "references": ["CWE-269", "OWASP A01:2021 Broken Access Control"]
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "hardcoded_secret",
+      "name": "Hardcoded Credentials",
+      "cwe": "CWE-798",
+      "real_world": "A secret (API key, database password, access token, private key) is committed in source, exposing it to anyone with repo access. Real disclosures regularly turn a leaked key into account takeover or cloud compromise.",
+      "detection_signatures": ["secret field assigned a literal", "known secret format (JWT/AWS/GitHub/Slack/…) in source", "high-entropy token under a non-obvious name"],
+      "chain_templates": ["api_key_leak_to_account_takeover", "appkey_leak_deserialization_rce", "default_creds_to_internal_pivot"],
+      "references": ["CWE-798", "OWASP A02:2021 Cryptographic Failures"]
+    }
+  ]
+}

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "blitzstrike",
-  "version": "2.4.56",
+  "version": "2.4.58",
   "description": "Blitz Strike — a universal MCP security-audit toolbelt. BLITZ sweeps the attack surface, EAGLE-EYE traces source-to-sink, STRIKE verifies live. 57 attack chains, 130-tool catalog, intelligence data layer. One server, every agent.",
   "type": "module",
   "bin": {