blitzstrike 2.4.190 → 2.4.191

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -5,6 +5,16 @@ All notable changes to Blitz Strike are documented here.
 The format follows [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.0.0/),
 and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/).
 
+## [2.4.191] — 2026-11-03
+
+### Added — finding→next-action knowledge base (ab-signals)
+
+- New `intelligence/ab-signals.json` (17 vuln classes) + `ab_signal` / list-all tool:
+  per class, how to CONFIRM it (proof_oracle = differential/timing/oob + test_vectors
+  + negative_control), what to suppress (negative_keywords), what to try next
+  (followup), what it chains into (chain_with), and when to STOP (kill_conditions).
+  The kill_conditions + proof_oracle fields are new (not in chains.json/attack_vectors).
+
 ## [2.4.190] — 2026-11-03
 
 ### Added — 4 anti-false-positive doctrine rules (PentestGPT + xalgorix + Dark-Moon + airecon)

package/dist/index.js

@@ -35795,6 +35795,26 @@ function taxonomy(kind, query) {
     usage: "taxonomy(kind='web'|'api'|'cwe'|'asvs', query?)"
   };
 }
+function listAbSignalClasses() {
+  const data = loadJson("ab-signals");
+  if (!data)
+    return { error: "ab-signals.json not found" };
+  return {
+    classes: data.classes.map((c) => ({ class: c.class, name: c.name, cwe: c.cwe, proof_oracle: c.proof_oracle }))
+  };
+}
+function abSignal(classOrKeyword) {
+  const data = loadJson("ab-signals");
+  if (!data)
+    return { found: false, error: "ab-signals.json not found" };
+  const q = classOrKeyword.trim().toLowerCase();
+  if (!q)
+    return { found: false, error: "pass a vuln class (sqli/xss/ssrf/idor/ssti/rce/...) or keyword" };
+  const hit = data.classes.find((c) => c.class.toLowerCase() === q || c.name.toLowerCase().includes(q) || c.keywords.some((k) => k.toLowerCase().includes(q) || q.includes(k.toLowerCase())));
+  if (hit)
+    return { found: true, ...hit };
+  return { found: false, query: classOrKeyword, suggestions: data.classes.map((c) => c.class) };
+}
 
 // src/writeup.ts
 var CHAIN_TO_CLASS = {
@@ -66697,6 +66717,17 @@ ${statusLine}` : statusLine },
   }, async ({ cls }) => {
     return { content: [{ type: "text", text: JSON.stringify(techniqueLookup(cls)) }] };
   });
+  server.registerTool("ab_signal", {
+    title: "Finding → next-action knowledge base",
+    description: "INTEL: return the deterministic finding→next-action entry for a vuln class (sqli/xss/ssrf/idor/ssti/rce/path_traversal/xxe/deserialization/csrf/jwt/open_redirect/auth_bypass/proto_pollution/nosql/crlf/file_upload): how to CONFIRM it (proof_oracle = differential/timing/oob + test_vectors + negative_control), what to suppress (negative_keywords), what to try NEXT (followup), what it CHAINS into (chain_with), and when to STOP (kill_conditions). Use right after you suspect or confirm a finding of that class — instead of reasoning 'what next' from scratch, one lookup gives confirm → chain → stop. Pass no arg to list all classes.",
+    inputSchema: {
+      cls: string2().optional().describe("Vuln class id or keyword (e.g. 'sqli', 'xss', 'idor', 'command injection').")
+    }
+  }, async ({ cls }) => {
+    if (!cls)
+      return { content: [{ type: "text", text: JSON.stringify(listAbSignalClasses()) }] };
+    return { content: [{ type: "text", text: JSON.stringify(abSignal(cls)) }] };
+  });
   server.registerTool("framework_tricks", {
     title: "Framework-specific exploitation tricks",
     description: "INTEL: return framework-specific exploitation knowledge for a framework (Laravel, Django, Flask, Node/Express, Next.js, Vue, Angular, WordPress, Joomla, Spring, JSP, Python, Go, Ruby/Rails, Perl, GraphQL) — detection signals, known vulns/CVEs, and concrete attack tricks. Use after detect_framework to hunt that framework's specific weaknesses.",

package/intelligence/ab-signals.json

@@ -0,0 +1,228 @@
+{
+  "$schema": "blitzstrike-ab-signals-v1",
+  "version": "1.0.0",
+  "_comment": "Finding -> next-action knowledge base. Per vuln class: how to CONFIRM it (proof_oracle + test_vectors + negative_control), what to suppress (negative_keywords), what to try NEXT (followup), what it CHAINS into (chain_with), and when to STOP (kill_conditions). proof_oracle ties to the verification-oracle doctrine: differential (attack diverges from control) / timing (induced delay clears noise floor) / oob (target calls back). kill_conditions is the missing piece: a vector with no growth past these is a dead end, not a 'keep trying'.",
+  "classes": [
+    {
+      "class": "sqli",
+      "name": "SQL Injection",
+      "cwe": "CWE-89",
+      "keywords": ["sql", "injection", "quote error", "syntax error", "database error", "mysql", "postgres", "oracle", "mssql", "sqlite"],
+      "negative_keywords": ["reflected in html", "echoed", "sanitized", "prepared statement", "parameterized", "orm"],
+      "proof_oracle": "differential",
+      "test_vectors": ["'", "\"", "' OR '1'='1", "1 AND 1=1", "1 AND 1=2", "' OR SLEEP(5)-- -"],
+      "negative_control": "1 AND 1=2 (must differ from 1 AND 1=1)",
+      "followup": ["extract version via union/error", "enumerate tables/columns", "read sensitive rows", "try time-based if blind"],
+      "chain_with": ["rce", "data_exposure", "auth_bypass"],
+      "kill_conditions": ["3 probes with zero differential and zero DB error", "input is a plain integer with no string concatenation", "WAF consistently blocks all quote variants"]
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "xss",
+      "name": "Cross-Site Scripting",
+      "cwe": "CWE-79",
+      "keywords": ["xss", "reflected", "stored", "dom", "script injection", "html injection"],
+      "negative_keywords": ["encoded", "escaped", "sanitized", "csp", "content-security-policy"],
+      "proof_oracle": "differential",
+      "test_vectors": ["<script>alert(1)</script>", "<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>", "\"><svg/onload=alert(1)>", "javascript:alert(1)"],
+      "negative_control": "a harmless literal string must NOT be interpreted as markup",
+      "followup": ["test stored vs reflected", "check DOM sinks", "prove execution not reflection", "steal session cookie / token"],
+      "chain_with": ["account_takeover", "csrf"],
+      "kill_conditions": ["payload reflected but never executed (escaped/encoded)", "CSP blocks inline script with no bypass", "input is server-encoded in all contexts"]
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "ssrf",
+      "name": "Server-Side Request Forgery",
+      "cwe": "CWE-918",
+      "keywords": ["ssrf", "server-side request", "url fetch", "webhook", "proxy", "curl"],
+      "negative_keywords": ["client-side", "browser fetch", "ajax", "localhost blocked", "allowlist"],
+      "proof_oracle": "oob",
+      "test_vectors": ["http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/", "http://127.0.0.1:8080", "http://[::1]", "gopher://127.0.0.1:6379/_"],
+      "negative_control": "a non-resolvable callback URL fires nothing while your real callback fires",
+      "followup": ["read cloud metadata (IMDS)", "hit internal services", "gopher/redis/FCGI chains", "confirm the target server (not you) made the request"],
+      "chain_with": ["rce", "data_exposure", "cloud_compromise"],
+      "kill_conditions": ["no callback despite correct interactsh setup and no egress filter", "strict host allowlist", "URL is fetched client-side not server-side"]
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "idor",
+      "name": "IDOR / BOLA / BFLA",
+      "cwe": "CWE-639",
+      "keywords": ["idor", "bola", "bfla", "object reference", "user id", "unauthorized access", "broken access control"],
+      "negative_keywords": ["own object", "scoped", "owner check", "authorization checked"],
+      "proof_oracle": "differential",
+      "test_vectors": ["swap id for another user's id", "swap uuid", "change role param", "cross-tenant id"],
+      "negative_control": "access your OWN object succeeds; another user's object must return 403/404",
+      "followup": ["prove protected DATA returned (not empty 200)", "test BFLA (function-level)", "test mass assignment", "test cross-tenant"],
+      "chain_with": ["data_exposure", "account_takeover", "priv_esc"],
+      "kill_conditions": ["cross-identity access returns 403/404", "a 200 with empty body is NOT access", "every object reference is server-scoped to the session"]
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "ssti",
+      "name": "Server-Side Template Injection",
+      "cwe": "CWE-1336",
+      "keywords": ["ssti", "template injection", "jinja", "twig", "freemarker", "velocity", "thymeleaf"],
+      "negative_keywords": ["client-side template", "handlebars client", "angular"],
+      "proof_oracle": "differential",
+      "test_vectors": ["{{7*7}}", "${7*7}", "#{7*7}", "<%= 7*7 %>", "{{config}}"],
+      "negative_control": "a non-template literal (e.g. plain text) must be echoed unchanged",
+      "followup": ["confirm 49 (or product) evaluates server-side", "read config/secret", "reach os eval/exec for RCE"],
+      "chain_with": ["rce", "data_exposure"],
+      "kill_conditions": ["expression is echoed verbatim without evaluation", "template syntax is escaped", "no template engine detected"]
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "rce",
+      "name": "Remote Code Execution / Command Injection",
+      "cwe": "CWE-78",
+      "keywords": ["rce", "command injection", "os command", "shell", "exec", "eval", "deserialization rce"],
+      "negative_keywords": ["escaped", "allowlist", "sandbox", "no shell"],
+      "proof_oracle": "timing",
+      "test_vectors": ["; id", "| whoami", "$(id)", "`id`", "&& sleep 5", "{{7*7}} (SSTI)", "ysoserial payload (deser)"],
+      "negative_control": "a harmless token must produce NO sleep and NO extra output",
+      "followup": ["establish quiet oracle (sleep/timing/OOB) BEFORE noisy payloads", "prove output from injected OS/runtime expression, not a fetch", "read /etc/passwd, whoami as read-only proof"],
+      "chain_with": ["data_exposure", "persistence", "pivot"],
+      "kill_conditions": ["no timing/OOB signal after 2 distinct primitives", "shell metacharacters are escaped/allowlisted", "execution is sandboxed with no escape"]
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "path_traversal",
+      "name": "Path Traversal / LFI",
+      "cwe": "CWE-22",
+      "keywords": ["path traversal", "lfi", "directory traversal", "include", "file read", "dot dot"],
+      "negative_keywords": ["whitelist", "basename", "realpath", "static file"],
+      "proof_oracle": "differential",
+      "test_vectors": ["../../../../etc/passwd", "..%2f..%2f..%2fetc/passwd", "....//....//etc/passwd", "..%252f..%252f", "php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=index.php"],
+      "negative_control": "a non-existent file must error differently than a readable one",
+      "followup": ["read sensitive files", "LFI to RCE via log poisoning / pearcmd / php://input", "confirm file CONTENT returned, not just an error change"],
+      "chain_with": ["rce", "data_exposure"],
+      "kill_conditions": ["path is normalized/allowlisted to a fixed directory", "no file content ever returned, only errors", "3 encodings all blocked"]
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "xxe",
+      "name": "XML External Entity",
+      "cwe": "CWE-611",
+      "keywords": ["xxe", "xml", "external entity", "doctype", "dtd"],
+      "negative_keywords": ["external entities disabled", "secure processing", "docx only", "no xml"],
+      "proof_oracle": "oob",
+      "test_vectors": ["<!DOCTYPE x [<!ENTITY e SYSTEM \"http://callback/\">]><x>&e;</x>", "<!ENTITY e SYSTEM \"file:///etc/passwd\">"],
+      "negative_control": "an XML without the entity must NOT fire the callback",
+      "followup": ["read local files (file://)", "SSRF via external entity", "exfiltrate via OOB parameter entity"],
+      "chain_with": ["data_exposure", "ssrf"],
+      "kill_conditions": ["entity not expanded (no callback, no file content)", "parser rejects DOCTYPE", "input is not XML"]
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "deserialization",
+      "name": "Insecure Deserialization",
+      "cwe": "CWE-502",
+      "keywords": ["deserialization", "unserialize", "pickle", "java object", "json.net", "gadget", "ysoserial"],
+      "negative_keywords": ["safe type allowlist", "serialization binder", "no user input to deserialize"],
+      "proof_oracle": "timing",
+      "test_vectors": ["ysoserial gadget chain", "pickle RCE payload", "PHP pop chain", "python cPickle __reduce__"],
+      "negative_control": "a benign serialized object must deserialize without side effect",
+      "followup": ["identify gadget chain", "trigger via crafted object", "confirm code exec, not just a type error"],
+      "chain_with": ["rce"],
+      "kill_conditions": ["no gadget chain available for the framework", "input is deserialized with a strict type allowlist", "deserialization is not reachable from user input"]
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "csrf",
+      "name": "Cross-Site Request Forgery",
+      "cwe": "CWE-352",
+      "keywords": ["csrf", "cross-site request forgery", "missing token", "no csrf"],
+      "negative_keywords": ["csrf token", "samesite=strict", "origin checked", "double submit"],
+      "proof_oracle": "differential",
+      "test_vectors": ["replay state-changing request without CSRF token", "cross-origin form", "JSON with CORS misconfig"],
+      "negative_control": "a request WITH the token succeeds; WITHOUT must fail",
+      "followup": ["confirm a state change (not just a 200)", "chain with CORS to read responses"],
+      "chain_with": ["account_takeover", "priv_esc"],
+      "kill_conditions": ["token is validated and not guessable", "SameSite=Strict + origin check", "no state-changing action without token"]
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "jwt",
+      "name": "JWT / Auth Token Attacks",
+      "cwe": "CWE-287",
+      "keywords": ["jwt", "json web token", "alg none", "token", "bearer"],
+      "negative_keywords": ["signature verified", "rs256 enforced", "key rotation"],
+      "proof_oracle": "differential",
+      "test_vectors": ["alg:none with empty signature", "alg:HS256 with public key", "kid path traversal", "expired token replay"],
+      "negative_control": "a tampered token must be rejected with 401",
+      "followup": ["forge admin token", "confused-deputy key swap", "test kid/jku injection"],
+      "chain_with": ["auth_bypass", "priv_esc", "account_takeover"],
+      "kill_conditions": ["signature strictly verified + alg pinned", "tampered token consistently 401", "no kid/jku/alg confusion surface"]
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "open_redirect",
+      "name": "Open Redirect",
+      "cwe": "CWE-601",
+      "keywords": ["open redirect", "redirect", "return url", "next param", "location header"],
+      "negative_keywords": ["whitelist", "allowlist", "relative only", "same host"],
+      "proof_oracle": "differential",
+      "test_vectors": ["?url=https://evil.com", "?next=//evil.com", "?return=javascript:alert(1)"],
+      "negative_control": "a same-host URL redirects, an external URL must not",
+      "followup": ["confirm external redirect fires", "chain into OAuth/token theft", "escalate to SSRF if server follows"],
+      "chain_with": ["account_takeover", "phishing"],
+      "kill_conditions": ["only relative/same-host redirects allowed", "strict allowlist", "redirect target validated server-side"]
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "auth_bypass",
+      "name": "Authentication Bypass",
+      "cwe": "CWE-287",
+      "keywords": ["auth bypass", "authentication bypass", "login bypass", "forced browsing"],
+      "negative_keywords": ["mfa", "session validated", "auth middleware"],
+      "proof_oracle": "differential",
+      "test_vectors": ["forced browsing to protected endpoint", "role/type confusion", "empty/invalid session", "default creds"],
+      "negative_control": "unauthenticated access must return 401/403/redirect to login",
+      "followup": ["confirm protected resource served without auth", "default credentials", "race the auth check"],
+      "chain_with": ["data_exposure", "priv_esc", "account_takeover"],
+      "kill_conditions": ["every protected route enforces auth", "no default/blank creds", "session is server-validated"]
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "proto_pollution",
+      "name": "Prototype Pollution",
+      "cwe": "CWE-1321",
+      "keywords": ["prototype pollution", "__proto__", "constructor.prototype", "object merge"],
+      "negative_keywords": ["object freeze", "json.parse only", "no merge"],
+      "proof_oracle": "differential",
+      "test_vectors": ["__proto__[isAdmin]=true", "constructor.prototype.x=1", "?__proto__.x=1"],
+      "negative_control": "a clean object must not gain polluted properties",
+      "followup": ["confirm polluted property affects control flow", "chain to RCE/XSS/auth bypass"],
+      "chain_with": ["rce", "auth_bypass", "xss"],
+      "kill_conditions": ["no unsafe merge/deep-merge", "Object.freeze / null-prototype used", "pollution has no observable effect"]
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "nosql",
+      "name": "NoSQL Injection",
+      "cwe": "CWE-943",
+      "keywords": ["nosql", "mongodb", "mongo", "operator injection", "$ne", "$gt"],
+      "negative_keywords": ["orm", "schema validated", "relational"],
+      "proof_oracle": "differential",
+      "test_vectors": ["{\"$ne\": null}", "{\"$gt\": \"\"}", "password[$ne]=x", "{\"$where\": \"sleep(5000)\"}"],
+      "negative_control": "a literal string must not be interpreted as an operator",
+      "followup": ["bypass auth with $ne/$gt", "extract via $regex", "time-based $where"],
+      "chain_with": ["auth_bypass", "data_exposure", "rce"],
+      "kill_conditions": ["input is a plain string not parsed as object", "operators escaped/sanitized", "schema validation rejects operator keys"]
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "crlf",
+      "name": "CRLF Injection / Header Injection",
+      "cwe": "CWE-93",
+      "keywords": ["crlf", "header injection", "log injection", "response splitting", "%0d%0a"],
+      "negative_keywords": ["header sanitized", "urlencoded", "blocked newline"],
+      "proof_oracle": "differential",
+      "test_vectors": ["%0d%0aSet-Cookie: evil=1", "%0d%0aX-Injected: 1", "\r\nLocation: http://evil.com"],
+      "negative_control": "a value without CRLF must not inject a header",
+      "followup": ["inject a header (set-cookie/location)", "log forging", "response splitting"],
+      "chain_with": ["xss", "open_redirect", "session_fixation"],
+      "kill_conditions": ["CR/LF stripped or encoded in the reflected position", "no user input reaches headers/logs", "framework blocks newline"]
+    },
+    {
+      "class": "file_upload",
+      "name": "Arbitrary File Upload",
+      "cwe": "CWE-434",
+      "keywords": ["file upload", "upload", "multipart", "avatar", "attachment"],
+      "negative_keywords": ["extension allowlist", "content validated", "mime checked", "execution denied"],
+      "proof_oracle": "differential",
+      "test_vectors": ["shell.php", "shell.php.jpg", "shell.pHp", "shell.php%00.jpg", ".htaccess", "svg with script"],
+      "negative_control": "a benign image must upload but a .php must be rejected OR stored non-executable",
+      "followup": ["reach the uploaded file", "confirm execution (not just storage)", "double-extension/encoding bypass"],
+      "chain_with": ["rce"],
+      "kill_conditions": [".php rejected or stored with no execute path", "content+MIME+extension all validated", "uploaded dir is non-executable / renamed"]
+    }
+  ]
+}

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "blitzstrike",
-  "version": "2.4.190",
+  "version": "2.4.191",
   "description": "Blitz Strike — a universal MCP security-audit toolbelt. BLITZ sweeps the attack surface, EAGLE-EYE traces source-to-sink, STRIKE verifies live. 57 attack chains, 130-tool catalog, intelligence data layer. One server, every agent.",
   "type": "module",
   "bin": {