blitzstrike 2.4.187 → 2.4.189
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/CHANGELOG.md +20 -0
- package/dist/index.js +25 -0
- package/package.json +1 -1
package/CHANGELOG.md
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@@ -5,6 +5,26 @@ All notable changes to Blitz Strike are documented here.
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The format follows [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.0.0/),
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and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/).
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## [2.4.189] — 2026-11-03
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### Added — 3 doctrine rules (swarm FP filter + red-team gates)
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- `fails_open_fp_filter` (FP filters must fail OPEN — error/timeout keeps every
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finding, never silently discard a real bug), `single_choke_point` (a rule enforced
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on one path only is no rule — constraints must gate EVERY dispatch path including
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background jobs), `phase_ordering` (informational → exploitation → post-exploitation;
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refuse a later-phase tool while an earlier phase is incomplete).
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## [2.4.188] — 2026-11-03
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### Added — 2 doctrine rules (swarm verification + stigmergic priority)
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- `verification_oracle` (proof lives outside the model: OOB callback / differential
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response / timing oracles; OOB never disproves; proof outranks confidence; probe
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error = inconclusive) and `stigmergic_priority` (time-decaying attention weight —
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volatile state like sessions/tokens decays fast, durable discoveries like ports/CVEs
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persist; act on what is still hot).
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## [2.4.187] — 2026-11-03
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### Added — 6 doctrine rules (multi-agent pentest orchestration)
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package/dist/index.js
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@@ -63829,6 +63829,31 @@ var HUNTING_DOCTRINE = [
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id: "compression_preserve_oob",
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title: "Compression Must Never Drop OOB Infrastructure — Summaries Are Lossless",
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rule: "When compressing or summarizing context, NEVER drop out-of-band (OOB) infrastructure — the public callback IP, listener ports, DNS exfiltration domains, and callback URLs. These are the most fragile context (a single line, easily lost in a summary) yet the most load-bearing: you need them to re-establish or verify blind RCE/SSRF/XXE, and once dropped they cannot be reconstructed. Preserve them verbatim in any summary. Likewise, when re-summarizing content that is ALREADY a summary, retain EVERY previously-distilled point — a summary-of-a-summary must be lossless, never a lossy re-compression that silently discards a prior conclusion."
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},
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{
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id: "verification_oracle",
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title: "Proof Lives Outside the Model — Three Oracles, and OOB Never Disproves",
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rule: "The line between a scanner that GUESSES a vulnerability and one that PROVES it is a signal OUTSIDE the model: a stronger model re-reading a finding is still a model grading a model. Confirm high-stakes findings against the live target with a non-model oracle, and trust that verdict over any model claim. Three oracles: (1) OOB CALLBACK — the target makes an out-of-band request to infrastructure you control; a fired callback PROVES, but silence never DISPROVES (WAF/egress/slow all look silent); (2) DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSE — an attack response diverges from the negative control; (3) TIMING — an induced delay clears the target's noise floor (and, in ladder mode, scales with the payload). Each oracle returns Proven / Disproven / Inconclusive, and a PROBE ERROR (missing tool, network failure, out-of-scope) is always Inconclusive — infrastructure failure can neither confirm nor condemn. PROOF OUTRANKS CONFIDENCE: a proven finding is worth more than a higher-CVSS-but-unproven one; prefer the verified low over the guessed high."
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},
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{
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id: "stigmergic_priority",
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title: "Stigmergic Priority — Attention Decays; Durable Discoveries Outlast Volatile State",
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rule: "Treat every finding/state item as carrying a time-decaying attention weight (like a pheromone trail). VOLATILE state — session tokens, one-shot probe results, transient errors — should decay FAST (minutes) so you stop paying attention to it once it is stale. DURABLE discoveries — open ports, tech fingerprints, CVE matches, confirmed vulns — should persist for hours so the engagement keeps them in focus across a long campaign. When deciding what to act on next, prefer what is still 'hot' (fresh + high-weight): a just-confirmed vuln or a just-opened port outranks an old, cold probe result. Never let a stale volatile token masquerade as a current fact — check its age before relying on it."
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},
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{
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id: "fails_open_fp_filter",
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title: "False-Positive Filters Must Fail OPEN — Never Silently Discard",
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rule: "Any automated false-positive filter or second-opinion scorer must FAIL OPEN: if it errors, times out, or is unreachable, keep EVERY finding and skip the filter — a transient failure must never silently discard a real bug. A dropped finding is an irreversible loss (the bug goes unreported); a kept false-positive is cheap to dismiss in triage. Only drop a finding when the filter returns a CONFIDENT negative verdict; on uncertainty or failure, keep it. This is the one asymmetry in detection that must always favor recall over precision."
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},
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{
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id: "single_choke_point",
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title: "A Rule Enforced on One Path Only Is No Rule — One Choke Point",
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rule: "Every operation constraint / red-line / scope check must sit at a SINGLE pre-dispatch choke point that EVERY execution path passes through — the direct tool call, the planned batch, the sub-agent, AND the background/spawned job. A rule enforced on only one path is no rule: the agent simply routes the forbidden action through an un-gated path. Before adding a guard, enumerate every path that can dispatch work and confirm the guard sits on all of them, or the guard is cosmetic. When a spawned/background job would run a tool, gate the SPAWN, not just the tool."
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},
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{
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id: "phase_ordering",
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title: "Phase Ordering — Informational → Exploitation → Post-Exploitation",
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rule: "Enforce phase ordering so the engagement cannot jump ahead: INFORMATIONAL (recon/discovery) must precede EXPLOITATION (weaponization/impact), which precedes POST-EXPLOITATION (persistence/pivot/lateral). A tool or action from a later phase must be refused while an earlier phase is incomplete — you cannot exploit before you have enumerated, and you cannot pivot before you have a foothold. This is not bureaucracy: it prevents the agent from burning a Metasploit module or a brute-force campaign against a target it has not yet fingerprinted, which is both noisy and self-defeating."
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}
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];
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var DOMAIN_EXHAUSTION_CHECKLIST = [
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package/package.json
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@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
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{
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"name": "blitzstrike",
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"version": "2.4.
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"version": "2.4.189",
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"description": "Blitz Strike — a universal MCP security-audit toolbelt. BLITZ sweeps the attack surface, EAGLE-EYE traces source-to-sink, STRIKE verifies live. 57 attack chains, 130-tool catalog, intelligence data layer. One server, every agent.",
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"type": "module",
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"bin": {
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