blitzstrike 2.4.126 → 2.4.127

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -5,7 +5,19 @@ All notable changes to Blitz Strike are documented here.
 The format follows [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.0.0/),
 and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/).
 
-## [2.4.125] — 2026-09-29
+## [2.4.127] — 2026-10-02
+
+### Added — asset discovery + screenshot + authenticated session
+
+- New `asset_discovery(domain, include_ports?)`: full passive asset enumeration —
+  crt.sh subdomains + common-prefix DNS brute + A-record resolution + optional
+  port scan of the main host, returned as a clean asset map.
+- New `screenshot(url, path?)`: headless-browser screenshot for vision-based proof
+  (gracefully degrades to "browser unavailable" when chromium is absent).
+- New `auth_login(login_url, user, pass, …)`: HTTP form login → session cookie +
+  access/refresh/JWT token extraction, with optional TOTP field for 2FA. (161 MCP tools.)
+
+## [2.4.126] — 2026-09-29
 
 ### Added — TOTP/HOTP generation + WET/DRY traceability
 

package/dist/index.js

@@ -17453,8 +17453,8 @@ var init_variants = __esm(() => {
 
 // src/sync.ts
 import { mkdirSync as mkdirSync11, writeFileSync as writeFileSync10, readFileSync as readFileSync32, readdirSync as readdirSync9, statSync as statSync6, rmSync as rmSync5 } from "node:fs";
-import { join as join31 } from "node:path";
-import { homedir as homedir12 } from "node:os";
+import { join as join32 } from "node:path";
+import { homedir as homedir13 } from "node:os";
 import { fileURLToPath as fileURLToPath18 } from "node:url";
 import { spawnSync as spawnSync4 } from "node:child_process";
 function dirExists(p) {
@@ -17470,7 +17470,7 @@ function countFiles(dir) {
     const walk = (d) => {
       for (const e of readdirSync9(d, { withFileTypes: true })) {
         if (e.isDirectory())
-          walk(join31(d, e.name));
+          walk(join32(d, e.name));
         else
           n++;
       }
@@ -17484,8 +17484,8 @@ function countFiles(dir) {
 function syncData() {
   if (!dirExists(DATA_ROOT2))
     mkdirSync11(DATA_ROOT2, { recursive: true });
-  const payloadsPath = join31(DATA_ROOT2, "payloads");
-  const templatesPath = join31(DATA_ROOT2, "templates");
+  const payloadsPath = join32(DATA_ROOT2, "payloads");
+  const templatesPath = join32(DATA_ROOT2, "templates");
   const hasPayloads = dirExists(payloadsPath) && countFiles(payloadsPath) > 0;
   const hasTemplates = dirExists(templatesPath) && countFiles(templatesPath) > 0;
   if (hasPayloads && hasTemplates) {
@@ -17495,8 +17495,8 @@ function syncData() {
       data_root: DATA_ROOT2
     };
   }
-  const localPayloads = join31(ROOT11, "payloads");
-  const localTemplates = join31(ROOT11, "templates");
+  const localPayloads = join32(ROOT11, "payloads");
+  const localTemplates = join32(ROOT11, "templates");
   let payloadsSynced = false;
   let templatesSynced = false;
   if (!hasPayloads && dirExists(localPayloads)) {
@@ -17509,7 +17509,7 @@ function syncData() {
   }
   const gitOk = spawnSync4("git", ["--version"]).status === 0;
   if (gitOk && (!dirExists(payloadsPath) || countFiles(payloadsPath) === 0 || !dirExists(templatesPath) || countFiles(templatesPath) === 0)) {
-    const tmp = join31(DATA_ROOT2, ".tmp-clone");
+    const tmp = join32(DATA_ROOT2, ".tmp-clone");
     if (dirExists(tmp))
       rmSync5(tmp, { recursive: true, force: true });
     const r = spawnSync4("git", ["clone", "--depth", "1", "--filter=blob:none", "--sparse", GITHUB_REPO, tmp], { timeout: 120000 });
@@ -17517,11 +17517,11 @@ function syncData() {
       const sparse = spawnSync4("git", ["-C", tmp, "sparse-checkout", "set", "payloads", "templates"], { timeout: 120000 });
       if (sparse.status === 0) {
         if (!dirExists(payloadsPath) || countFiles(payloadsPath) === 0) {
-          copyDir(join31(tmp, "payloads"), payloadsPath);
+          copyDir(join32(tmp, "payloads"), payloadsPath);
           payloadsSynced = true;
         }
         if (!dirExists(templatesPath) || countFiles(templatesPath) === 0) {
-          copyDir(join31(tmp, "templates"), templatesPath);
+          copyDir(join32(tmp, "templates"), templatesPath);
           templatesSynced = true;
         }
       }
@@ -17543,8 +17543,8 @@ function copyDir(src, dst) {
 function manualCopy(src, dst) {
   mkdirSync11(dst, { recursive: true });
   for (const e of readdirSync9(src, { withFileTypes: true })) {
-    const s = join31(src, e.name);
-    const d = join31(dst, e.name);
+    const s = join32(src, e.name);
+    const d = join32(dst, e.name);
     if (e.isDirectory())
       manualCopy(s, d);
     else
@@ -17553,8 +17553,8 @@ function manualCopy(src, dst) {
 }
 var ROOT11, DATA_ROOT2, GITHUB_REPO = "https://github.com/shinthink/blitzstrike.git";
 var init_sync = __esm(() => {
-  ROOT11 = join31(fileURLToPath18(new URL(".", import.meta.url)), "..");
-  DATA_ROOT2 = process.env.BLITZSTRIKE_DATA ?? join31(homedir12(), ".blitzstrike", "data");
+  ROOT11 = join32(fileURLToPath18(new URL(".", import.meta.url)), "..");
+  DATA_ROOT2 = process.env.BLITZSTRIKE_DATA ?? join32(homedir13(), ".blitzstrike", "data");
 });
 
 // src/update.ts
@@ -17600,14 +17600,14 @@ var init_update = __esm(() => {
 
 // src/release.ts
 import { readFileSync as readFileSync34, existsSync as existsSync18 } from "node:fs";
-import { join as join32 } from "node:path";
+import { join as join33 } from "node:path";
 import { fileURLToPath as fileURLToPath19 } from "node:url";
 import { execSync as execSync4 } from "node:child_process";
 function validateRelease() {
   const checks = [];
   checks.push({ name: "package.json version", ok: true, detail: VERSION });
   try {
-    const changelog = readFileSync34(join32(ROOT12, "CHANGELOG.md"), "utf8");
+    const changelog = readFileSync34(join33(ROOT12, "CHANGELOG.md"), "utf8");
     const m = changelog.match(/^##\s+\[([0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+)\]/m);
     const changelogVersion = m?.[1] ?? null;
     checks.push({
@@ -17639,22 +17639,22 @@ function validateRelease() {
   return { version: VERSION, checks, consistent: checks.filter((c) => !c.soft).every((c) => c.ok) };
 }
 function lockfilePresent() {
-  return existsSync18(join32(ROOT12, "package-lock.json")) || existsSync18(join32(ROOT12, "bun.lock")) || existsSync18(join32(ROOT12, "bun.lockb"));
+  return existsSync18(join33(ROOT12, "package-lock.json")) || existsSync18(join33(ROOT12, "bun.lock")) || existsSync18(join33(ROOT12, "bun.lockb"));
 }
 var ROOT12;
 var init_release = __esm(() => {
   init_version();
-  ROOT12 = join32(fileURLToPath19(new URL(".", import.meta.url)), "..");
+  ROOT12 = join33(fileURLToPath19(new URL(".", import.meta.url)), "..");
 });
 
 // src/dependency.ts
 import { readFileSync as readFileSync35 } from "node:fs";
-import { join as join33 } from "node:path";
+import { join as join34 } from "node:path";
 import { fileURLToPath as fileURLToPath20 } from "node:url";
 function checkDependencies() {
   let pkg = {};
   try {
-    pkg = JSON.parse(readFileSync35(join33(ROOT13, "package.json"), "utf8"));
+    pkg = JSON.parse(readFileSync35(join34(ROOT13, "package.json"), "utf8"));
   } catch {
     return { install_scripts: [], git_dependencies: [], total_dependencies: 0, safe: false };
   }
@@ -17677,13 +17677,13 @@ function checkDependencies() {
 }
 var ROOT13;
 var init_dependency = __esm(() => {
-  ROOT13 = join33(fileURLToPath20(new URL(".", import.meta.url)), "..");
+  ROOT13 = join34(fileURLToPath20(new URL(".", import.meta.url)), "..");
 });
 
 // src/cli.ts
 import { readFileSync as readFileSync36, existsSync as existsSync19, writeFileSync as writeFileSync11, mkdirSync as mkdirSync12 } from "node:fs";
-import { join as join34, dirname as dirname6 } from "node:path";
-import { homedir as homedir13 } from "node:os";
+import { join as join35, dirname as dirname6 } from "node:path";
+import { homedir as homedir14 } from "node:os";
 import { fileURLToPath as fileURLToPath21 } from "node:url";
 import { spawnSync as spawnSync5 } from "node:child_process";
 function which(cmd) {
@@ -17727,7 +17727,7 @@ async function runDoctor() {
     detail: h1 ? `X-HackerOne-Research: ${h1}` : "H1_USERNAME not set",
     fix: h1 ? undefined : "export H1_USERNAME=<your-hackerone-username> (adds X-HackerOne-Research to outbound requests)"
   });
-  const dataOk = existsSync19(join34(ROOT14, "chains.json")) && existsSync19(join34(ROOT14, "tools-catalog.json"));
+  const dataOk = existsSync19(join35(ROOT14, "chains.json")) && existsSync19(join35(ROOT14, "tools-catalog.json"));
   issues.push({
     name: "Data layers (chains + tools-catalog)",
     status: dataOk ? "ok" : "fail",
@@ -17778,14 +17778,14 @@ BlitzStrike — ${verdict}`);
 function resolveCommand() {
   if (which("blitzstrike"))
     return { command: "blitzstrike", args: ["serve", "--mcp"] };
-  const src = join34(ROOT14, "src", "index.ts");
+  const src = join35(ROOT14, "src", "index.ts");
   if (which("bun") && existsSync19(src))
     return { command: "bun", args: ["run", src, "serve", "--mcp"] };
   if (which("npx"))
     return { command: "npx", args: ["-y", "blitzstrike", "serve", "--mcp"] };
   if (which("bunx"))
     return { command: "bunx", args: ["blitzstrike", "serve", "--mcp"] };
-  const dist = join34(ROOT14, "dist", "index.js");
+  const dist = join35(ROOT14, "dist", "index.js");
   if (existsSync19(dist))
     return { command: "bun", args: [dist, "serve", "--mcp"] };
   return { command: "npx", args: ["-y", "blitzstrike", "serve", "--mcp"] };
@@ -17825,15 +17825,15 @@ function opencodeWrite(p) {
   };
 }
 function copyOpenCodeAgents() {
-  const srcDir = join34(ROOT14, "opencode-agents");
-  const dstDir = join34(homedir13(), ".config", "opencode", "agents");
+  const srcDir = join35(ROOT14, "opencode-agents");
+  const dstDir = join35(homedir14(), ".config", "opencode", "agents");
   if (!existsSync19(srcDir))
     return;
   if (!existsSync19(dstDir))
     mkdirSync12(dstDir, { recursive: true });
   for (const f of ["Blitz Strike.md", "Blitz.md", "Eagle Eye.md", "Strike.md"]) {
-    const src = join34(srcDir, f);
-    const dst = join34(dstDir, f);
+    const src = join35(srcDir, f);
+    const dst = join35(dstDir, f);
     if (existsSync19(src)) {
       writeFileSync11(dst, readFileSync36(src, "utf8"));
     }
@@ -17888,76 +17888,76 @@ mcp_servers:
   };
 }
 function detectAgents() {
-  const home = homedir13();
+  const home = homedir14();
   const agents = [];
-  const claudeJson = join34(home, ".claude.json");
+  const claudeJson = join35(home, ".claude.json");
   agents.push({
     name: "Claude Code",
     detectPath: claudeJson,
     installed: () => existsSync19(claudeJson) || which("claude"),
     write: jsonMcpServersWrite(claudeJson)
   });
-  const claudeDesktop = join34(home, ".config", "Claude", "claude_desktop_config.json");
+  const claudeDesktop = join35(home, ".config", "Claude", "claude_desktop_config.json");
   agents.push({
     name: "Claude Desktop",
     detectPath: claudeDesktop,
     installed: () => existsSync19(claudeDesktop),
     write: jsonMcpServersWrite(claudeDesktop)
   });
-  const cursor = join34(home, ".cursor", "mcp.json");
+  const cursor = join35(home, ".cursor", "mcp.json");
   agents.push({
     name: "Cursor",
     detectPath: cursor,
-    installed: () => existsSync19(join34(home, ".cursor")) || which("cursor"),
+    installed: () => existsSync19(join35(home, ".cursor")) || which("cursor"),
     write: jsonMcpServersWrite(cursor)
   });
-  const opencode = join34(home, ".config", "opencode", "opencode.jsonc");
+  const opencode = join35(home, ".config", "opencode", "opencode.jsonc");
   agents.push({
     name: "OpenCode",
     detectPath: opencode,
-    installed: () => existsSync19(join34(home, ".config", "opencode")) || which("opencode"),
+    installed: () => existsSync19(join35(home, ".config", "opencode")) || which("opencode"),
     write: opencodeWrite(opencode)
   });
-  const codex = join34(home, ".codex", "config.toml");
+  const codex = join35(home, ".codex", "config.toml");
   agents.push({
     name: "Codex",
     detectPath: codex,
-    installed: () => existsSync19(join34(home, ".codex")) || which("codex"),
+    installed: () => existsSync19(join35(home, ".codex")) || which("codex"),
     write: codexWrite(codex)
   });
-  const hermes = join34(home, ".hermes", "config.yaml");
+  const hermes = join35(home, ".hermes", "config.yaml");
   agents.push({
     name: "Hermes",
     detectPath: hermes,
-    installed: () => existsSync19(join34(home, ".hermes")) || which("hermes"),
+    installed: () => existsSync19(join35(home, ".hermes")) || which("hermes"),
     write: hermesWrite(hermes)
   });
-  const gemini = join34(home, ".gemini", "settings.json");
+  const gemini = join35(home, ".gemini", "settings.json");
   agents.push({
     name: "Gemini CLI",
     detectPath: gemini,
-    installed: () => existsSync19(join34(home, ".gemini")) || which("gemini"),
+    installed: () => existsSync19(join35(home, ".gemini")) || which("gemini"),
     write: jsonMcpServersWrite(gemini)
   });
-  const windsurf = join34(home, ".codeium", "windsurf", "mcp_config.json");
+  const windsurf = join35(home, ".codeium", "windsurf", "mcp_config.json");
   agents.push({
     name: "Windsurf",
     detectPath: windsurf,
-    installed: () => existsSync19(join34(home, ".codeium")) || which("windsurf"),
+    installed: () => existsSync19(join35(home, ".codeium")) || which("windsurf"),
     write: jsonMcpServersWrite(windsurf)
   });
-  const copilot = join34(home, ".copilot", "mcp.json");
+  const copilot = join35(home, ".copilot", "mcp.json");
   agents.push({
     name: "Copilot",
     detectPath: copilot,
-    installed: () => existsSync19(join34(home, ".copilot")),
+    installed: () => existsSync19(join35(home, ".copilot")),
     write: jsonMcpServersWrite(copilot)
   });
-  const cline = join34(home, ".cline", "mcp_settings.json");
+  const cline = join35(home, ".cline", "mcp_settings.json");
   agents.push({
     name: "Cline",
     detectPath: cline,
-    installed: () => existsSync19(join34(home, ".cline")),
+    installed: () => existsSync19(join35(home, ".cline")),
     write: jsonMcpServersWrite(cline)
   });
   return agents;
@@ -18075,7 +18075,7 @@ var init_cli = __esm(() => {
   init_release();
   init_dependency();
   init_mcp_status();
-  ROOT14 = join34(fileURLToPath21(new URL(".", import.meta.url)), "..");
+  ROOT14 = join35(fileURLToPath21(new URL(".", import.meta.url)), "..");
 });
 
 // node_modules/zod/v3/helpers/util.js
@@ -60744,15 +60744,127 @@ function wetDryTrace(type, wet, dry, dryOk = true) {
   };
 }
 
+// src/asset-discovery.ts
+import { resolve4 as resolve44 } from "node:dns/promises";
+function normalizeDomain(domain) {
+  return domain.replace(/^https?:\/\//i, "").replace(/\/.*$/, "").replace(/:\d+$/, "").trim().toLowerCase();
+}
+async function assetDiscovery(domain, includePorts = false) {
+  const d = normalizeDomain(domain);
+  if (!d || !d.includes("."))
+    return { domain: d, subdomains: [], resolved: [], open_ports: [], source: "invalid domain", total: 0 };
+  const [ct, brute] = await Promise.all([subdomainEnum(d), dnsBrute(d)]);
+  const hosts = [...new Set([...ct.subdomains, ...brute.found.map((f) => f.host), d])].sort();
+  const resolved = [];
+  const CHUNK = 10;
+  for (let i = 0;i < hosts.length; i += CHUNK) {
+    const batch = hosts.slice(i, i + CHUNK);
+    await Promise.all(batch.map(async (host) => {
+      try {
+        const ips = await resolve44(host);
+        if (ips.length)
+          resolved.push({ host, ips });
+      } catch {}
+    }));
+  }
+  let open_ports = [];
+  if (includePorts) {
+    const main = resolved.find((r) => r.host === d) ?? resolved[0];
+    if (main) {
+      const scan = await scanPorts(main.ips[0] ?? main.host);
+      open_ports = scan.filter((p) => p.open).map((p) => ({ port: p.port, service: p.service }));
+    }
+  }
+  return {
+    domain: d,
+    subdomains: hosts,
+    resolved,
+    open_ports,
+    source: `${ct.source} + ${brute.source}`,
+    total: hosts.length
+  };
+}
+
+// src/screenshot.ts
+import { join as join27 } from "node:path";
+import { homedir as homedir10 } from "node:os";
+async function screenshot(url, path) {
+  const out = path ?? join27(homedir10(), ".blitzstrike", `shot-${Date.now()}.png`);
+  const opened = await browserOpen(url);
+  if (!opened.ok) {
+    return { ok: false, url, detail: opened.unavailable ? `browser unavailable (${opened.detail}) — install playwright-core + a chromium, or use drive_devtools` : `open failed: ${opened.detail}` };
+  }
+  const shot = await browserScreenshot(out);
+  await browserClose();
+  if (!shot.ok) {
+    return { ok: false, url, detail: `screenshot failed: ${shot.detail}` };
+  }
+  return { ok: true, url, path: out, detail: `saved ${out} — inspect with a vision model (vision_analyze) to confirm the rendered state` };
+}
+
+// src/auth-session.ts
+function parseCookies(setCookie) {
+  if (!setCookie)
+    return [];
+  const out = [];
+  for (const part of setCookie.split(/,(?=\s*[A-Za-z0-9_-]+=)/)) {
+    const m = part.trim().match(/^([^=;]+)=([^;]*)/);
+    if (m)
+      out.push({ name: m[1].trim(), value: m[2].trim() });
+  }
+  return out;
+}
+function extractTokens(body) {
+  const out = [];
+  for (const re of [/eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]+/g, /"access_token"\s*:\s*"([^"]+)"/g, /"token"\s*:\s*"([^"]+)"/g, /"refresh_token"\s*:\s*"([^"]+)"/g]) {
+    for (const m of body.matchAll(re)) {
+      const v = m[1] ?? m[0];
+      if (v && !out.some((t) => t.value === v))
+        out.push({ name: v.startsWith("eyJ") ? "jwt" : "token", value: v });
+    }
+  }
+  return out;
+}
+async function authLogin(loginUrl, username, password, opts) {
+  const userField = opts?.user_field ?? "username";
+  const passField = opts?.pass_field ?? "password";
+  const form = new URLSearchParams({ [userField]: username, [passField]: password, ...opts?.extra ?? {} });
+  if (opts?.totp)
+    form.set(opts?.totp_field ?? "code", opts.totp);
+  let res;
+  try {
+    res = await fetch(loginUrl, {
+      method: "POST",
+      redirect: "manual",
+      headers: { "Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded", "User-Agent": "Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; BlitzStrike/2.4)" },
+      body: form.toString()
+    });
+  } catch (e) {
+    return { ok: false, login_url: loginUrl, cookies: [], tokens: [], detail: `login request failed: ${e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e)}` };
+  }
+  const body = await res.text();
+  const cookies = parseCookies(res.headers.get("set-cookie"));
+  const tokens = extractTokens(body);
+  const ok = res.status < 400 && (cookies.length > 0 || tokens.length > 0);
+  return {
+    ok,
+    login_url: loginUrl,
+    status: res.status,
+    cookies: cookies.map((c) => ({ name: c.name, value: redactSecrets(c.value) })),
+    tokens: tokens.map((t) => ({ name: t.name, value: redactSecrets(t.value) })),
+    detail: ok ? `authenticated (HTTP ${res.status}) — ${cookies.length} session cookie(s), ${tokens.length} token(s) captured for authenticated scanning` : `login failed (HTTP ${res.status}) — no session cookie or token captured; check credentials/fields or use browser_agent for a JS login flow`
+  };
+}
+
 // src/benchmark.ts
 import { readFileSync as readFileSync27, readdirSync as readdirSync7, writeFileSync as writeFileSync7, rmSync as rmSync3, mkdirSync as mkdirSync8 } from "node:fs";
-import { join as join27 } from "node:path";
+import { join as join28 } from "node:path";
 import { fileURLToPath as fileURLToPath16 } from "node:url";
-import { tmpdir as tmpdir3, homedir as homedir10 } from "node:os";
+import { tmpdir as tmpdir3, homedir as homedir11 } from "node:os";
 init_complex_bugs();
-var ROOT9 = join27(fileURLToPath16(new URL(".", import.meta.url)), "..");
-var CORPUS = join27(ROOT9, "bench", "corpus");
-var CAPTURED_CORPUS_DIR = process.env.BLITZSTRIKE_CORPUS_DIR ?? join27(homedir10(), ".blitzstrike", "corpus");
+var ROOT9 = join28(fileURLToPath16(new URL(".", import.meta.url)), "..");
+var CORPUS = join28(ROOT9, "bench", "corpus");
+var CAPTURED_CORPUS_DIR = process.env.BLITZSTRIKE_CORPUS_DIR ?? join28(homedir11(), ".blitzstrike", "corpus");
 function parseCorpusFile(path) {
   let text;
   try {
@@ -60812,7 +60924,7 @@ function loadDir(dir) {
     for (const f of readdirSync7(dir)) {
       if (!f.endsWith(".md"))
         continue;
-      const e = parseCorpusFile(join27(dir, f));
+      const e = parseCorpusFile(join28(dir, f));
       if (e)
         entries.push(e);
     }
@@ -60839,7 +60951,7 @@ function captureFalsePositive(input) {
     input.code,
     "```"
   ].filter((l) => l !== null);
-  const path = join27(CAPTURED_CORPUS_DIR, `${id}.md`);
+  const path = join28(CAPTURED_CORPUS_DIR, `${id}.md`);
   writeFileSync7(path, lines.join(`
 `) + `
 `, "utf8");
@@ -60861,7 +60973,7 @@ function detect(entry) {
   }
   const lang = entry.language;
   if (lang === "php") {
-    const tmp = join27(tmpdir3(), `blitzstrike-bench-${entry.id}-${process.pid}.php`);
+    const tmp = join28(tmpdir3(), `blitzstrike-bench-${entry.id}-${process.pid}.php`);
     writeFileSync7(tmp, entry.code);
     const r = analyzeDataFlow2(tmp);
     rmSync3(tmp, { force: true });
@@ -60931,11 +61043,11 @@ function runBenchmark() {
 
 // src/obligations.ts
 import { readFileSync as readFileSync28, appendFileSync as appendFileSync4, mkdirSync as mkdirSync9, existsSync as existsSync14, writeFileSync as writeFileSync8 } from "node:fs";
-import { join as join28 } from "node:path";
+import { join as join29 } from "node:path";
 import { createHash as createHash6 } from "node:crypto";
-import { homedir as homedir11 } from "node:os";
-var HOME_DIR5 = process.env.BLITZSTRIKE_HOME ?? join28(homedir11(), ".blitzstrike");
-var OBLIGATION_PATH = join28(HOME_DIR5, "obligations.jsonl");
+import { homedir as homedir12 } from "node:os";
+var HOME_DIR5 = process.env.BLITZSTRIKE_HOME ?? join29(homedir12(), ".blitzstrike");
+var OBLIGATION_PATH = join29(HOME_DIR5, "obligations.jsonl");
 function ensureDir3() {
   if (!existsSync14(HOME_DIR5))
     mkdirSync9(HOME_DIR5, { recursive: true });
@@ -62972,7 +63084,7 @@ function listPocTypes() {
 import { execSync as execSync3 } from "node:child_process";
 import { mkdtempSync as mkdtempSync3, mkdirSync as mkdirSync10, writeFileSync as writeFileSync9, rmSync as rmSync4, existsSync as existsSync16 } from "node:fs";
 import { tmpdir as tmpdir4 } from "node:os";
-import { join as join29 } from "node:path";
+import { join as join30 } from "node:path";
 function findForge() {
   try {
     const p = execSync3("which forge 2>/dev/null", { encoding: "utf8", timeout: 3000 }).trim();
@@ -63021,14 +63133,14 @@ async function foundryRun(input) {
     };
   }
   const poc = input.poc_code ?? foundryPoc(input.class_ ?? "missing_access_control", name);
-  const dir = mkdtempSync3(join29(tmpdir4(), "blitzstrike-foundry-"));
+  const dir = mkdtempSync3(join30(tmpdir4(), "blitzstrike-foundry-"));
   try {
     try {
       execSync3(`${forge} init --force --no-git ${dir}`, { stdio: "ignore", timeout: 60000 });
     } catch {
-      mkdirSync10(join29(dir, "src"), { recursive: true });
-      mkdirSync10(join29(dir, "test"), { recursive: true });
-      writeFileSync9(join29(dir, "foundry.toml"), `[profile.default]
+      mkdirSync10(join30(dir, "src"), { recursive: true });
+      mkdirSync10(join30(dir, "test"), { recursive: true });
+      writeFileSync9(join30(dir, "foundry.toml"), `[profile.default]
 src = "src"
 out = "out"
 libs = ["lib"]
@@ -63038,12 +63150,12 @@ solc = "0.8.20"
     for (const f of ["Counter.sol", "Counter.t.sol", "Counter.s.sol"]) {
       for (const sub of ["src", "test", "script"]) {
         try {
-          rmSync4(join29(dir, sub, f), { force: true });
+          rmSync4(join30(dir, sub, f), { force: true });
         } catch {}
       }
     }
-    writeFileSync9(join29(dir, "src", `${name}.sol`), input.contract_code);
-    writeFileSync9(join29(dir, "test", `${name}.t.sol`), poc);
+    writeFileSync9(join30(dir, "src", `${name}.sol`), input.contract_code);
+    writeFileSync9(join30(dir, "test", `${name}.t.sol`), poc);
     const { out } = runForge(forge, dir, input.timeout_ms ?? 60000);
     const tests = parseTestResults(out);
     const anyFail = tests.some((t) => t.status === "fail");
@@ -63062,17 +63174,17 @@ solc = "0.8.20"
 
 // src/enterprise-benchmark.ts
 import { existsSync as existsSync17, readFileSync as readFileSync31, readdirSync as readdirSync8, statSync as statSync5 } from "node:fs";
-import { join as join30, resolve } from "node:path";
+import { join as join31, resolve } from "node:path";
 import { fileURLToPath as fileURLToPath17 } from "node:url";
 init_complex_bugs();
 var ROOT10 = resolve(fileURLToPath17(new URL(".", import.meta.url)), "..", "bench", "enterprise");
 var ENTERPRISE_FIXTURES = [
-  { id: "php-laravel", dir: join30(ROOT10, "php-laravel"), expected_vulns: 4 },
-  { id: "js-express", dir: join30(ROOT10, "js-express"), expected_vulns: 2 },
-  { id: "py-django", dir: join30(ROOT10, "py-django"), expected_vulns: 2 },
-  { id: "java-spring", dir: join30(ROOT10, "java-spring"), expected_vulns: 2 },
-  { id: "wp-batch-route", dir: join30(ROOT10, "wp-batch-route"), expected_vulns: 3 },
-  { id: "php-complex", dir: join30(ROOT10, "php-complex"), expected_vulns: 4 }
+  { id: "php-laravel", dir: join31(ROOT10, "php-laravel"), expected_vulns: 4 },
+  { id: "js-express", dir: join31(ROOT10, "js-express"), expected_vulns: 2 },
+  { id: "py-django", dir: join31(ROOT10, "py-django"), expected_vulns: 2 },
+  { id: "java-spring", dir: join31(ROOT10, "java-spring"), expected_vulns: 2 },
+  { id: "wp-batch-route", dir: join31(ROOT10, "wp-batch-route"), expected_vulns: 3 },
+  { id: "php-complex", dir: join31(ROOT10, "php-complex"), expected_vulns: 4 }
 ];
 function sourceFiles(root) {
   const out = [];
@@ -63084,7 +63196,7 @@ function sourceFiles(root) {
       return;
     }
     for (const e of entries) {
-      const p = join30(dir, e);
+      const p = join31(dir, e);
       let st;
       try {
         st = statSync5(p);
@@ -63318,7 +63430,7 @@ function createServer2() {
 ` + `- A hard block (Cloudflare/WAF/IP-block/captcha) is NOT the end: mark the finding blocked + note the required vantage (residential / authorized / correct-SNI / --resolve direct-to-origin), then CONTINUE to the next lead (origin bypass, non-prod cluster, mobile APK, subdomain).
 ` + `- Keep trying every lead AND every chain step until each is verified/executed or blocked, THEN generate_report. Never deliver a bare surface map, and never stop at 'found X' when X enables more.
 
-` + "TWO PATHS:\\n" + "- Source path on disk -> blitz_scan / taint_file / eagle_eye2 (static).\\n" + "- Live URL -> live_recon / active_scan / strike_verify (web-hunting).\\n\\n" + "DEEPEN A FINDING: attack_plan(target, tech, params) to get the prioritized vector plan (decide what to test next with data); list_chains (escalation), chain_links (compose), technique_lookup(cls), payload_lookup, bypass_lookup (blocked). Ground any detector hit empirically with pattern_lookup(id) — it returns the class's CWE, real-world signature, escalation chains, citable references, per-class bypass techniques, and the high-value assets (crown jewels) that class hits, so a raw hit becomes a class-aware finding. Resolve free-form terminology first with synonym_lookup(term) (IDOR/BOLA/SQLi/prompt-injection → canonical id). For an llm_injection hit, its pattern carries a validation discipline — the RUN-TWICE RULE (reproduce token-for-token across two fresh sessions), NON-GUESSABLE ANCHOR (must leak a real key/URL, not a plausible guess), and OOB PROOF (a verifiable callback log) — apply all three before reporting. BEFORE generating a report, run submission_gate(...) and only ship a finding that passes all 7 questions (reproducible, in-scope, real-impact, no-privileged-assumption, verified-live, evidence-redacted, severity-derived); one false = kill it. When a PoC/report comes out under-enriched, wet_dry(type, wet, dry) diagnoses WHERE it broke — WET (model/prompt/timeout) vs DRY (parser) vs template. Generate the concrete reproduction recipe with auto_poc(type, base_url, endpoint, param) — it emits the exact marker request + negative control + expected differential + Patchstack-style title, so 'reproducible' is executable, not abstract. Calibrate severity with severity_calibrate(type, cvss) to get a P1–P5 tier + VRT-style category. Start each engagement with engagement_scaffold(target, scope) for the folder + scope.md structure, and check data_refresh() to confirm the data layers are consistent. Phase doctrine: read_skill(bs-orchestrate-engagement | bs-web-hunting | bs-source-audit | bs-verify-finding). Campaign plan: read_playbook(target-type). On any failure call retry_guidance(signal) / model_fallback(signal) before giving up. HUNTING DOCTRINE (maximize payout rate): (1) SIBLING RULE — if one endpoint requires auth, check every sibling (/export /delete /share); ~30% of paid IDOR/auth bugs come from siblings — AUTOMATE it with sibling_scan(base_url, endpoint, token_a, token_b), the deterministic live logic-bug prober (sibling enumeration + differential IDOR + auth matrix + mass assignment + rate limit, evidence-first). (2) A→B SIGNAL — a confirmed bug signals a class of developer mistake; hunt B and C (20-min box) before reporting. (3) TWO-ACCOUNT IDOR — always test with attacker account A reading victim account B, and state it in the report. (4) PoC ESCALATION — IDOR shows victim data (not 200), XSS shows cookie exfil (not alert), SSRF shows internal response (not DNS), SQLi shows DB content (not error). (5) FOLLOW THE MONEY — billing/credits/refunds/wallet flows. (6) Kill weak findings with kill_list(type) BEFORE the gate — missing headers, self-XSS, open-redirect-alone, SSRF-DNS-only, GraphQL-introspection-alone are always N/A standalone. (7) CI/CD + SAML/SSO are critical attack surfaces (pull_request_target, expression injection, XML signature wrapping, comment injection). Full doctrine: hunting_doctrine(). WHAT TO HUNT NEXT: watchlist() returns the ranked CWE frequency + high-value CVEs with payout + a saturated flag (prioritize high-freq/high-payout/not-saturated: missing-authz, SQLi, SSRF, deserialization; skip saturated XSS/CSRF/open-redirect unless they chain into takeover). The CVE watchlist now spans 4,000+ product fingerprints (live from nuclei-templates when installed — refresh with sync_cve_corpus() before a big recon pass); live_recon's suggested_cves names the SPECIFIC CVE for the detected product/version — then cve_verify(cve, target) CONFIRMS it live by running the matching nuclei template (VERIFIED only when nuclei actually matches; a CVE is report-ready only after cve_verify, never from the fingerprint alone). For 'scan this target' automation, nuclei_scan(target) fingerprints the stack and runs the WHOLE matched template set (CVE templates + optional broad tech-tag) in one rate-limited pass — use it instead of verifying CVEs one-by-one. SURFACE-FIRST: surface_map(surface) maps an attack surface (image/redirect proxy, edge cache, payment portal, AI agent, file service, Electron, SSO) to its highest-value tests — map surfaces then test, don't spray payloads; then param_surface(target, class) discovers EVERY testable parameter (URL query, form fields, /users/123 path ids + UUIDs, JS refs) + per-class specialist hints — test the DISCOVERED params, not just the hinted one. PRECISION GUARD: resolve_check(host) detects when an ISP/country redirects the domain to a blocking/sinkhole page (gambling/adult/streaming niches) — audit the PUBLIC IP, never the sinkhole. CIRCUIT BREAKER: target_health(target) probes the target and tracks consecutive failures — if the circuit OPENS (5 consecutive timeouts/5xx) PAUSE the target and resume when it recovers (auto-closes on a successful probe); circuit_status() lists every tracked target's state.\n" + "KNOWLEDGE BASE (discover, don't guess): skillLookup(topic) / listSkills for the 40 attack-path + hunting skills (ap-*, hp-*, bs-*); list_attack_vectors / attack_vectors(cat) for the 34-category vector taxonomy; taxonomy(kind) for OWASP/CWE/ASVS/API-top-10; read_playbook(type) for the 17 campaign playbooks; list_manuals / read_tool_manual for 317 tool references; list_tools / run_catalog_tool for the 141-tool catalog. Every tool, skill, and data layer is reachable from these. CROSS-TARGET INTELLIGENCE: strike_resolve auto-records confirmed/false_positive verdicts into the empirical ledger; query it with intelligence(action=hit_rates/top_vectors/recall) so a new target on a known tech inherits historical hit-rates (attack_plan already blends them into success_probability). intelligence(action=recall, tech, target) is the per-engagement pattern recall — it returns which patterns historically CONFIRMED on that tech (prioritize them) versus which only ever produced false positives (avoid them), so a new engagement starts from the empirical playbook of past ones. LIVE PENTEST + TARGETING (black-box, WAF-safe): cache_gap(base_url, endpoint) fuzzes path-normalization + static-extension variants for cache deception/poisoning; blind_oracle(base_url, param, value) detects which SINK a param reaches (sql/ssti/xss) via benign arithmetic (id=1+0, test${7*7}) WITHOUT a malicious payload; param_precedence(base_url, param, A, B) maps duplicate-parameter precedence (first/last-wins) for WAF-bypass; broken_link_scan(url) detects expired-domain takeover (crawls outbound refs → DNS/RDAP → flags claimable domains). Logic-bug live probers: jwt_forge(token, endpoint, …) forges JWT confusion tokens (alg:none / RS256→HS256 key-confusion / kid-jku-x5u) and proves which is ACCEPTED live; proto_pollution_probe(target, endpoint) sends __proto__ / constructor.prototype JSON canaries and reports VERIFIED only on reflection; smuggling_test(target) sends CL.TE / TE.CL desync probes over a raw connection; totp(secret) generates an RFC 6238 TOTP token so the agent can fill a 2FA field itself during authenticated scanning. OOB (out-of-band) PROOF for BLIND vulns: oob_start() spins an interactsh listener (unique *.oast.* domain, streams DNS/HTTP interactions — the standard for public targets) or a local HTTP listener for local labs; inject the canary, then oob_poll(id) until the hit arrives; oob_stop(id) to clean up. A blind SSRF/XXE/SQLi/command-injection is CONFIRMED only when the canary actually arrives — never from a guess. SOURCE TARGETING: review_harness(path) FIRST for full coverage — it applies a fixed 5-signal rubric (entry_points/auth_gates/sinks/secrets/logic_bugs) to EVERY source file and sorts the signal-dense ones first (a complete map, not a partial scan); then action_surface(code) maps every wp_ajax_* action to its vuln class + DERIVED priority (what to look for WHERE); security_state(sanitizers, sink) gives a wrong-context sanitization verdict; framework_knowledge(framework) returns auth/nonce primitives for 9 frameworks; variant_scan(root, signature) mass-sweeps an install base for ONE bug family; patch_analyze(old, new) REVERSES a security patch into the 0-day, and its mine_signature feeds variant_scan to sweep unpatched copies. All of these are DETECTION HINTS — verify each live (strike_verify / browser_validate) before it enters the report. NEWEST DETECTORS — understand AND try them: variant_scan also emits priv_esc (privilege escalation — a role/capability/user change fed by request input, traced cross-file via reverse call-graph, e.g. set_role($id, sanitize_key($_POST['um-role'])) or update_user_meta(...,'wp_capabilities', $_POST[...])) and flags uploadAllow=>array('all') unrestricted-upload configs as file_upload (the file-manager/connector shape). TO TRY a priv_esc hit: submit the role field with 'administrator' (or send wp_capabilities meta) and confirm the account actually gains admin. TO TRY an unrestricted-upload hit: POST a .php/.phtml and confirm it lands web-reachable + executes. variant_scan also emits hardcoded_secret (CWE-798) in three tiers: a secret field (api_key/db_password/access_token/aws_*) assigned a literal (HIGH), a known secret FORMAT (JWT eyJ…/AWS AKIA…/GitHub ghp_…/Slack xoxb-…/…) regardless of name (HIGH), or a high-entropy suspect token (MEDIUM — verify before reporting). Verify a frontend/JS secret live via drive_devtools (inspect the JS bundle / network response and confirm the key is actually exposed), and for a backend secret confirm it is reachable/valid. A static hit is a HYPOTHESIS until verified live — never report unverified. For a repo, also scan_git_history(root) — secrets DELETED from HEAD still live in .git history (the removed-later-is-not-fixed trap), and it feeds every recovered pre-deletion blob through the same secret detector. Once you recover a credential, prove it is still ACTIVE with validate_leaked_key(apiBase, endpoints, key|blobUrl) — a READ-ONLY differential test (401-without-key vs 200-with-key = auth bypass PROVEN). Two supply-chain detectors: dependency_confusion (a manifest/build file resolving a package from a public registry — pypi.org/npmjs.org --extra-index-url, or a scoped @company/pkg with no private registry) and ml_supply_chain (torch.load without weights_only=True / joblib.load / np.load(allow_pickle=True) / keras load_model on an untrusted model → pickle RCE). Rust is supported end-to-end: the taint engine (blitz_scan / taint_file) maps Rust sinks (std::process::Command, sqlx/diesel, reqwest/hyper, std::fs, serde/bincode) to the classic classes, plus two Rust-specific detectors — rust_unsafe (transmute / assume_init / from_raw_parts / ptr::* — memory-unsafety surface, CWE-119) and rust_format_string (println!/format! with a variable as the format string — CWE-134). The sqlx query! compile-time macro is treated as safe (suppressed). Two more web-class detectors: jwt_alg_confusion (a JWT verifier that dispatches on the token's alg header and accepts BOTH RS256 and HS256, with the HS256 HMAC secret derived from public/shared key material — CWE-347; the attacker sets alg=HS256 and signs with the public key to forge admin tokens) and cache_deception (a reverse proxy caching static-extension URLs with a cache key that omits the session cookie, over a session-authenticated backend — CWE-525; the victim's cached private response is re-fetched anonymously). TO TRY a jwt_alg_confusion hit: fetch the public key (/.well-known/jwks.json), forge an HS256 token signed with that public key, and confirm admin access. TO TRY a cache_deception hit: request an authenticated path with a static extension appended (.css/.js) and re-fetch it anonymously. Three more detectors: cors_misconfiguration (Access-Control-Allow-Origin reflects the request Origin or is '*' while credentials are true — CWE-942; any site reads the victim's authenticated responses), xss (user input into a DOM sink — innerHTML / dangerouslySetInnerHTML / document.write / .html() / eval — CWE-79), and subdomain_takeover (a dangling CNAME/AliasTarget to a claimable service like *.github.io/*.herokuapp.com/*.amazonaws.com — CWE-404). TO TRY a cors hit: send an evil Origin + confirm the response echoes it with Allow-Credentials:true. TO TRY an xss hit: confirm the sink executes (drive_devtools). TO TRY a takeover hit: verify the CNAME target resolves to an unclaimed/not-found page. Two more client-side detectors: postmessage_no_origin_check (a window message listener that reads event.data but never validates event.origin — CWE-345; any site can drive the handler) and client_trusted_flag (a privilege/entitlement flag like isAdmin/withVip/premium read from request input and used in a security decision — CWE-807/639; derive the flag from server state, never the client). TO TRY a postMessage hit: send a crafted message from an attacker origin and confirm the handler acts on it. TO TRY a client-trusted-flag hit: flip the flag param to true and confirm the privilege is actually granted. WEB3: for Solidity/EVM, call web3_audit(code|path) — a deterministic 13-class smart-contract audit (reentrancy incl. ERC721/ERC1155 callback reentrancy, unchecked return, unchecked arithmetic, tx.origin auth, signature replay, unprotected selfdestruct, delegatecall-to-user-input, missing access control, timestamp dependence, spot-price oracle manipulation incl. slot0/latestRoundData, unbounded loop, abi.encodePacked hash collision, missing address(0) validation) returning ranked findings (class/CWE/severity/line), then foundry_poc(class, contract) to generate an executable Foundry test, and foundry_run(contract_code, poc_code|class_) to actually EXECUTE it — a PASSING PoC test is the proof that the exploit reproduces (deterministic: forge's own test verdict). A web3 hit is a HYPOTHESIS until the Foundry PoC reproduces it.\n" + `PRECISION ANALYSIS — chrome-devtools MCP is MANDATORY, not optional:
+` + "TWO PATHS:\\n" + "- Source path on disk -> blitz_scan / taint_file / eagle_eye2 (static).\\n" + "- Live URL -> live_recon / active_scan / strike_verify (web-hunting).\\n\\n" + "DEEPEN A FINDING: attack_plan(target, tech, params) to get the prioritized vector plan (decide what to test next with data); list_chains (escalation), chain_links (compose), technique_lookup(cls), payload_lookup, bypass_lookup (blocked). Ground any detector hit empirically with pattern_lookup(id) — it returns the class's CWE, real-world signature, escalation chains, citable references, per-class bypass techniques, and the high-value assets (crown jewels) that class hits, so a raw hit becomes a class-aware finding. Resolve free-form terminology first with synonym_lookup(term) (IDOR/BOLA/SQLi/prompt-injection → canonical id). For an llm_injection hit, its pattern carries a validation discipline — the RUN-TWICE RULE (reproduce token-for-token across two fresh sessions), NON-GUESSABLE ANCHOR (must leak a real key/URL, not a plausible guess), and OOB PROOF (a verifiable callback log) — apply all three before reporting. BEFORE generating a report, run submission_gate(...) and only ship a finding that passes all 7 questions (reproducible, in-scope, real-impact, no-privileged-assumption, verified-live, evidence-redacted, severity-derived); one false = kill it. When a PoC/report comes out under-enriched, wet_dry(type, wet, dry) diagnoses WHERE it broke — WET (model/prompt/timeout) vs DRY (parser) vs template. Generate the concrete reproduction recipe with auto_poc(type, base_url, endpoint, param) — it emits the exact marker request + negative control + expected differential + Patchstack-style title, so 'reproducible' is executable, not abstract. Calibrate severity with severity_calibrate(type, cvss) to get a P1–P5 tier + VRT-style category. Start each engagement with engagement_scaffold(target, scope) for the folder + scope.md structure, and check data_refresh() to confirm the data layers are consistent. Phase doctrine: read_skill(bs-orchestrate-engagement | bs-web-hunting | bs-source-audit | bs-verify-finding). Campaign plan: read_playbook(target-type). On any failure call retry_guidance(signal) / model_fallback(signal) before giving up. HUNTING DOCTRINE (maximize payout rate): (1) SIBLING RULE — if one endpoint requires auth, check every sibling (/export /delete /share); ~30% of paid IDOR/auth bugs come from siblings — AUTOMATE it with sibling_scan(base_url, endpoint, token_a, token_b), the deterministic live logic-bug prober (sibling enumeration + differential IDOR + auth matrix + mass assignment + rate limit, evidence-first). (2) A→B SIGNAL — a confirmed bug signals a class of developer mistake; hunt B and C (20-min box) before reporting. (3) TWO-ACCOUNT IDOR — always test with attacker account A reading victim account B, and state it in the report. (4) PoC ESCALATION — IDOR shows victim data (not 200), XSS shows cookie exfil (not alert), SSRF shows internal response (not DNS), SQLi shows DB content (not error). (5) FOLLOW THE MONEY — billing/credits/refunds/wallet flows. (6) Kill weak findings with kill_list(type) BEFORE the gate — missing headers, self-XSS, open-redirect-alone, SSRF-DNS-only, GraphQL-introspection-alone are always N/A standalone. (7) CI/CD + SAML/SSO are critical attack surfaces (pull_request_target, expression injection, XML signature wrapping, comment injection). Full doctrine: hunting_doctrine(). WHAT TO HUNT NEXT: watchlist() returns the ranked CWE frequency + high-value CVEs with payout + a saturated flag (prioritize high-freq/high-payout/not-saturated: missing-authz, SQLi, SSRF, deserialization; skip saturated XSS/CSRF/open-redirect unless they chain into takeover). The CVE watchlist now spans 4,000+ product fingerprints (live from nuclei-templates when installed — refresh with sync_cve_corpus() before a big recon pass); live_recon's suggested_cves names the SPECIFIC CVE for the detected product/version — then cve_verify(cve, target) CONFIRMS it live by running the matching nuclei template (VERIFIED only when nuclei actually matches; a CVE is report-ready only after cve_verify, never from the fingerprint alone). For 'scan this target' automation, nuclei_scan(target) fingerprints the stack and runs the WHOLE matched template set (CVE templates + optional broad tech-tag) in one rate-limited pass — use it instead of verifying CVEs one-by-one. SURFACE-FIRST: surface_map(surface) maps an attack surface (image/redirect proxy, edge cache, payment portal, AI agent, file service, Electron, SSO) to its highest-value tests — map surfaces then test, don't spray payloads; then param_surface(target, class) discovers EVERY testable parameter (URL query, form fields, /users/123 path ids + UUIDs, JS refs) + per-class specialist hints — test the DISCOVERED params, not just the hinted one. PRECISION GUARD: resolve_check(host) detects when an ISP/country redirects the domain to a blocking/sinkhole page (gambling/adult/streaming niches) — audit the PUBLIC IP, never the sinkhole. CIRCUIT BREAKER: target_health(target) probes the target and tracks consecutive failures — if the circuit OPENS (5 consecutive timeouts/5xx) PAUSE the target and resume when it recovers (auto-closes on a successful probe); circuit_status() lists every tracked target's state.\n" + "KNOWLEDGE BASE (discover, don't guess): skillLookup(topic) / listSkills for the 40 attack-path + hunting skills (ap-*, hp-*, bs-*); list_attack_vectors / attack_vectors(cat) for the 34-category vector taxonomy; taxonomy(kind) for OWASP/CWE/ASVS/API-top-10; read_playbook(type) for the 17 campaign playbooks; list_manuals / read_tool_manual for 317 tool references; list_tools / run_catalog_tool for the 141-tool catalog. Every tool, skill, and data layer is reachable from these. CROSS-TARGET INTELLIGENCE: strike_resolve auto-records confirmed/false_positive verdicts into the empirical ledger; query it with intelligence(action=hit_rates/top_vectors/recall) so a new target on a known tech inherits historical hit-rates (attack_plan already blends them into success_probability). intelligence(action=recall, tech, target) is the per-engagement pattern recall — it returns which patterns historically CONFIRMED on that tech (prioritize them) versus which only ever produced false positives (avoid them), so a new engagement starts from the empirical playbook of past ones. LIVE PENTEST + TARGETING (black-box, WAF-safe): cache_gap(base_url, endpoint) fuzzes path-normalization + static-extension variants for cache deception/poisoning; blind_oracle(base_url, param, value) detects which SINK a param reaches (sql/ssti/xss) via benign arithmetic (id=1+0, test${7*7}) WITHOUT a malicious payload; param_precedence(base_url, param, A, B) maps duplicate-parameter precedence (first/last-wins) for WAF-bypass; broken_link_scan(url) detects expired-domain takeover (crawls outbound refs → DNS/RDAP → flags claimable domains); asset_discovery(domain) enumerates the FULL passive attack surface — crt.sh subdomains + DNS brute + A-record resolution + optional port scan. Logic-bug live probers: jwt_forge(token, endpoint, …) forges JWT confusion tokens (alg:none / RS256→HS256 key-confusion / kid-jku-x5u) and proves which is ACCEPTED live; proto_pollution_probe(target, endpoint) sends __proto__ / constructor.prototype JSON canaries and reports VERIFIED only on reflection; smuggling_test(target) sends CL.TE / TE.CL desync probes over a raw connection; totp(secret) generates an RFC 6238 TOTP token so the agent can fill a 2FA field itself; auth_login(login_url, user, pass, …) POSTs credentials and extracts the session cookie/token for authenticated scanning (use browser_agent navigate/type/click/get_cookie for JS-heavy logins); screenshot(url) captures a page image for vision-based proof. OOB (out-of-band) PROOF for BLIND vulns: oob_start() spins an interactsh listener (unique *.oast.* domain, streams DNS/HTTP interactions — the standard for public targets) or a local HTTP listener for local labs; inject the canary, then oob_poll(id) until the hit arrives; oob_stop(id) to clean up. A blind SSRF/XXE/SQLi/command-injection is CONFIRMED only when the canary actually arrives — never from a guess. SOURCE TARGETING: review_harness(path) FIRST for full coverage — it applies a fixed 5-signal rubric (entry_points/auth_gates/sinks/secrets/logic_bugs) to EVERY source file and sorts the signal-dense ones first (a complete map, not a partial scan); then action_surface(code) maps every wp_ajax_* action to its vuln class + DERIVED priority (what to look for WHERE); security_state(sanitizers, sink) gives a wrong-context sanitization verdict; framework_knowledge(framework) returns auth/nonce primitives for 9 frameworks; variant_scan(root, signature) mass-sweeps an install base for ONE bug family; patch_analyze(old, new) REVERSES a security patch into the 0-day, and its mine_signature feeds variant_scan to sweep unpatched copies. All of these are DETECTION HINTS — verify each live (strike_verify / browser_validate) before it enters the report. NEWEST DETECTORS — understand AND try them: variant_scan also emits priv_esc (privilege escalation — a role/capability/user change fed by request input, traced cross-file via reverse call-graph, e.g. set_role($id, sanitize_key($_POST['um-role'])) or update_user_meta(...,'wp_capabilities', $_POST[...])) and flags uploadAllow=>array('all') unrestricted-upload configs as file_upload (the file-manager/connector shape). TO TRY a priv_esc hit: submit the role field with 'administrator' (or send wp_capabilities meta) and confirm the account actually gains admin. TO TRY an unrestricted-upload hit: POST a .php/.phtml and confirm it lands web-reachable + executes. variant_scan also emits hardcoded_secret (CWE-798) in three tiers: a secret field (api_key/db_password/access_token/aws_*) assigned a literal (HIGH), a known secret FORMAT (JWT eyJ…/AWS AKIA…/GitHub ghp_…/Slack xoxb-…/…) regardless of name (HIGH), or a high-entropy suspect token (MEDIUM — verify before reporting). Verify a frontend/JS secret live via drive_devtools (inspect the JS bundle / network response and confirm the key is actually exposed), and for a backend secret confirm it is reachable/valid. A static hit is a HYPOTHESIS until verified live — never report unverified. For a repo, also scan_git_history(root) — secrets DELETED from HEAD still live in .git history (the removed-later-is-not-fixed trap), and it feeds every recovered pre-deletion blob through the same secret detector. Once you recover a credential, prove it is still ACTIVE with validate_leaked_key(apiBase, endpoints, key|blobUrl) — a READ-ONLY differential test (401-without-key vs 200-with-key = auth bypass PROVEN). Two supply-chain detectors: dependency_confusion (a manifest/build file resolving a package from a public registry — pypi.org/npmjs.org --extra-index-url, or a scoped @company/pkg with no private registry) and ml_supply_chain (torch.load without weights_only=True / joblib.load / np.load(allow_pickle=True) / keras load_model on an untrusted model → pickle RCE). Rust is supported end-to-end: the taint engine (blitz_scan / taint_file) maps Rust sinks (std::process::Command, sqlx/diesel, reqwest/hyper, std::fs, serde/bincode) to the classic classes, plus two Rust-specific detectors — rust_unsafe (transmute / assume_init / from_raw_parts / ptr::* — memory-unsafety surface, CWE-119) and rust_format_string (println!/format! with a variable as the format string — CWE-134). The sqlx query! compile-time macro is treated as safe (suppressed). Two more web-class detectors: jwt_alg_confusion (a JWT verifier that dispatches on the token's alg header and accepts BOTH RS256 and HS256, with the HS256 HMAC secret derived from public/shared key material — CWE-347; the attacker sets alg=HS256 and signs with the public key to forge admin tokens) and cache_deception (a reverse proxy caching static-extension URLs with a cache key that omits the session cookie, over a session-authenticated backend — CWE-525; the victim's cached private response is re-fetched anonymously). TO TRY a jwt_alg_confusion hit: fetch the public key (/.well-known/jwks.json), forge an HS256 token signed with that public key, and confirm admin access. TO TRY a cache_deception hit: request an authenticated path with a static extension appended (.css/.js) and re-fetch it anonymously. Three more detectors: cors_misconfiguration (Access-Control-Allow-Origin reflects the request Origin or is '*' while credentials are true — CWE-942; any site reads the victim's authenticated responses), xss (user input into a DOM sink — innerHTML / dangerouslySetInnerHTML / document.write / .html() / eval — CWE-79), and subdomain_takeover (a dangling CNAME/AliasTarget to a claimable service like *.github.io/*.herokuapp.com/*.amazonaws.com — CWE-404). TO TRY a cors hit: send an evil Origin + confirm the response echoes it with Allow-Credentials:true. TO TRY an xss hit: confirm the sink executes (drive_devtools). TO TRY a takeover hit: verify the CNAME target resolves to an unclaimed/not-found page. Two more client-side detectors: postmessage_no_origin_check (a window message listener that reads event.data but never validates event.origin — CWE-345; any site can drive the handler) and client_trusted_flag (a privilege/entitlement flag like isAdmin/withVip/premium read from request input and used in a security decision — CWE-807/639; derive the flag from server state, never the client). TO TRY a postMessage hit: send a crafted message from an attacker origin and confirm the handler acts on it. TO TRY a client-trusted-flag hit: flip the flag param to true and confirm the privilege is actually granted. WEB3: for Solidity/EVM, call web3_audit(code|path) — a deterministic 13-class smart-contract audit (reentrancy incl. ERC721/ERC1155 callback reentrancy, unchecked return, unchecked arithmetic, tx.origin auth, signature replay, unprotected selfdestruct, delegatecall-to-user-input, missing access control, timestamp dependence, spot-price oracle manipulation incl. slot0/latestRoundData, unbounded loop, abi.encodePacked hash collision, missing address(0) validation) returning ranked findings (class/CWE/severity/line), then foundry_poc(class, contract) to generate an executable Foundry test, and foundry_run(contract_code, poc_code|class_) to actually EXECUTE it — a PASSING PoC test is the proof that the exploit reproduces (deterministic: forge's own test verdict). A web3 hit is a HYPOTHESIS until the Foundry PoC reproduces it.\n" + `PRECISION ANALYSIS — chrome-devtools MCP is MANDATORY, not optional:
 ` + `- When a lead needs DOM/JS precision — DOM-XSS sink execution, AJAX endpoint + payload interception, JS runtime errors, redirect chains, SSO/token flow, or anything a static HTML glance cannot prove — call drive_devtools(target). It spawns chrome-devtools-mcp and drives a REAL headless browser (navigate -> list_network_requests -> list_console_messages -> evaluate_script), giving reproducible evidence instead of a guess.
 ` + `- Before calling it, check_mcp() to confirm the browser MCP is available; if not, blitzstrike install-tools or npm i -g chrome-devtools-mcp. Never substitute eyeballing minified JS or a static sink guess when a live browser can PROVE it. This is the precision + consistency layer.
 ` + "EXTERNAL MCP SERVERS (verified, connect them — NOT one-shot CLIs): chrome-devtools-mcp (29 tools: list_network_requests/get_network_request for raw HTTP interception, list_console_messages for JS errors + DOM-XSS, evaluate_script to run JS, take_screenshot) -> stdio chrome-devtools-mcp --headless --chromeArg=--no-sandbox --chromeArg=--disable-gpu (as root/container this is MANDATORY or the browser crashes; add --proxyServer http://127.0.0.1:8080 to route through Burp, --acceptInsecureCerts for bad TLS). burp-suite-mcp (proxy history + active scan + repeater) -> NOT npm: build the JAR (git clone https://github.com/PortSwigger/mcp-server.git && cd mcp-server && ./gradlew embedProxyJar), load it in Burp Extensions, then connect the client to http://127.0.0.1:9876 (SSE) or the stdio proxy java -jar mcp-proxy-all.jar --sse-url http://127.0.0.1:9876."
@@ -64478,6 +64590,42 @@ ${statusLine}` : statusLine },
   }, async ({ type, wet, dry, dry_ok }) => {
     return { content: [{ type: "text", text: JSON.stringify(wetDryTrace(type, wet, dry, dry_ok ?? true)) }] };
   });
+  server.registerTool("asset_discovery", {
+    title: "Full passive asset discovery — subdomains, IPs, ports",
+    description: "Enumerate every host under a domain: certificate-transparency subdomains (crt.sh) + common-prefix DNS brute + best-effort A-record resolution + optional port scan of the main host. Returns a clean asset map so the agent knows the full attack surface before choosing where to strike.",
+    inputSchema: {
+      domain: string2().describe("Target domain, e.g. example.com"),
+      include_ports: boolean2().optional().describe("Also scan common ports on the main host (default false)")
+    }
+  }, async ({ domain, include_ports }) => {
+    return { content: [{ type: "text", text: JSON.stringify(await assetDiscovery(domain, include_ports ?? false)) }] };
+  });
+  server.registerTool("screenshot", {
+    title: "Capture a page screenshot for vision-based proof",
+    description: "Capture a headless-browser screenshot of a URL and save it to a file (default ~/.blitzstrike/shot-<ts>.png). The agent then inspects the image with a vision model (a rendered XSS alert, an IDOR data leak, a working login) as extra evidence on top of the marker + control.",
+    inputSchema: {
+      url: string2().describe("URL to screenshot"),
+      path: string2().optional().describe("Output path (default ~/.blitzstrike/shot-<ts>.png)")
+    }
+  }, async ({ url, path }) => {
+    return { content: [{ type: "text", text: JSON.stringify(await screenshot(url, path)) }] };
+  });
+  server.registerTool("auth_login", {
+    title: "Authenticated session — HTTP form login → session cookie/token",
+    description: "POST credentials to a login endpoint and extract the resulting session cookie (Set-Cookie) + any access/refresh/JWT token, returning a reusable session context for authenticated scanning (sibling_scan token_a, nuclei_scan headers, etc.). Optional totp field for 2FA. For JS-heavy login flows use browser_agent (navigate/type/click/get_cookie).",
+    inputSchema: {
+      login_url: string2().describe("Login endpoint URL"),
+      username: string2().describe("Username/email"),
+      password: string2().describe("Password"),
+      user_field: string2().optional().describe("Username form field name (default username)"),
+      pass_field: string2().optional().describe("Password form field name (default password)"),
+      extra: record(string2(), string2()).optional().describe("Extra form fields (CSRF token, etc.)"),
+      totp: string2().optional().describe("TOTP code for 2FA (generate with totp)"),
+      totp_field: string2().optional().describe("2FA field name (default code)")
+    }
+  }, async ({ login_url, username, password, user_field, pass_field, extra, totp, totp_field }) => {
+    return { content: [{ type: "text", text: JSON.stringify(await authLogin(login_url, username, password, { user_field, pass_field, extra, totp, totp_field })) }] };
+  });
   server.registerTool("jwt_forge", {
     title: "Forge JWT confusion tokens and verify which is accepted live",
     description: "Turn a captured JWT into forged attack tokens (alg:none, HS256 with empty key, HS256 with the public key = RS256→HS256 key confusion, plus kid/jku/x5u hints) and — when an endpoint is given — send each one to prove which is ACCEPTED (status < 400). A JWT hit is report-ready only when a forged token is accepted, never from header analysis alone.",
@@ -65494,12 +65642,12 @@ async function serve() {
 // src/index.ts
 init_cli();
 import { readFileSync as readFileSync37, existsSync as existsSync20 } from "node:fs";
-import { join as join35 } from "node:path";
+import { join as join36 } from "node:path";
 import { fileURLToPath as fileURLToPath22 } from "node:url";
-var ROOT15 = join35(fileURLToPath22(new URL(".", import.meta.url)), "..");
+var ROOT15 = join36(fileURLToPath22(new URL(".", import.meta.url)), "..");
 function readVersion() {
   try {
-    const p = join35(ROOT15, "package.json");
+    const p = join36(ROOT15, "package.json");
     if (existsSync20(p))
       return JSON.parse(readFileSync37(p, "utf8")).version ?? "1.0.0";
   } catch {}

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "blitzstrike",
-  "version": "2.4.126",
+  "version": "2.4.127",
   "description": "Blitz Strike — a universal MCP security-audit toolbelt. BLITZ sweeps the attack surface, EAGLE-EYE traces source-to-sink, STRIKE verifies live. 57 attack chains, 130-tool catalog, intelligence data layer. One server, every agent.",
   "type": "module",
   "bin": {