blitzstrike 2.4.115 → 2.4.117

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -5,29 +5,29 @@ All notable changes to Blitz Strike are documented here.
 The format follows [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.0.0/),
 and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/).
 
-## [2.4.115] — 2026-09-17
+## [2.4.117] — 2026-09-29
 
-### Reverted — brand guard on the CVE corpus
+### Added — `cve_verify` (fingerprint-first → live nuclei confirmation)
 
-- The CVE corpus is a factual reference (CVE id → product name), so
-  competitor/vendor product names (elFinder / RevSlider / wpcf7 / ultimate-member
-  / …) are allowed there — the brand guard applies to FRAMING (README/CHANGELOG/
-  tool descriptions), not the CVE list. Removed the BRAND_GUARD filter from both
-  the sync script and the live loader; the corpus is back to 4,113 entries.
+- New `cve_verify(cve, target)` tool closes the fingerprint-first loop: when
+  `live_recon` / the nuclei corpus SUGGESTS a CVE, `cve_verify` locates the
+  matching nuclei template, runs it against the target, and returns VERIFIED /
+  UNVERIFIED / no_template / error from nuclei's own JSONL output. A suggested
+  CVE is only report-ready after `cve_verify` confirms it — never from the
+  fingerprint alone. (149 MCP tools.)
 
-## [2.4.114] — 2026-09-17
+## [2.4.116] — 2026-09-29
 
-### Fixed — brand guard in the nuclei CVE corpus
+### Changed — system prompt tells the LLM about the new tooling
 
-- The nuclei-derived `cve-corpus.json` contained competitor/vendor product
-  names (elFinder / RevSlider / wpcf7 / ultimate-member / argus / forminator /
-  ai1wm / …) as CVE subjects. Added a BRAND_GUARD blacklist filter to both the
-  sync script (`scripts/sync-cve-corpus.py`) and the live loader
-  (`src/nuclei-corpus.ts`) so those CVEs are excluded (21 → 0); the corpus is
-  now brand-clean (4,113 → 4,092 entries). The blacklist definition itself is a
-  functional filter (like `waf_signatures.json`), not competitor framing.
+- The LLM-facing system prompt now documents the new tools/features added this
+  cycle: `review_harness` (full-coverage 5-signal per-file rubric — run it FIRST
+  on any source repo), `broken_link_scan` (expired-domain takeover via DNS/RDAP),
+  `surface_map` (surface-first targeting), `sync_cve_corpus` (refresh the 4,000+
+  CVE fingerprint corpus), and the nuclei-derived CVE corpus behind
+  `live_recon`'s `suggested_cves`.
 
-## [2.4.113] — 2026-09-17
+## [2.4.113] — 2026-09-29
 
 ### Added — auto-updating nuclei CVE corpus (live-read + sync tool)
 
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/).
   or the bundled snapshot — call it before a large recon pass to pick up
   newly-disclosed CVEs.
 
-## [2.4.112] — 2026-09-17
+## [2.4.112] — 2026-09-29
 
 ### Added — nuclei-templates CVE corpus (watchlist 35 → 4,100+ fingerprints)
 
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/).
   so a plain PHP/HTML target yields ZERO false matches — regression-tested
   (plain php → 0; vite/gradio/ollama/n8n → their specific CVEs).
 
-## [2.4.111] — 2026-09-17
+## [2.4.111] — 2026-09-29
 
 ### Added — CVE watchlist expanded 18 → 35 (2025-2026 fingerprints)
 
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/).
   "workflow" keyword that false-positived n8n↔Kibana); regression-tested
   fingerprint precision (n8n ≠ kibana).
 
-## [2.4.110] — 2026-09-17
+## [2.4.110] — 2026-09-29
 
 ### Added — hash length extension + concrete payload enrichment
 
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/).
   `sql_injection` (Kona-style WAF bypass: MID/LIKE//**//double-quote),
   `command_injection` (i'''d, brace expansion, Shellshock, Werkzeug debugger PIN).
 
-## [2.4.109] — 2026-09-17
+## [2.4.109] — 2026-09-29
 
 ### Changed — follow-the-money doctrine rule with concrete proven patterns
 
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/).
   Reinforces "if the client can add credits, apply a discount, or reset a
   credential client-side, that is the highest-value test in the program."
 
-## [2.4.108] — 2026-09-17
+## [2.4.108] — 2026-09-29
 
 ### Added — surface-first map (attack surface → high-value tests)
 
@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/).
   step. Added doctrine rule `surface_first` ("map surfaces before spraying
   payloads").
 
-## [2.4.107] — 2026-09-17
+## [2.4.107] — 2026-09-29
 
 ### Added — `review_harness` (per-file review, full-coverage deterministic rubric)
 
@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/).
   hooks against it; sinks still use the string-blanking strip. Regression-tested:
   `wp_ajax_nopriv_` now detected.
 
-## [2.4.106] — 2026-09-17
+## [2.4.106] — 2026-09-29
 
 ### Added — report assembly (metadata + vulnerability-location block)
 
@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/).
   matching the report-template structure (Executive Summary → Location →
   Description → numbered Steps → Impact → Remediation → References).
 
-## [2.4.105] — 2026-09-17
+## [2.4.105] — 2026-09-29
 
 ### Added — technique depth (concrete tools + payloads in the technique base)
 
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/).
     (alg:none / key confusion / jku-x5u / kid traversal / CVE-2022-21449).
   - `nosql_injection` — $ne/$gt/$regex/$where payloads (form + JSON) + $where RCE.
 
-## [2.4.104] — 2026-09-17
+## [2.4.104] — 2026-09-29
 
 ### Added — two client-side detectors (postMessage + client-trusted flag)
 
@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/).
   permission). Both grounded (pattern + CWE + severity + synonym + chain) and
   covered by fire-vs-clean regression checks.
 
-## [2.4.103] — 2026-09-17
+## [2.4.103] — 2026-09-29
 
 ### Added — version-precise fingerprint-first (semver narrowing)
 
@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/).
   CVE-2025-29927 (affected) but not CVE-2024-34351 (patched 14.1.1); Next.js
   15.3.0 → both excluded; unknown version → full product list (fallback).
 
-## [2.4.102] — 2026-09-17
+## [2.4.102] — 2026-09-29
 
 ### Added — `broken_link_scan` (broken-link hijacking live detector)
 
@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/).
   domain. Verified live: example.com → registered (not claimable), a
   nonexistent domain → RDAP 404 → claimable.
 
-## [2.4.101] — 2026-09-17
+## [2.4.101] — 2026-09-29
 
 ### Added — three new hunting classes (techniques + attack vectors)
 
@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/).
   how-to-test steps, concrete techniques, and verify (marker + negative
   control) — matching the existing per-class methodology shape.
 
-## [2.4.100] — 2026-09-17
+## [2.4.100] — 2026-09-29
 
 ### Fixed — data-file resolution was `process.cwd()`-dependent (broke under npx)
 
@@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/).
   every other data loader (`patterns.ts`, `chains.json`, `tools-catalog.json`).
   Verified: `watchlist()` and the enterprise fixtures load from an arbitrary cwd.
 
-## [2.4.99] — 2026-09-17
+## [2.4.99] — 2026-09-29
 
 ### Fixed — grounding completeness for the CVE watchlist class tags
 
@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/).
   `hardcoded_secret`). Every one of the 18 CVE class tags now resolves to a
   grounded pattern (locked by a regression check).
 
-## [2.4.98] — 2026-09-17
+## [2.4.98] — 2026-09-29
 
 ### Added — fingerprint-first CVE matching wired into live_recon
 
@@ -257,7 +257,7 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/).
   Grafana, Keycloak, …) it names the specific CVEs to test first (with EPSS)
   instead of relying on generic scanning.
 
-## [2.4.97] — 2026-09-17
+## [2.4.97] — 2026-09-29
 
 ### Added — hunting-intel upgrade (Hacktivity-ranked CVE watchlist + dedup doctrine)
 
@@ -272,7 +272,7 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/).
   public reports) for the same endpoint/tech/vuln class before writing the
   report; the #1 cause of "Duplicate"/"N/A" rejections is not searching first.
 
-## [2.4.96] — 2026-09-17
+## [2.4.96] — 2026-09-29
 
 ### Security — self-audit (command injection + path traversal fixed)
 
@@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/).
 - Added regression checks: `isValidHostname` rejects shell metacharacters
   (`;`, backticks, `$()`, `|`, `../`, newlines); the identifier regex is shared.
 
-## [2.4.95] — 2026-09-17
+## [2.4.95] — 2026-09-29
 
 ### Fixed — full interconnection audit (unreachable template + 2 ungrounded classes)
 
@@ -304,7 +304,7 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/).
 - `SINK_TO_VECTOR` mapped the `code_execution` sink to a non-pattern vector name;
   now maps to `command_injection` (consistent with the "code execution" synonym).
 
-## [2.4.94] — 2026-09-17
+## [2.4.94] — 2026-09-29
 
 ### Added — Hunting intel (DNS sinkhole detection + CWE/CVE watchlist)
 
@@ -321,7 +321,7 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/).
   deserialization) and flags saturated low-value ones (XSS/CSRF/open-redirect).
   Data: intelligence/watchlist.json.
 
-## [2.4.93] — 2026-09-17
+## [2.4.93] — 2026-09-29
 
 ### Fixed — reproducible verify harness (flaky wordlist test)
 
@@ -330,7 +330,7 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/).
   verify` was not reproducible. Now uses a bundled `test/fixtures/wordlist.txt` via
   the `opts.wordlist` argument — deterministic, no external wordlist required.
 
-## [2.4.92] — 2026-09-17
+## [2.4.92] — 2026-09-29
 
 ### Fixed — interconnection audit (grounding gaps + reversed PoC semantics)
 
@@ -350,7 +350,7 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/).
   detector types) to a subset invariant (every detector type grounded), so extra
   classes like command_injection don't fail it.
 
-## [2.4.91] — 2026-09-17
+## [2.4.91] — 2026-09-29
 
 ### Added — Foundry runner (execute Web3 PoC to PROVE a finding)
 
@@ -362,7 +362,7 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/).
   Deterministic differential (passes on the vulnerable contract, fails on the fixed
   one). Requires forge installed.
 
-## [2.4.90] — 2026-09-17
+## [2.4.90] — 2026-09-29
 
 ### Added — Auto-PoC (reproduction recipe generator)
 
@@ -375,7 +375,7 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/).
   open_redirect, xxe, prototype_pollution, deserialization, hardcoded_secret,
   cache_deception, cors_misconfiguration, subdomain_takeover.
 
-## [2.4.89] — 2026-09-17
+## [2.4.89] — 2026-09-29
 
 ### Added — Sibling Rule Engine (deterministic live logic-bug prober)
 
@@ -388,7 +388,7 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/).
   (4) mass assignment — role/admin field injection on POST/PUT, (5) rate limit —
   15 rapid requests. Hits-only, differential (status + body), real-time append.
 
-## [2.4.88] — 2026-09-17
+## [2.4.88] — 2026-09-29
 
 ### Changed — XSS detector precision (local taint flow)
 
@@ -398,7 +398,7 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/).
   is a direct source expression. Removes the "source + sink co-occurrence" false
   positives (4 FPs on the 30-lab benchmark) with zero recall loss.
 
-## [2.4.87] — 2026-09-17
+## [2.4.87] — 2026-09-29
 
 ### Fixed — web3 class naming consistency + jwt grounding
 
@@ -407,7 +407,7 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/).
 - Added the `jwt` → `jwt_alg_confusion` synonym so the `jwt` attack-vector resolves
   to its pattern grounding + payout (previously returned no bounty signal).
 
-## [2.4.86] — 2026-09-17
+## [2.4.86] — 2026-09-29
 
 ### Added — Web3 audit extended to 13 bug classes
 
@@ -422,7 +422,7 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/).
   `initialize` assigning an address param without `!= address(0)` (CWE-20).
 - Foundry PoC templates added for both new classes; web3 severity now supports `low`.
 
-## [2.4.85] — 2026-09-17
+## [2.4.85] — 2026-09-29
 
 ### Added — CORS, XSS (DOM sinks), and subdomain-takeover detectors
 
@@ -441,7 +441,7 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/).
   updated.
 
 
-## [2.4.84] — 2026-09-17
+## [2.4.84] — 2026-09-29
 
 ### Added — hunting doctrine + always-rejected kill-list (LLM-facing methodology)
 
@@ -460,7 +460,7 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/).
 
 reporting.md).
 
-## [2.4.83] — 2026-09-17
+## [2.4.83] — 2026-09-29
 
 ### Added — Web3 / Solidity audit (10 bug classes + Foundry PoC)
 
@@ -476,7 +476,7 @@ reporting.md).
 - `.sol` added to the scan extensions.
 
 
-## [2.4.82] — 2026-09-17
+## [2.4.82] — 2026-09-29
 
 ### Added — out-of-band (OOB) listener for blind vuln proof
 
@@ -489,7 +489,7 @@ reporting.md).
   interactsh's ANSI-colored `[INF]` banner + JSONL interaction parsing.
 
 
-## [2.4.81] — 2026-09-17
+## [2.4.81] — 2026-09-29
 
 ### Added — impact-first prioritization via typical bounty payout
 
@@ -504,7 +504,7 @@ reporting.md).
   curated PAYOUT_FALLBACK table.
 
 
-## [2.4.80] — 2026-09-17
+## [2.4.80] — 2026-09-29
 
 ### Changed — LLM-facing wiring for the two new web-class detectors
 
@@ -520,7 +520,7 @@ reporting.md).
 Full end-to-end ground: synonym_lookup → pattern_lookup (CWE + chains + bypass)
 → severity_calibrate (P1/P2) → list_chains → coverage_matrix.
 
-## [2.4.79] — 2026-09-17
+## [2.4.79] — 2026-09-29
 
 ### Changed — precision pass (FP reduction, benchmark-driven)
 
@@ -539,7 +539,7 @@ Full end-to-end ground: synonym_lookup → pattern_lookup (CWE + chains + bypass
 
 FP labs on the 30-lab benchmark dropped 16 → 8 (TP 12 unchanged).
 
-## [2.4.78] — 2026-09-17
+## [2.4.78] — 2026-09-29
 
 ### Fixed — taint-engine sanitizer name collision (whole-class FN)
 
@@ -552,7 +552,7 @@ FP labs on the 30-lab benchmark dropped 16 → 8 (TP 12 unchanged).
   string literals. Python f-string SQLi (`request.args.get -> f"{var}" -> execute`)
   is now caught.
 
-## [2.4.77] — 2026-09-17
+## [2.4.77] — 2026-09-29
 
 ### Changed — SQLi Node/Python coverage + missing_authz root-path precision
 
@@ -564,7 +564,7 @@ FP labs on the 30-lab benchmark dropped 16 → 8 (TP 12 unchanged).
 - `detectRouteAuthz` now skips root/empty paths (`@app.get("/")`) as public-by-design
   (was flagging the index route), plus `home`/`index`/`root` route segments.
 
-## [2.4.76] — 2026-09-17
+## [2.4.76] — 2026-09-29
 
 ### Fixed — config/manifest files were not scanned (whole-class FN)
 
@@ -575,7 +575,7 @@ FP labs on the 30-lab benchmark dropped 16 → 8 (TP 12 unchanged).
   `cache_deception` (nginx.conf — caught labs01) and `dependency_confusion` /
   `oauth_misconfig` / `grpc_reflection` (package.json / requirements.txt / yaml).
 
-## [2.4.75] — 2026-09-17
+## [2.4.75] — 2026-09-29
 
 ### Fixed — detection FP/FN remediation (Hackbot Arena benchmark-driven)
 
@@ -603,7 +603,7 @@ Four fixes driven by the 30-lab detection benchmark (TP/FP/FN):
    bare `FLAG` env marker, and quoted-prefix concatenations (`'usr_' + random`) so
    seeded CTF flags and runtime-built values aren't reported as CWE-798.
 
-## [2.4.74] — 2026-09-17
+## [2.4.74] — 2026-09-29
 
 ### Fixed — live_recon tech fingerprint false-positive (benchmark-driven)
 
@@ -618,7 +618,7 @@ Four fixes driven by the 30-lab detection benchmark (TP/FP/FN):
 - `gunicorn` no longer implies "flask" (it's a generic WSGI server shared by
   Flask/Django/FastAPI); only `werkzeug` maps to flask.
 
-## [2.4.73] — 2026-09-17
+## [2.4.73] — 2026-09-29
 
 ### Changed — crack_hash wordlist support (benchmark-driven fix)
 

package/dist/index.js

@@ -17452,14 +17452,14 @@ var init_variants = __esm(() => {
 });
 
 // src/sync.ts
-import { mkdirSync as mkdirSync10, writeFileSync as writeFileSync9, readFileSync as readFileSync30, readdirSync as readdirSync8, statSync as statSync5, rmSync as rmSync5 } from "node:fs";
-import { join as join28 } from "node:path";
+import { mkdirSync as mkdirSync10, writeFileSync as writeFileSync9, readFileSync as readFileSync30, readdirSync as readdirSync9, statSync as statSync6, rmSync as rmSync5 } from "node:fs";
+import { join as join29 } from "node:path";
 import { homedir as homedir11 } from "node:os";
 import { fileURLToPath as fileURLToPath17 } from "node:url";
 import { spawnSync as spawnSync4 } from "node:child_process";
 function dirExists(p) {
   try {
-    return statSync5(p).isDirectory();
+    return statSync6(p).isDirectory();
   } catch {
     return false;
   }
@@ -17468,9 +17468,9 @@ function countFiles(dir) {
   try {
     let n = 0;
     const walk = (d) => {
-      for (const e of readdirSync8(d, { withFileTypes: true })) {
+      for (const e of readdirSync9(d, { withFileTypes: true })) {
         if (e.isDirectory())
-          walk(join28(d, e.name));
+          walk(join29(d, e.name));
         else
           n++;
       }
@@ -17484,8 +17484,8 @@ function countFiles(dir) {
 function syncData() {
   if (!dirExists(DATA_ROOT2))
     mkdirSync10(DATA_ROOT2, { recursive: true });
-  const payloadsPath = join28(DATA_ROOT2, "payloads");
-  const templatesPath = join28(DATA_ROOT2, "templates");
+  const payloadsPath = join29(DATA_ROOT2, "payloads");
+  const templatesPath = join29(DATA_ROOT2, "templates");
   const hasPayloads = dirExists(payloadsPath) && countFiles(payloadsPath) > 0;
   const hasTemplates = dirExists(templatesPath) && countFiles(templatesPath) > 0;
   if (hasPayloads && hasTemplates) {
@@ -17495,8 +17495,8 @@ function syncData() {
       data_root: DATA_ROOT2
     };
   }
-  const localPayloads = join28(ROOT10, "payloads");
-  const localTemplates = join28(ROOT10, "templates");
+  const localPayloads = join29(ROOT10, "payloads");
+  const localTemplates = join29(ROOT10, "templates");
   let payloadsSynced = false;
   let templatesSynced = false;
   if (!hasPayloads && dirExists(localPayloads)) {
@@ -17509,7 +17509,7 @@ function syncData() {
   }
   const gitOk = spawnSync4("git", ["--version"]).status === 0;
   if (gitOk && (!dirExists(payloadsPath) || countFiles(payloadsPath) === 0 || !dirExists(templatesPath) || countFiles(templatesPath) === 0)) {
-    const tmp = join28(DATA_ROOT2, ".tmp-clone");
+    const tmp = join29(DATA_ROOT2, ".tmp-clone");
     if (dirExists(tmp))
       rmSync5(tmp, { recursive: true, force: true });
     const r = spawnSync4("git", ["clone", "--depth", "1", "--filter=blob:none", "--sparse", GITHUB_REPO, tmp], { timeout: 120000 });
@@ -17517,11 +17517,11 @@ function syncData() {
       const sparse = spawnSync4("git", ["-C", tmp, "sparse-checkout", "set", "payloads", "templates"], { timeout: 120000 });
       if (sparse.status === 0) {
         if (!dirExists(payloadsPath) || countFiles(payloadsPath) === 0) {
-          copyDir(join28(tmp, "payloads"), payloadsPath);
+          copyDir(join29(tmp, "payloads"), payloadsPath);
           payloadsSynced = true;
         }
         if (!dirExists(templatesPath) || countFiles(templatesPath) === 0) {
-          copyDir(join28(tmp, "templates"), templatesPath);
+          copyDir(join29(tmp, "templates"), templatesPath);
           templatesSynced = true;
         }
       }
@@ -17542,9 +17542,9 @@ function copyDir(src, dst) {
 }
 function manualCopy(src, dst) {
   mkdirSync10(dst, { recursive: true });
-  for (const e of readdirSync8(src, { withFileTypes: true })) {
-    const s = join28(src, e.name);
-    const d = join28(dst, e.name);
+  for (const e of readdirSync9(src, { withFileTypes: true })) {
+    const s = join29(src, e.name);
+    const d = join29(dst, e.name);
     if (e.isDirectory())
       manualCopy(s, d);
     else
@@ -17553,8 +17553,8 @@ function manualCopy(src, dst) {
 }
 var ROOT10, DATA_ROOT2, GITHUB_REPO = "https://github.com/shinthink/blitzstrike.git";
 var init_sync = __esm(() => {
-  ROOT10 = join28(fileURLToPath17(new URL(".", import.meta.url)), "..");
-  DATA_ROOT2 = process.env.BLITZSTRIKE_DATA ?? join28(homedir11(), ".blitzstrike", "data");
+  ROOT10 = join29(fileURLToPath17(new URL(".", import.meta.url)), "..");
+  DATA_ROOT2 = process.env.BLITZSTRIKE_DATA ?? join29(homedir11(), ".blitzstrike", "data");
 });
 
 // src/update.ts
@@ -17600,14 +17600,14 @@ var init_update = __esm(() => {
 
 // src/release.ts
 import { readFileSync as readFileSync32, existsSync as existsSync17 } from "node:fs";
-import { join as join29 } from "node:path";
+import { join as join30 } from "node:path";
 import { fileURLToPath as fileURLToPath18 } from "node:url";
 import { execSync as execSync4 } from "node:child_process";
 function validateRelease() {
   const checks = [];
   checks.push({ name: "package.json version", ok: true, detail: VERSION });
   try {
-    const changelog = readFileSync32(join29(ROOT11, "CHANGELOG.md"), "utf8");
+    const changelog = readFileSync32(join30(ROOT11, "CHANGELOG.md"), "utf8");
     const m = changelog.match(/^##\s+\[([0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+)\]/m);
     const changelogVersion = m?.[1] ?? null;
     checks.push({
@@ -17639,22 +17639,22 @@ function validateRelease() {
   return { version: VERSION, checks, consistent: checks.filter((c) => !c.soft).every((c) => c.ok) };
 }
 function lockfilePresent() {
-  return existsSync17(join29(ROOT11, "package-lock.json")) || existsSync17(join29(ROOT11, "bun.lock")) || existsSync17(join29(ROOT11, "bun.lockb"));
+  return existsSync17(join30(ROOT11, "package-lock.json")) || existsSync17(join30(ROOT11, "bun.lock")) || existsSync17(join30(ROOT11, "bun.lockb"));
 }
 var ROOT11;
 var init_release = __esm(() => {
   init_version();
-  ROOT11 = join29(fileURLToPath18(new URL(".", import.meta.url)), "..");
+  ROOT11 = join30(fileURLToPath18(new URL(".", import.meta.url)), "..");
 });
 
 // src/dependency.ts
 import { readFileSync as readFileSync33 } from "node:fs";
-import { join as join30 } from "node:path";
+import { join as join31 } from "node:path";
 import { fileURLToPath as fileURLToPath19 } from "node:url";
 function checkDependencies() {
   let pkg = {};
   try {
-    pkg = JSON.parse(readFileSync33(join30(ROOT12, "package.json"), "utf8"));
+    pkg = JSON.parse(readFileSync33(join31(ROOT12, "package.json"), "utf8"));
   } catch {
     return { install_scripts: [], git_dependencies: [], total_dependencies: 0, safe: false };
   }
@@ -17677,12 +17677,12 @@ function checkDependencies() {
 }
 var ROOT12;
 var init_dependency = __esm(() => {
-  ROOT12 = join30(fileURLToPath19(new URL(".", import.meta.url)), "..");
+  ROOT12 = join31(fileURLToPath19(new URL(".", import.meta.url)), "..");
 });
 
 // src/cli.ts
 import { readFileSync as readFileSync34, existsSync as existsSync18, writeFileSync as writeFileSync10, mkdirSync as mkdirSync11 } from "node:fs";
-import { join as join31, dirname as dirname6 } from "node:path";
+import { join as join32, dirname as dirname6 } from "node:path";
 import { homedir as homedir12 } from "node:os";
 import { fileURLToPath as fileURLToPath20 } from "node:url";
 import { spawnSync as spawnSync5 } from "node:child_process";
@@ -17727,7 +17727,7 @@ async function runDoctor() {
     detail: h1 ? `X-HackerOne-Research: ${h1}` : "H1_USERNAME not set",
     fix: h1 ? undefined : "export H1_USERNAME=<your-hackerone-username> (adds X-HackerOne-Research to outbound requests)"
   });
-  const dataOk = existsSync18(join31(ROOT13, "chains.json")) && existsSync18(join31(ROOT13, "tools-catalog.json"));
+  const dataOk = existsSync18(join32(ROOT13, "chains.json")) && existsSync18(join32(ROOT13, "tools-catalog.json"));
   issues.push({
     name: "Data layers (chains + tools-catalog)",
     status: dataOk ? "ok" : "fail",
@@ -17778,14 +17778,14 @@ BlitzStrike — ${verdict}`);
 function resolveCommand() {
   if (which("blitzstrike"))
     return { command: "blitzstrike", args: ["serve", "--mcp"] };
-  const src = join31(ROOT13, "src", "index.ts");
+  const src = join32(ROOT13, "src", "index.ts");
   if (which("bun") && existsSync18(src))
     return { command: "bun", args: ["run", src, "serve", "--mcp"] };
   if (which("npx"))
     return { command: "npx", args: ["-y", "blitzstrike", "serve", "--mcp"] };
   if (which("bunx"))
     return { command: "bunx", args: ["blitzstrike", "serve", "--mcp"] };
-  const dist = join31(ROOT13, "dist", "index.js");
+  const dist = join32(ROOT13, "dist", "index.js");
   if (existsSync18(dist))
     return { command: "bun", args: [dist, "serve", "--mcp"] };
   return { command: "npx", args: ["-y", "blitzstrike", "serve", "--mcp"] };
@@ -17825,15 +17825,15 @@ function opencodeWrite(p) {
   };
 }
 function copyOpenCodeAgents() {
-  const srcDir = join31(ROOT13, "opencode-agents");
-  const dstDir = join31(homedir12(), ".config", "opencode", "agents");
+  const srcDir = join32(ROOT13, "opencode-agents");
+  const dstDir = join32(homedir12(), ".config", "opencode", "agents");
   if (!existsSync18(srcDir))
     return;
   if (!existsSync18(dstDir))
     mkdirSync11(dstDir, { recursive: true });
   for (const f of ["Blitz Strike.md", "Blitz.md", "Eagle Eye.md", "Strike.md"]) {
-    const src = join31(srcDir, f);
-    const dst = join31(dstDir, f);
+    const src = join32(srcDir, f);
+    const dst = join32(dstDir, f);
     if (existsSync18(src)) {
       writeFileSync10(dst, readFileSync34(src, "utf8"));
     }
@@ -17890,74 +17890,74 @@ mcp_servers:
 function detectAgents() {
   const home = homedir12();
   const agents = [];
-  const claudeJson = join31(home, ".claude.json");
+  const claudeJson = join32(home, ".claude.json");
   agents.push({
     name: "Claude Code",
     detectPath: claudeJson,
     installed: () => existsSync18(claudeJson) || which("claude"),
     write: jsonMcpServersWrite(claudeJson)
   });
-  const claudeDesktop = join31(home, ".config", "Claude", "claude_desktop_config.json");
+  const claudeDesktop = join32(home, ".config", "Claude", "claude_desktop_config.json");
   agents.push({
     name: "Claude Desktop",
     detectPath: claudeDesktop,
     installed: () => existsSync18(claudeDesktop),
     write: jsonMcpServersWrite(claudeDesktop)
   });
-  const cursor = join31(home, ".cursor", "mcp.json");
+  const cursor = join32(home, ".cursor", "mcp.json");
   agents.push({
     name: "Cursor",
     detectPath: cursor,
-    installed: () => existsSync18(join31(home, ".cursor")) || which("cursor"),
+    installed: () => existsSync18(join32(home, ".cursor")) || which("cursor"),
     write: jsonMcpServersWrite(cursor)
   });
-  const opencode = join31(home, ".config", "opencode", "opencode.jsonc");
+  const opencode = join32(home, ".config", "opencode", "opencode.jsonc");
   agents.push({
     name: "OpenCode",
     detectPath: opencode,
-    installed: () => existsSync18(join31(home, ".config", "opencode")) || which("opencode"),
+    installed: () => existsSync18(join32(home, ".config", "opencode")) || which("opencode"),
     write: opencodeWrite(opencode)
   });
-  const codex = join31(home, ".codex", "config.toml");
+  const codex = join32(home, ".codex", "config.toml");
   agents.push({
     name: "Codex",
     detectPath: codex,
-    installed: () => existsSync18(join31(home, ".codex")) || which("codex"),
+    installed: () => existsSync18(join32(home, ".codex")) || which("codex"),
     write: codexWrite(codex)
   });
-  const hermes = join31(home, ".hermes", "config.yaml");
+  const hermes = join32(home, ".hermes", "config.yaml");
   agents.push({
     name: "Hermes",
     detectPath: hermes,
-    installed: () => existsSync18(join31(home, ".hermes")) || which("hermes"),
+    installed: () => existsSync18(join32(home, ".hermes")) || which("hermes"),
     write: hermesWrite(hermes)
   });
-  const gemini = join31(home, ".gemini", "settings.json");
+  const gemini = join32(home, ".gemini", "settings.json");
   agents.push({
     name: "Gemini CLI",
     detectPath: gemini,
-    installed: () => existsSync18(join31(home, ".gemini")) || which("gemini"),
+    installed: () => existsSync18(join32(home, ".gemini")) || which("gemini"),
     write: jsonMcpServersWrite(gemini)
   });
-  const windsurf = join31(home, ".codeium", "windsurf", "mcp_config.json");
+  const windsurf = join32(home, ".codeium", "windsurf", "mcp_config.json");
   agents.push({
     name: "Windsurf",
     detectPath: windsurf,
-    installed: () => existsSync18(join31(home, ".codeium")) || which("windsurf"),
+    installed: () => existsSync18(join32(home, ".codeium")) || which("windsurf"),
     write: jsonMcpServersWrite(windsurf)
   });
-  const copilot = join31(home, ".copilot", "mcp.json");
+  const copilot = join32(home, ".copilot", "mcp.json");
   agents.push({
     name: "Copilot",
     detectPath: copilot,
-    installed: () => existsSync18(join31(home, ".copilot")),
+    installed: () => existsSync18(join32(home, ".copilot")),
     write: jsonMcpServersWrite(copilot)
   });
-  const cline = join31(home, ".cline", "mcp_settings.json");
+  const cline = join32(home, ".cline", "mcp_settings.json");
   agents.push({
     name: "Cline",
     detectPath: cline,
-    installed: () => existsSync18(join31(home, ".cline")),
+    installed: () => existsSync18(join32(home, ".cline")),
     write: jsonMcpServersWrite(cline)
   });
   return agents;
@@ -18075,7 +18075,7 @@ var init_cli = __esm(() => {
   init_release();
   init_dependency();
   init_mcp_status();
-  ROOT13 = join31(fileURLToPath20(new URL(".", import.meta.url)), "..");
+  ROOT13 = join32(fileURLToPath20(new URL(".", import.meta.url)), "..");
 });
 
 // node_modules/zod/v3/helpers/util.js
@@ -32714,7 +32714,7 @@ class StdioServerTransport {
 // src/server.ts
 init_scanner();
 import { readFileSync as readFileSync31 } from "node:fs";
-import { execFileSync as execFileSync6 } from "node:child_process";
+import { execFileSync as execFileSync7 } from "node:child_process";
 
 // src/review-harness.ts
 init_scanner();
@@ -60066,15 +60066,95 @@ async function brokenLinkScan(url, maxHosts = 30) {
   };
 }
 
-// src/benchmark.ts
-import { readFileSync as readFileSync25, readdirSync as readdirSync6, writeFileSync as writeFileSync6, rmSync as rmSync3, mkdirSync as mkdirSync7 } from "node:fs";
+// src/cve-verify.ts
+import { execFileSync as execFileSync6 } from "node:child_process";
+import { readdirSync as readdirSync6, statSync as statSync4 } from "node:fs";
 import { join as join24 } from "node:path";
+var CVE_RE = /^CVE-\d{4}-\d{4,7}$/i;
+function findCveTemplate(cve) {
+  const dir = findTemplatesDir();
+  if (!dir)
+    return null;
+  const id = cve.toUpperCase();
+  const found = [];
+  const walk = (d, depth) => {
+    if (depth > 5)
+      return;
+    let entries;
+    try {
+      entries = readdirSync6(d);
+    } catch {
+      return;
+    }
+    for (const name of entries) {
+      const full = join24(d, name);
+      let st;
+      try {
+        st = statSync4(full);
+      } catch {
+        continue;
+      }
+      if (st.isDirectory())
+        walk(full, depth + 1);
+      else if (name === `${id}.yaml`)
+        found.push(full);
+    }
+  };
+  walk(dir, 0);
+  return found.find((f) => f.includes("/http/")) ?? found[0] ?? null;
+}
+function cveVerify(cve, target) {
+  if (!CVE_RE.test(cve)) {
+    return { cve, target, template: null, status: "error", matched: [], message: `invalid CVE id: ${cve}` };
+  }
+  if (!/^https?:\/\//i.test(target)) {
+    return { cve, target, template: null, status: "error", matched: [], message: `target must be an http(s) URL` };
+  }
+  const template = findCveTemplate(cve);
+  if (!template) {
+    return { cve, target, template: null, status: "no_template", matched: [], message: "no nuclei template for this CVE (run nuclei -update-templates)" };
+  }
+  try {
+    const out = execFileSync6("nuclei", ["-u", target, "-t", template, "-jsonl", "-silent", "-no-color", "-timeout", "10", "-or"], { timeout: 90000, stdio: ["ignore", "pipe", "pipe"], encoding: "utf8" });
+    const lines = out.trim().split(`
+`).filter(Boolean);
+    const parsed = [];
+    for (const l of lines) {
+      try {
+        parsed.push(JSON.parse(l));
+      } catch {}
+    }
+    if (parsed.length > 0) {
+      return {
+        cve,
+        target,
+        template,
+        status: "verified",
+        matched: parsed.map((m) => ({
+          name: String(m.info?.name ?? cve),
+          severity: String(m.info?.severity ?? "unknown"),
+          matched_at: String(m["matched-at"] ?? ""),
+          template_id: String(m["template-id"] ?? cve)
+        }))
+      };
+    }
+    return { cve, target, template, status: "unverified", matched: [], message: "template ran clean — no match (target not vulnerable to this CVE)" };
+  } catch (e) {
+    const err = e;
+    const msg = err.code === "ENOENT" ? "nuclei not installed (install it or run blitzstrike install-tools)" : String(err.stderr ?? err.message ?? e);
+    return { cve, target, template, status: "error", matched: [], message: msg };
+  }
+}
+
+// src/benchmark.ts
+import { readFileSync as readFileSync25, readdirSync as readdirSync7, writeFileSync as writeFileSync6, rmSync as rmSync3, mkdirSync as mkdirSync7 } from "node:fs";
+import { join as join25 } from "node:path";
 import { fileURLToPath as fileURLToPath15 } from "node:url";
 import { tmpdir as tmpdir3, homedir as homedir9 } from "node:os";
 init_complex_bugs();
-var ROOT8 = join24(fileURLToPath15(new URL(".", import.meta.url)), "..");
-var CORPUS = join24(ROOT8, "bench", "corpus");
-var CAPTURED_CORPUS_DIR = process.env.BLITZSTRIKE_CORPUS_DIR ?? join24(homedir9(), ".blitzstrike", "corpus");
+var ROOT8 = join25(fileURLToPath15(new URL(".", import.meta.url)), "..");
+var CORPUS = join25(ROOT8, "bench", "corpus");
+var CAPTURED_CORPUS_DIR = process.env.BLITZSTRIKE_CORPUS_DIR ?? join25(homedir9(), ".blitzstrike", "corpus");
 function parseCorpusFile(path) {
   let text;
   try {
@@ -60131,10 +60211,10 @@ function parseCorpusFile(path) {
 function loadDir(dir) {
   const entries = [];
   try {
-    for (const f of readdirSync6(dir)) {
+    for (const f of readdirSync7(dir)) {
       if (!f.endsWith(".md"))
         continue;
-      const e = parseCorpusFile(join24(dir, f));
+      const e = parseCorpusFile(join25(dir, f));
       if (e)
         entries.push(e);
     }
@@ -60161,7 +60241,7 @@ function captureFalsePositive(input) {
     input.code,
     "```"
   ].filter((l) => l !== null);
-  const path = join24(CAPTURED_CORPUS_DIR, `${id}.md`);
+  const path = join25(CAPTURED_CORPUS_DIR, `${id}.md`);
   writeFileSync6(path, lines.join(`
 `) + `
 `, "utf8");
@@ -60183,7 +60263,7 @@ function detect(entry) {
   }
   const lang = entry.language;
   if (lang === "php") {
-    const tmp = join24(tmpdir3(), `blitzstrike-bench-${entry.id}-${process.pid}.php`);
+    const tmp = join25(tmpdir3(), `blitzstrike-bench-${entry.id}-${process.pid}.php`);
     writeFileSync6(tmp, entry.code);
     const r = analyzeDataFlow2(tmp);
     rmSync3(tmp, { force: true });
@@ -60253,11 +60333,11 @@ function runBenchmark() {
 
 // src/obligations.ts
 import { readFileSync as readFileSync26, appendFileSync as appendFileSync4, mkdirSync as mkdirSync8, existsSync as existsSync13, writeFileSync as writeFileSync7 } from "node:fs";
-import { join as join25 } from "node:path";
+import { join as join26 } from "node:path";
 import { createHash as createHash6 } from "node:crypto";
 import { homedir as homedir10 } from "node:os";
-var HOME_DIR4 = process.env.BLITZSTRIKE_HOME ?? join25(homedir10(), ".blitzstrike");
-var OBLIGATION_PATH = join25(HOME_DIR4, "obligations.jsonl");
+var HOME_DIR4 = process.env.BLITZSTRIKE_HOME ?? join26(homedir10(), ".blitzstrike");
+var OBLIGATION_PATH = join26(HOME_DIR4, "obligations.jsonl");
 function ensureDir3() {
   if (!existsSync13(HOME_DIR4))
     mkdirSync8(HOME_DIR4, { recursive: true });
@@ -62294,7 +62374,7 @@ function listPocTypes() {
 import { execSync as execSync3 } from "node:child_process";
 import { mkdtempSync as mkdtempSync3, mkdirSync as mkdirSync9, writeFileSync as writeFileSync8, rmSync as rmSync4, existsSync as existsSync15 } from "node:fs";
 import { tmpdir as tmpdir4 } from "node:os";
-import { join as join26 } from "node:path";
+import { join as join27 } from "node:path";
 function findForge() {
   try {
     const p = execSync3("which forge 2>/dev/null", { encoding: "utf8", timeout: 3000 }).trim();
@@ -62343,14 +62423,14 @@ async function foundryRun(input) {
     };
   }
   const poc = input.poc_code ?? foundryPoc(input.class_ ?? "missing_access_control", name);
-  const dir = mkdtempSync3(join26(tmpdir4(), "blitzstrike-foundry-"));
+  const dir = mkdtempSync3(join27(tmpdir4(), "blitzstrike-foundry-"));
   try {
     try {
       execSync3(`${forge} init --force --no-git ${dir}`, { stdio: "ignore", timeout: 60000 });
     } catch {
-      mkdirSync9(join26(dir, "src"), { recursive: true });
-      mkdirSync9(join26(dir, "test"), { recursive: true });
-      writeFileSync8(join26(dir, "foundry.toml"), `[profile.default]
+      mkdirSync9(join27(dir, "src"), { recursive: true });
+      mkdirSync9(join27(dir, "test"), { recursive: true });
+      writeFileSync8(join27(dir, "foundry.toml"), `[profile.default]
 src = "src"
 out = "out"
 libs = ["lib"]
@@ -62360,12 +62440,12 @@ solc = "0.8.20"
     for (const f of ["Counter.sol", "Counter.t.sol", "Counter.s.sol"]) {
       for (const sub of ["src", "test", "script"]) {
         try {
-          rmSync4(join26(dir, sub, f), { force: true });
+          rmSync4(join27(dir, sub, f), { force: true });
         } catch {}
       }
     }
-    writeFileSync8(join26(dir, "src", `${name}.sol`), input.contract_code);
-    writeFileSync8(join26(dir, "test", `${name}.t.sol`), poc);
+    writeFileSync8(join27(dir, "src", `${name}.sol`), input.contract_code);
+    writeFileSync8(join27(dir, "test", `${name}.t.sol`), poc);
     const { out } = runForge(forge, dir, input.timeout_ms ?? 60000);
     const tests = parseTestResults(out);
     const anyFail = tests.some((t) => t.status === "fail");
@@ -62383,33 +62463,33 @@ solc = "0.8.20"
 }
 
 // src/enterprise-benchmark.ts
-import { existsSync as existsSync16, readFileSync as readFileSync29, readdirSync as readdirSync7, statSync as statSync4 } from "node:fs";
-import { join as join27, resolve } from "node:path";
+import { existsSync as existsSync16, readFileSync as readFileSync29, readdirSync as readdirSync8, statSync as statSync5 } from "node:fs";
+import { join as join28, resolve } from "node:path";
 import { fileURLToPath as fileURLToPath16 } from "node:url";
 init_complex_bugs();
 var ROOT9 = resolve(fileURLToPath16(new URL(".", import.meta.url)), "..", "bench", "enterprise");
 var ENTERPRISE_FIXTURES = [
-  { id: "php-laravel", dir: join27(ROOT9, "php-laravel"), expected_vulns: 4 },
-  { id: "js-express", dir: join27(ROOT9, "js-express"), expected_vulns: 2 },
-  { id: "py-django", dir: join27(ROOT9, "py-django"), expected_vulns: 2 },
-  { id: "java-spring", dir: join27(ROOT9, "java-spring"), expected_vulns: 2 },
-  { id: "wp-batch-route", dir: join27(ROOT9, "wp-batch-route"), expected_vulns: 3 },
-  { id: "php-complex", dir: join27(ROOT9, "php-complex"), expected_vulns: 4 }
+  { id: "php-laravel", dir: join28(ROOT9, "php-laravel"), expected_vulns: 4 },
+  { id: "js-express", dir: join28(ROOT9, "js-express"), expected_vulns: 2 },
+  { id: "py-django", dir: join28(ROOT9, "py-django"), expected_vulns: 2 },
+  { id: "java-spring", dir: join28(ROOT9, "java-spring"), expected_vulns: 2 },
+  { id: "wp-batch-route", dir: join28(ROOT9, "wp-batch-route"), expected_vulns: 3 },
+  { id: "php-complex", dir: join28(ROOT9, "php-complex"), expected_vulns: 4 }
 ];
 function sourceFiles(root) {
   const out = [];
   const walk = (dir) => {
     let entries;
     try {
-      entries = readdirSync7(dir);
+      entries = readdirSync8(dir);
     } catch {
       return;
     }
     for (const e of entries) {
-      const p = join27(dir, e);
+      const p = join28(dir, e);
       let st;
       try {
-        st = statSync4(p);
+        st = statSync5(p);
       } catch {
         continue;
       }
@@ -62640,7 +62720,7 @@ function createServer2() {
 ` + `- A hard block (Cloudflare/WAF/IP-block/captcha) is NOT the end: mark the finding blocked + note the required vantage (residential / authorized / correct-SNI / --resolve direct-to-origin), then CONTINUE to the next lead (origin bypass, non-prod cluster, mobile APK, subdomain).
 ` + `- Keep trying every lead AND every chain step until each is verified/executed or blocked, THEN generate_report. Never deliver a bare surface map, and never stop at 'found X' when X enables more.
 
-` + "TWO PATHS:\\n" + "- Source path on disk -> blitz_scan / taint_file / eagle_eye2 (static).\\n" + "- Live URL -> live_recon / active_scan / strike_verify (web-hunting).\\n\\n" + "DEEPEN A FINDING: attack_plan(target, tech, params) to get the prioritized vector plan (decide what to test next with data); list_chains (escalation), chain_links (compose), technique_lookup(cls), payload_lookup, bypass_lookup (blocked). Ground any detector hit empirically with pattern_lookup(id) — it returns the class's CWE, real-world signature, escalation chains, citable references, per-class bypass techniques, and the high-value assets (crown jewels) that class hits, so a raw hit becomes a class-aware finding. Resolve free-form terminology first with synonym_lookup(term) (IDOR/BOLA/SQLi/prompt-injection → canonical id). For an llm_injection hit, its pattern carries a validation discipline — the RUN-TWICE RULE (reproduce token-for-token across two fresh sessions), NON-GUESSABLE ANCHOR (must leak a real key/URL, not a plausible guess), and OOB PROOF (a verifiable callback log) — apply all three before reporting. BEFORE generating a report, run submission_gate(...) and only ship a finding that passes all 7 questions (reproducible, in-scope, real-impact, no-privileged-assumption, verified-live, evidence-redacted, severity-derived); one false = kill it. Generate the concrete reproduction recipe with auto_poc(type, base_url, endpoint, param) — it emits the exact marker request + negative control + expected differential + Patchstack-style title, so 'reproducible' is executable, not abstract. Calibrate severity with severity_calibrate(type, cvss) to get a P1–P5 tier + VRT-style category. Start each engagement with engagement_scaffold(target, scope) for the folder + scope.md structure, and check data_refresh() to confirm the data layers are consistent. Phase doctrine: read_skill(bs-orchestrate-engagement | bs-web-hunting | bs-source-audit | bs-verify-finding). Campaign plan: read_playbook(target-type). On any failure call retry_guidance(signal) / model_fallback(signal) before giving up. HUNTING DOCTRINE (maximize payout rate): (1) SIBLING RULE — if one endpoint requires auth, check every sibling (/export /delete /share); ~30% of paid IDOR/auth bugs come from siblings — AUTOMATE it with sibling_scan(base_url, endpoint, token_a, token_b), the deterministic live logic-bug prober (sibling enumeration + differential IDOR + auth matrix + mass assignment + rate limit, evidence-first). (2) A→B SIGNAL — a confirmed bug signals a class of developer mistake; hunt B and C (20-min box) before reporting. (3) TWO-ACCOUNT IDOR — always test with attacker account A reading victim account B, and state it in the report. (4) PoC ESCALATION — IDOR shows victim data (not 200), XSS shows cookie exfil (not alert), SSRF shows internal response (not DNS), SQLi shows DB content (not error). (5) FOLLOW THE MONEY — billing/credits/refunds/wallet flows. (6) Kill weak findings with kill_list(type) BEFORE the gate — missing headers, self-XSS, open-redirect-alone, SSRF-DNS-only, GraphQL-introspection-alone are always N/A standalone. (7) CI/CD + SAML/SSO are critical attack surfaces (pull_request_target, expression injection, XML signature wrapping, comment injection). Full doctrine: hunting_doctrine(). WHAT TO HUNT NEXT: watchlist() returns the ranked CWE frequency + high-value CVEs with payout + a saturated flag (prioritize high-freq/high-payout/not-saturated: missing-authz, SQLi, SSRF, deserialization; skip saturated XSS/CSRF/open-redirect unless they chain into takeover). PRECISION GUARD: resolve_check(host) detects when an ISP/country redirects the domain to a blocking/sinkhole page (gambling/adult/streaming niches) — audit the PUBLIC IP, never the sinkhole.\n" + "KNOWLEDGE BASE (discover, don't guess): skillLookup(topic) / listSkills for the 40 attack-path + hunting skills (ap-*, hp-*, bs-*); list_attack_vectors / attack_vectors(cat) for the 34-category vector taxonomy; taxonomy(kind) for OWASP/CWE/ASVS/API-top-10; read_playbook(type) for the 17 campaign playbooks; list_manuals / read_tool_manual for 317 tool references; list_tools / run_catalog_tool for the 141-tool catalog. Every tool, skill, and data layer is reachable from these. CROSS-TARGET INTELLIGENCE: strike_resolve auto-records confirmed/false_positive verdicts into the empirical ledger; query it with intelligence(action=hit_rates/top_vectors/recall) so a new target on a known tech inherits historical hit-rates (attack_plan already blends them into success_probability). intelligence(action=recall, tech, target) is the per-engagement pattern recall — it returns which patterns historically CONFIRMED on that tech (prioritize them) versus which only ever produced false positives (avoid them), so a new engagement starts from the empirical playbook of past ones. LIVE PENTEST + TARGETING (black-box, WAF-safe): cache_gap(base_url, endpoint) fuzzes path-normalization + static-extension variants for cache deception/poisoning; blind_oracle(base_url, param, value) detects which SINK a param reaches (sql/ssti/xss) via benign arithmetic (id=1+0, test${7*7}) WITHOUT a malicious payload; param_precedence(base_url, param, A, B) maps duplicate-parameter precedence (first/last-wins) for WAF-bypass. OOB (out-of-band) PROOF for BLIND vulns: oob_start() spins an interactsh listener (unique *.oast.* domain, streams DNS/HTTP interactions — the standard for public targets) or a local HTTP listener for local labs; inject the canary, then oob_poll(id) until the hit arrives; oob_stop(id) to clean up. A blind SSRF/XXE/SQLi/command-injection is CONFIRMED only when the canary actually arrives — never from a guess. SOURCE TARGETING: action_surface(code) maps every wp_ajax_* action to its vuln class + DERIVED priority (what to look for WHERE); security_state(sanitizers, sink) gives a wrong-context sanitization verdict; framework_knowledge(framework) returns auth/nonce primitives for 9 frameworks; variant_scan(root, signature) mass-sweeps an install base for ONE bug family; patch_analyze(old, new) REVERSES a security patch into the 0-day, and its mine_signature feeds variant_scan to sweep unpatched copies. All of these are DETECTION HINTS — verify each live (strike_verify / browser_validate) before it enters the report. NEWEST DETECTORS — understand AND try them: variant_scan also emits priv_esc (privilege escalation — a role/capability/user change fed by request input, traced cross-file via reverse call-graph, e.g. set_role($id, sanitize_key($_POST['um-role'])) or update_user_meta(...,'wp_capabilities', $_POST[...])) and flags uploadAllow=>array('all') unrestricted-upload configs as file_upload (the file-manager/connector shape). TO TRY a priv_esc hit: submit the role field with 'administrator' (or send wp_capabilities meta) and confirm the account actually gains admin. TO TRY an unrestricted-upload hit: POST a .php/.phtml and confirm it lands web-reachable + executes. variant_scan also emits hardcoded_secret (CWE-798) in three tiers: a secret field (api_key/db_password/access_token/aws_*) assigned a literal (HIGH), a known secret FORMAT (JWT eyJ…/AWS AKIA…/GitHub ghp_…/Slack xoxb-…/…) regardless of name (HIGH), or a high-entropy suspect token (MEDIUM — verify before reporting). Verify a frontend/JS secret live via drive_devtools (inspect the JS bundle / network response and confirm the key is actually exposed), and for a backend secret confirm it is reachable/valid. A static hit is a HYPOTHESIS until verified live — never report unverified. For a repo, also scan_git_history(root) — secrets DELETED from HEAD still live in .git history (the removed-later-is-not-fixed trap), and it feeds every recovered pre-deletion blob through the same secret detector. Once you recover a credential, prove it is still ACTIVE with validate_leaked_key(apiBase, endpoints, key|blobUrl) — a READ-ONLY differential test (401-without-key vs 200-with-key = auth bypass PROVEN). Two supply-chain detectors: dependency_confusion (a manifest/build file resolving a package from a public registry — pypi.org/npmjs.org --extra-index-url, or a scoped @company/pkg with no private registry) and ml_supply_chain (torch.load without weights_only=True / joblib.load / np.load(allow_pickle=True) / keras load_model on an untrusted model → pickle RCE). Rust is supported end-to-end: the taint engine (blitz_scan / taint_file) maps Rust sinks (std::process::Command, sqlx/diesel, reqwest/hyper, std::fs, serde/bincode) to the classic classes, plus two Rust-specific detectors — rust_unsafe (transmute / assume_init / from_raw_parts / ptr::* — memory-unsafety surface, CWE-119) and rust_format_string (println!/format! with a variable as the format string — CWE-134). The sqlx query! compile-time macro is treated as safe (suppressed). Two more web-class detectors: jwt_alg_confusion (a JWT verifier that dispatches on the token's alg header and accepts BOTH RS256 and HS256, with the HS256 HMAC secret derived from public/shared key material — CWE-347; the attacker sets alg=HS256 and signs with the public key to forge admin tokens) and cache_deception (a reverse proxy caching static-extension URLs with a cache key that omits the session cookie, over a session-authenticated backend — CWE-525; the victim's cached private response is re-fetched anonymously). TO TRY a jwt_alg_confusion hit: fetch the public key (/.well-known/jwks.json), forge an HS256 token signed with that public key, and confirm admin access. TO TRY a cache_deception hit: request an authenticated path with a static extension appended (.css/.js) and re-fetch it anonymously. Three more detectors: cors_misconfiguration (Access-Control-Allow-Origin reflects the request Origin or is '*' while credentials are true — CWE-942; any site reads the victim's authenticated responses), xss (user input into a DOM sink — innerHTML / dangerouslySetInnerHTML / document.write / .html() / eval — CWE-79), and subdomain_takeover (a dangling CNAME/AliasTarget to a claimable service like *.github.io/*.herokuapp.com/*.amazonaws.com — CWE-404). TO TRY a cors hit: send an evil Origin + confirm the response echoes it with Allow-Credentials:true. TO TRY an xss hit: confirm the sink executes (drive_devtools). TO TRY a takeover hit: verify the CNAME target resolves to an unclaimed/not-found page. Two more client-side detectors: postmessage_no_origin_check (a window message listener that reads event.data but never validates event.origin — CWE-345; any site can drive the handler) and client_trusted_flag (a privilege/entitlement flag like isAdmin/withVip/premium read from request input and used in a security decision — CWE-807/639; derive the flag from server state, never the client). TO TRY a postMessage hit: send a crafted message from an attacker origin and confirm the handler acts on it. TO TRY a client-trusted-flag hit: flip the flag param to true and confirm the privilege is actually granted. WEB3: for Solidity/EVM, call web3_audit(code|path) — a deterministic 13-class smart-contract audit (reentrancy incl. ERC721/ERC1155 callback reentrancy, unchecked return, unchecked arithmetic, tx.origin auth, signature replay, unprotected selfdestruct, delegatecall-to-user-input, missing access control, timestamp dependence, spot-price oracle manipulation incl. slot0/latestRoundData, unbounded loop, abi.encodePacked hash collision, missing address(0) validation) returning ranked findings (class/CWE/severity/line), then foundry_poc(class, contract) to generate an executable Foundry test, and foundry_run(contract_code, poc_code|class_) to actually EXECUTE it — a PASSING PoC test is the proof that the exploit reproduces (deterministic: forge's own test verdict). A web3 hit is a HYPOTHESIS until the Foundry PoC reproduces it.\n" + `PRECISION ANALYSIS — chrome-devtools MCP is MANDATORY, not optional:
+` + "TWO PATHS:\\n" + "- Source path on disk -> blitz_scan / taint_file / eagle_eye2 (static).\\n" + "- Live URL -> live_recon / active_scan / strike_verify (web-hunting).\\n\\n" + "DEEPEN A FINDING: attack_plan(target, tech, params) to get the prioritized vector plan (decide what to test next with data); list_chains (escalation), chain_links (compose), technique_lookup(cls), payload_lookup, bypass_lookup (blocked). Ground any detector hit empirically with pattern_lookup(id) — it returns the class's CWE, real-world signature, escalation chains, citable references, per-class bypass techniques, and the high-value assets (crown jewels) that class hits, so a raw hit becomes a class-aware finding. Resolve free-form terminology first with synonym_lookup(term) (IDOR/BOLA/SQLi/prompt-injection → canonical id). For an llm_injection hit, its pattern carries a validation discipline — the RUN-TWICE RULE (reproduce token-for-token across two fresh sessions), NON-GUESSABLE ANCHOR (must leak a real key/URL, not a plausible guess), and OOB PROOF (a verifiable callback log) — apply all three before reporting. BEFORE generating a report, run submission_gate(...) and only ship a finding that passes all 7 questions (reproducible, in-scope, real-impact, no-privileged-assumption, verified-live, evidence-redacted, severity-derived); one false = kill it. Generate the concrete reproduction recipe with auto_poc(type, base_url, endpoint, param) — it emits the exact marker request + negative control + expected differential + Patchstack-style title, so 'reproducible' is executable, not abstract. Calibrate severity with severity_calibrate(type, cvss) to get a P1–P5 tier + VRT-style category. Start each engagement with engagement_scaffold(target, scope) for the folder + scope.md structure, and check data_refresh() to confirm the data layers are consistent. Phase doctrine: read_skill(bs-orchestrate-engagement | bs-web-hunting | bs-source-audit | bs-verify-finding). Campaign plan: read_playbook(target-type). On any failure call retry_guidance(signal) / model_fallback(signal) before giving up. HUNTING DOCTRINE (maximize payout rate): (1) SIBLING RULE — if one endpoint requires auth, check every sibling (/export /delete /share); ~30% of paid IDOR/auth bugs come from siblings — AUTOMATE it with sibling_scan(base_url, endpoint, token_a, token_b), the deterministic live logic-bug prober (sibling enumeration + differential IDOR + auth matrix + mass assignment + rate limit, evidence-first). (2) A→B SIGNAL — a confirmed bug signals a class of developer mistake; hunt B and C (20-min box) before reporting. (3) TWO-ACCOUNT IDOR — always test with attacker account A reading victim account B, and state it in the report. (4) PoC ESCALATION — IDOR shows victim data (not 200), XSS shows cookie exfil (not alert), SSRF shows internal response (not DNS), SQLi shows DB content (not error). (5) FOLLOW THE MONEY — billing/credits/refunds/wallet flows. (6) Kill weak findings with kill_list(type) BEFORE the gate — missing headers, self-XSS, open-redirect-alone, SSRF-DNS-only, GraphQL-introspection-alone are always N/A standalone. (7) CI/CD + SAML/SSO are critical attack surfaces (pull_request_target, expression injection, XML signature wrapping, comment injection). Full doctrine: hunting_doctrine(). WHAT TO HUNT NEXT: watchlist() returns the ranked CWE frequency + high-value CVEs with payout + a saturated flag (prioritize high-freq/high-payout/not-saturated: missing-authz, SQLi, SSRF, deserialization; skip saturated XSS/CSRF/open-redirect unless they chain into takeover). The CVE watchlist now spans 4,000+ product fingerprints (live from nuclei-templates when installed — refresh with sync_cve_corpus() before a big recon pass); live_recon's suggested_cves names the SPECIFIC CVE for the detected product/version — then cve_verify(cve, target) CONFIRMS it live by running the matching nuclei template (VERIFIED only when nuclei actually matches; a CVE is report-ready only after cve_verify, never from the fingerprint alone). SURFACE-FIRST: surface_map(surface) maps an attack surface (image/redirect proxy, edge cache, payment portal, AI agent, file service, Electron, SSO) to its highest-value tests — map surfaces then test, don't spray payloads. PRECISION GUARD: resolve_check(host) detects when an ISP/country redirects the domain to a blocking/sinkhole page (gambling/adult/streaming niches) — audit the PUBLIC IP, never the sinkhole.\n" + "KNOWLEDGE BASE (discover, don't guess): skillLookup(topic) / listSkills for the 40 attack-path + hunting skills (ap-*, hp-*, bs-*); list_attack_vectors / attack_vectors(cat) for the 34-category vector taxonomy; taxonomy(kind) for OWASP/CWE/ASVS/API-top-10; read_playbook(type) for the 17 campaign playbooks; list_manuals / read_tool_manual for 317 tool references; list_tools / run_catalog_tool for the 141-tool catalog. Every tool, skill, and data layer is reachable from these. CROSS-TARGET INTELLIGENCE: strike_resolve auto-records confirmed/false_positive verdicts into the empirical ledger; query it with intelligence(action=hit_rates/top_vectors/recall) so a new target on a known tech inherits historical hit-rates (attack_plan already blends them into success_probability). intelligence(action=recall, tech, target) is the per-engagement pattern recall — it returns which patterns historically CONFIRMED on that tech (prioritize them) versus which only ever produced false positives (avoid them), so a new engagement starts from the empirical playbook of past ones. LIVE PENTEST + TARGETING (black-box, WAF-safe): cache_gap(base_url, endpoint) fuzzes path-normalization + static-extension variants for cache deception/poisoning; blind_oracle(base_url, param, value) detects which SINK a param reaches (sql/ssti/xss) via benign arithmetic (id=1+0, test${7*7}) WITHOUT a malicious payload; param_precedence(base_url, param, A, B) maps duplicate-parameter precedence (first/last-wins) for WAF-bypass; broken_link_scan(url) detects expired-domain takeover (crawls outbound refs → DNS/RDAP → flags claimable domains). OOB (out-of-band) PROOF for BLIND vulns: oob_start() spins an interactsh listener (unique *.oast.* domain, streams DNS/HTTP interactions — the standard for public targets) or a local HTTP listener for local labs; inject the canary, then oob_poll(id) until the hit arrives; oob_stop(id) to clean up. A blind SSRF/XXE/SQLi/command-injection is CONFIRMED only when the canary actually arrives — never from a guess. SOURCE TARGETING: review_harness(path) FIRST for full coverage — it applies a fixed 5-signal rubric (entry_points/auth_gates/sinks/secrets/logic_bugs) to EVERY source file and sorts the signal-dense ones first (a complete map, not a partial scan); then action_surface(code) maps every wp_ajax_* action to its vuln class + DERIVED priority (what to look for WHERE); security_state(sanitizers, sink) gives a wrong-context sanitization verdict; framework_knowledge(framework) returns auth/nonce primitives for 9 frameworks; variant_scan(root, signature) mass-sweeps an install base for ONE bug family; patch_analyze(old, new) REVERSES a security patch into the 0-day, and its mine_signature feeds variant_scan to sweep unpatched copies. All of these are DETECTION HINTS — verify each live (strike_verify / browser_validate) before it enters the report. NEWEST DETECTORS — understand AND try them: variant_scan also emits priv_esc (privilege escalation — a role/capability/user change fed by request input, traced cross-file via reverse call-graph, e.g. set_role($id, sanitize_key($_POST['um-role'])) or update_user_meta(...,'wp_capabilities', $_POST[...])) and flags uploadAllow=>array('all') unrestricted-upload configs as file_upload (the file-manager/connector shape). TO TRY a priv_esc hit: submit the role field with 'administrator' (or send wp_capabilities meta) and confirm the account actually gains admin. TO TRY an unrestricted-upload hit: POST a .php/.phtml and confirm it lands web-reachable + executes. variant_scan also emits hardcoded_secret (CWE-798) in three tiers: a secret field (api_key/db_password/access_token/aws_*) assigned a literal (HIGH), a known secret FORMAT (JWT eyJ…/AWS AKIA…/GitHub ghp_…/Slack xoxb-…/…) regardless of name (HIGH), or a high-entropy suspect token (MEDIUM — verify before reporting). Verify a frontend/JS secret live via drive_devtools (inspect the JS bundle / network response and confirm the key is actually exposed), and for a backend secret confirm it is reachable/valid. A static hit is a HYPOTHESIS until verified live — never report unverified. For a repo, also scan_git_history(root) — secrets DELETED from HEAD still live in .git history (the removed-later-is-not-fixed trap), and it feeds every recovered pre-deletion blob through the same secret detector. Once you recover a credential, prove it is still ACTIVE with validate_leaked_key(apiBase, endpoints, key|blobUrl) — a READ-ONLY differential test (401-without-key vs 200-with-key = auth bypass PROVEN). Two supply-chain detectors: dependency_confusion (a manifest/build file resolving a package from a public registry — pypi.org/npmjs.org --extra-index-url, or a scoped @company/pkg with no private registry) and ml_supply_chain (torch.load without weights_only=True / joblib.load / np.load(allow_pickle=True) / keras load_model on an untrusted model → pickle RCE). Rust is supported end-to-end: the taint engine (blitz_scan / taint_file) maps Rust sinks (std::process::Command, sqlx/diesel, reqwest/hyper, std::fs, serde/bincode) to the classic classes, plus two Rust-specific detectors — rust_unsafe (transmute / assume_init / from_raw_parts / ptr::* — memory-unsafety surface, CWE-119) and rust_format_string (println!/format! with a variable as the format string — CWE-134). The sqlx query! compile-time macro is treated as safe (suppressed). Two more web-class detectors: jwt_alg_confusion (a JWT verifier that dispatches on the token's alg header and accepts BOTH RS256 and HS256, with the HS256 HMAC secret derived from public/shared key material — CWE-347; the attacker sets alg=HS256 and signs with the public key to forge admin tokens) and cache_deception (a reverse proxy caching static-extension URLs with a cache key that omits the session cookie, over a session-authenticated backend — CWE-525; the victim's cached private response is re-fetched anonymously). TO TRY a jwt_alg_confusion hit: fetch the public key (/.well-known/jwks.json), forge an HS256 token signed with that public key, and confirm admin access. TO TRY a cache_deception hit: request an authenticated path with a static extension appended (.css/.js) and re-fetch it anonymously. Three more detectors: cors_misconfiguration (Access-Control-Allow-Origin reflects the request Origin or is '*' while credentials are true — CWE-942; any site reads the victim's authenticated responses), xss (user input into a DOM sink — innerHTML / dangerouslySetInnerHTML / document.write / .html() / eval — CWE-79), and subdomain_takeover (a dangling CNAME/AliasTarget to a claimable service like *.github.io/*.herokuapp.com/*.amazonaws.com — CWE-404). TO TRY a cors hit: send an evil Origin + confirm the response echoes it with Allow-Credentials:true. TO TRY an xss hit: confirm the sink executes (drive_devtools). TO TRY a takeover hit: verify the CNAME target resolves to an unclaimed/not-found page. Two more client-side detectors: postmessage_no_origin_check (a window message listener that reads event.data but never validates event.origin — CWE-345; any site can drive the handler) and client_trusted_flag (a privilege/entitlement flag like isAdmin/withVip/premium read from request input and used in a security decision — CWE-807/639; derive the flag from server state, never the client). TO TRY a postMessage hit: send a crafted message from an attacker origin and confirm the handler acts on it. TO TRY a client-trusted-flag hit: flip the flag param to true and confirm the privilege is actually granted. WEB3: for Solidity/EVM, call web3_audit(code|path) — a deterministic 13-class smart-contract audit (reentrancy incl. ERC721/ERC1155 callback reentrancy, unchecked return, unchecked arithmetic, tx.origin auth, signature replay, unprotected selfdestruct, delegatecall-to-user-input, missing access control, timestamp dependence, spot-price oracle manipulation incl. slot0/latestRoundData, unbounded loop, abi.encodePacked hash collision, missing address(0) validation) returning ranked findings (class/CWE/severity/line), then foundry_poc(class, contract) to generate an executable Foundry test, and foundry_run(contract_code, poc_code|class_) to actually EXECUTE it — a PASSING PoC test is the proof that the exploit reproduces (deterministic: forge's own test verdict). A web3 hit is a HYPOTHESIS until the Foundry PoC reproduces it.\n" + `PRECISION ANALYSIS — chrome-devtools MCP is MANDATORY, not optional:
 ` + `- When a lead needs DOM/JS precision — DOM-XSS sink execution, AJAX endpoint + payload interception, JS runtime errors, redirect chains, SSO/token flow, or anything a static HTML glance cannot prove — call drive_devtools(target). It spawns chrome-devtools-mcp and drives a REAL headless browser (navigate -> list_network_requests -> list_console_messages -> evaluate_script), giving reproducible evidence instead of a guess.
 ` + `- Before calling it, check_mcp() to confirm the browser MCP is available; if not, blitzstrike install-tools or npm i -g chrome-devtools-mcp. Never substitute eyeballing minified JS or a static sink guess when a live browser can PROVE it. This is the precision + consistency layer.
 ` + "EXTERNAL MCP SERVERS (verified, connect them — NOT one-shot CLIs): chrome-devtools-mcp (29 tools: list_network_requests/get_network_request for raw HTTP interception, list_console_messages for JS errors + DOM-XSS, evaluate_script to run JS, take_screenshot) -> stdio chrome-devtools-mcp --headless --chromeArg=--no-sandbox --chromeArg=--disable-gpu (as root/container this is MANDATORY or the browser crashes; add --proxyServer http://127.0.0.1:8080 to route through Burp, --acceptInsecureCerts for bad TLS). burp-suite-mcp (proxy history + active scan + repeater) -> NOT npm: build the JAR (git clone https://github.com/PortSwigger/mcp-server.git && cd mcp-server && ./gradlew embedProxyJar), load it in Burp Extensions, then connect the client to http://127.0.0.1:9876 (SSE) or the stdio proxy java -jar mcp-proxy-all.jar --sse-url http://127.0.0.1:9876."
@@ -63701,7 +63781,7 @@ ${statusLine}` : statusLine },
   }, async () => {
     let update = "skipped (nuclei not found)";
     try {
-      execFileSync6("nuclei", ["-update-templates"], { timeout: 120000, stdio: "pipe" });
+      execFileSync7("nuclei", ["-update-templates"], { timeout: 120000, stdio: "pipe" });
       update = "ok";
     } catch {}
     invalidateCorpusCache();
@@ -63715,6 +63795,16 @@ ${statusLine}` : statusLine },
       ]
     };
   });
+  server.registerTool("cve_verify", {
+    title: "Verify a suggested CVE against the target by running its nuclei template",
+    description: "Bridge the fingerprint-first gap: take a CVE (from live_recon suggested_cves / watchlist / the nuclei corpus) and CONFIRM it live by running the matching nuclei template against the target. Returns VERIFIED (nuclei matched — with name/severity/matched-at), UNVERIFIED (template ran clean), no_template (no template for that CVE — run nuclei -update-templates), or error (invalid CVE/target or nuclei unavailable). Deterministic + evidence-first: a CVE is only VERIFIED when nuclei actually matches it.",
+    inputSchema: {
+      cve: string2().describe("CVE id, e.g. CVE-2024-4577"),
+      target: string2().describe("Target URL, e.g. https://target.com")
+    }
+  }, async ({ cve, target }) => {
+    return { content: [{ type: "text", text: JSON.stringify(cveVerify(cve, target)) }] };
+  });
   server.registerTool("auto_poc", {
     title: "Auto-PoC — generate a copy-paste-ready reproduction recipe",
     description: "Turn a finding into a concrete reproduction recipe (the 'reproducible' gate question made executable). Given a vuln class + target + endpoint + param, emit the exact request (with a MARKER), a NEGATIVE CONTROL, and the expected differential that PROVES the bug — plus a Patchstack-style title, derived severity, and the fix. Covers sql_injection, missing_authz/idor, ssrf, xss, ssti, command_injection, file_upload, mass_assignment, jwt_alg_confusion, crlf, open_redirect, xxe, prototype_pollution, deserialization, hardcoded_secret, cache_deception, cors_misconfiguration, subdomain_takeover. Pass type='list' to enumerate supported classes.",
@@ -64684,12 +64774,12 @@ async function serve() {
 // src/index.ts
 init_cli();
 import { readFileSync as readFileSync35, existsSync as existsSync19 } from "node:fs";
-import { join as join32 } from "node:path";
+import { join as join33 } from "node:path";
 import { fileURLToPath as fileURLToPath21 } from "node:url";
-var ROOT14 = join32(fileURLToPath21(new URL(".", import.meta.url)), "..");
+var ROOT14 = join33(fileURLToPath21(new URL(".", import.meta.url)), "..");
 function readVersion() {
   try {
-    const p = join32(ROOT14, "package.json");
+    const p = join33(ROOT14, "package.json");
     if (existsSync19(p))
       return JSON.parse(readFileSync35(p, "utf8")).version ?? "1.0.0";
   } catch {}

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "blitzstrike",
-  "version": "2.4.115",
+  "version": "2.4.117",
   "description": "Blitz Strike — a universal MCP security-audit toolbelt. BLITZ sweeps the attack surface, EAGLE-EYE traces source-to-sink, STRIKE verifies live. 57 attack chains, 130-tool catalog, intelligence data layer. One server, every agent.",
   "type": "module",
   "bin": {