blitzstrike 2.4.103 → 2.4.104

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -5,6 +5,21 @@ All notable changes to Blitz Strike are documented here.
 The format follows [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.0.0/),
 and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/).
 
+## [2.4.104] — 2026-09-17
+
+### Added — two client-side detectors (postMessage + client-trusted flag)
+
+- `postmessage_no_origin_check` (CWE-345, medium): a `window.addEventListener
+  ("message")` / `onmessage` handler that reads `event.data` but never validates
+  `event.origin` — any site can drive the handler. Detector fires only when the
+  handler reads `.data` with no `.origin` check anywhere in scope.
+- `client_trusted_flag` (CWE-807/639, high): a privilege/entitlement flag
+  (isAdmin / withVip / premium / hidden / …) read from request input and used in
+  a security decision — the client asserts its own privilege. Detector requires a
+  flag-like key from a request source PLUS a decision context (if/where/role/
+  permission). Both grounded (pattern + CWE + severity + synonym + chain) and
+  covered by fire-vs-clean regression checks.
+
 ## [2.4.103] — 2026-09-17
 
 ### Added — version-precise fingerprint-first (semver narrowing)

package/dist/index.js

@@ -16323,6 +16323,8 @@ function detectComplexBugs(code, file) {
   detectCorsMisconfig(code, file, out);
   detectXss(code, file, out);
   detectSubdomainTakeover(code, file, out);
+  detectPostMessageOrigin(code, file, out);
+  detectClientTrustedFlag(code, file, out);
   out.push(...detectWrongSanitizer(code, file));
   out.push(...detectMissingAuthz(code, file));
   const seen = new Set;
@@ -16989,6 +16991,54 @@ function detectXss(code, file, out) {
     });
   }
 }
+function detectPostMessageOrigin(code, file, out) {
+  const clean = stripCommentsOnly(code);
+  const ls = lines2(clean);
+  for (let i = 0;i < ls.length; i++) {
+    const line = ls[i];
+    if (!/(?:addEventListener\s*\(\s*["']message["']|\.onmessage\s*=|onmessage\s*[:=])/i.test(line))
+      continue;
+    const scope = ls.slice(i, Math.min(i + 13, ls.length)).join(`
+`);
+    if (!/\.data\b/.test(scope))
+      continue;
+    if (/\.origin\b/.test(scope))
+      continue;
+    out.push({
+      file,
+      line: i + 1,
+      type: "postmessage_no_origin_check",
+      category: "postMessage handler without origin check",
+      severity: "medium",
+      evidence: line.trim(),
+      detail: "A postMessage listener reads event.data but never validates event.origin — any website can deliver a crafted message to this handler (CWE-345). Validate event.origin against a static allowlist before acting on event.data."
+    });
+  }
+}
+function detectClientTrustedFlag(code, file, out) {
+  const clean = stripCommentsOnly(code);
+  const ls = lines2(clean);
+  const flagKey = /\b(?:is_?admin|with_?vip|is_?premium|with_?hidden|is_?pro|is_?paid|is_?verified|is_?moderator|is_?staff|is_?owner|with_?admin|has_?admin|is_?trusted)\b/i;
+  const sourceRead = /(?:\$_GET|\$_POST|\$_REQUEST|req\.(?:query|body|params)|request\.(?:args|form|get|json|values)|queryParams|searchParams)\s*[\[\(\.]/i;
+  for (let i = 0;i < ls.length; i++) {
+    const line = ls[i];
+    if (!sourceRead.test(line) || !flagKey.test(line))
+      continue;
+    const scope = ls.slice(i, Math.min(i + 4, ls.length)).join(`
+`);
+    if (!/(?:if\s*\(|\?[^;]*:|WHERE|authoriz|permission|access|role|is_?admin|vip|premium)\b/i.test(scope))
+      continue;
+    out.push({
+      file,
+      line: i + 1,
+      type: "client_trusted_flag",
+      category: "Client-trusted flag (security decision from request input)",
+      severity: "high",
+      evidence: line.trim(),
+      detail: "A flag-like value (isAdmin / withVip / premium / hidden / …) is read from request input and drives a security decision. The client must never assert its own privilege — derive the flag from server state (session/DB), not the request (CWE-807 / CWE-639)."
+    });
+  }
+}
 function detectSubdomainTakeover(code, file, out) {
   const clean = stripCommentsOnly(code);
   const ls = lines2(code);
@@ -34562,7 +34612,15 @@ var ALIASES = {
   "host header": "host_header",
   "host header injection": "host_header",
   "host header poisoning": "host_header",
-  "password reset poisoning": "host_header"
+  "password reset poisoning": "host_header",
+  postmessage: "postmessage_no_origin_check",
+  "post message": "postmessage_no_origin_check",
+  "missing origin check": "postmessage_no_origin_check",
+  "client trusted flag": "client_trusted_flag",
+  "client trusted boolean": "client_trusted_flag",
+  "client controlled flag": "client_trusted_flag",
+  "privilege flag": "client_trusted_flag",
+  "entitlement flag": "client_trusted_flag"
 };
 function normalize(term) {
   return term.trim().toLowerCase().replace(/[_-]+/g, " ").replace(/\s+/g, " ").trim();
@@ -59213,6 +59271,8 @@ var VRT_MAP = {
   command_injection: { vrt: "injection > os_command_injection", priority: "P1", severity: "critical", rationale: "User input reaches a shell (system/exec/popen) → arbitrary command execution, full host takeover." },
   nosql_injection: { vrt: "injection > nosql_injection", priority: "P1", severity: "critical", rationale: "NoSQL operator injection reaches a database query → auth bypass or data exfiltration." },
   host_header: { vrt: "injection > host_header_injection", priority: "P3", severity: "medium", rationale: "A reflected/trusted Host header can poison password-reset links or enable cache poisoning → account takeover in the right flow." },
+  postmessage_no_origin_check: { vrt: "client_side > postmessage_origin_missing", priority: "P3", severity: "medium", rationale: "A postMessage listener that never checks event.origin lets any site drive the handler (CWE-345)." },
+  client_trusted_flag: { vrt: "broken_access_control > client_trusted_flag", priority: "P1", severity: "high", rationale: "A privilege flag read from request input lets the client assert its own privilege (CWE-807/639)." },
   deserialization: { vrt: "injection > insecure_deserialization", priority: "P1", severity: "critical", rationale: "Deserialization escalated via a gadget chain → code execution." },
   xxe: { vrt: "injection > xml_external_entity", priority: "P1", severity: "critical", rationale: "XXE reads local files or reaches internal services." },
   file_upload: { vrt: "insecure_design > unrestricted_file_upload", priority: "P1", severity: "critical", rationale: "A web-reachable uploaded file of an executable type → code execution." },
@@ -62044,7 +62104,7 @@ function createServer2() {
 ` + `- A hard block (Cloudflare/WAF/IP-block/captcha) is NOT the end: mark the finding blocked + note the required vantage (residential / authorized / correct-SNI / --resolve direct-to-origin), then CONTINUE to the next lead (origin bypass, non-prod cluster, mobile APK, subdomain).
 ` + `- Keep trying every lead AND every chain step until each is verified/executed or blocked, THEN generate_report. Never deliver a bare surface map, and never stop at 'found X' when X enables more.
 
-` + "TWO PATHS:\\n" + "- Source path on disk -> blitz_scan / taint_file / eagle_eye2 (static).\\n" + "- Live URL -> live_recon / active_scan / strike_verify (web-hunting).\\n\\n" + "DEEPEN A FINDING: attack_plan(target, tech, params) to get the prioritized vector plan (decide what to test next with data); list_chains (escalation), chain_links (compose), technique_lookup(cls), payload_lookup, bypass_lookup (blocked). Ground any detector hit empirically with pattern_lookup(id) — it returns the class's CWE, real-world signature, escalation chains, citable references, per-class bypass techniques, and the high-value assets (crown jewels) that class hits, so a raw hit becomes a class-aware finding. Resolve free-form terminology first with synonym_lookup(term) (IDOR/BOLA/SQLi/prompt-injection → canonical id). For an llm_injection hit, its pattern carries a validation discipline — the RUN-TWICE RULE (reproduce token-for-token across two fresh sessions), NON-GUESSABLE ANCHOR (must leak a real key/URL, not a plausible guess), and OOB PROOF (a verifiable callback log) — apply all three before reporting. BEFORE generating a report, run submission_gate(...) and only ship a finding that passes all 7 questions (reproducible, in-scope, real-impact, no-privileged-assumption, verified-live, evidence-redacted, severity-derived); one false = kill it. Generate the concrete reproduction recipe with auto_poc(type, base_url, endpoint, param) — it emits the exact marker request + negative control + expected differential + Patchstack-style title, so 'reproducible' is executable, not abstract. Calibrate severity with severity_calibrate(type, cvss) to get a P1–P5 tier + VRT-style category. Start each engagement with engagement_scaffold(target, scope) for the folder + scope.md structure, and check data_refresh() to confirm the data layers are consistent. Phase doctrine: read_skill(bs-orchestrate-engagement | bs-web-hunting | bs-source-audit | bs-verify-finding). Campaign plan: read_playbook(target-type). On any failure call retry_guidance(signal) / model_fallback(signal) before giving up. HUNTING DOCTRINE (maximize payout rate): (1) SIBLING RULE — if one endpoint requires auth, check every sibling (/export /delete /share); ~30% of paid IDOR/auth bugs come from siblings — AUTOMATE it with sibling_scan(base_url, endpoint, token_a, token_b), the deterministic live logic-bug prober (sibling enumeration + differential IDOR + auth matrix + mass assignment + rate limit, evidence-first). (2) A→B SIGNAL — a confirmed bug signals a class of developer mistake; hunt B and C (20-min box) before reporting. (3) TWO-ACCOUNT IDOR — always test with attacker account A reading victim account B, and state it in the report. (4) PoC ESCALATION — IDOR shows victim data (not 200), XSS shows cookie exfil (not alert), SSRF shows internal response (not DNS), SQLi shows DB content (not error). (5) FOLLOW THE MONEY — billing/credits/refunds/wallet flows. (6) Kill weak findings with kill_list(type) BEFORE the gate — missing headers, self-XSS, open-redirect-alone, SSRF-DNS-only, GraphQL-introspection-alone are always N/A standalone. (7) CI/CD + SAML/SSO are critical attack surfaces (pull_request_target, expression injection, XML signature wrapping, comment injection). Full doctrine: hunting_doctrine(). WHAT TO HUNT NEXT: watchlist() returns the ranked CWE frequency + high-value CVEs with payout + a saturated flag (prioritize high-freq/high-payout/not-saturated: missing-authz, SQLi, SSRF, deserialization; skip saturated XSS/CSRF/open-redirect unless they chain into takeover). PRECISION GUARD: resolve_check(host) detects when an ISP/country redirects the domain to a blocking/sinkhole page (gambling/adult/streaming niches) — audit the PUBLIC IP, never the sinkhole.\n" + "KNOWLEDGE BASE (discover, don't guess): skillLookup(topic) / listSkills for the 40 attack-path + hunting skills (ap-*, hp-*, bs-*); list_attack_vectors / attack_vectors(cat) for the 34-category vector taxonomy; taxonomy(kind) for OWASP/CWE/ASVS/API-top-10; read_playbook(type) for the 17 campaign playbooks; list_manuals / read_tool_manual for 317 tool references; list_tools / run_catalog_tool for the 141-tool catalog. Every tool, skill, and data layer is reachable from these. CROSS-TARGET INTELLIGENCE: strike_resolve auto-records confirmed/false_positive verdicts into the empirical ledger; query it with intelligence(action=hit_rates/top_vectors/recall) so a new target on a known tech inherits historical hit-rates (attack_plan already blends them into success_probability). intelligence(action=recall, tech, target) is the per-engagement pattern recall — it returns which patterns historically CONFIRMED on that tech (prioritize them) versus which only ever produced false positives (avoid them), so a new engagement starts from the empirical playbook of past ones. LIVE PENTEST + TARGETING (black-box, WAF-safe): cache_gap(base_url, endpoint) fuzzes path-normalization + static-extension variants for cache deception/poisoning; blind_oracle(base_url, param, value) detects which SINK a param reaches (sql/ssti/xss) via benign arithmetic (id=1+0, test${7*7}) WITHOUT a malicious payload; param_precedence(base_url, param, A, B) maps duplicate-parameter precedence (first/last-wins) for WAF-bypass. OOB (out-of-band) PROOF for BLIND vulns: oob_start() spins an interactsh listener (unique *.oast.* domain, streams DNS/HTTP interactions — the standard for public targets) or a local HTTP listener for local labs; inject the canary, then oob_poll(id) until the hit arrives; oob_stop(id) to clean up. A blind SSRF/XXE/SQLi/command-injection is CONFIRMED only when the canary actually arrives — never from a guess. SOURCE TARGETING: action_surface(code) maps every wp_ajax_* action to its vuln class + DERIVED priority (what to look for WHERE); security_state(sanitizers, sink) gives a wrong-context sanitization verdict; framework_knowledge(framework) returns auth/nonce primitives for 9 frameworks; variant_scan(root, signature) mass-sweeps an install base for ONE bug family; patch_analyze(old, new) REVERSES a security patch into the 0-day, and its mine_signature feeds variant_scan to sweep unpatched copies. All of these are DETECTION HINTS — verify each live (strike_verify / browser_validate) before it enters the report. NEWEST DETECTORS — understand AND try them: variant_scan also emits priv_esc (privilege escalation — a role/capability/user change fed by request input, traced cross-file via reverse call-graph, e.g. set_role($id, sanitize_key($_POST['um-role'])) or update_user_meta(...,'wp_capabilities', $_POST[...])) and flags uploadAllow=>array('all') unrestricted-upload configs as file_upload (the file-manager/connector shape). TO TRY a priv_esc hit: submit the role field with 'administrator' (or send wp_capabilities meta) and confirm the account actually gains admin. TO TRY an unrestricted-upload hit: POST a .php/.phtml and confirm it lands web-reachable + executes. variant_scan also emits hardcoded_secret (CWE-798) in three tiers: a secret field (api_key/db_password/access_token/aws_*) assigned a literal (HIGH), a known secret FORMAT (JWT eyJ…/AWS AKIA…/GitHub ghp_…/Slack xoxb-…/…) regardless of name (HIGH), or a high-entropy suspect token (MEDIUM — verify before reporting). Verify a frontend/JS secret live via drive_devtools (inspect the JS bundle / network response and confirm the key is actually exposed), and for a backend secret confirm it is reachable/valid. A static hit is a HYPOTHESIS until verified live — never report unverified. For a repo, also scan_git_history(root) — secrets DELETED from HEAD still live in .git history (the removed-later-is-not-fixed trap), and it feeds every recovered pre-deletion blob through the same secret detector. Once you recover a credential, prove it is still ACTIVE with validate_leaked_key(apiBase, endpoints, key|blobUrl) — a READ-ONLY differential test (401-without-key vs 200-with-key = auth bypass PROVEN). Two supply-chain detectors: dependency_confusion (a manifest/build file resolving a package from a public registry — pypi.org/npmjs.org --extra-index-url, or a scoped @company/pkg with no private registry) and ml_supply_chain (torch.load without weights_only=True / joblib.load / np.load(allow_pickle=True) / keras load_model on an untrusted model → pickle RCE). Rust is supported end-to-end: the taint engine (blitz_scan / taint_file) maps Rust sinks (std::process::Command, sqlx/diesel, reqwest/hyper, std::fs, serde/bincode) to the classic classes, plus two Rust-specific detectors — rust_unsafe (transmute / assume_init / from_raw_parts / ptr::* — memory-unsafety surface, CWE-119) and rust_format_string (println!/format! with a variable as the format string — CWE-134). The sqlx query! compile-time macro is treated as safe (suppressed). Two more web-class detectors: jwt_alg_confusion (a JWT verifier that dispatches on the token's alg header and accepts BOTH RS256 and HS256, with the HS256 HMAC secret derived from public/shared key material — CWE-347; the attacker sets alg=HS256 and signs with the public key to forge admin tokens) and cache_deception (a reverse proxy caching static-extension URLs with a cache key that omits the session cookie, over a session-authenticated backend — CWE-525; the victim's cached private response is re-fetched anonymously). TO TRY a jwt_alg_confusion hit: fetch the public key (/.well-known/jwks.json), forge an HS256 token signed with that public key, and confirm admin access. TO TRY a cache_deception hit: request an authenticated path with a static extension appended (.css/.js) and re-fetch it anonymously. Three more detectors: cors_misconfiguration (Access-Control-Allow-Origin reflects the request Origin or is '*' while credentials are true — CWE-942; any site reads the victim's authenticated responses), xss (user input into a DOM sink — innerHTML / dangerouslySetInnerHTML / document.write / .html() / eval — CWE-79), and subdomain_takeover (a dangling CNAME/AliasTarget to a claimable service like *.github.io/*.herokuapp.com/*.amazonaws.com — CWE-404). TO TRY a cors hit: send an evil Origin + confirm the response echoes it with Allow-Credentials:true. TO TRY an xss hit: confirm the sink executes (drive_devtools). TO TRY a takeover hit: verify the CNAME target resolves to an unclaimed/not-found page. WEB3: for Solidity/EVM, call web3_audit(code|path) — a deterministic 13-class smart-contract audit (reentrancy incl. ERC721/ERC1155 callback reentrancy, unchecked return, unchecked arithmetic, tx.origin auth, signature replay, unprotected selfdestruct, delegatecall-to-user-input, missing access control, timestamp dependence, spot-price oracle manipulation incl. slot0/latestRoundData, unbounded loop, abi.encodePacked hash collision, missing address(0) validation) returning ranked findings (class/CWE/severity/line), then foundry_poc(class, contract) to generate an executable Foundry test, and foundry_run(contract_code, poc_code|class_) to actually EXECUTE it — a PASSING PoC test is the proof that the exploit reproduces (deterministic: forge's own test verdict). A web3 hit is a HYPOTHESIS until the Foundry PoC reproduces it.\n" + `PRECISION ANALYSIS — chrome-devtools MCP is MANDATORY, not optional:
+` + "TWO PATHS:\\n" + "- Source path on disk -> blitz_scan / taint_file / eagle_eye2 (static).\\n" + "- Live URL -> live_recon / active_scan / strike_verify (web-hunting).\\n\\n" + "DEEPEN A FINDING: attack_plan(target, tech, params) to get the prioritized vector plan (decide what to test next with data); list_chains (escalation), chain_links (compose), technique_lookup(cls), payload_lookup, bypass_lookup (blocked). Ground any detector hit empirically with pattern_lookup(id) — it returns the class's CWE, real-world signature, escalation chains, citable references, per-class bypass techniques, and the high-value assets (crown jewels) that class hits, so a raw hit becomes a class-aware finding. Resolve free-form terminology first with synonym_lookup(term) (IDOR/BOLA/SQLi/prompt-injection → canonical id). For an llm_injection hit, its pattern carries a validation discipline — the RUN-TWICE RULE (reproduce token-for-token across two fresh sessions), NON-GUESSABLE ANCHOR (must leak a real key/URL, not a plausible guess), and OOB PROOF (a verifiable callback log) — apply all three before reporting. BEFORE generating a report, run submission_gate(...) and only ship a finding that passes all 7 questions (reproducible, in-scope, real-impact, no-privileged-assumption, verified-live, evidence-redacted, severity-derived); one false = kill it. Generate the concrete reproduction recipe with auto_poc(type, base_url, endpoint, param) — it emits the exact marker request + negative control + expected differential + Patchstack-style title, so 'reproducible' is executable, not abstract. Calibrate severity with severity_calibrate(type, cvss) to get a P1–P5 tier + VRT-style category. Start each engagement with engagement_scaffold(target, scope) for the folder + scope.md structure, and check data_refresh() to confirm the data layers are consistent. Phase doctrine: read_skill(bs-orchestrate-engagement | bs-web-hunting | bs-source-audit | bs-verify-finding). Campaign plan: read_playbook(target-type). On any failure call retry_guidance(signal) / model_fallback(signal) before giving up. HUNTING DOCTRINE (maximize payout rate): (1) SIBLING RULE — if one endpoint requires auth, check every sibling (/export /delete /share); ~30% of paid IDOR/auth bugs come from siblings — AUTOMATE it with sibling_scan(base_url, endpoint, token_a, token_b), the deterministic live logic-bug prober (sibling enumeration + differential IDOR + auth matrix + mass assignment + rate limit, evidence-first). (2) A→B SIGNAL — a confirmed bug signals a class of developer mistake; hunt B and C (20-min box) before reporting. (3) TWO-ACCOUNT IDOR — always test with attacker account A reading victim account B, and state it in the report. (4) PoC ESCALATION — IDOR shows victim data (not 200), XSS shows cookie exfil (not alert), SSRF shows internal response (not DNS), SQLi shows DB content (not error). (5) FOLLOW THE MONEY — billing/credits/refunds/wallet flows. (6) Kill weak findings with kill_list(type) BEFORE the gate — missing headers, self-XSS, open-redirect-alone, SSRF-DNS-only, GraphQL-introspection-alone are always N/A standalone. (7) CI/CD + SAML/SSO are critical attack surfaces (pull_request_target, expression injection, XML signature wrapping, comment injection). Full doctrine: hunting_doctrine(). WHAT TO HUNT NEXT: watchlist() returns the ranked CWE frequency + high-value CVEs with payout + a saturated flag (prioritize high-freq/high-payout/not-saturated: missing-authz, SQLi, SSRF, deserialization; skip saturated XSS/CSRF/open-redirect unless they chain into takeover). PRECISION GUARD: resolve_check(host) detects when an ISP/country redirects the domain to a blocking/sinkhole page (gambling/adult/streaming niches) — audit the PUBLIC IP, never the sinkhole.\n" + "KNOWLEDGE BASE (discover, don't guess): skillLookup(topic) / listSkills for the 40 attack-path + hunting skills (ap-*, hp-*, bs-*); list_attack_vectors / attack_vectors(cat) for the 34-category vector taxonomy; taxonomy(kind) for OWASP/CWE/ASVS/API-top-10; read_playbook(type) for the 17 campaign playbooks; list_manuals / read_tool_manual for 317 tool references; list_tools / run_catalog_tool for the 141-tool catalog. Every tool, skill, and data layer is reachable from these. CROSS-TARGET INTELLIGENCE: strike_resolve auto-records confirmed/false_positive verdicts into the empirical ledger; query it with intelligence(action=hit_rates/top_vectors/recall) so a new target on a known tech inherits historical hit-rates (attack_plan already blends them into success_probability). intelligence(action=recall, tech, target) is the per-engagement pattern recall — it returns which patterns historically CONFIRMED on that tech (prioritize them) versus which only ever produced false positives (avoid them), so a new engagement starts from the empirical playbook of past ones. LIVE PENTEST + TARGETING (black-box, WAF-safe): cache_gap(base_url, endpoint) fuzzes path-normalization + static-extension variants for cache deception/poisoning; blind_oracle(base_url, param, value) detects which SINK a param reaches (sql/ssti/xss) via benign arithmetic (id=1+0, test${7*7}) WITHOUT a malicious payload; param_precedence(base_url, param, A, B) maps duplicate-parameter precedence (first/last-wins) for WAF-bypass. OOB (out-of-band) PROOF for BLIND vulns: oob_start() spins an interactsh listener (unique *.oast.* domain, streams DNS/HTTP interactions — the standard for public targets) or a local HTTP listener for local labs; inject the canary, then oob_poll(id) until the hit arrives; oob_stop(id) to clean up. A blind SSRF/XXE/SQLi/command-injection is CONFIRMED only when the canary actually arrives — never from a guess. SOURCE TARGETING: action_surface(code) maps every wp_ajax_* action to its vuln class + DERIVED priority (what to look for WHERE); security_state(sanitizers, sink) gives a wrong-context sanitization verdict; framework_knowledge(framework) returns auth/nonce primitives for 9 frameworks; variant_scan(root, signature) mass-sweeps an install base for ONE bug family; patch_analyze(old, new) REVERSES a security patch into the 0-day, and its mine_signature feeds variant_scan to sweep unpatched copies. All of these are DETECTION HINTS — verify each live (strike_verify / browser_validate) before it enters the report. NEWEST DETECTORS — understand AND try them: variant_scan also emits priv_esc (privilege escalation — a role/capability/user change fed by request input, traced cross-file via reverse call-graph, e.g. set_role($id, sanitize_key($_POST['um-role'])) or update_user_meta(...,'wp_capabilities', $_POST[...])) and flags uploadAllow=>array('all') unrestricted-upload configs as file_upload (the file-manager/connector shape). TO TRY a priv_esc hit: submit the role field with 'administrator' (or send wp_capabilities meta) and confirm the account actually gains admin. TO TRY an unrestricted-upload hit: POST a .php/.phtml and confirm it lands web-reachable + executes. variant_scan also emits hardcoded_secret (CWE-798) in three tiers: a secret field (api_key/db_password/access_token/aws_*) assigned a literal (HIGH), a known secret FORMAT (JWT eyJ…/AWS AKIA…/GitHub ghp_…/Slack xoxb-…/…) regardless of name (HIGH), or a high-entropy suspect token (MEDIUM — verify before reporting). Verify a frontend/JS secret live via drive_devtools (inspect the JS bundle / network response and confirm the key is actually exposed), and for a backend secret confirm it is reachable/valid. A static hit is a HYPOTHESIS until verified live — never report unverified. For a repo, also scan_git_history(root) — secrets DELETED from HEAD still live in .git history (the removed-later-is-not-fixed trap), and it feeds every recovered pre-deletion blob through the same secret detector. Once you recover a credential, prove it is still ACTIVE with validate_leaked_key(apiBase, endpoints, key|blobUrl) — a READ-ONLY differential test (401-without-key vs 200-with-key = auth bypass PROVEN). Two supply-chain detectors: dependency_confusion (a manifest/build file resolving a package from a public registry — pypi.org/npmjs.org --extra-index-url, or a scoped @company/pkg with no private registry) and ml_supply_chain (torch.load without weights_only=True / joblib.load / np.load(allow_pickle=True) / keras load_model on an untrusted model → pickle RCE). Rust is supported end-to-end: the taint engine (blitz_scan / taint_file) maps Rust sinks (std::process::Command, sqlx/diesel, reqwest/hyper, std::fs, serde/bincode) to the classic classes, plus two Rust-specific detectors — rust_unsafe (transmute / assume_init / from_raw_parts / ptr::* — memory-unsafety surface, CWE-119) and rust_format_string (println!/format! with a variable as the format string — CWE-134). The sqlx query! compile-time macro is treated as safe (suppressed). Two more web-class detectors: jwt_alg_confusion (a JWT verifier that dispatches on the token's alg header and accepts BOTH RS256 and HS256, with the HS256 HMAC secret derived from public/shared key material — CWE-347; the attacker sets alg=HS256 and signs with the public key to forge admin tokens) and cache_deception (a reverse proxy caching static-extension URLs with a cache key that omits the session cookie, over a session-authenticated backend — CWE-525; the victim's cached private response is re-fetched anonymously). TO TRY a jwt_alg_confusion hit: fetch the public key (/.well-known/jwks.json), forge an HS256 token signed with that public key, and confirm admin access. TO TRY a cache_deception hit: request an authenticated path with a static extension appended (.css/.js) and re-fetch it anonymously. Three more detectors: cors_misconfiguration (Access-Control-Allow-Origin reflects the request Origin or is '*' while credentials are true — CWE-942; any site reads the victim's authenticated responses), xss (user input into a DOM sink — innerHTML / dangerouslySetInnerHTML / document.write / .html() / eval — CWE-79), and subdomain_takeover (a dangling CNAME/AliasTarget to a claimable service like *.github.io/*.herokuapp.com/*.amazonaws.com — CWE-404). TO TRY a cors hit: send an evil Origin + confirm the response echoes it with Allow-Credentials:true. TO TRY an xss hit: confirm the sink executes (drive_devtools). TO TRY a takeover hit: verify the CNAME target resolves to an unclaimed/not-found page. Two more client-side detectors: postmessage_no_origin_check (a window message listener that reads event.data but never validates event.origin — CWE-345; any site can drive the handler) and client_trusted_flag (a privilege/entitlement flag like isAdmin/withVip/premium read from request input and used in a security decision — CWE-807/639; derive the flag from server state, never the client). TO TRY a postMessage hit: send a crafted message from an attacker origin and confirm the handler acts on it. TO TRY a client-trusted-flag hit: flip the flag param to true and confirm the privilege is actually granted. WEB3: for Solidity/EVM, call web3_audit(code|path) — a deterministic 13-class smart-contract audit (reentrancy incl. ERC721/ERC1155 callback reentrancy, unchecked return, unchecked arithmetic, tx.origin auth, signature replay, unprotected selfdestruct, delegatecall-to-user-input, missing access control, timestamp dependence, spot-price oracle manipulation incl. slot0/latestRoundData, unbounded loop, abi.encodePacked hash collision, missing address(0) validation) returning ranked findings (class/CWE/severity/line), then foundry_poc(class, contract) to generate an executable Foundry test, and foundry_run(contract_code, poc_code|class_) to actually EXECUTE it — a PASSING PoC test is the proof that the exploit reproduces (deterministic: forge's own test verdict). A web3 hit is a HYPOTHESIS until the Foundry PoC reproduces it.\n" + `PRECISION ANALYSIS — chrome-devtools MCP is MANDATORY, not optional:
 ` + `- When a lead needs DOM/JS precision — DOM-XSS sink execution, AJAX endpoint + payload interception, JS runtime errors, redirect chains, SSO/token flow, or anything a static HTML glance cannot prove — call drive_devtools(target). It spawns chrome-devtools-mcp and drives a REAL headless browser (navigate -> list_network_requests -> list_console_messages -> evaluate_script), giving reproducible evidence instead of a guess.
 ` + `- Before calling it, check_mcp() to confirm the browser MCP is available; if not, blitzstrike install-tools or npm i -g chrome-devtools-mcp. Never substitute eyeballing minified JS or a static sink guess when a live browser can PROVE it. This is the precision + consistency layer.
 ` + "EXTERNAL MCP SERVERS (verified, connect them — NOT one-shot CLIs): chrome-devtools-mcp (29 tools: list_network_requests/get_network_request for raw HTTP interception, list_console_messages for JS errors + DOM-XSS, evaluate_script to run JS, take_screenshot) -> stdio chrome-devtools-mcp --headless --chromeArg=--no-sandbox --chromeArg=--disable-gpu (as root/container this is MANDATORY or the browser crashes; add --proxyServer http://127.0.0.1:8080 to route through Burp, --acceptInsecureCerts for bad TLS). burp-suite-mcp (proxy history + active scan + repeater) -> NOT npm: build the JAR (git clone https://github.com/PortSwigger/mcp-server.git && cd mcp-server && ./gradlew embedProxyJar), load it in Burp Extensions, then connect the client to http://127.0.0.1:9876 (SSE) or the stdio proxy java -jar mcp-proxy-all.jar --sse-url http://127.0.0.1:9876."

package/intelligence/cwe_map.json

@@ -347,6 +347,16 @@
       "id": "cors_misconfiguration",
       "cwe": "CWE-942",
       "name": "Overly Permissive Cross-domain Whitelist (CORS)"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "postmessage_no_origin_check",
+      "cwe": "CWE-345",
+      "name": "Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "client_trusted_flag",
+      "cwe": "CWE-807",
+      "name": "Reliance on Untrusted Inputs in a Security Decision"
     }
   ]
 }

package/intelligence/patterns.json

@@ -1051,6 +1051,68 @@
       "payout_min": 500,
       "payout_max": 5000,
       "typical_payout": "$500\u2013$5K"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "postmessage_no_origin_check",
+      "name": "postMessage handler without origin check",
+      "cwe": "CWE-345",
+      "real_world": "A window message listener reads event.data without validating event.origin. Any website can deliver a crafted message to the handler and drive its privileged action (DOM mutation, token handoff, function call).",
+      "detection_signatures": [
+        "addEventListener('message') / onmessage that reads .data but never checks .origin"
+      ],
+      "chain_templates": [
+        "xss_to_account_takeover"
+      ],
+      "references": [
+        "CWE-345",
+        "OWASP A07:2021 Identification and Authentication Failures"
+      ],
+      "bypass_techniques": [
+        "wildcard '*' postMessage targetOrigin",
+        "missing event.origin comparison",
+        "origin check against the wrong window/source"
+      ],
+      "crown_jewels": [
+        "auth tokens handed off via postMessage",
+        "privileged parent-frame APIs",
+        "DOM XSS via postMessage data"
+      ],
+      "severity": "medium",
+      "payout_min": 500,
+      "payout_max": 5000,
+      "typical_payout": "$500\u2013$5K"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "client_trusted_flag",
+      "name": "Client-trusted privilege flag",
+      "cwe": "CWE-807",
+      "real_world": "A privilege/entitlement flag (isAdmin/withVip/premium/hidden) is read from request input and used in a security decision. The client asserts its own privilege instead of the server deriving it from session/DB state.",
+      "detection_signatures": [
+        "request-input flag (isAdmin/withVip/premium) driving an if/role/access decision"
+      ],
+      "chain_templates": [
+        "mass_assignment_to_admin_takeover"
+      ],
+      "references": [
+        "CWE-807",
+        "CWE-639",
+        "OWASP A01:2021 Broken Access Control"
+      ],
+      "bypass_techniques": [
+        "withVip/withHidden boolean toggling",
+        "isAdmin role param",
+        "premium entitlement flag",
+        "hidden resource access via a client flag"
+      ],
+      "crown_jewels": [
+        "admin role",
+        "paid/premium content",
+        "hidden resources"
+      ],
+      "severity": "high",
+      "payout_min": 1000,
+      "payout_max": 15000,
+      "typical_payout": "$1K\u2013$15K"
     }
   ]
 }

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "blitzstrike",
-  "version": "2.4.103",
+  "version": "2.4.104",
   "description": "Blitz Strike — a universal MCP security-audit toolbelt. BLITZ sweeps the attack surface, EAGLE-EYE traces source-to-sink, STRIKE verifies live. 57 attack chains, 130-tool catalog, intelligence data layer. One server, every agent.",
   "type": "module",
   "bin": {