blitzstrike 1.0.94 → 1.0.95

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -5,6 +5,21 @@ All notable changes to Blitz Strike are documented here.
 The format follows [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.0.0/),
 and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/).
 
+## [1.0.95] — 2026-09-13
+
+### Added — three new complex-bug detectors (deepen the moat)
+
+- `complex_scan` now detects six classes (was three), adding:
+  - **prototype pollution** — unsafe merge/extend of request data into an object
+    without a `__proto__`/`constructor.prototype` guard (Node/JS).
+  - **CRLF / header injection** — user input into `header`/`setHeader`/
+    `writeHead` (response splitting, cookie poisoning).
+  - **path confusion** — user input into a file path with no nearby
+    canonicalization (`basename`/`realpath`/`normalize`), catching `..%2f`,
+    backslash, and null-byte variants that evade a naive `../` filter.
+- Widened `SOURCE_TOKENS` to cover `req.headers`/`req.cookies`/`request.body`.
+- `complex_scan` and the `instructions` now name all six classes.
+
 ## [1.0.94] — 2026-09-13
 
 ### Added — model fallback (mature: classify → decide, not blind fallback)

package/dist/index.js

@@ -52671,7 +52671,7 @@ function detectRouteConfusion(code, file) {
 }
 
 // src/complex-bugs.ts
-var SOURCE_TOKENS2 = /\$_(GET|POST|REQUEST|COOKIE|FILES|SERVER)\b|\$request->|\$req->|request\.(get|input|query|post|data)|getParameter\(|req\.(query|body|params)/;
+var SOURCE_TOKENS2 = /\$_(GET|POST|REQUEST|COOKIE|FILES|SERVER)\b|\$request->|\$req->|request\.(get|input|query|post|data|body|headers|cookies|params)|getParameter\(|req\.(query|body|params|headers|cookies)/;
 function lines2(code) {
   return code.split(`
 `);
@@ -52775,6 +52775,9 @@ function detectComplexBugs(code, file) {
   detectDeserialization(code, file, out);
   detectTypeJuggling(code, file, out);
   detectMassAssignment(code, file, out);
+  detectPrototypePollution(code, file, out);
+  detectCrlfInjection(code, file, out);
+  detectPathConfusion(code, file, out);
   const seen = new Set;
   return out.filter((f) => {
     const key = `${f.type}:${f.line}`;
@@ -52784,6 +52787,75 @@ function detectComplexBugs(code, file) {
     return true;
   });
 }
+function detectPrototypePollution(code, file, out) {
+  const ls = lines2(code);
+  const mergeRe = /\b(Object\.assign|_\.merge|_\.defaultsDeep|\.extend|\.merge|\.defaultsDeep|mergeDeep|deepMerge|_.set)\s*\(/g;
+  let m;
+  while ((m = mergeRe.exec(code)) !== null) {
+    const ln = lineNo2(code, m.index);
+    const l = ls[ln - 1] ?? "";
+    const scope = ls.slice(Math.max(0, ln - 4), ln).join(`
+`);
+    if (!SOURCE_TOKENS2.test(l) && !SOURCE_TOKENS2.test(scope))
+      continue;
+    out.push({
+      file,
+      line: ln,
+      type: "prototype_pollution",
+      category: "Prototype pollution (unsafe merge)",
+      severity: "high",
+      evidence: l.trim(),
+      detail: "Merge/extend of request data into an object without a `__proto__`/`constructor.prototype` guard — attacker-controlled keys can pollute `Object.prototype` and pivot to RCE or property injection."
+    });
+  }
+}
+function detectCrlfInjection(code, file, out) {
+  const ls = lines2(code);
+  const headerRe = /\b(header|setHeader|addHeader|writeHead|appendHeader)\s*\(/g;
+  let m;
+  while ((m = headerRe.exec(code)) !== null) {
+    const ln = lineNo2(code, m.index);
+    const l = ls[ln - 1] ?? "";
+    const scope = ls.slice(Math.max(0, ln - 3), ln).join(`
+`);
+    if (!SOURCE_TOKENS2.test(l) && !SOURCE_TOKENS2.test(scope))
+      continue;
+    out.push({
+      file,
+      line: ln,
+      type: "crlf_injection",
+      category: "CRLF / header injection",
+      severity: "medium",
+      evidence: l.trim(),
+      detail: "User input reaches an HTTP header — CRLF (`%0d%0a`) can split the response, inject headers, or poison cookies. Strip newlines from header values."
+    });
+  }
+}
+function detectPathConfusion(code, file, out) {
+  const ls = lines2(code);
+  const fileRe = /\b(file_get_contents|file_put_contents|fopen|readFileSync|readFile|open|include|require|new\s+File|Files\.read|FileInputStream|FileOutputStream)\s*\(/g;
+  let m;
+  while ((m = fileRe.exec(code)) !== null) {
+    const ln = lineNo2(code, m.index);
+    const l = ls[ln - 1] ?? "";
+    const scope = ls.slice(Math.max(0, ln - 3), ln).join(`
+`);
+    if (!SOURCE_TOKENS2.test(l) && !SOURCE_TOKENS2.test(scope))
+      continue;
+    if (/\b(basename|realpath|canonicalPath|getCanonicalPath|normalize|resolve|toRealPath)\s*\(/i.test(scope + `
+` + l))
+      continue;
+    out.push({
+      file,
+      line: ln,
+      type: "path_confusion",
+      category: "Path confusion (unsanitized file path)",
+      severity: "medium",
+      evidence: l.trim(),
+      detail: "User input reaches a file path with no canonicalization (`basename`/`realpath`/`normalize`) — traversal, `..%2f`, backslash and null-byte variants can confuse a naive `../` filter."
+    });
+  }
+}
 
 // src/guidance.ts
 var SINK_DIRECTIVES = {
@@ -53605,7 +53677,7 @@ function createServer() {
     name: "blitzstrike",
     version: "1.0.0"
   }, {
-    instructions: "Blitz Strike is a universal penetration-testing toolbelt with three tiers — " + "BLITZ (reconnaissance / attack-surface mapping), EAGLE-EYE (source-to-sink " + "analysis), STRIKE (live validation) — plus a canonical evidence-first finding " + "engine and a multi-language taint engine.\\n\\n" + "CORE MENTAL MODEL:\\n" + "- A scanner hit is a HYPOTHESIS, not a finding. Live verification (or data-flow " + "  proof) is the verdict. Never report an unverified hit as a vulnerability.\\n" + "- Distinguish REACHABLE from mere PRESENT: a sink is only a finding when tainted " + "  input reaches it AND it is not neutralized by a sanitizer and not guarded by an " + "  auth gate.\\n\\n" + "HOW TO RUN AN AUDIT (start here):\\n" + "0. ROUTE BY TARGET. Classify the target automatically - no need to ask. A " + "   URL - with or without http/https (example.com, 192.168.1.1, host:8080) - " + "   is LIVE (scope-gated, then live_recon + active_scan + strike_verify). A " + "   filesystem path (exists on disk, or a code extension) is SOURCE audit " + "   (blitz_scan + eagle_eye2 + complex_scan/route_scan). If the scheme is " + "   missing, prepend https://. run_engagement auto-detects both internally.\\n" + "1. SCOPE FIRST. Call scope_check(target, scope, mode) before ANY active testing. " + "   Passive analysis (reading source, fingerprinting public pages) needs no gate; " + "   active probing (exploitation, fuzzing, path brute-force) is blocked until scope " + "   authorizes it.\\n" + "2. MAP THE SURFACE (BLITZ). For a source tree use blitz_scan (tree) or blitz_file " + "   (single file) then enrich_scan to match sinks to escalation chains. For a live " + "   URL use live_recon for a full pass (fingerprint/WAF/tech/version/crawler/params/" + "   subdomains/API endpoints/intel correlation) — it returns next_steps. active_scan " + "   is the lighter gated alternative. Both re-check scope internally.\\n" + "3. TRACE REACHABILITY (EAGLE-EYE). For every sink, determine whether attacker " + "   input actually reaches it:\\n" + "   - PHP/JS/TS/Python/Java source: taint_file (auto-detects language) or " + "     taint_scan/taint_tree (PHP AST). list_languages shows what's supported.\\n" + "   - Any language: trace_data_flow (window heuristic) and eagle_eye/eagle_grep " + "     (function-scoped view of sinks + auth gates). Beyond taint: route_scan (route confusion / dispatch abuse / batch forwarding) and complex_scan (deserialization->POP, type juggling, mass assignment) catch classes plain taint misses.\\n" + "   A sink counts only if tainted input reaches it unsanitized and unguarded.\\n" + "4. VALIDATE (STRIKE). Confirm live with strike_verify using a MARKER plus a " + "   NEGATIVE CONTROL plus a BASELINE. The verdict is deterministic: marker " + "   reflected AND control inert = confirmed; both reflected = false_positive; " + "   marker not reflected = unconfirmed. Feed the verdict to strike_resolve to " + "   advance the finding lifecycle (hypothesis->validating->confirmed). Use " + "   read_tool_manual for the exploit tool's manual, payload_lookup for payloads, " + "   detect_waf/tech_correlation for context.\\n" + "5. RECORD + REPORT. Create a canonical finding with finding_create, advance it " + "   through the lifecycle with finding_transition, attach confidence_score, and " + "   redact any secrets before persisting. Only report findings that survived " + "   verification.\\n\\n" + "SUPPORTING LAYERS:\\n" + "- run_engagement: ONE call does the whole audit (no babysitting). Source path -> " + "  full static pipeline + inline report (markdown/JSON/SARIF). URL target -> " + "  autonomous live marker sweep + confirmed findings + report. Prefer this first.\\n" + "- list_chains: 57 escalation chains (source -> sink -> impact).\\n" + "- list_languages / taint_file: multi-language taint (PHP, JS/TS, Python, Java).\\n" + "- tool_lookup / ensure_tool / list_tools: 130-tool catalog, auto-install.\\n" + "- read_playbook / list_playbooks: 17 engagement playbooks (web-app, api-security, " + "  source-code-audit, active-directory, mobile, external-attack-surface, ...).\\n" + "- skill_lookup / read_skill / list_skills: 38 skills (6 bs-* agent doctrine + " + "  technique playbooks: WP/PHP 0-day, AD, malware, mobile, cloud).\\n" + "- read_tool_manual / list_manuals: 317 tool manuals (sqlmap, nmap, commix, ...).\\n" + "- payload_lookup / read_payload: 66 payload collections (sqli, xss, ssti, xxe, lfi).\\n" + "- detect_waf / tech_correlation / cve_correlation / port_correlation: signature " + "  + correlation intelligence.\\n" + "- nvd_lookup / fofa_search: CVE lookup + asset reconnaissance (FOFA needs env creds).\\n" + "- remember / memory_lookup / memory_list: persist + recall verified knowledge.\\n\\n" + "RESOURCE MAP (know what to reach for):\\n" + "- ORCHESTRATION = the engagement framework. orchestration() returns the " + "  lifecycle (scope->recon->analyze->deep->verify->report, each with " + "  entry/exit criteria) + sub-agent team + handoff contract + termination " + "  criteria. Load it at engagement start.\\n" + "- TOOL = acts (scan, taint, verify, record, correlate). Call it to DO something.\\n" + "- PLAYBOOK = campaign plan for a target TYPE. read_playbook(web-application) " + "  BEFORE a full engagement of that type.\\n" + "- SKILL = procedure doctrine. Load the bs-* skill for the phase you are on " + "  (orchestrate, scope, source-audit, verify, review, report); load a technique " + "  skill for the specific technique (WP 0-day, AD, malware).\\n" + "- MANUAL = deep reference for ONE tool. read_tool_manual right before using it.\\n" + "- CATALOG = external tools (130: sqlmap, nmap, nuclei, ffuf, ysoserial, ...). " + "  Blitz Strike's OWN tools find + verify; the catalog is for deeper EXTERNAL " + "  exploitation/enumeration. After your own analysis confirms a finding, run " + "  tool_lookup -> ensure_tool (auto-install) -> read_tool_manual to drive the " + "  external tool that demonstrates impact.\\n" + "- PAYLOAD = attack payloads for a class. payload_lookup before crafting a probe.\\n" + "- INTELLIGENCE = knowledge. list_attack_vectors (34 categories) maps the " + "  full surface during RECON; list_chains (57) turns a finding into impact; " + "  chain_links composes chains for complex bugs; bypass_lookup when blocked; " + "  payload_lookup when crafting a probe. Reach for them at that moment.\\n\\n" + "NO-BABYSITTING (while scanning + testing):\\n" + "- Scan the WHOLE surface before reporting - every file, entry point, and sink. " + "  Do not stop after the first hit to ask; keep enumerating the full tree.\\n" + "- Test every hypothesis through its full verification cycle - vary probes on " + "  failure, apply bypasses when blocked, keep going. Do not pause to ask.\\n" + "- Persist through partial results: a scan that surfaces few sinks is NOT done - " + "  widen the surface, escalate detectors, dig into each reachable sink.\\n" + "- Only surface to the user when: scope/authorization is genuinely unclear, a " + "  destructive or DoS action needs explicit consent, or the engagement is complete.\\n\\n" + "PERSISTENCE (complex bugs - do not give up):\\n" + "- On any failure (empty output, blocked probe, failed sub-agent/model), call " + "  retry_guidance(signal) for concrete recovery actions before giving up.\\n" + "- On a model/sub-agent error (rate-limit, quota, timeout, 5xx, auth, " + "  unavailable), model_fallback(signal) classifies it and returns the exact " + "  recovery (retry+backoff / fall back / shrink scope / fix credentials / " + "  abort). Do not fall back blindly - the class decides.\\n" + "- One failed probe != not vulnerable. Vary: alternative sinks, other params, " + "  encoding/case/whitespace bypasses, different injection context.\\n" + "- Empty output != no findings. Re-run (server may be stale after an upgrade - " + "  /reload-mcp), or escalate to route_scan / complex_scan for classes taint " + "  misses (POP chains, type juggling, mass assignment, route confusion).\\n" + "- A 'sanitized' sink may not be safe. Challenge the sanitizer: loose == vs ===, " + "  missing EXTR_SKIP, int cast truncation, weak regex.\\n" + "- An unconfirmed hypothesis is KEPT as hypothesis - try alternate verification, " + "  then let adversarial review decide.\\n" + "- Complex chains (deserialization->POP, LFI->RCE) need the FULL chain traced, " + `  not just the first sink.\\n
+    instructions: "Blitz Strike is a universal penetration-testing toolbelt with three tiers — " + "BLITZ (reconnaissance / attack-surface mapping), EAGLE-EYE (source-to-sink " + "analysis), STRIKE (live validation) — plus a canonical evidence-first finding " + "engine and a multi-language taint engine.\\n\\n" + "CORE MENTAL MODEL:\\n" + "- A scanner hit is a HYPOTHESIS, not a finding. Live verification (or data-flow " + "  proof) is the verdict. Never report an unverified hit as a vulnerability.\\n" + "- Distinguish REACHABLE from mere PRESENT: a sink is only a finding when tainted " + "  input reaches it AND it is not neutralized by a sanitizer and not guarded by an " + "  auth gate.\\n\\n" + "HOW TO RUN AN AUDIT (start here):\\n" + "0. ROUTE BY TARGET. Classify the target automatically - no need to ask. A " + "   URL - with or without http/https (example.com, 192.168.1.1, host:8080) - " + "   is LIVE (scope-gated, then live_recon + active_scan + strike_verify). A " + "   filesystem path (exists on disk, or a code extension) is SOURCE audit " + "   (blitz_scan + eagle_eye2 + complex_scan/route_scan). If the scheme is " + "   missing, prepend https://. run_engagement auto-detects both internally.\\n" + "1. SCOPE FIRST. Call scope_check(target, scope, mode) before ANY active testing. " + "   Passive analysis (reading source, fingerprinting public pages) needs no gate; " + "   active probing (exploitation, fuzzing, path brute-force) is blocked until scope " + "   authorizes it.\\n" + "2. MAP THE SURFACE (BLITZ). For a source tree use blitz_scan (tree) or blitz_file " + "   (single file) then enrich_scan to match sinks to escalation chains. For a live " + "   URL use live_recon for a full pass (fingerprint/WAF/tech/version/crawler/params/" + "   subdomains/API endpoints/intel correlation) — it returns next_steps. active_scan " + "   is the lighter gated alternative. Both re-check scope internally.\\n" + "3. TRACE REACHABILITY (EAGLE-EYE). For every sink, determine whether attacker " + "   input actually reaches it:\\n" + "   - PHP/JS/TS/Python/Java source: taint_file (auto-detects language) or " + "     taint_scan/taint_tree (PHP AST). list_languages shows what's supported.\\n" + "   - Any language: trace_data_flow (window heuristic) and eagle_eye/eagle_grep " + "     (function-scoped view of sinks + auth gates). Beyond taint: route_scan (route confusion / dispatch abuse / batch forwarding) and complex_scan (deserialization->POP, type juggling, mass assignment, prototype pollution, CRLF/header injection, path confusion) catch classes plain taint misses.\\n" + "   A sink counts only if tainted input reaches it unsanitized and unguarded.\\n" + "4. VALIDATE (STRIKE). Confirm live with strike_verify using a MARKER plus a " + "   NEGATIVE CONTROL plus a BASELINE. The verdict is deterministic: marker " + "   reflected AND control inert = confirmed; both reflected = false_positive; " + "   marker not reflected = unconfirmed. Feed the verdict to strike_resolve to " + "   advance the finding lifecycle (hypothesis->validating->confirmed). Use " + "   read_tool_manual for the exploit tool's manual, payload_lookup for payloads, " + "   detect_waf/tech_correlation for context.\\n" + "5. RECORD + REPORT. Create a canonical finding with finding_create, advance it " + "   through the lifecycle with finding_transition, attach confidence_score, and " + "   redact any secrets before persisting. Only report findings that survived " + "   verification.\\n\\n" + "SUPPORTING LAYERS:\\n" + "- run_engagement: ONE call does the whole audit (no babysitting). Source path -> " + "  full static pipeline + inline report (markdown/JSON/SARIF). URL target -> " + "  autonomous live marker sweep + confirmed findings + report. Prefer this first.\\n" + "- list_chains: 57 escalation chains (source -> sink -> impact).\\n" + "- list_languages / taint_file: multi-language taint (PHP, JS/TS, Python, Java).\\n" + "- tool_lookup / ensure_tool / list_tools: 130-tool catalog, auto-install.\\n" + "- read_playbook / list_playbooks: 17 engagement playbooks (web-app, api-security, " + "  source-code-audit, active-directory, mobile, external-attack-surface, ...).\\n" + "- skill_lookup / read_skill / list_skills: 38 skills (6 bs-* agent doctrine + " + "  technique playbooks: WP/PHP 0-day, AD, malware, mobile, cloud).\\n" + "- read_tool_manual / list_manuals: 317 tool manuals (sqlmap, nmap, commix, ...).\\n" + "- payload_lookup / read_payload: 66 payload collections (sqli, xss, ssti, xxe, lfi).\\n" + "- detect_waf / tech_correlation / cve_correlation / port_correlation: signature " + "  + correlation intelligence.\\n" + "- nvd_lookup / fofa_search: CVE lookup + asset reconnaissance (FOFA needs env creds).\\n" + "- remember / memory_lookup / memory_list: persist + recall verified knowledge.\\n\\n" + "RESOURCE MAP (know what to reach for):\\n" + "- ORCHESTRATION = the engagement framework. orchestration() returns the " + "  lifecycle (scope->recon->analyze->deep->verify->report, each with " + "  entry/exit criteria) + sub-agent team + handoff contract + termination " + "  criteria. Load it at engagement start.\\n" + "- TOOL = acts (scan, taint, verify, record, correlate). Call it to DO something.\\n" + "- PLAYBOOK = campaign plan for a target TYPE. read_playbook(web-application) " + "  BEFORE a full engagement of that type.\\n" + "- SKILL = procedure doctrine. Load the bs-* skill for the phase you are on " + "  (orchestrate, scope, source-audit, verify, review, report); load a technique " + "  skill for the specific technique (WP 0-day, AD, malware).\\n" + "- MANUAL = deep reference for ONE tool. read_tool_manual right before using it.\\n" + "- CATALOG = external tools (130: sqlmap, nmap, nuclei, ffuf, ysoserial, ...). " + "  Blitz Strike's OWN tools find + verify; the catalog is for deeper EXTERNAL " + "  exploitation/enumeration. After your own analysis confirms a finding, run " + "  tool_lookup -> ensure_tool (auto-install) -> read_tool_manual to drive the " + "  external tool that demonstrates impact.\\n" + "- PAYLOAD = attack payloads for a class. payload_lookup before crafting a probe.\\n" + "- INTELLIGENCE = knowledge. list_attack_vectors (34 categories) maps the " + "  full surface during RECON; list_chains (57) turns a finding into impact; " + "  chain_links composes chains for complex bugs; bypass_lookup when blocked; " + "  payload_lookup when crafting a probe. Reach for them at that moment.\\n\\n" + "NO-BABYSITTING (while scanning + testing):\\n" + "- Scan the WHOLE surface before reporting - every file, entry point, and sink. " + "  Do not stop after the first hit to ask; keep enumerating the full tree.\\n" + "- Test every hypothesis through its full verification cycle - vary probes on " + "  failure, apply bypasses when blocked, keep going. Do not pause to ask.\\n" + "- Persist through partial results: a scan that surfaces few sinks is NOT done - " + "  widen the surface, escalate detectors, dig into each reachable sink.\\n" + "- Only surface to the user when: scope/authorization is genuinely unclear, a " + "  destructive or DoS action needs explicit consent, or the engagement is complete.\\n\\n" + "PERSISTENCE (complex bugs - do not give up):\\n" + "- On any failure (empty output, blocked probe, failed sub-agent/model), call " + "  retry_guidance(signal) for concrete recovery actions before giving up.\\n" + "- On a model/sub-agent error (rate-limit, quota, timeout, 5xx, auth, " + "  unavailable), model_fallback(signal) classifies it and returns the exact " + "  recovery (retry+backoff / fall back / shrink scope / fix credentials / " + "  abort). Do not fall back blindly - the class decides.\\n" + "- One failed probe != not vulnerable. Vary: alternative sinks, other params, " + "  encoding/case/whitespace bypasses, different injection context.\\n" + "- Empty output != no findings. Re-run (server may be stale after an upgrade - " + "  /reload-mcp), or escalate to route_scan / complex_scan for classes taint " + "  misses (POP chains, type juggling, mass assignment, route confusion).\\n" + "- A 'sanitized' sink may not be safe. Challenge the sanitizer: loose == vs ===, " + "  missing EXTR_SKIP, int cast truncation, weak regex.\\n" + "- An unconfirmed hypothesis is KEPT as hypothesis - try alternate verification, " + "  then let adversarial review decide.\\n" + "- Complex chains (deserialization->POP, LFI->RCE) need the FULL chain traced, " + `  not just the first sink.\\n
 ` + "- When a probe is BLOCKED by a WAF/filter/sanitizer, call bypass_lookup(defense) " + "  for concrete techniques (encoding, case, comment insertion, chunked, null byte, " + "  double-encoding, verb tampering, header spoofing) and apply them - do not give up.\\n" + "- CHAIN findings: a low-severity finding may escalate — do not assume it is the " + "  end of the story. list_chains / chain_links show whether it composes into a " + "  multi-stage chain (e.g. SSRF->metadata, SQLi->RCE, LFI->RCE, upload->shell). " + "  Check before concluding, and do not overclaim an escalation that is not there.\\n\\n" + "- Complex bugs chain ACROSS chains: after confirming one chain, chain_links " + "  shows what follows (SSRF->metadata then default-creds->pivot via stolen IAM). " + "  Trace the full composition, not just a single chain.\\n\\n" + "HYPOTHESIS EXPANSION (from each finding, enumerate + verify every follow-up):\\n" + "- A confirmed finding is the START, not the end. From each one, enumerate " + "  the follow-ups: ESCALATE (list_chains + chain_links), CHAIN (chain_links " + "  from->to), BYPASS (bypass_lookup), PIVOT (new endpoints/sinks now reachable).\\n" + "- Every follow-up (this might happen, this could chain, maybe bypassable) is " + "  a HYPOTHESIS, not a finding. Verify EACH via strike_verify (marker + negative " + "  control) before it enters the report.\\n" + "- Never report speculation: might / could / possibly live in the " + "  hypothesis list, never in the report. Every report line is a verified fact.\\n\\n" + "PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT (act like a senior tester, not a checklist runner):\\n" + "- PRIORITIZE by severity, computed deterministically with cvss_score (impact x " + "  exploitability) and weighted by escalation potential (chain_links). Do NOT rank " + "  by bug class - a critical stored XSS that yields account takeover outranks an " + "  unreachable blind RCE. Weight by the engagement context (which asset/data is " + "  most sensitive for THIS target).\\n" + "- Recognize dead ends: if a branch yields nothing after a few varied probes, " + "  note it and move on. Do not tunnel-vision one sink at the expense of the rest.\\n" + "- Live-test with care: respect rate limits, do not lock accounts, do not " + "  trigger DoS. Test non-destructively and prove impact with the smallest payload.\\n" + "- Know when done: stop when the termination criteria are met, not when you feel " + "  tired. A thorough audit over a rushed one, every time.\\n\\n" + "IRON RULES:\\n" + "- Scope first; authorized targets only. Refuse out-of-scope or destructive/DoS work.\\n" + "- A hit is a hypothesis; a verified exploit (or proven data-flow) is the finding.\\n" + "- Prefer the one-call run_engagement path; fall back to granular tools when you " + "  need finer control."
   });
   server.registerTool("blitz_scan", {
@@ -54392,9 +54464,9 @@ ${statusLine}` : statusLine },
     };
   });
   server.registerTool("complex_scan", {
-    title: "Complex-bug scan (deserialization / type juggling / mass assignment)",
-    description: "Complex-bug detection beyond taint: deserialization→POP gadget chain (unserialize + magic method), type juggling (loose ==/!= vs hash/secret), and mass assignment (extract/parse_str of request data without a safe flag).",
-    inputSchema: { path: string2().describe("Source file path (PHP)") }
+    title: "Complex-bug scan (deserialization / type juggling / mass assignment / prototype pollution / CRLF / path confusion)",
+    description: "Complex-bug detection beyond taint: deserialization→POP gadget chain (unserialize + magic method), type juggling (loose ==/!= vs hash/secret), mass assignment (extract/parse_str without a safe flag), prototype pollution (unsafe merge of request data), CRLF/header injection (user input into a header), and path confusion (user input into a file path without canonicalization).",
+    inputSchema: { path: string2().describe("Source file path") }
   }, async ({ path }) => {
     const code = readFileSync18(path, "utf8");
     const findings = detectComplexBugs(code, path);

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "blitzstrike",
-  "version": "1.0.94",
+  "version": "1.0.95",
   "description": "Blitz Strike — a universal MCP security-audit toolbelt. BLITZ sweeps the attack surface, EAGLE-EYE traces source-to-sink, STRIKE verifies live. 57 attack chains, 130-tool catalog, intelligence data layer. One server, every agent.",
   "type": "module",
   "bin": {