blitzstrike 1.0.81 → 1.0.84

package/intelligence/chain_links.json

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+{
+  "_comment": "Chain-to-chain composition: which escalation chains naturally follow another. A complex bug chains several of these. Each link: from -> to (via the pivot primitive).",
+  "links": [
+    {"from": "ssrf_cloud_metadata", "to": ["default_creds_to_internal_pivot", "docker_container_breakout"], "via": "stolen IAM/cloud credentials"},
+    {"from": "xxe_to_ssrf_and_file_read", "to": ["ssrf_cloud_metadata", "ssrf_to_redis_rce"], "via": "SSRF primitive gained from XXE"},
+    {"from": "ssrf_to_redis_rce", "to": ["default_creds_to_internal_pivot"], "via": "OS shell on internal service"},
+    {"from": "sqli_to_rce", "to": ["sqli_to_hash_dump_and_crack", "path_traversal_to_credential_theft"], "via": "OS shell / DB access"},
+    {"from": "file_upload_to_rce", "to": ["path_traversal_to_credential_theft", "default_creds_to_internal_pivot"], "via": "web shell on host"},
+    {"from": "lfi_to_rce_via_log_poisoning", "to": ["path_traversal_to_credential_theft"], "via": "code execution on host"},
+    {"from": "ssti_to_full_rce", "to": ["path_traversal_to_credential_theft"], "via": "code execution on host"},
+    {"from": "deserialization_to_rce", "to": ["path_traversal_to_credential_theft", "docker_container_breakout"], "via": "code execution on host"},
+    {"from": "xss_to_account_takeover", "to": ["idor_to_admin_takeover", "api_key_leak_to_account_takeover"], "via": "session/account control"},
+    {"from": "idor_to_admin_takeover", "to": ["api_key_leak_to_account_takeover"], "via": "admin access"},
+    {"from": "api_key_leak_to_account_takeover", "to": ["idor_to_admin_takeover"], "via": "account takeover"},
+    {"from": "default_creds_to_internal_pivot", "to": ["docker_container_breakout", "kubernetes_pod_escape"], "via": "internal foothold"},
+    {"from": "docker_container_breakout", "to": ["kubernetes_pod_escape"], "via": "host access"},
+    {"from": "open_redirect_to_oauth_theft", "to": ["xss_to_account_takeover"], "via": "stolen OAuth token"},
+    {"from": "subdomain_takeover_to_cookie_theft", "to": ["xss_to_account_takeover"], "via": "cookie scope control"},
+    {"from": "cache_poison_to_stored_xss", "to": ["xss_to_account_takeover"], "via": "persistent XSS"},
+    {"from": "graphql_idor_to_data_theft", "to": ["idor_to_admin_takeover"], "via": "admin identifier leaked"},
+    {"from": "path_traversal_to_credential_theft", "to": ["default_creds_to_internal_pivot", "docker_container_breakout"], "via": "credentials/hashes recovered"}
+  ]
+}

package/intelligence/retry_guidance.json

@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+{
+  "_comment": "Structured failure recovery. When a step fails, returns empty, or is blocked, look up the failure mode and apply the concrete actions instead of giving up. Mirrors a delegate/retry-guidance pattern, adapted to Blitz Strike's deterministic tools.",
+  "modes": [
+    {
+      "id": "empty_output",
+      "signal": "a detector returns empty for a file/target that clearly contains a sink or entry point",
+      "actions": [
+        "reload the MCP server (/reload-mcp) — a stale server after an upgrade is a silent false negative, not a clean result",
+        "re-run the same detector once",
+        "escalate to a deeper detector: blitz_scan -> eagle_eye2 -> route_scan / complex_scan",
+        "check the argument name — source-analysis tools take `path`, not `target`"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "blocked",
+      "signal": "a live probe is blocked by a WAF, filter, or sanitizer",
+      "actions": [
+        "bypass_lookup(defense) for concrete techniques (encoding, case, comment insertion, chunked, null byte, double-encoding)",
+        "apply one technique at a time and re-probe",
+        "if still blocked, move the injection to another context (header, body, path, cookie)"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "sanitized",
+      "signal": "a sink appears neutralized by a sanitizer",
+      "actions": [
+        "challenge the sanitizer: loose == vs ===, missing EXTR_SKIP, int cast truncation, weak regex",
+        "test an evasion: double-encoding, unicode normalization, case mixing"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "subagent_failed",
+      "signal": "a delegated sub-agent returns empty, errors, or prose without evidence",
+      "actions": [
+        "re-delegate with a more specific goal + exact tool names + exact argument names (path vs target)",
+        "require deterministic output (file:line, sink, chain) — never prose",
+        "fall back to calling the tool yourself if the sub-agent cannot reach the MCP tools"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "model_failed",
+      "signal": "a sub-agent/model returns a rate-limit, quota, context-length, or model-unavailable error",
+      "actions": [
+        "fall back to a different model",
+        "shrink the sub-agent's scope (one file, one sink class)",
+        "run the step yourself with granular tools"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "unconfirmed",
+      "signal": "a hypothesis is not confirmed live",
+      "actions": [
+        "keep it as a hypothesis — do not drop it",
+        "try an alternate verification path",
+        "let adversarial review decide confirmed vs false_positive vs needs_more_evidence"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "low_severity",
+      "signal": "only a low-severity finding is found",
+      "actions": [
+        "list_chains + chain_links to see how it escalates",
+        "trace the full chain, not just the first sink"
+      ]
+    }
+  ]
+}

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "blitzstrike",
-  "version": "1.0.81",
+  "version": "1.0.84",
   "description": "Blitz Strike — a universal MCP security-audit toolbelt. BLITZ sweeps the attack surface, EAGLE-EYE traces source-to-sink, STRIKE verifies live. 57 attack chains, 130-tool catalog, intelligence data layer. One server, every agent.",
   "type": "module",
   "bin": {