blitzstrike 1.0.21 → 1.0.23

package/dist/index.js

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env node
+import { createRequire } from "node:module";
 var __create = Object.create;
 var __getProtoOf = Object.getPrototypeOf;
 var __defProp = Object.defineProperty;
@@ -43,6 +44,7 @@ var __esm = (fn, res, err) => () => {
     throw err[0];
   return res;
 };
+var __require = /* @__PURE__ */ createRequire(import.meta.url);
 
 // node_modules/ajv/dist/compile/codegen/code.js
 var require_code = __commonJS(function(exports) {
@@ -29759,6 +29761,18 @@ function listMemory() {
     entries: entries.sort((a, b) => a.created < b.created ? 1 : -1).map((e) => ({ id: e.id, topic: e.topic, type: e.type, verified: e.verified, created: e.created }))
   };
 }
+function forget(id) {
+  const { writeFileSync } = __require("node:fs");
+  const entries = loadMemory();
+  const kept = entries.filter((e) => e.id !== id);
+  if (kept.length === entries.length) {
+    return { removed: false, id, note: "not found" };
+  }
+  writeFileSync(MEMORY_PATH, kept.map((e) => JSON.stringify(e)).join(`
+`) + (kept.length ? `
+` : ""));
+  return { removed: true, id };
+}
 function rememberIfAbsent(topic, content, type, tags, source, verified) {
   const r = remember(topic, content, type, tags, source, verified);
   return r.saved === true;
@@ -29954,6 +29968,12 @@ var DEFAULT_WEIGHTS = {
   negative_control: 0.1
 };
 var confidenceWeights = { ...DEFAULT_WEIGHTS };
+function setConfidenceWeights(weights) {
+  confidenceWeights = { ...DEFAULT_WEIGHTS, ...weights };
+}
+function getConfidenceWeights() {
+  return { ...confidenceWeights };
+}
 function computeConfidence(factors) {
   let score = 0;
   for (const [key, weight] of Object.entries(confidenceWeights)) {
@@ -30017,6 +30037,59 @@ function confidenceFactorsFor(_input) {
     negative_control: false
   };
 }
+function transition(finding, to) {
+  if (!canTransition(finding.status, to)) {
+    throw new Error(`illegal transition ${finding.status} -> ${to}`);
+  }
+  const updated = { ...finding, status: to, timestamps: { ...finding.timestamps, updated: new Date().toISOString() } };
+  return updated;
+}
+function attachEvidence(finding, evidence) {
+  return {
+    ...finding,
+    evidence: [...finding.evidence, evidence],
+    timestamps: { ...finding.timestamps, updated: new Date().toISOString() }
+  };
+}
+function confirmFinding(finding, opts) {
+  const evidence = opts.evidence.map((e) => makeEvidence(e));
+  const negativeControl = opts.negative_control ?? true;
+  const confidence = computeConfidence({
+    static_analysis: true,
+    data_flow: true,
+    reachability: true,
+    preconditions: true,
+    runtime_validation: true,
+    negative_control: negativeControl
+  });
+  const level = confidenceLevel(confidence);
+  const status = negativeControl ? "confirmed" : "hypothesis";
+  return {
+    ...finding,
+    status,
+    confidence,
+    confidence_level: level,
+    validation: {
+      performed: true,
+      status: negativeControl ? "confirmed" : "unconfirmed",
+      baseline: opts.baseline ?? true,
+      negative_control: negativeControl
+    },
+    evidence: [...finding.evidence, ...evidence],
+    timestamps: { ...finding.timestamps, updated: new Date().toISOString() }
+  };
+}
+function rejectFinding(finding, status, reason, evidence) {
+  const ev = evidence?.map((e) => makeEvidence(e)) ?? [];
+  const updated = transition(finding, status);
+  return {
+    ...updated,
+    validation: { ...updated.validation, performed: false },
+    remediation: { ...updated.remediation, note: reason },
+    evidence: [...updated.evidence, ...ev],
+    timestamps: { ...updated.timestamps, updated: new Date().toISOString() }
+  };
+}
 
 // src/orchestrator.ts
 var _chainsCache = null;
@@ -30383,7 +30456,7 @@ function ensureTool(name) {
 }
 
 // src/intel.ts
-import { readFileSync as readFileSync6, existsSync as existsSync5 } from "node:fs";
+import { readFileSync as readFileSync6, existsSync as existsSync4 } from "node:fs";
 import { join as join6 } from "node:path";
 import { fileURLToPath as fileURLToPath4 } from "node:url";
 import { readdirSync as readdirSync3 } from "node:fs";
@@ -30392,7 +30465,7 @@ var ROOT3 = join6(fileURLToPath4(new URL(".", import.meta.url)), "..");
 var INTEL = join6(ROOT3, "intelligence");
 function loadJson(name) {
   const p = join6(INTEL, `${name}.json`);
-  if (!existsSync5(p))
+  if (!existsSync4(p))
     return null;
   try {
     return JSON.parse(readFileSync6(p, "utf8"));
@@ -30408,7 +30481,6 @@ function detectWaf(headers, body = "") {
   const bodySigs = sigs.body_signatures ?? [];
   const matches = [];
   const headerKeys = Object.keys(headers).map((k) => k.toLowerCase());
-  const headerVals = Object.values(headers).join(" ").toLowerCase();
   for (const s of headerSigs) {
     const h = (s.header ?? "").toLowerCase();
     const pattern = (s.pattern ?? "").toLowerCase();
@@ -30507,12 +30579,12 @@ var PACKAGE_PAYLOADS = join6(ROOT3, "payloads");
 var PACKAGE_TEMPLATES = join6(ROOT3, "templates");
 var DATA_ROOT = process.env.BLITZSTRIKE_DATA ?? join6(homedir2(), ".blitzstrike", "data");
 function payloadsDir() {
-  if (existsSync5(PACKAGE_PAYLOADS))
+  if (existsSync4(PACKAGE_PAYLOADS))
     return PACKAGE_PAYLOADS;
   return join6(DATA_ROOT, "payloads");
 }
 function templatesDir() {
-  if (existsSync5(PACKAGE_TEMPLATES))
+  if (existsSync4(PACKAGE_TEMPLATES))
     return PACKAGE_TEMPLATES;
   return join6(DATA_ROOT, "templates");
 }
@@ -31086,7 +31158,6 @@ function walkExpression(node, env, summaries, findings, suppressed, file) {
         const sanitizers = tainted.flatMap((t) => t.sanitizers);
         const inlineSan = findSanitizers(JSON.stringify(node));
         const san = [...sanitizers, ...inlineSan].filter((s, i, arr) => arr.indexOf(s) === i);
-        const authGated = false;
         const cls = sink.cls;
         if (!isSanitized(san, cls.id)) {
           findings.push({
@@ -49357,7 +49428,6 @@ var phpAdapter = {
         }
       }
     }
-    const superSources = new Map;
     for (const n of nodes) {
       if (n.kind === "assign") {
         const target = phpVar(n.left);
@@ -49430,7 +49500,7 @@ function jsWalk(node, out) {
 var jsAdapter = {
   language: "javascript",
   extensions: [".js", ".mjs", ".cjs", ".jsx", ".ts", ".tsx"],
-  parse(code, file) {
+  parse(code, _file) {
     let ast;
     try {
       ast = parse6(code, {
@@ -49539,7 +49609,7 @@ var PY_SANITIZERS = [
 var pythonAdapter = {
   language: "python",
   extensions: [".py", ".pyw"],
-  parse(code, file) {
+  parse(code, _file) {
     const tree = parser2.parse(code);
     const sources = [];
     const sinks = [];
@@ -49657,7 +49727,7 @@ var JAVA_SANITIZERS = [
 var javaAdapter = {
   language: "java",
   extensions: [".java"],
-  parse(code, file) {
+  parse(code, _file) {
     const sources = [];
     const sinks = [];
     const sanitizers = [];
@@ -50184,13 +50254,151 @@ async function liveRecon(target, includeActive = false) {
   };
 }
 
+// src/strike.ts
+var DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS = 15000;
+async function httpRequest(url, method, data, headers, timeoutMs = DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS) {
+  const controller = new AbortController;
+  const t = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), timeoutMs);
+  try {
+    const res = await fetch(url, {
+      method,
+      body: method === "POST" ? data : undefined,
+      headers: { "User-Agent": "blitzstrike/1.0", ...headers ?? {} },
+      signal: controller.signal,
+      redirect: "follow"
+    });
+    const body = await res.text();
+    const hdrs = {};
+    res.headers.forEach((v, k) => {
+      hdrs[k] = v;
+    });
+    return { status: res.status, body: body.slice(0, 20000), headers: hdrs };
+  } catch (e) {
+    return { status: 0, body: String(e), headers: {} };
+  } finally {
+    clearTimeout(t);
+  }
+}
+function defaultMarker() {
+  return `BS${Date.now().toString(36).toUpperCase()}${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8).toUpperCase()}`;
+}
+function inject(target, value, param) {
+  const placeholder = "{{MARKER}}";
+  if (target.includes(placeholder))
+    return target.split(placeholder).join(value);
+  if (target.includes("?"))
+    return `${target}&${param}=${encodeURIComponent(value)}`;
+  return `${target}?${param}=${encodeURIComponent(value)}`;
+}
+async function strikeVerify(input) {
+  const method = input.method ?? "GET";
+  const param = input.param ?? "q";
+  const marker = input.marker ?? defaultMarker();
+  const control = input.control ?? defaultMarker();
+  const baseUrl = input.url;
+  const timeoutMs = input.timeout ?? DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS;
+  const baselineTarget = inject(baseUrl, "", param).replace(/[?&]q=$/, "").replace(/[?&]$/, "");
+  const markerTarget = inject(baseUrl, marker, param);
+  const controlTarget = inject(baseUrl, control, param);
+  const baseline = await httpRequest(baselineTarget, method, input.data, input.headers, timeoutMs);
+  const markerResp = await httpRequest(markerTarget, method, input.data, input.headers, timeoutMs);
+  const controlResp = await httpRequest(controlTarget, method, input.data, input.headers, timeoutMs);
+  if (baseline.status === 0 || markerResp.status === 0) {
+    return {
+      status: "blocked",
+      marker_reflected: false,
+      control_reflected: false,
+      baseline: { status: baseline.status, body_preview: redactSecrets(baseline.body.slice(0, 400)), body_hash: sha256(baseline.body) },
+      marker_response: { status: markerResp.status, body_preview: redactSecrets(markerResp.body.slice(0, 400)), body_hash: sha256(markerResp.body) },
+      control_response: { status: controlResp.status, body_preview: redactSecrets(controlResp.body.slice(0, 400)), body_hash: sha256(controlResp.body) },
+      reason: "request failed or target unreachable — cannot validate",
+      evidence: []
+    };
+  }
+  const markerReflected = markerResp.body.includes(marker);
+  const controlReflected = controlResp.body.includes(control);
+  let status;
+  let reason;
+  if (markerReflected && !controlReflected) {
+    status = "confirmed";
+    reason = "marker reflected; negative control did not — the sink reflects attacker-controlled input (real finding)";
+  } else if (markerReflected && controlReflected) {
+    status = "false_positive";
+    reason = "marker AND negative control both reflected — behaviour is indistinguishable from benign reflection (likely false positive)";
+  } else if (!markerReflected && !controlReflected) {
+    status = "unconfirmed";
+    reason = "marker not reflected — reachability/exploitability could not be demonstrated live";
+  } else {
+    status = "unconfirmed";
+    reason = "negative control reflected but marker did not — inconsistent, requires deeper analysis";
+  }
+  const evidence = [
+    {
+      type: "baseline_comparison",
+      description: `Baseline response (status ${baseline.status}) for ${redactSecrets(baselineTarget)}`,
+      artifacts: [{ name: "baseline", kind: "http_response", content: `${baseline.status}
+${baseline.body}` }]
+    },
+    {
+      type: "validation_result",
+      description: `Marker '${redactSecrets(marker)}' reflected=${markerReflected}; control reflected=${controlReflected}`,
+      artifacts: [{ name: "marker_response", kind: "http_response", content: `${markerResp.status}
+${markerResp.body}` }]
+    },
+    {
+      type: "negative_control",
+      description: `Negative control '${redactSecrets(control)}' reflected=${controlReflected}`,
+      artifacts: [{ name: "control_response", kind: "http_response", content: `${controlResp.status}
+${controlResp.body}` }]
+    }
+  ];
+  return {
+    status,
+    marker_reflected: markerReflected,
+    control_reflected: controlReflected,
+    baseline: { status: baseline.status, body_preview: redactSecrets(baseline.body.slice(0, 400)), body_hash: sha256(baseline.body) },
+    marker_response: { status: markerResp.status, body_preview: redactSecrets(markerResp.body.slice(0, 400)), body_hash: sha256(markerResp.body) },
+    control_response: { status: controlResp.status, body_preview: redactSecrets(controlResp.body.slice(0, 400)), body_hash: sha256(controlResp.body) },
+    reason,
+    evidence
+  };
+}
+function resolveFinding(finding, verdict) {
+  let f = finding;
+  if (f.status === "hypothesis") {
+    f = transition(f, "validating");
+  }
+  switch (verdict.status) {
+    case "confirmed":
+      return confirmFinding(f, {
+        evidence: verdict.evidence,
+        negative_control: true,
+        baseline: true
+      });
+    case "false_positive":
+      return rejectFinding(f, "false_positive", verdict.reason, verdict.evidence);
+    case "blocked":
+      return rejectFinding(f, "blocked", verdict.reason, verdict.evidence);
+    case "unconfirmed":
+    case "likely":
+    default: {
+      return {
+        ...f,
+        validation: { performed: true, status: verdict.status === "likely" ? "likely" : "unconfirmed", negative_control: verdict.control_reflected === false, baseline: true },
+        remediation: { ...f.remediation, note: verdict.reason },
+        timestamps: { ...f.timestamps, updated: new Date().toISOString() }
+      };
+    }
+  }
+}
+
 // src/server.ts
 function createServer() {
   const server = new McpServer({
     name: "blitzstrike",
     version: "1.0.0"
   }, {
-    instructions: "Blitz Strike is a universal penetration-testing toolbelt with three tiers — " + "BLITZ (reconnaissance / attack-surface mapping), EAGLE-EYE (source-to-sink " + "analysis), STRIKE (live validation) — plus a canonical evidence-first finding " + "engine and a multi-language taint engine.\\n\\n" + "CORE MENTAL MODEL:\\n" + "- A scanner hit is a HYPOTHESIS, not a finding. Live verification (or data-flow " + "  proof) is the verdict. Never report an unverified hit as a vulnerability.\\n" + "- Distinguish REACHABLE from mere PRESENT: a sink is only a finding when tainted " + "  input reaches it AND it is not neutralized by a sanitizer and not guarded by an " + "  auth gate.\\n\\n" + "HOW TO RUN AN AUDIT (start here):\\n" + "1. SCOPE FIRST. Call scope_check(target, scope, mode) before ANY active testing. " + "   Passive analysis (reading source, fingerprinting public pages) needs no gate; " + "   active probing (exploitation, fuzzing, path brute-force) is blocked until scope " + "   authorizes it.\\n" + "2. MAP THE SURFACE (BLITZ). For a source tree use blitz_scan (tree) or blitz_file " + "   (single file) then enrich_scan to match sinks to escalation chains. For a live " + "   URL use live_recon for a full pass (fingerprint/WAF/tech/version/crawler/params/" + "   subdomains/API endpoints/intel correlation) — it returns next_steps. active_scan " + "   is the lighter gated alternative. Both re-check scope internally.\\n" + "3. TRACE REACHABILITY (EAGLE-EYE). For every sink, determine whether attacker " + "   input actually reaches it:\\n" + "   - PHP/JS/TS/Python/Java source: taint_file (auto-detects language) or " + "     taint_scan/taint_tree (PHP AST). list_languages shows what's supported.\\n" + "   - Any language: trace_data_flow (window heuristic) and eagle_eye/eagle_grep " + "     (function-scoped view of sinks + auth gates).\\n" + "   A sink counts only if tainted input reaches it unsanitized and unguarded.\\n" + "4. VALIDATE (STRIKE). Confirm live with strike_verify using a MARKER plus a " + "   NEGATIVE CONTROL; the finding is confirmed only when your marker reflects AND " + "   the negative control stays inert. Use read_tool_manual for the exploit tool's " + "   manual, payload_lookup for payloads, detect_waf/tech_correlation for context.\\n" + "5. RECORD + REPORT. Create a canonical finding with finding_create, advance it " + "   through the lifecycle with finding_transition, attach confidence_score, and " + "   redact any secrets before persisting. Only report findings that survived " + "   verification.\\n\\n" + "SUPPORTING LAYERS:\\n" + "- run_engagement: full one-call audit (scope gate -> triage -> chain enrichment " + "  -> findings with tool manuals attached).\\n" + "- list_languages / taint_file: multi-language taint (PHP, JS/TS, Python, Java).\\n" + "- list_chains: 57 escalation chains (source -> sink -> impact).\\n" + "- tool_lookup / ensure_tool / list_tools: 130-tool catalog, auto-install.\\n" + "- skill_lookup / read_skill / list_skills: 85 playbooks (WP/PHP 0-day, AD, " + "  malware, mobile, cloud, etc.).\\n" + "- read_playbook / read_tool_manual / list_manuals: 270 tool manuals + engagement " + "  playbooks.\\n" + "- detect_waf / tech_correlation / cve_correlation / port_correlation: signature " + "  + correlation intelligence.\\n" + "- nvd_lookup / fofa_search: CVE + asset reconnaissance (FOFA needs env creds).\\n" + "- remember / memory_lookup / memory_list: persist + recall verified knowledge.\\n\\n" + "IRON RULES:\\n" + "- Scope first; authorized targets only. Refuse out-of-scope or destructive/DoS work.\\n" + "- A hit is a hypothesis; a verified exploit (or proven data-flow) is the finding.\\n" + "- Prefer the one-call run_engagement path; fall back to granular tools when you " + "  need finer control."
+    instructions: "Blitz Strike is a universal penetration-testing toolbelt with three tiers — " + "BLITZ (reconnaissance / attack-surface mapping), EAGLE-EYE (source-to-sink " + "analysis), STRIKE (live validation) — plus a canonical evidence-first finding " + "engine and a multi-language taint engine.\\n\\n" + "CORE MENTAL MODEL:\\n" + "- A scanner hit is a HYPOTHESIS, not a finding. Live verification (or data-flow " + "  proof) is the verdict. Never report an unverified hit as a vulnerability.\\n" + "- Distinguish REACHABLE from mere PRESENT: a sink is only a finding when tainted " + "  input reaches it AND it is not neutralized by a sanitizer and not guarded by an " + "  auth gate.\\n\\n" + "HOW TO RUN AN AUDIT (start here):\\n" + "1. SCOPE FIRST. Call scope_check(target, scope, mode) before ANY active testing. " + "   Passive analysis (reading source, fingerprinting public pages) needs no gate; " + "   active probing (exploitation, fuzzing, path brute-force) is blocked until scope " + "   authorizes it.\\n" + "2. MAP THE SURFACE (BLITZ). For a source tree use blitz_scan (tree) or blitz_file " + "   (single file) then enrich_scan to match sinks to escalation chains. For a live " + "   URL use live_recon for a full pass (fingerprint/WAF/tech/version/crawler/params/" + "   subdomains/API endpoints/intel correlation) — it returns next_steps. active_scan " + "   is the lighter gated alternative. Both re-check scope internally.\\n" + "3. TRACE REACHABILITY (EAGLE-EYE). For every sink, determine whether attacker " + "   input actually reaches it:\\n" + "   - PHP/JS/TS/Python/Java source: taint_file (auto-detects language) or " + "     taint_scan/taint_tree (PHP AST). list_languages shows what's supported.\\n" + "   - Any language: trace_data_flow (window heuristic) and eagle_eye/eagle_grep " + "     (function-scoped view of sinks + auth gates).\\n" + "   A sink counts only if tainted input reaches it unsanitized and unguarded.\\n" + "4. VALIDATE (STRIKE). Confirm live with strike_verify using a MARKER plus a " + "   NEGATIVE CONTROL plus a BASELINE. The verdict is deterministic: marker " + "   reflected AND control inert = confirmed; both reflected = false_positive; " + "   marker not reflected = unconfirmed. Feed the verdict to strike_resolve to " + "   advance the finding lifecycle (hypothesis->validating->confirmed). Use " + "   read_tool_manual for the exploit tool's manual, payload_lookup for payloads, " + "   detect_waf/tech_correlation for context.\\n" + "5. RECORD + REPORT. Create a canonical finding with finding_create, advance it " + "   through the lifecycle with finding_transition, attach confidence_score, and " + "   redact any secrets before persisting. Only report findings that survived " + "   verification.\\n\\n" + "SUPPORTING LAYERS:\\n" + "- run_engagement: full one-call audit (scope gate -> triage -> chain enrichment " + "  -> findings with tool manuals attached).\\n" + "- list_languages / taint_file: multi-language taint (PHP, JS/TS, Python, Java).\\n" + "- list_chains: 57 escalation chains (source -> sink -> impact).\\n" + "- tool_lookup / ensure_tool / list_tools: 130-tool catalog, auto-install.\\n" + "- skill_lookup / read_skill / list_skills: 85 playbooks (WP/PHP 0-day, AD, " + "  malware, mobile, cloud, etc.).\\n" + "- read_playbook / read_tool_manual / list_manuals: 270 tool manuals + engagement " + "  playbooks.\\n" + "- detect_waf / tech_correlation / cve_correlation / port_correlation: signature " + "  + correlation intelligence.\\n" + "- nvd_lookup / fofa_search: CVE + asset reconnaissance (FOFA needs env creds).\\n" + "- remember / memory_lookup / memory_list: persist + recall verified knowledge.\\n\\n" + "IRON RULES:\\n" + "- Scope first; authorized targets only. Refuse out-of-scope or destructive/DoS work.\\n" + "- A hit is a hypothesis; a verified exploit (or proven data-flow) is the finding.\\n" + "- Prefer the one-call run_engagement path; fall back to granular tools when you " + "  need finer control."
   });
   server.registerTool("blitz_scan", {
     title: "BLITZ scan",
@@ -50272,55 +50480,67 @@ function createServer() {
   });
   server.registerTool("strike_verify", {
     title: "STRIKE live verification",
-    description: "STRIKE: live HTTP verification with marker + negative control. A hit is a HYPOTHESIS until the marker reflects.",
+    description: "STRIKE: live HTTP verification with marker + negative control + baseline. Verdict: confirmed (marker reflected, control NOT) / false_positive (both reflected) / unconfirmed (marker not reflected) / blocked. Returns redacted SHA-256-tagged evidence. " + "USE WHEN: you have a hypothesis and need to prove (or refute) it live. " + "NEXT: feed the verdict to strike_resolve to advance the finding's lifecycle.",
     inputSchema: {
       url: string2().describe("Target URL"),
       method: _enum(["GET", "POST"]).optional().describe("HTTP method"),
-      data: string2().optional().describe("POST body (urlencoded)"),
+      data: string2().optional().describe("POST body template; a literal {{MARKER}} is replaced"),
       headers: string2().optional().describe("JSON object of extra headers"),
-      marker: string2().optional().describe("String that must appear in the response to confirm"),
+      marker: string2().optional().describe("Unique string the payload should reflect (defaults to a random token)"),
+      control: string2().optional().describe("Benign lookalike for the negative control (defaults to a random token)"),
+      param: string2().optional().describe("Query/body param name to inject into (default 'q')"),
       timeout: number2().int().optional().describe("Timeout seconds (default 15)")
     }
-  }, async ({ url, method, data, headers, marker, timeout }) => {
-    const controller = new AbortController;
-    const t = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), (timeout ?? 15) * 1000);
+  }, async ({ url, method, data, headers, marker, control, param, timeout }) => {
     let hdrs = {};
     try {
       hdrs = headers ? JSON.parse(headers) : {};
     } catch {}
+    const verdict = await strikeVerify({
+      url,
+      method: method ?? "GET",
+      data,
+      headers: hdrs,
+      marker,
+      control,
+      param,
+      timeout: timeout ? timeout * 1000 : undefined
+    });
+    return {
+      content: [{
+        type: "text",
+        text: JSON.stringify({
+          ...verdict,
+          next_steps: [
+            `Verdict: ${verdict.status} — ${verdict.reason}`,
+            verdict.status === "confirmed" ? "Confirmed. Attach to the finding with strike_resolve, then record evidence (finding_create already carried SHA-256 artifacts)." : verdict.status === "false_positive" ? "False positive. Reject the finding via strike_resolve to close it out." : "Not confirmed. Refine the payload or trace reachability (taint_file / eagle_eye) before re-validating."
+          ]
+        })
+      }]
+    };
+  });
+  server.registerTool("strike_resolve", {
+    title: "Resolve a finding from a STRIKE verdict",
+    description: "STRIKE+FINDINGS: take a canonical Finding and a STRIKE verdict, and advance the lifecycle end-to-end — hypothesis->validating->confirmed (marker reflected, control inert) or ->false_positive/blocked/unconfirmed. Returns the updated finding with evidence + recomputed confidence.",
+    inputSchema: {
+      finding: string2().describe("JSON of the canonical Finding object (from finding_create)"),
+      verdict: string2().describe("JSON of the STRIKE verdict (from strike_verify)")
+    }
+  }, async ({ finding, verdict }) => {
+    let f;
+    let v;
     try {
-      const res = await fetch(url, {
-        method: method ?? "GET",
-        body: method === "POST" ? data : undefined,
-        headers: { "User-Agent": "blitzstrike/1.0", ...hdrs },
-        signal: controller.signal,
-        redirect: "follow"
-      });
-      const body = await res.text();
-      const reflected = marker ? body.includes(marker) : true;
-      return {
-        content: [
-          {
-            type: "text",
-            text: JSON.stringify({
-              url,
-              status: res.status,
-              marker,
-              marker_reflected: reflected,
-              body_preview: body.slice(0, 800)
-            })
-          }
-        ]
-      };
-    } catch (e) {
-      return {
-        content: [
-          { type: "text", text: JSON.stringify({ url, error: String(e) }) }
-        ]
-      };
-    } finally {
-      clearTimeout(t);
+      f = JSON.parse(finding);
+    } catch {
+      return { content: [{ type: "text", text: JSON.stringify({ error: "invalid finding JSON" }) }] };
+    }
+    try {
+      v = JSON.parse(verdict);
+    } catch {
+      return { content: [{ type: "text", text: JSON.stringify({ error: "invalid verdict JSON" }) }] };
     }
+    const updated = resolveFinding(f, v);
+    return { content: [{ type: "text", text: JSON.stringify(updated) }] };
   });
   server.registerTool("scope_check", {
     title: "STRIKE scope enforcement",
@@ -50509,6 +50729,13 @@ function createServer() {
   }, async () => {
     return { content: [{ type: "text", text: JSON.stringify(listMemory()) }] };
   });
+  server.registerTool("memory_forget", {
+    title: "Forget a memory entry",
+    description: "MEMORY: remove a memory entry by id (append-only store; 'forget' = tombstone).",
+    inputSchema: { id: string2().describe("Memory entry id (from memory_list)") }
+  }, async ({ id }) => {
+    return { content: [{ type: "text", text: JSON.stringify(forget(id)) }] };
+  });
   server.registerTool("read_tool_manual", {
     title: "Read a tool manual",
     description: "Read the full deep reference manual for a security tool (270+ manuals from kali-pentest, Apache-2.0).",
@@ -50692,6 +50919,44 @@ function createServer() {
     const score = computeConfidence(factors);
     return { content: [{ type: "text", text: JSON.stringify({ score, level: confidenceLevel(score) }) }] };
   });
+  server.registerTool("confidence_weights", {
+    title: "Get/set confidence weights",
+    description: "FINDINGS: inspect or override the deterministic confidence weights (configurable per the framework spec). Pass `set` (JSON object of weight overrides) to change them; omit to read the current weights.",
+    inputSchema: {
+      set: string2().optional().describe('JSON object of weight overrides (e.g. {"data_flow":0.3})')
+    }
+  }, async ({ set }) => {
+    if (set) {
+      let w;
+      try {
+        w = JSON.parse(set);
+      } catch {
+        return { content: [{ type: "text", text: JSON.stringify({ error: "invalid JSON" }) }] };
+      }
+      setConfidenceWeights(w);
+    }
+    return { content: [{ type: "text", text: JSON.stringify({ weights: getConfidenceWeights() }) }] };
+  });
+  server.registerTool("finding_attach_evidence", {
+    title: "Attach evidence to a finding",
+    description: "FINDINGS: attach a redacted, SHA-256-tagged evidence record to an existing canonical finding (without advancing its lifecycle).",
+    inputSchema: {
+      finding: string2().describe("JSON of the Finding object"),
+      type: string2().describe("Evidence type (source_location/response/validation_result/negative_control/...)"),
+      description: string2().describe("Evidence description"),
+      content: string2().optional().describe("Evidence artifact content")
+    }
+  }, async ({ finding, type, description, content }) => {
+    let f;
+    try {
+      f = JSON.parse(finding);
+    } catch {
+      return { content: [{ type: "text", text: JSON.stringify({ error: "invalid finding JSON" }) }] };
+    }
+    const ev = makeEvidence({ type, description, artifacts: content ? [{ name: "artifact", kind: "evidence", content }] : [] });
+    const updated = attachEvidence(f, ev);
+    return { content: [{ type: "text", text: JSON.stringify(updated) }] };
+  });
   server.registerTool("redact", {
     title: "Redact secrets from text",
     description: "EVIDENCE: redact passwords/API keys/tokens/cookies/private keys from text before persisting evidence or reporting.",
@@ -50828,7 +51093,7 @@ async function serve() {
 }
 
 // src/cli.ts
-import { readFileSync as readFileSync9, existsSync as existsSync6, writeFileSync, mkdirSync as mkdirSync2 } from "node:fs";
+import { readFileSync as readFileSync9, existsSync as existsSync5, writeFileSync, mkdirSync as mkdirSync2 } from "node:fs";
 import { join as join7, dirname } from "node:path";
 import { homedir as homedir3 } from "node:os";
 import { fileURLToPath as fileURLToPath5 } from "node:url";
@@ -50868,7 +51133,7 @@ function runDoctor() {
     detail: fofa ? "set" : "FOFA_EMAIL/FOFA_KEY not set",
     fix: fofa ? undefined : "export FOFA_EMAIL=... && export FOFA_KEY=... (enables fofa_search)"
   });
-  const dataOk = existsSync6(join7(ROOT4, "chains.json")) && existsSync6(join7(ROOT4, "tools-catalog.json"));
+  const dataOk = existsSync5(join7(ROOT4, "chains.json")) && existsSync5(join7(ROOT4, "tools-catalog.json"));
   issues.push({
     name: "Data layers (chains + tools-catalog)",
     status: dataOk ? "ok" : "fail",
@@ -50897,14 +51162,14 @@ function resolveCommand() {
   if (which("blitzstrike"))
     return { command: "blitzstrike", args: ["serve", "--mcp"] };
   const src = join7(ROOT4, "src", "index.ts");
-  if (which("bun") && existsSync6(src))
+  if (which("bun") && existsSync5(src))
     return { command: "bun", args: ["run", src, "serve", "--mcp"] };
   if (which("npx"))
     return { command: "npx", args: ["-y", "blitzstrike", "serve", "--mcp"] };
   if (which("bunx"))
     return { command: "bunx", args: ["blitzstrike", "serve", "--mcp"] };
   const dist = join7(ROOT4, "dist", "index.js");
-  if (existsSync6(dist))
+  if (existsSync5(dist))
     return { command: "bun", args: [dist, "serve", "--mcp"] };
   return { command: "npx", args: ["-y", "blitzstrike", "serve", "--mcp"] };
 }
@@ -50918,7 +51183,7 @@ function readJson(p) {
 function jsonMcpServersWrite(p) {
   return (command, args) => {
     const dir = dirname(p);
-    if (!existsSync6(dir))
+    if (!existsSync5(dir))
       mkdirSync2(dir, { recursive: true });
     const existing = readJson(p) ?? {};
     existing.mcpServers = {
@@ -50931,7 +51196,7 @@ function jsonMcpServersWrite(p) {
 function opencodeWrite(p) {
   return (_command, _args) => {
     const dir = dirname(p);
-    if (!existsSync6(dir))
+    if (!existsSync5(dir))
       mkdirSync2(dir, { recursive: true });
     const existing = readJson(p) ?? {};
     existing.mcp = {
@@ -50945,14 +51210,14 @@ function opencodeWrite(p) {
 function copyOpenCodeAgents() {
   const srcDir = join7(ROOT4, "opencode-agents");
   const dstDir = join7(homedir3(), ".config", "opencode", "agents");
-  if (!existsSync6(srcDir))
+  if (!existsSync5(srcDir))
     return;
-  if (!existsSync6(dstDir))
+  if (!existsSync5(dstDir))
     mkdirSync2(dstDir, { recursive: true });
   for (const f of ["Blitz Strike.md", "Blitz.md", "Eagle Eye.md", "Strike.md"]) {
     const src = join7(srcDir, f);
     const dst = join7(dstDir, f);
-    if (existsSync6(src)) {
+    if (existsSync5(src)) {
       writeFileSync(dst, readFileSync9(src, "utf8"));
     }
   }
@@ -50960,9 +51225,9 @@ function copyOpenCodeAgents() {
 function codexWrite(p) {
   return (command, args) => {
     const dir = dirname(p);
-    if (!existsSync6(dir))
+    if (!existsSync5(dir))
       mkdirSync2(dir, { recursive: true });
-    let existing = existsSync6(p) ? readFileSync9(p, "utf8") : "";
+    let existing = existsSync5(p) ? readFileSync9(p, "utf8") : "";
     if (!existing.trimEnd().endsWith(`
 `))
       existing += `
@@ -50979,9 +51244,9 @@ args = ${JSON.stringify(args)}
 function hermesWrite(p) {
   return (command, args) => {
     const dir = dirname(p);
-    if (!existsSync6(dir))
+    if (!existsSync5(dir))
       mkdirSync2(dir, { recursive: true });
-    let existing = existsSync6(p) ? readFileSync9(p, "utf8") : "";
+    let existing = existsSync5(p) ? readFileSync9(p, "utf8") : "";
     existing = existing.replace(/^  blitzstrike:\n(?:    .*\n?)*/m, "");
     if (!existing.trimEnd().endsWith(`
 `))
@@ -51012,70 +51277,70 @@ function detectAgents() {
   agents.push({
     name: "Claude Code",
     detectPath: claudeJson,
-    installed: () => existsSync6(claudeJson) || which("claude"),
+    installed: () => existsSync5(claudeJson) || which("claude"),
     write: jsonMcpServersWrite(claudeJson)
   });
   const claudeDesktop = join7(home, ".config", "Claude", "claude_desktop_config.json");
   agents.push({
     name: "Claude Desktop",
     detectPath: claudeDesktop,
-    installed: () => existsSync6(claudeDesktop),
+    installed: () => existsSync5(claudeDesktop),
     write: jsonMcpServersWrite(claudeDesktop)
   });
   const cursor = join7(home, ".cursor", "mcp.json");
   agents.push({
     name: "Cursor",
     detectPath: cursor,
-    installed: () => existsSync6(join7(home, ".cursor")) || which("cursor"),
+    installed: () => existsSync5(join7(home, ".cursor")) || which("cursor"),
     write: jsonMcpServersWrite(cursor)
   });
   const opencode = join7(home, ".config", "opencode", "opencode.jsonc");
   agents.push({
     name: "OpenCode",
     detectPath: opencode,
-    installed: () => existsSync6(join7(home, ".config", "opencode")) || which("opencode"),
+    installed: () => existsSync5(join7(home, ".config", "opencode")) || which("opencode"),
     write: opencodeWrite(opencode)
   });
   const codex = join7(home, ".codex", "config.toml");
   agents.push({
     name: "Codex",
     detectPath: codex,
-    installed: () => existsSync6(join7(home, ".codex")) || which("codex"),
+    installed: () => existsSync5(join7(home, ".codex")) || which("codex"),
     write: codexWrite(codex)
   });
   const hermes = join7(home, ".hermes", "config.yaml");
   agents.push({
     name: "Hermes",
     detectPath: hermes,
-    installed: () => existsSync6(join7(home, ".hermes")) || which("hermes"),
+    installed: () => existsSync5(join7(home, ".hermes")) || which("hermes"),
     write: hermesWrite(hermes)
   });
   const gemini = join7(home, ".gemini", "settings.json");
   agents.push({
     name: "Gemini CLI",
     detectPath: gemini,
-    installed: () => existsSync6(join7(home, ".gemini")) || which("gemini"),
+    installed: () => existsSync5(join7(home, ".gemini")) || which("gemini"),
     write: jsonMcpServersWrite(gemini)
   });
   const windsurf = join7(home, ".codeium", "windsurf", "mcp_config.json");
   agents.push({
     name: "Windsurf",
     detectPath: windsurf,
-    installed: () => existsSync6(join7(home, ".codeium")) || which("windsurf"),
+    installed: () => existsSync5(join7(home, ".codeium")) || which("windsurf"),
     write: jsonMcpServersWrite(windsurf)
   });
   const copilot = join7(home, ".copilot", "mcp.json");
   agents.push({
     name: "Copilot",
     detectPath: copilot,
-    installed: () => existsSync6(join7(home, ".copilot")),
+    installed: () => existsSync5(join7(home, ".copilot")),
     write: jsonMcpServersWrite(copilot)
   });
   const cline = join7(home, ".cline", "mcp_settings.json");
   agents.push({
     name: "Cline",
     detectPath: cline,
-    installed: () => existsSync6(join7(home, ".cline")),
+    installed: () => existsSync5(join7(home, ".cline")),
     write: jsonMcpServersWrite(cline)
   });
   return agents;
@@ -51119,14 +51384,14 @@ Registered with ${ok}/${installed.length} agent(s).`);
 }
 
 // src/index.ts
-import { readFileSync as readFileSync11, existsSync as existsSync8 } from "node:fs";
+import { readFileSync as readFileSync11, existsSync as existsSync6 } from "node:fs";
 import { join as join9 } from "node:path";
 import { fileURLToPath as fileURLToPath7 } from "node:url";
 var ROOT6 = join9(fileURLToPath7(new URL(".", import.meta.url)), "..");
 function readVersion() {
   try {
     const p = join9(ROOT6, "package.json");
-    if (existsSync8(p))
+    if (existsSync6(p))
       return JSON.parse(readFileSync11(p, "utf8")).version ?? "1.0.0";
   } catch {}
   return "1.0.0";

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "blitzstrike",
-  "version": "1.0.21",
+  "version": "1.0.23",
   "description": "Blitz Strike — a universal MCP security-audit toolbelt. BLITZ sweeps the attack surface, EAGLE-EYE traces source-to-sink, STRIKE verifies live. 57 attack chains, 130-tool catalog, intelligence data layer. One server, every agent.",
   "type": "module",
   "bin": {