billion-context 0.1.53-pr.239.81 → 0.1.53-pr.241.82

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package/README.md CHANGED
@@ -148,6 +148,23 @@ bili --no-auto-update # disable self-update for this run
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  Flags override env vars and the config file. `bili --help` lists them all.
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+ ### Remote agents (`--host`)
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+
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+ By default the proxy binds `127.0.0.1` and only accepts loopback
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+ connections. To serve agents on other machines, bind a non-loopback host:
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+
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+ ```bash
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+ bili --host 0.0.0.0 # all interfaces (or use your LAN IP)
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+ ```
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+
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+ - Remote agents point their model `baseURL` at `http://<this-host>:<port>/bili/…`.
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+ - MITM-mode `CONNECT` then also accepts remote clients — for **whitelisted
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+ model hosts only**. Blind tunnels to arbitrary hosts stay loopback-only, so
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+ the proxy can never be used as an open relay.
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+ - There is **no authentication**: only do this on a trusted LAN or behind a
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+ firewall. The `/__bili/` management endpoints remain loopback-only.
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+ - A startup `[security]` warning reminds you of the above.
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+
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  ### Debugging
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  Three ways to enable verbose logging (priority: flag > env > config):
package/README.zh-CN.md CHANGED
@@ -133,6 +133,21 @@ bili --no-auto-update # 本次启动禁用自动更新
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  参数优先级高于环境变量和配置文件。`bili --help` 列出全部。
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+ ### 远程 agent(`--host`)
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+
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+ 默认绑定 `127.0.0.1`,只接受本机连接。要给其他机器上的 agent 用,绑定非 loopback 地址:
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+
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+ ```bash
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+ bili --host 0.0.0.0 # 所有网卡(或直接用局域网 IP)
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+ ```
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+
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+ - 远程 agent 把模型 `baseURL` 指向 `http://<本机IP>:<端口>/bili/…`。
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+ - MITM 模式的 `CONNECT` 也会接受远程客户端 —— 但仅限**白名单内的模型域名**;
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+ 到任意主机的盲隧道仍仅限本机,代理不会沦为开放中继。
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+ - **没有任何鉴权**: 只应在可信局域网或防火墙内使用。`/__bili/` 管理
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+ 端点仍仅限本机访问。
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+ - 启动时的 `[security]` 警告会提醒上述事项。
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+
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  ### 调试
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  三种方式打开详细日志(优先级:参数 > 环境变量 > 配置):
package/dist/index.js CHANGED
@@ -50295,7 +50295,6 @@ async function* runCompressLoop(upstream, ctx, requestBody, requestOptions, adap
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  const calls = [];
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  let usage = {};
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  let finishReason;
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- let sawDone = false;
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  let suppressCompletion = false;
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  for await (const ev of adapter.parseStream(currentUpstream, round)) {
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  if (signal?.aborted) break;
@@ -50333,7 +50332,6 @@ async function* runCompressLoop(upstream, ctx, requestBody, requestOptions, adap
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  cachedTokens: ev.cachedTokens
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  };
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  } else if (ev.kind === "done") {
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- sawDone = true;
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  finishReason = ev.finishReason;
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  suppressCompletion = ev.suppressCompletion === true;
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  } else if (ev.kind === "meta") {
@@ -50455,15 +50453,6 @@ async function* runCompressLoop(upstream, ctx, requestBody, requestOptions, adap
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  }
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  const reRequest = proxyResults.length > 0 && realCalls === 0;
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  if (!reRequest) {
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- if (!sawDone) {
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- const partialText = assistantText.length;
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- const partialReasoning = assistantReasoning.length;
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- const msg = `upstream stream truncated (no completion event; round ${round}, ${partialText} text chars + ${partialReasoning} reasoning chars received)`;
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- ctx.log(`[acp-loop] round ${round}: ${msg}`);
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- log("error", `[acp-loop] ${msg}`);
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- yield adapter.emitError(msg);
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- return;
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- }
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  if (!suppressCompletion) {
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  yield adapter.emitCompletion({ finishReason, usage });
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  }
@@ -53228,17 +53217,23 @@ function isMitmHost(host, extraDomains = []) {
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  return all.some((d) => h === d || h.endsWith("." + d));
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  }
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  function setupMitm(server, extraDomains = [], log2 = () => {
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- }, resolveProxyUrl) {
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+ }, resolveProxyUrl, allowRemoteClients = false) {
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  ensureRootCA();
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  server.on("connect", (req, clientSocket, head) => {
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- if (!isLoopbackAddress(clientSocket.remoteAddress)) {
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- log2(`CONNECT ${req.url} rejected: non-loopback client ${clientSocket.remoteAddress}`);
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+ const remote = !isLoopbackAddress(clientSocket.remoteAddress);
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+ if (remote && !allowRemoteClients) {
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+ log2(`CONNECT ${req.url} rejected: non-loopback client ${clientSocket.remoteAddress} (bind a non-loopback --host to allow remote clients)`);
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  clientSocket.end("HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden\r\n\r\n");
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  return;
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  }
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  const { hostname, port } = parseHostPort(req.url ?? "");
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  const targetPort = port || 443;
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  if (!isMitmHost(hostname, extraDomains)) {
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+ if (remote) {
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+ log2(`CONNECT ${req.url} rejected: remote client ${clientSocket.remoteAddress} tunneling non-whitelisted host`);
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+ clientSocket.end("HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden\r\n\r\n");
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+ return;
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+ }
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  const proxyUrl = resolveProxyUrl?.(hostname);
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  tunnelThrough(clientSocket, hostname, targetPort, head, log2, proxyUrl);
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  return;
@@ -54158,10 +54153,12 @@ Content-Length: ${Buffer.byteLength(body)}\r
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  );
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  });
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  if (opts.mitm.enabled) {
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- setupMitm(server, opts.mitm.domains, (msg) => log2("info", msg), (host) => resolveProxy(opts.routes, opts.proxy, `https://${host}`, opts.proxyFallback));
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+ const allowRemoteConnect = opts.host === "0.0.0.0" || opts.host === "::" || !isLoopbackAddress(opts.host);
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+ setupMitm(server, opts.mitm.domains, (msg) => log2("info", msg), (host) => resolveProxy(opts.routes, opts.proxy, `https://${host}`, opts.proxyFallback), allowRemoteConnect);
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  }
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  server.listen(opts.port, opts.host, () => {
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- const displayHost = opts.host === "0.0.0.0" ? "localhost" : opts.host;
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+ const nonLoopbackBind = opts.host === "0.0.0.0" || opts.host === "::" || !isLoopbackAddress(opts.host);
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+ const displayHost = nonLoopbackBind ? opts.host : opts.host === "0.0.0.0" ? "localhost" : opts.host;
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  try {
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  fs6.mkdirSync(stateDir(), { recursive: true });
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  const originHost = opts.host === "0.0.0.0" || opts.host === "::" || opts.host === "localhost" ? "127.0.0.1" : opts.host.includes(":") && !opts.host.startsWith("[") ? `[${opts.host}]` : opts.host;
@@ -54174,6 +54171,12 @@ Content-Length: ${Buffer.byteLength(body)}\r
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  "info",
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  `acp-proxy listening on http://${displayHost}:${opts.port} \u2014 web UI: http://${displayHost}:${opts.port}/__bili/ \u2014 zero-config: prefix any baseURL with http://${displayHost}:${opts.port}/bili/` + (nOverrides ? ` \u2014 context overrides for ${nOverrides} upstream URL(s)` : "") + (opts.mitm.enabled ? ` \u2014 MITM proxy on (whitelist)${opts.mitm.domains.length ? ` +${opts.mitm.domains.join(",")}` : ""}` : "")
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  );
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+ if (nonLoopbackBind) {
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+ log2(
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+ "warn",
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+ `[security] bound to ${opts.host} \u2014 proxy endpoints (/bili/, CONNECT for whitelisted model hosts) are reachable from the network with NO authentication; /__bili/ management endpoints stay loopback-only. Restrict access with a firewall on untrusted networks. Remote agents: point baseURL at http://<this-host>:${opts.port}/bili/`
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+ );
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+ }
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  if (opts.debug) {
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  log2("info", `[debug] build features: raw-HTTP-capture(on) | remote_compaction_v2-strip(on) | cert-MITM-launcher(on) | strip-acp-summary(on) \u2014 seeing this line confirms the launcher build (not registry 0.1.34)`);
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  }